Terrorism and cabinet duration

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Gassebner, M., Jong-A-Pin, R. and Mierau, J. O. (2011) Terrorism and cabinet duration. International Economic Review, 52 (4). pp. 1253-1270. ISSN 0020-6598 doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x

Abstract/Summary

Terrorism can strengthen or weaken electoral support for ruling governments. We show in a simple model of coalition formation that, regardless of the direction of a public opinion shock, the impact of terrorism on cabinet duration is ambiguous. However, in an analysis of a data set including 2,400 cabinets in over 150 countries in the period 1970–2002, we find that terrorism, on average, shortens cabinet duration. This result is robust for a range of alternative terror measures and is present in both democratic as well as autocratic political regimes.

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Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/34880
Identification Number/DOI	10.1111/j.1468-2354.2011.00666.x
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	No Reading authors. Back catalogue items Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher	Wiley
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Date Deposited:	25 Oct 2013 13:17	Date item deposited into CentAUR
Last Modified:	05 Jan 2025 05:26	Date item last modified

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