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Schroeder, S. 
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4480-6458
(2018)
On some standard objections to mathematical conventionalism.
Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 30.
pp. 83-98.
ISSN 0353-3891
doi: 10.5937/BPA1730083S
Abstract/Summary
According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, that is, conventions, or implications of conventions. So his position can be regarded as a form of conventionalism. However, mathematical conventionalism is widely thought to be untenable due to objections presented by Quine, Dummett and Crispin Wright. It has also been argued that only an implausibly radical form of conventionalism could withstand the critical implications of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. In this article I discuss those objections to conventionalism and argue that none of them is convincing.
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| Item Type | Article |
| URI | https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/75539 |
| Identification Number/DOI | 10.5937/BPA1730083S |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Divisions | Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Publisher | Institute for Philosophy, University of Belgrade |
| Download/View statistics | View download statistics for this item |
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