Should philosophical reflection on ethics do without moral concepts?

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Hooker, B. (2022) Should philosophical reflection on ethics do without moral concepts? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16. ISSN 1572-8447 doi: 10.1007/s10677-022-10303-x

Abstract/Summary

Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of de-moralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what ‘de-moralizing’ means. Then the paper assesses Crisp’s argument for de-moralizing and puts forward arguments against de-moralizing.

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Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/106612
Identification Number/DOI	10.1007/s10677-022-10303-x
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher	Springer
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Date Deposited:	17 Aug 2022 08:37	Date item deposited into CentAUR
Last Modified:	10 Nov 2024 02:53	Date item last modified

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