Why incitement to harm against those with different political opinions is constitutionally impermissible

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Bilchitz, D. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6195-675X (2019) Why incitement to harm against those with different political opinions is constitutionally impermissible. Journal of South African Law, 2019 (2). pp. 364-374. ISSN 0257-7747

Abstract/Summary

Is it acceptable in the course of a charged political meeting to incite harm to be committed against those who hold diametrically opposing views? This is a crucial question for the construction of a truly democratic society in South Africa. Democracies are indeed noisy and argumentative places: there are strongly felt disagreements that take place – yet, to enable an environment in which all individuals equally can express their views, it is necessary to ensure that individuals do not fear violent reprisals. It is thus legitimate for democratic societies to place legal limits on discourse that incites violence or other harm against those who hold differing views.

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/102769
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
Publisher Juta and Company (Pty) Ltd (Juta's Law Journals)
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