Attention, visual consciousness and indeterminacy

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Stazicker, J. (2011) Attention, visual consciousness and indeterminacy. Mind and Language, 26 (2). pp. 156-184. ISSN 1468-0017 doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01414.x

Abstract/Summary

I propose a new argument showing that conscious vision sometimes depends constitutively on conscious attention. I criticise traditional arguments for this constitutive connection, on the basis that they fail adequately to dissociate evidence about visual consciousness from evidence about attention. On the same basis, I criticise Ned Block's recent counterargument that conscious vision is independent of one sort of attention (‘cognitive access'). Block appears to achieve the dissociation only because he underestimates the indeterminacy of visual consciousness. I then appeal to empirical work on the interaction between visual indeterminacy and attention, to argue for the constitutive connection.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/28674
Identification Number/DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01414.x
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher Wiley-Blackwell
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