Civil conflict and agenda-setting speed in the United Nations Security Council

Binder, M. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9144-3979 and Golub, J. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2686-139X (2020) Civil conflict and agenda-setting speed in the United Nations Security Council. International Studies Quarterly, 64 (2). pp. 419-430. ISSN 1468-2478 doi: 10.1093/isq/sqaa017

Abstract/Summary

The UN Security Council (UNSC) can respond to a civil conflict only if that conflict first enters the Council’s agenda. Some conflicts reach the Council’s agenda within days after they start, others after years (or even decades), and some never make it. So far, only a few studies have looked at the crucial UNSC agenda-setting stage, and none have examined agenda-setting speed. To fill this important gap, we develop and test a novel theoretical framework that combines insights from realist and constructivist theory with lessons from institutionalist theory and bargaining theory. Applying survival analysis to an original dataset, we show that the parochial interests of the permanent (P-5) members matter, but they do not determine the Council’s agenda-setting speed. Rather, P-5 interests are constrained by normative considerations and concerns for the Council’s organizational mission arising from the severity of a conflict (in terms of spillover effects and civilian casualties); by the interests of the widely ignored elected members (E-10); and by the degree of preference heterogeneity both among the P-5 and the E-10. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of how the UN works, and they have implications for the UN’s legitimacy.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/89091
Identification Number/DOI	10.1093/isq/sqaa017
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
Publisher	Oxford University Press
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