



**INVESTIGATING THE INTERACTION BETWEEN
CORPORATE BUREAUCRACIES AND EMPLOYEES'
MORAL IDENTITIES IN EXPLAINING MORAL BEHAVIOUR**

BY

ADEYINKA A ADEWALE

MAY 2016

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Henley Business School

School of Leadership, Organisations and Behaviour

ABSTRACT

How CAN organisations make ‘good’ people do ‘bad’ things? This question has become more pertinent with rising cases of corporate scandals emphasising the importance of understanding the role of organisational context in behavioural ethics involving individuals and groups in organisational sociology. Few empirical studies exist in the literature that examines the role of context in workplace morality of employees and managers. This dissertation aims to develop this research on the role of context in morality, by offering an exploration of bureaucracy and its effects on employee morality drawing on two theories: Moral Identity Theory (Aquino and Reed, 2002) and Kohlberg’s (1961) Cognitive Moral Development (CMD).

My key findings suggest that a bureaucracy is not merely a cluster of related characteristics or general typology as it is often abstracted in the literature and relevant theory (e.g Weber, 1978). Instead, even within the characteristics of a common type, there are subtle differences. Six multinational pharmaceuticals paired into three matched case groups were investigated along two Weberian dimensions - Rules and Managerial Control from which four different hybrids of bureaucracies were discovered namely: *Traditional Bureaucracy* (a context of strict rule-based compliance and personalised managerial control); *Caste Bureaucracy* (a culturally charged rule-based bureaucracy that fosters a caste controlled structure); *Charismatic Bureaucracy* (a system of unwritten rules and personalised managerial control underpinned by the charisma of leaders) and *Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy* (a hierarchical structure without rules and managerial control supporting opportunism).

The effects of these hybrids on employee morality were found to be generally negative except the charismatic bureaucracy, which encouraged moral awareness in employees through the visible charisma of its leaders. Other hybrids typically encouraged a general pattern of inflated moral identity through rule compliance for instance that inspired an inflated sense of moral and professional competence in employees. By this, the bureaucracies were discovered to encourage conventional reasoning level (Kohlberg Stage 3) in individual employees such that conformity is the norm, to the detriment of individual critical moral inquiry - the vital component of ethics. Finally, all these helped the bureaucracies influence an overwhelming number of persons within them to become socialised in displaying loyalty to their organisations rather than to their professions, implying that the bureaucracies encouraged ‘expertise’ over ‘professionalism’ (Koehn, 2006). It was therefore concluded that for bureaucracies to empower employee morality, tacit means rather than explicit rule compliance methods must be employed.

DEDICATION

In loving memory of my late dad, John Adewale
You taught me to value diligence and to aspire for excellence in all my ways
Your ideals have moulded me into the man I have become
I am forever grateful to God for your life

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my profound gratitude to my supervisors Dr. Kleio Akrivou and Dr. Evelyn Fenton. Your insightful contributions, guidance, criticism, suggestions and ideas have shaped my work and made me a better student.

To every participant in my interviews without whom my research would not have been possible; Special thanks to Yemisi Bolade-Ogunfodun whose initial contact made my data collection process less burdensome, thank you all.

To my families in Reading – Africa Christian Fellowship, Reading University Bible Study, Reading University Nigerian Students’ Society and Christ Abundant Life Ministries, thank you all for making a home for me in Reading, for loving and supporting me throughout my journey. Your love has been incredible.

To my good friends; Tayo Odunsi and Ife Ajelabi, for their relentless support and encouragement. My Pastors – Mike and Celina Adeyemi for their countless prayers, words of admonition and parental love. Thank you.

To my family, thanks for showing me plenty of love, support and encouragement despite distance. You have all been marvellous. And to my sweetheart, my *bestie* and number one fan – Oluwabamike, you met me on this journey and you brought to me a lot of focus, stability and strength. You wrote with me and stood solidly behind me. You are a rare, priceless gem. I love you!

