Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort

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García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A. (2008) Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort. Economics Letters, 98 (1). pp. 78-83. ISSN 01651765 doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.009

Abstract/Summary

We report experimental results on ultimatum salary bargaining with a real task performed by employee subjects. Compared to the baseline treatment with a hypothetical task, the introduction of a real task raises offers, accepted wages and rejection rates.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/34780
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.009
Refereed Yes
Divisions Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
Publisher Elsevier
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