Game of regional environmental policy: Europe and US

Asproudis, E., Khan, N. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6911-9737 and Korac-Kakabadse, N. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9517-8279 (2019) Game of regional environmental policy: Europe and US. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, 19 (1). pp. 1-20. ISSN 1566-1679 doi: 10.1007/s10842-018-0274-7

Abstract/Summary

We analyse a different timing implementation of environmental regulation and compare the effects on the markets from a policy innovation perspective. The paper addresses the question: Should a regulator try to commit to a policy (ex-ante regulation) or rather adapt its policy to a firm's decisions (ex-post)? The findings are of interest towards improving regulatory effectiveness and economics efficiencies, e.g. for the transatlantic regional relationship between EU and USA. Our findings highlight differences in policy timing between markets may be harmful. The transatlantic regulators should consider the timing of the policy innovation for the achievement of mutual benefits.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/76165
Identification Number/DOI	10.1007/s10842-018-0274-7
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Henley Business School > Leadership, Organisations, Behaviour and Reputation
Publisher	Springer
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