DECLARATION

I declare that this is my own work and the use of material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
DECLARATION	iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS	v
CHAPTER 1	1
1.0 Background	1
1.1 Introduction	2
1.2 Aim of the Study	4
1.3 Research Questions.....	5
1.4 Propositions.....	5
1.5 Study Design	6
1.6 Assumptions, Limitations and Scope	6
1.7 Breakdown of Dissertation Chapters.....	7
CHAPTER 2	10
2.0 Introduction.....	10
2.1 History of Bureaucracy: Applied 20 th Century Evolution of Bureaucracy in Business	10
2.2 Weber’s Ideal Type and Post Bureaucratic Organisations	13
2.3 The Morality of Bureaucracy	17
2.4 Summary of Studies on Bureaucratic Morality.....	22
2.5 Moral Impact of Weber’s Ideal Bureaucratic type	26
2.6 Conclusion.....	34
CHAPTER 3	35
3.0 Introduction.....	35
3.1 Theoretical Approaches in Descriptive Ethics	35
3.2 Kohlberg’s Cognitive Moral Development Theory.....	39
3.3 Moral Identity Theory	45
3.4 CMD and Moral Identity in Bureaucratic Contexts	51
3.5 Propositions.....	62
3.6 Conclusion	64
CHAPTER 4	66
4.0 Introduction.....	66
4.1 Aim of the Study	66
4.2 Research Context.....	66
4.3 Research Paradigm	67

4.4	Research Design	69
4.5	Propositions.....	74
4.6	Data Collection Tools.....	75
4.7	Participants.....	83
4.8	Interview Setting	89
4.9	Procedure	90
4.10	Data Analysis.....	90
4.11	Thematic Analysis.....	91
4.12	Generation of Themes and Sub-themes.....	95
4.13	Ethical Considerations	97
4.14	Trustworthiness.....	97
4.15	Potential Research Bias and Subjectivity	97
4.16	Reflecting on my cultural / personal proximity with the context.....	98
CHAPTER 5.....		103
5.0	Introduction.....	103
5.1	Research Context.....	103
5.2	A Culture of Corruption.....	104
5.3	The Nigerian Pharmaceutical Industry: Firm X's Scandal	107
5.4	Case Group 1 – American Firms	109
5.5	Case Group 2 – Indian Firms	113
5.6	Case Group 3 – Nigerian Firms	117
CHAPTER 6.....		121
6.0	Introduction.....	121
6.1	Formalised Rules - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)	121
6.2	Managerial Control.....	125
6.3	The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees' Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities	130
6.4	Proposition 1	134
6.5	Proposition 2	141
6.6	Proposition 3	147
6.7	Conclusion.....	151
CHAPTER 7.....		153
7.0	Introduction.....	153
7.1	Management Control	153
7.2	Formalised Rules.....	159
7.3	The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees' Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities	165

7.4	Proposition 1	167
7.5	Proposition 2	173
7.6	Proposition 3	178
7.7	Conclusion	185
CHAPTER 8		187
8.0	Introduction	187
8.1	Management Control	187
8.2	Formalization and Rules.....	196
8.3	The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees' Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities	200
8.4	Proposition 1	202
8.5	Proposition 2	210
8.6	Proposition 3	215
8.7	Conclusion	220
CHAPTER 9		223
9.0	Introduction	223
9.1	Interpretations of Bureaucracy	223
9.1.1	Traditional Bureaucracy	224
9.1.2	Caste Bureaucracy	228
9.1.3	Charismatic Bureaucracy	232
9.1.4	Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy	237
9.2	Discussion Theme 1: General pattern of “inflated” moral identities: A need to reflect on the potentially contaminating role of bureaucratic context over the construct/operational measure of moral identity in its literature.	245
9.3	Discussion Theme 2 – The CMR is a better predictor of morality	251
9.4	Discussion Theme 3 – Bureaucracies encourage expertise over professionalism.....	256
9.5	Theoretical Implications.....	260
9.6	Conclusion	266
CHAPTER 10.....		267
10.0	Introduction	267
10.1	Limitations	267
10.2	Practical Implications and Future research	268
10.3	Conclusion	274
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....		277
APPENDICES.....		306

