Philosophical works as objects of aesthetic judgement

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De Gaynesford, M. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2715-6342 (1998) Philosophical works as objects of aesthetic judgement. Ratio, 11. pp. 1-13. ISSN 1467-9329 doi: 10.1111/1467-9329.00048

Abstract/Summary

This paper draws attention to the fact that works of philosophy are often judged by aesthetic criteria. This raises the question of whether philosophical writings may properly be regarded as suitable objects of aesthetic judgement in a strong sense; namely, that judging their worth qua works of philosophy is an aesthetic endeavour. The paper argues in the affirmative with the aid of a Kantian account of aesthetic judgement. Judging a work of philosophy by the means chosen may be regarded as subjecting it to criticism by criteria established within a philosophical aesthetic.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/93670
Identification Number/DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00048
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher Wiley
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