The dizzying turn of epistemic contextualism

Grindrod, J. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8684-974X (2020) The dizzying turn of epistemic contextualism. Metaphilosophy, 51 (1). pp. 87-96. ISSN 1467-9973 doi: 10.1111/meta.12406

Abstract/Summary

The debate concerning epistemic contextualism represents a kind of linguistic turn in epistemology, where the focus has shifted from theorising about knowledge to theorising about knowledge attributions. Such a shift may well prove valuable, but only if we are clear on what the relationship is between a semantic analysis of knowledge attributions and a philosophical analysis of knowledge. One plausible approach is to claim that the semantic analysis entails and is entailed by the philosophical analysis. Yet this view - referred to here as the default view - has been explicitly adopted by few in the contextualism debate. This paper considers a form of argument in favour of the default view, and then considers the challenges that arise from either accepting or rejecting the default view.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/88334
Identification Number/DOI	10.1111/meta.12406
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher	Blackwell Publishing
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