Rescuing failing banks for financial stability: the unintended outcomes of bail-in rules

Miglionico, A. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2114-6709 (2018) Rescuing failing banks for financial stability: the unintended outcomes of bail-in rules. International Company and Commercial Law Review, 29 (10). pp. 608-617.

Abstract/Summary

The regulatory architecture of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) introduced rules necessary to prevent financial instability and systemic risk contagion. However the restructuring tools for failing banks, namely bail-in, precautionary recapitalisation and resolving plans are largely flexible to allow Member States to adopt domestic policy measures to rescue distressed institutions. This leaves broad discretion to national competent authorities to provide public financial support, a legacy of the bail-out programmes that can undermine the new EU bank insolvency regime.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/83415
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
Publisher	Sweet & Maxwell
Publisher Statement	The attached full text is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in International Company and Commercial Law Review following peer review. The definitive published version, Andrea Miglionico, “Rescuing Failing Banks for Financial Stability: The Unintended Outcomes of Bail-in Rules” [2018] I.C.C.L.R. 608–617, is available online on Westlaw UK or from Thomson Reuters DocDel service.
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