'The Elements' and Hobbesian moral thinking

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Cromartie, A. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-9558-8081 (2011) 'The Elements' and Hobbesian moral thinking. History of Political Thought, 32 (1). pp. 21-47. ISSN 0143-781X

Abstract/Summary

It is easy to read Hobbes's moral thinking as a deviant contribution to 'modern' natural law, especially if Leviathan (1651) is read through a lens provided by De Cive (1642). But The Elements of Law (1640) encourages the view that Hobbes's argument is 'physicalist', that is, that it requires no premises beyond those required by his physics of matter in motion. The Elements included a draft De Homine and its argument is intimately connected with De Cive's; it shows how such concepts as 'reason', 'right', 'natural law' and 'obligation' can be understood in physicalist terms. But Hobbes's decision to print the latter work in isolation has led to serious misunderstandings

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/19707
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > Early Modern Research Centre (EMRC)
Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
Uncontrolled Keywords Elements of Law; Hobbes; De Cive; De Homine; Leviathan; natural law; obligation; moral; sense; sovereignty; right; reason; supposition; Grotius; Tuck; God; virtue; Pufendorf; optics
Publisher Imprint Academic
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