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

Increasing interests in ethical decision making in organisations have been linked to repeated incidents of corporate scandals in recent history. The Enron saga tops the list, with others such as the Tyco scandal, HealthSouth's mismanagement and Parmalat's corruption shame also drawing considerable attention (Healy and Krishna, 2003; Chaubey, 2006). More recently, the Petrobras oil scandal in Brazil (Leahy, 2016), Volkswagen carbon emission scandal (Gates, Ewing, Russell and Watkins, 2016), Tesco's overstated profit (Ruddick, 2016) and the drug trials in France (BBC, 2016) have further highlighted the critical importance of understanding morality in the work place. The kind of people, usually senior executives, involved in these scandals raises further curiosity. For example, Anand, Ashforth & Joshi, (2004) in their study observed that most corporate acts of wrongdoing reported in corporations are perpetrated by individuals via senior and through middle management who are upstanding members of society, giving to charities, are caring parents and don't share the image of typical criminals.

More puzzling also is the finding of Elm and Nichols, (1993) that older individuals in management roles have been found to display lower moral judgement than younger, less experienced employees. This has since been confirmed by other studies like that of Trevino and Weaver, (2003). These findings are troublesome, since they demonstrate that management role holders may not be ethical role models in business organisations, which may also help raise concern with the kind of broader moral context in organisations and its effects for employee morality. Hence we can reasonably infer there are more forces at work beyond the individual, which has been supported by behavioural ethics theories (Weaver, 2006; Crane and Matten, 2010). This is further buttressed by empirical findings that confirm individual moral reasoning to be lower in work-related dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas (Weber, 1990; Elm & Nichols, 1993; Adewale, 2011).

All these findings emphasize the role of contextual elements in shaping the morality of workers and have led to the emergence of a growing literature on psychological

mechanisms that enable ethical behaviour in business roles (Harman, 2003; Doris, 1998). As such Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, (2006) in a comprehensive literature review of behavioural ethics in organisations suggested that subsequent research in this field should focus on the role contexts play in shaping the ethics of workers and the key contextual factors and variables which interact with moral identity. This study aims to contribute to knowledge in this regard.

1.1 Introduction

We understand from existing literature that the complex nature of ethical decision making in organisations is a function of the interaction between actors (individuals) and the organisation's environment (contextual factors) (Ford and Richardson, 1994; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005; Weaver, 2006; Trevino et al 2006; Verbeke, Ouwerkerk & Peelen, 1996). This interaction could evolve into a highly complex series of interdependent relationships depending on the nature of the contextual factors and dimensions of individuality studied in the process.

1.1.1 Bureaucratic Context

One very important contextual variable is an organisation's structure which Stephens and Lewin, (1992) identified could manifest in different forms particularly bureaucracies (Weber, 1948). Bureaucratic context has been specifically identified to causally impact ethics and morality in the workplace (Bauman, 1983, 1993, Verbeke et al, 1996; Ten Bos, 1997; Schein, 2004 Trevino et al, 2006; Weaver, 2006, Martin and Cullen, 2006; Parboteeah and Kapp, 2008; Chen et al, 2010). Despite well-documented evidence of this impact, bureaucracy has actually been exposed to limited empirical research in this regard, hence, its specific consequences for ethical decision making remains unclear (Weaver et al, 2006; Crane and Matten, 2010). This research will be attempting to make a contribution towards this gap in knowledge. Also, given the large expanse of work in the literature on bureaucracy and its many facets, this study gives careful consideration to one of its core foundational tenets – the legal-rational decision making concept believed to be at the epicentre of bureaucratic morality discourse (Adler & Borys, 1996). As Clegg and Baumeler (2010) explained, the highly technical rationality which bureaucracy encourages is the essential fabric of its metaphoric 'iron cage' (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) description. It has also been claimed by some scholars to represent a high

form of irrationality (Humell, 1998) despite its overly rational façade (Abrahamson and Baumard, 2008). With irrationality, ethical issues become noticeable, and this provides useful grounds to critically evaluate bureaucratic morality.

