An experiment on subjective game valuations

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Garcia-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Gil-Molto, M. J. and Orts-Rios, V. (2006) An experiment on subjective game valuations. Economics Bulletin, 3. pp. 1-6. ISSN 1545-2921

Abstract/Summary

We report experimental results on a prisoners' dilemma implemented in a way which allows us to elicit incentive−compatible valuations of the game. We test the hypothesis that players' valuations coincide with their Nash equilibrium earnings. Our results offer significantly less support for this hypothesis than for the prediction of Dominant Strategy (DS) play.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/34820
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
Publisher	AccessEcon
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Date Deposited:	22 Nov 2013 15:18	Date item deposited into CentAUR
Last Modified:	09 Jun 2024 04:49	Date item last modified

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