Why is there no doctrine of frustration in the law of trusts?

[thumbnail of Article - Frustration of trusts.pdf]
Preview
Text - Accepted Version
· Please see our End User Agreement before downloading.
| Preview

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Wilde, D. (2024) Why is there no doctrine of frustration in the law of trusts? Trust Law International, 38 (1). pp. 12-23. ISSN 0962-2624

Abstract/Summary

Lord Millett, delivering one of the leading judgments in the House of Lords, said in Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley:1 ‘A trust does not fail merely because the settlor's purpose in creating it has been frustrated: the trust must become illegal or impossible to perform. The settlor's motives must not be confused with the purpose of the trust; the frustration of the former does not by itself cause the failure of the latter.’ This seems to be a generally accepted statement of the law.2 Assuming it to be correct, the question then arises, ‘Why is there no doctrine of frustration in the law of trusts as there is in the law of contract?’ This short article will seek to explore the issue. Such a question doubtless sounds doomed to be merely an exercise in idle academic curiosity. And perhaps it is. But the hesitant and speculative suggestion here is that there is possible scope for recognising a doctrine of frustration in the law of trusts.

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/116100
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
Publisher Bloomsbury Professional
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Search Google Scholar