Semantic normativity and moral obligation

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Schroeder, S. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4480-6458 (2020) Semantic normativity and moral obligation. In: Gaffal, M. (ed.) Language, Truth and Democracy. Aporia. de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 79-88. ISBN 9783110697322 doi: 10.1515/9783110697360-006

Abstract/Summary

This chapter offers a brief sketch of the normativity of linguistic meaning and then considers the opposing view of semantic anti-normativism as defended by Gluer and Wickforss. The author distinguishes between three different types of obligation (moral obligation, socially enforced obligation, and freely adopted obligation) and argues that Gluer & Wickforss's position is based on a misconstrual of semantic normativity as a source of something like moral obligation, when in fact it produces only obligation of the third type.

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Item Type Book or Report Section
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/92738
Identification Number/DOI 10.1515/9783110697360-006
Refereed No
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher de Gruyter
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