Terrorism and electoral accountability: one strike, you're out!

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Gassebner, M., Jong-A-Pin, R. and Mierau, J. O. (2008) Terrorism and electoral accountability: one strike, you're out! Economics Letters, 100 (1). pp. 126-129. ISSN 0165-1765 doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.011

Abstract/Summary

We examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability. We find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent government is replaced. The magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/35209
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.011
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher Elsevier
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