Bank market competition and syndicated loan prices

Mi, B. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5063-8673 and Han, L. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2778-3338 (2020) Bank market competition and syndicated loan prices. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 54. pp. 1-28. ISSN 1573-7179 doi: 10.1007/s11156-018-0781-y

Abstract/Summary

This paper investigates the ‘price-concentration’ relationship in pricing syndicated loans. By measuring bank concentration at a state level in U.S, we show supporting evidence to market power hypothesis that syndicated loan prices are positively associated with the concentration of both borrower’s and lead arranger’s markets but not the concentration of participant lenders’ markets. We also show that loan prices are more sensitively to lead arranger’s market concentration than to borrower’s and a borrower could reduce loan costs by borrowing from a less concentrated bank market. In sharp contrast, loan prices are negatively associated with bank concentration if a loan syndication is led by an investment bank or non-bank financial institution. Our findings are robust to a variety of bank concentration measures and model specification.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/80881
Identification Number/DOI	10.1007/s11156-018-0781-y
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Henley Business School > Finance and Accounting
Publisher	Springer
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