1.1.2 The role of individuals in the organisational decision making processes

On the other hand, studies on morality at the individual level in the literature have been dominated by Kohlberg's cognitive moral development (CMD) theoretical approach (Kohlberg, 1969; Treviño, 1986; Trevino, 1990) further developed by Rest and his colleagues (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & Thoma, 1999). They came up with a widely accepted four-stage process involved in ethical decision-making as shown in figure 1 below:

Figure 1.1: Rest's Ethical Decision making process framework



Source: Adapted from Rest, (1994)

Associated with the above, two research lines are most prominent. On one hand research that closely relates to the assumptions associated with the above process framework and the work of Rest (1994) and Kohlberg (1961). These emphasize the role of personal cognitive maturity for each of the above stages (Sparks and Hunt, 1998; Jones, 1991; Hare, 1991; Reynolds, 2006; Loe, Ferrell & Mansfield, 2000; Frey, 2000; Khatri and Ng, 2000; Haidt, 2001; Dane and Pratt, 2007; Salvador and Folger 2009). Kohlberg's (1961) CMD is a strong predictor of ethical behaviour (Weaver, 2006) when it comes to individual moral reasoning capacity. Thus, a qualitative approximation of Kohlberg's CMD assumptions will be one of the theoretical lenses to be employed in this study.

In a second competing line of research, the concept of *moral identity* (Blasi, 1983, 1984, 2005; Aquino and Reed, 2002) surfaced and has become increasingly popular as another explanatory theory in the behavioural ethics especially amid research lines that focus on the importance of the sociology of organisations and social

aspects of individual identity for organisational ethics. (Blasi, 1983; Bergman, 2004; Hoffman, 2000; Walker, 2004; Shao, Aquino and Freeman, 2008). These researchers have attempted to show that the strength of the relationship between moral reasoning and moral action maybe at best moderate in all tested scenarios. Besides moral capacities, it has been proposed that individual moral (social) identity is thus strongly influencing in the ethical decision making process (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Trevino, 1990; Rest, 1991; Weaver, 2006). At the identity level of studying individuals, the question to be answered is “Who am I?” This is the whole concept of self which according to Markus & Wurf, (1987) is the interpretive structure that mediates most significant intrapersonal processes (including information processing, affect and motivation) and a wide variety of interpersonal processes (including social perception, choice of situation among others). It is also essentially regarded as a self-regulation mechanism of how individuals control and direct their own actions. Many recent studies (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Blasi, 2005) have begun looking actively into identity based moral motivation for greater insight into the complex human ethical decision making process, from which the construct of moral identity emerged. Hence inasmuch as morality is central to a person, the chances of acting morally become higher (Blasi, 1999). If however he falters, it is simply a betrayal of self. As a second lens, the moral identity theory will also be employed in understanding individual morality within the bureaucratic contexts.

Thus, building on these increasingly popular bodies of work, this study will be examining the role of bureaucratic context in affecting employee (and to some extent) managerial morality in the workplace. Overall however it has been noted that the relationship between contextual factors and individual capacities is a delicate and intertwined phenomenon, which may also be explaining why this dissertation has relied on qualitative research methods for the exploration of the phenomenon.

1.2 Aim of the Study

As established, contexts are known to influence moral behaviour and actions (Weaver, 2006), especially with findings in the ethical decision making literature that have established employees adopt lower levels of morality at work than they do at home (Elms and Nichol, 1993; Adewale, 2011). As such, bureaucracy being a major contextual fabric in our organisations by which work is organised has been widely reported to have negative impacts on the moral capacities of employees working in

them (Merton, 1968; Jackall, 1988; Hummel, 1998). However, there is little empirical evidence for this (Jackall, 1988). This study therefore aims to investigate the interaction between bureaucratic contexts and employees' moral identity in affecting moral behaviour. This study aims to clarify existing claims about the negative effects of bureaucratic environments on employee morality but also intends to uncover the specific mechanisms by which the bureaucracies do this.

1.3 Research Questions

Broad Research Question: How do contextual variables and in particular bureaucracy shape employee morality?

1. How does bureaucracy's emphasis on bureaucratic rationality influence (enhance or suppress) moral action as manifested in various types and contexts of real world bureaucracy?
2. How do bureaucratic context's key features influence individuals' moral identity, and how may such effects differ vis-à-vis individuals with salient moral identity, versus individuals with weaker moral identity?
3. How do bureaucratic context's key features affect individual moral reasoning dynamics in the workplace?
4. How does bureaucratic context influence the quality of the professional workplace ethics?

