Social capital and equilibrium selection in Stag Hunt games

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Bosworth, S. J. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8978-9516 (2013) Social capital and equilibrium selection in Stag Hunt games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39. pp. 11-20. ISSN 0167-4870 doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.06.004

Abstract/Summary

Surveys of trusting attitudes are found to correlate with growth and development outcomes. The question of why trust attitudes correlate with economic growth remains open however. I argue that trust surveys capture facets of social capital not previously investigated, namely, coordination. Hence a complete investigation of the relationship between trust attitudes in growth must encompass their predictive power in a coordination game. This study shows that affirmative responses to surveys of trust attitudes correlate with and predict efficiency-supporting behavior in a Stag Hunt game.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/72602
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.joep.2013.06.004
Refereed Yes
Divisions No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Publisher Elsevier
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