Philosophical problems with the gender critical feminist argument against trans inclusion

Zanghellini, A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8997-4941 (2020) Philosophical problems with the gender critical feminist argument against trans inclusion. Sage Open, 10 (2). ISSN 2158-2440 doi: 10.1177/2158244020927029

Abstract/Summary

The Reform of the Gender Recognition Act: Government Consultation (2018) catalyzed a heated debate on transgender rights and trans inclusion in the United Kingdom. I start by explaining what the reforms to the U.K. system of gender recognition propose, why gender-critical feminists oppose them, and how other feminist academics have responded to their arguments. I then offer a more detailed philosophical critique of gender-critical trans-exclusionary feminist arguments. I argue that the gender-critical feminist case against trans women’s access to women-only (or sex-segregated, or single-sex) spaces suffers from a number of fallacies, and introduces modes of argument that are at odds with well-established and sound uses of practical reason. I try to make sense of these problems with gender-critical feminist thought by appealing to the idea of presupposed paranoid structuralism. I also argue that gender-critical feminists’ enthusiastic use of social media and allied online platforms may be implicated in generating some of these problems.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/90937
Identification Number/DOI	10.1177/2158244020927029
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
Publisher	Sage
Download/View statistics	View download statistics for this item