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Borderline cases and the collapsing principle

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Elson, L. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3013-8030 (2014) Borderline cases and the collapsing principle. Utilitas, 26 (1). pp. 51-60. ISSN 1741-6183 doi: 10.1017/S095382081300023X

Abstract/Summary

John Broome has argued that value incommensurability is vagueness, by appeal to a controversial ‘collapsing principle’ about comparative indeterminacy. I offer a new counterexample to the collapsing principle. That principle allows us to derive an outright contradiction from the claim that some object is a borderline case of some predicate. But if there are no borderline cases, then the principle is empty. The collapsing principle is either false or empty.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/39644
Identification Number/DOI 10.1017/S095382081300023X
Refereed Yes
Divisions No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Uncontrolled Keywords incommensurability
Publisher Cambridge University Press
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