Asymmetric oligopoly and foreign direct investment: implications for host-country tax-setting

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Porter, L. A. (2012) Asymmetric oligopoly and foreign direct investment: implications for host-country tax-setting. International Economic Journal, 26 (2). pp. 229-246. ISSN 1743-517X doi: 10.1080/10168737.2011.552515

Abstract/Summary

We present a duopoly model with heterogeneous firms that vary in cost-efficiency, each of which can choose to serve a foreign market by either exporting or local production. We do so to analyse the effects of a host-country corporate profit tax on both the scale and composition of FDI, and find that: strategic interaction between oligopolistic firms provides for a pattern of FDI that favours cost-inefficiency to the detriment of host-country welfare; and the host-country tax rate can be optimally used to avoid such patterns of FDI and instead promote direct investment by a relatively cost-efficient firm.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/26380
Identification Number/DOI 10.1080/10168737.2011.552515
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Uncontrolled Keywords Firm heterogeneity; oligopoly; trade; FDI; taxation
Publisher Taylor & Francis Ltd
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