Inter-gender interaction and communication in ultimatum games

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Georgantzis, N., Parasyri, D. and Tsagarakis, K. (2017) Inter-gender interaction and communication in ultimatum games. Applied Economics Letters, 24 (12). pp. 858-862. ISSN 1466-4291 doi: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1237725

Abstract/Summary

In this paper, we focus on bargaining within male–female pairs, the most pervasive partnership in humankind. We analyze data from an ultimatum game played by Greek subjects. Parallel to this, we introduce a one-way communication protocol according to which the responders can send short messages to the receivers, after making their decisions. The analysis shows that gender and message effects exist and that males are more effective bargainers.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/67055
Identification Number/DOI 10.1080/13504851.2016.1237725
Refereed Yes
Divisions Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
Publisher Taylor & Francis
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