Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions

Full text not archived in this repository.

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Enkelmann, S. and Leibrecht, M. (2013) Political expenditure cycles and election outcomes: Evidence from disaggregation of public expenditures by economic functions. Economics Letters, 121 (1). pp. 128-132. ISSN 0165-1765 doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015

Abstract/Summary

We analyze electorally motivated public spending using disaggregated expenditure data. Election cycles in total expenditures and in specific sub-categories mainly exist in newly democratized Eastern European countries. However, electorally motivated spending policies are ineffective means to enhance the re-election probability.

Altmetric Badge

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/67701
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.015
Refereed Yes
Divisions Henley Business School > International Business and Strategy
University of Reading Malaysia
Uncontrolled Keywords Political expenditure cycle; Political economy; Re-election probability; COFOG
Publisher Elsevier
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Search Google Scholar