Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing

Metz, E. H. (2018) Reasons and oughts: an explanation and defence of deontic buck-passing. PhD thesis, University of Reading.

Abstract/Summary

This thesis is about what a normative reason is and how reasons relate to oughts. I argue that normative reasons are to be understood as relational properties of favouring or disfavouring. I then examine the question: What is the relation between reasons, so understood, and what we ought to do, believe, or feel? I argue that the relation is an explanatory one. We should explain what we ought to do in terms of reasons, and not the other way around. This view faces a number of difficulties, in particular in accounting for supererogatory acts and the distinction between an action being required and an action being recommended. The analysis that I provide explains how we can solve these problems. In providing such an analysis, this thesis aims to be a contribution to the discussion of how we might elucidate the structure of what is sometimes called normativity.

Item Type	Thesis (PhD)
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/83856
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
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