Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience?

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Elson, L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3013-8030 (2019) Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience? Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 16 (3). pp. 259-267. ISSN 1559-3061 doi: 10.26556/jesp.v16i3.508

Abstract/Summary

In his defence of an error theory for normative judgements, Bart Streumer presents a new 'reduction' argument against nonreductive normative realism. Streumer claims that unlike previous versions, his 'simple moral theory' version of the argument doesn’t rely on the supervenience of the normative on the descriptive. But this is incorrect; without supervenience the argument does not succeed.

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Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/82679
Identification Number/DOI	10.26556/jesp.v16i3.508
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher	University of Southern California
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Date Deposited:	12 Mar 2019 13:16	Date item deposited into CentAUR
Last Modified:	23 Mar 2025 02:19	Date item last modified

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