How do markets manage water resources? An experiment

García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Hernán-González, R. and Kujal, P. (2012) How do markets manage water resources? An experiment. Environmental and Resource Economics, 53 (1). pp. 1-23. ISSN 1573-1502 doi: 10.1007/s10640-012-9545-7

Abstract/Summary

We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/34670
Identification Number/DOI	10.1007/s10640-012-9545-7
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	No Reading authors. Back catalogue items Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
Uncontrolled Keywords	Resource overexploitation; Public utility; Private monopoly; Duopoly; Water quality; Experiments; Experimental economics; Design
Publisher	Springer
Publisher Statement	The final publication is available at link.springer.com
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