The immaterial soul and the embodied human being: Descartes on mind and body

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Cottingham, J. (2023) The immaterial soul and the embodied human being: Descartes on mind and body. Think, 22 (63). pp. 7-13. ISSN 1755-1196 doi: 10.1017/S1477175622000276

Abstract/Summary

Descartes’s arguments in support of his claim that the mind is an immaterial substance are examined and found wanting. But despite the flaws in his dualistic view of the mind, Descartes has fascinating and important things to say about how much of human experience involves an ‘intermingling’ of mind and body. There are still philosophical lessons to be learnt from Descartes’s legacy.

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Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/111314
Identification Number/DOI	10.1017/S1477175622000276
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher	Th Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Date Deposited:	03 Apr 2023 10:51	Date item deposited into CentAUR
Last Modified:	23 Mar 2025 02:08	Date item last modified

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