Fairness in hazmat routing-scheduling: a bi-objective Stackelberg game

Mohri, S., Asgari, N., Farahini, R. Z., Bourlakis, M. and Laker, B. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0850-9744 (2020) Fairness in hazmat routing-scheduling: a bi-objective Stackelberg game. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 140. 102006. ISSN 1366-5545 doi: 10.1016/j.tre.2020.102006

Abstract/Summary

We investigate a hazmat routing-scheduling problem. To minimize the overall expected risk, various vehicles may take different routes/schedules to avoid multiple accidents on the same link. Therefore, the company envisages two issues: (1) unfairly, a vehicle departing earlier from its origin may arrive earlier at its destination than the others leaving later; (2) focusing only on the minimization of risk may increase travel time/cost incurred by the company. We suggest a bi-objective game-theoretic formulation and solve it by a modified Adaptive Large Neighborhood Search and Simulated Annealing. We test the solution on a real-life case and extract practical insights.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/91125
Identification Number/DOI	10.1016/j.tre.2020.102006
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Henley Business School > Leadership, Organisations, Behaviour and Reputation
Publisher	Elsevier
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