Raz on rights: human rights, fundamental rights and balancing

Zanghellini, A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8997-4941 (2017) Raz on rights: human rights, fundamental rights and balancing. Ratio Juris, 30 (1). pp. 25-40. ISSN 1467-9337 doi: 10.1111/raju.12156

Abstract/Summary

After clarifying the outlines of Raz’s interest theory of rights and its relationship to aspects of the principles theory of rights, I consider how his recent observations on human rights fit (or fail to fit) into the interest theory. I then address two questions. First, I elaborate on Raz’s definition of morally fundamental rights, arguing that he is right in claiming that there are no such rights. I then show that the interest theory accommodates the notion that rights may take qualitative precedence over conflicting considerations – a question that has become increasingly relevant in light of recent writing on rights.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/45898
Identification Number/DOI	10.1111/raju.12156
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
Publisher	Wiley
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