Data brokers co-opetition

Gu, Y. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4594-4852, Madio, L. and Reggiani, C. (2022) Data brokers co-opetition. Oxford Economic Papers, 74 (3). pp. 820-839. ISSN 0030-7653 doi: 10.1093/oep/gpab042

Abstract/Summary

Data brokers share consumer data with rivals and, at the same time, compete with them for selling. We propose a ‘co-opetition’ game of data brokers and characterize their optimal strategies. When data are ‘sub-additive’ with the merged value net of the merging cost being lower than the sum of the values of individual datasets, data brokers are more likely to share their data and sell them jointly. When data are ‘super-additive’, with the merged value being greater than the sum of the individual datasets, competition emerges more often. Finally, data sharing is more likely when data brokers are more efficient at merging datasets than data buyers.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/108166
Identification Number/DOI	10.1093/oep/gpab042
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Henley Business School > Real Estate and Planning
Publisher	Oxford University Press
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