Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance

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Bach, C. W. and Perea, A. (2021) Incomplete information and iterated strict dominance. Oxford Economic Papers, 73 (2). pp. 820-836. ISSN 1464-3812 doi: 10.1093/oep/gpz075

Abstract/Summary

The solution concept of iterated strict dominance for static games with complete information recursively deletes choices that are inferior. Here, we devise such an algorithm for the more general case of incomplete information. The ensuing solution concept of generalized iterated strict dominance is characterized in terms of common belief in rationality as well as in terms of best response sets. Besides, we provide doxastic conditions that are necessary and sufficient for modelling complete information from a one-person perspective.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/118765
Identification Number/DOI 10.1093/oep/gpz075
Refereed Yes
Divisions No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher Oxford University Press
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