Utility proportional beliefs

Full text not archived in this repository.

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Bach, C. W. and Perea, A. (2014) Utility proportional beliefs. International Journal of Game Theory, 43 (4). pp. 881-902. ISSN 1432-1270 doi: 10.1007/s00182-013-0409-3

Abstract/Summary

In game theory, basic solution concepts often conflict with experimental findings or intuitive reasoning. This fact is possibly due to the requirement that zero probability is assigned to irrational choices in these concepts. Here, we introduce the epistemic notion of common belief in utility proportional beliefs which also attributes positive probability to irrational choices, restricted however by the natural postulate that the probabilities should be proportional to the utilities the respective choices generate. Besides, we propose a procedural characterization of our epistemic concept. With regards to experimental findings common belief in utility proportional beliefs fares well in explaining observed behavior.

Altmetric Badge

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/118750
Identification Number/DOI 10.1007/s00182-013-0409-3
Refereed Yes
Divisions No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher Springer
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Search Google Scholar