On fixing international cricket matches

[thumbnail of cricket_fix.pdf]
Text - Accepted Version
· Restricted to Repository staff only
· The Copyright of this document has not been checked yet. This may affect its availability.
Restricted to Repository staff only

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Jewell, S. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4413-6618 and Reade, J. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8610-530X (2020) On fixing international cricket matches. The Journal of Gambling Business and Economics, 13 (2). pp. 37-82. ISSN 1751-8008 doi: 10.5750/jgbe.v13i2.1869

Abstract/Summary

Corruption is hidden action which distorts allocations of resources away from competitive outcomes. Hence the detection of such actions is both difficult yet important. In many economic contexts, agent actions are unobservable by principals and hence detection is difficult; sport offers a well-measured context in which individual actions are documented in great detail. In recent years the sport of cricket, which records a huge volume of statistics, has been beset by a number of corruption scandals surrounding the fixing of matches. We use 18 one day international (ODI) matches that are known to be fixed by one of the teams involved and analyse a wide range of observed statistics from all ODI matches since 1971, in order to determine whether corruption manifests itself in recorded outcomes. We find that corruption does affect a number of observed outcomes in anticipated ways, suggesting that both the increased reporting of statistics, and the statistical analysis of them may be a useful tool in detecting corruption.

Altmetric Badge

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/94932
Identification Number/DOI 10.5750/jgbe.v13i2.1869
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Search Google Scholar