A partial defence of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions: a reply to Molyneux

Andow, J. (2017) A partial defence of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions: a reply to Molyneux. Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2). pp. 183-195. ISSN 1467-9973 doi: 10.1111/meta.12225

Abstract/Summary

Bernard Molyneux presents some new arguments against descriptive evidentialism about intuitions. Descriptive evidentialism is the thesis that philosophers use intuitions as evidence. Molyneux's arguments are that: (1) the propositions that intuition putatively supports are treated as having a degree and kind of certainty and justification that they could not have got from being intuited; (2) intuitions influence us in ways we cannot explain by supposing we treat them as evidence; and (3) certain strong intuitions that persuade us of their contents are treated as inadmissible in the context of justification. This article presents a partial defence of descriptive evidentialism against these new arguments.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/69024
Identification Number/DOI	10.1111/meta.12225
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher	Blackwell Publishing
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