1.4 Propositions

Three propositions will be explored in this study as follows:

Proposition 1: *Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)*

Proposition 2: *Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders*

Proposition 3: *Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and*

values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity

1.5 Study Design

This study will be adopting a case study design that allows a combination of some correlational design within a qualitative descriptive design method. It will be thus a mixed method study with a salient qualitative method focus. The correlational nature of this study will aim at exploring the strength of employees' moral identities and nature of their bureaucratic environments using a carefully devised survey tool. On the other hand, the descriptive aspect of the study, will aim at using semi-structured interviews to explore the interactions going on between the employees and their work environments with a view to understanding the likely impacts of the former on their moral behaviours. This provides deeper insights into contextual issues not discovered from the survey instrument. Thus, this study will be drawing on some quantitative data but predominantly qualitative data, allowing for a triangulation of methods. Hitherto, studies in the organisational ethics literature have adopted purely quantitative data in correlational designs. This study intends going further by including a descriptive design that would require qualitative data set to enrich our understanding of the relationships not captured at the correlational stage. In this regard, the case study design allows for this multiplicity of methods and data and will be the chosen design framework for this study. As Yin, (2003) posited, case study design 'allows the researcher to explore individuals or organisations, simple through complex interventions, relationships, communities, or programs' using a variety of data sources. It thus helps in the holistic understanding of the phenomenon being studied, with each data source being one piece of a 'puzzle' that will be converged at the analysis stage (Baxter and Jack, 2008).

1.6 Assumptions, Limitations and Scope

In a qualitative study of this nature, it may be assumed that participants will answer all questions honestly and accurately without holding back useful information. Despite the limited use of objective quantitative measures the qualitative study has to rely on the subjects' and the researchers' integrity in sharing and reporting key patterns. It will also be assumed that the subjects' opinions are reliable based on their true personal experiences within the bureaucracies and this to the best of their

abilities. The main potential limitation in this study is researcher's bias due to personal links to the wider local context in which the study is taking place. The specific nature of this researcher bias will be further discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter 4) including how it was controlled throughout the study. Perceptual misrepresentations are also a possibility in qualitative studies. Also, this study takes place in a context that could be particularly difficult to navigate and thus the projected number of participants could be restricted. The generalizability of the study could also be a potential limitation, even though the robust case study design employed in this study considered this.

1.7 Breakdown of Dissertation Chapters

Chapter one presents a broad overview of this entire dissertation. It begins with a background to this study, which explores the gaps the research intends to fill. It then presents the aim of the study, research questions as well as the assumptions, limitations and scope of the study.

Chapter two is the first of two literature review chapters. This chapter critically discusses the literature on bureaucracy and bureaucratic morality. It begins by presenting a history of bureaucracy and its evolution in the 20th century business landscape. Then the specific conceptualisation of bureaucracy to be adopted in this study was discussed amongst the possible concepts available in literature. Weber's ideal type is unveiled and discussed in great detail as the adopted perspective in this study. The morality of bureaucracy is then explored with all previous empirical studies also presented in the process. It concludes with the moral impact of Weber's bureaucracy and more specifically the likely impact of two key Weberian features on employee morality.

Chapter three is a succinct literature review on ethical decision-making. The various theoretical approaches in descriptive ethics were first discussed with a clear focus on Kohlberg's CMD and the moral identity theory. Then both are discussed in the context of bureaucracies from which the contributions of both CMD and Moral Identity theories are offered. Finally the three propositions to be explored in this study are also presented.

Chapter four introduces and critically discusses how this research was designed and executed. It begins by reiterating the overall aim of this research and the research

paradigm employed in this study. Subsequent sections provide discussions on the choice of a qualitative research approach; the case study design employed in the study as well as all data collection tools including interviews, questionnaire, and field notes. Further, details of participants in this study, sampling methods employed, and a comprehensive description of interview settings, are also discussed. Beyond these, the final sections of this chapter present thematic analysis as the data analysis method and how themes were generated in this study. Other issues discussed include the ethical considerations for this study, researcher's bias and limitations in the process of executing the study. It concludes with a reflexive piece by the researcher.

Chapter five offers a critical description of the research context. It begins by profiling the economic, social and institutional environment of the country, Nigeria. Next, a history of scandals within the Nigerian industry is discussed to present a context relevant canvas of immoral practices by MNCs in the pharmaceutical industry in Africa/Nigeria. Beyond these, a detailed description of the specific firm contexts in each of the three case groups is presented.

