Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudes

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García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A. (2012) Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83 (1). pp. 42-49. ISSN 0167-2681 doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.012

Abstract/Summary

We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee-employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects' risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/34669
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.012
Refereed Yes
Divisions No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
Uncontrolled Keywords Gender differences; Ultimatum game; Risk attitudes Prisoners-dilemma game; Financial decision-making; Public-goods; behaviour; Sex; Women; Cooperation; Fairness; Men
Publisher Elsevier
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