Epistemic consequentialism, truth fairies and worse fairies

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Andow, J. (2017) Epistemic consequentialism, truth fairies and worse fairies. Philosophia, 45 (3). pp. 987-993. ISSN 1574-9274 doi: 10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0

Abstract/Summary

Direct Epistemic Consequentialism faces the Truth Fairy. Indirect Epistemic Consequentialism promises to avoid this issue. But there are worse fairies than the Truth Fairy. There is the Worse Fairy. The case of the Worse Fairy helps demonstrate that epistemic consequentialists who would solve problems like the Truth Fairy by ‘going indirect’ face a dilemma.

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Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/70002
Identification Number/DOI	10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher	Springer Verlag
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Date Deposited:	07 Apr 2017 11:15	Date item deposited into CentAUR
Last Modified:	09 Jun 2024 05:54	Date item last modified

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