Chapter six presents the analysis and findings on the first paired cases - the two American pharmaceuticals. It begins by discussing the nature of formalised rules through standard operating procedures (SOPs) and managerial control within the context. Both of these features were discovered to function together to create a "*Traditional Bureaucracy*" context. Evidences that showed this were presented alongside a critical discussion of the impact of this traditional bureaucracy on the moral capacities of employees.

Chapter seven presents the analysis and findings on two Indian pharmaceuticals, the second case group in this study. Unlike the American case group, this case presents a different scenario in which both rules and managerial control had an intertwined influence that creates a '*Caste Bureaucracy*'. Evidence from interview data and secondary sources such as organisations' websites were then used to critically present salient findings.

Chapter eight presents the analysis and findings in a sample of two Nigerian pharmaceuticals. This is the third case group in this study. Unlike the two previous case groups however, this case group presented a pair of dissimilar firms. The first

(N1) is a quasi-bureaucracy with charismatic authority underpinning its bureaucratic features hence is regarded as a '*Charismatic Bureaucracy*'. The second (N2) is an '*Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy*' characterised by a laissez-faire opportunity seeking culture. Evidences of these two different bureaucracies were presented in the sections that follow. Finally, relevant findings along the three key propositions explored in this study were presented using evidence from interview data and secondary sources.

Chapter nine presents a critical discussion of the prevalent themes across the three case groups explored in this study. It starts by giving a general overview of the different hybrids of bureaucracies that typified each of the case groups and their effects on morality. It followed on with the discussion of three key themes common across the case groups explored in this study namely: General pattern of "inflated" moral identities; The CMR is a better predictor of morality; Bureaucracies encourage expertise over professionalism. By comparing and contrasting these with relevant literature new contributions to both theory and practice were drawn.

Chapter ten is the final chapter of this dissertation. It begins by discussing the observed limitations in the cause of this study. It then follows with key practical implications for different fields of study such as organisational design, national health systems and so on following from the key findings in this study. Finally, for each of these implications, directions for future research are also presented.

CHAPTER 2

BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCRATIC MORALITY

2.0 Introduction

A bureaucracy according to Weber, (1948) signifies a distinct organisational setting also known as “the bureau” (French word for “office” and “official”), ideally characterized by formalized rules, hierarchies, specialized duties, demarcation of jurisdiction, standardized processes and impersonality, all aimed at governing relationships and organisational performance with a focus on efficiency and long term effectiveness (Akrivou & Bradbury-Huang, 2011; Weber, Gerth & Mills, 1946; Adler & Borys, 1996; Hales, 2002, duGay, 2000, Mintzberg, 1979; Croizer, 1964; Farazmand, 2009). The anticipated effect of this structure is a technically superior and procedurally rational system that works with precision, speed, knowledge, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction as well as material and personal costs (Udy, 1959, Weber, 1978; Fry, 1980; Olowu, 1988; Jaffee, 2001; Al-Habil, 2011). Implicit in Weber’s definition are: its use as a control tool through the exercising of power, the possibility of ordering the actions of a large group of people and also its concept of rationalism, which streamlines social actions into logical structures to achieve efficient ends.

Amidst a huge existing body of literature on bureaucracy, this review will focus on the sociological and business streams, offering rich insights into the workings of bureaucracy in modern business organisations. First, a brief historical review of bureaucracies and its evolution over time is presented spanning the earliest human civilisations to the industrial revolution era. Second, drawing from the works of du Gay, (2000) a critical discussion of Weber’s ideal type follows alongside its criticisms and the emergence of post bureaucratic organisations. Finally, emerging moral issues from the practical adoption of bureaucracies in organizations will be highlighted, focusing on specific attributes of bureaucracy and their impacts on employee morality.

2.1 History of Bureaucracy: Applied 20th Century Evolution of Bureaucracy in Business

Bureaucracy has been around us since the earliest human societies. History documents its adoption by the earliest empires as an administrative and power tool

in the form of institutions, for organising resources towards achieving pre-determined ends, often the development of infrastructure and inventions (Farazmand, 2009). Long before Weber's conceptualisation of bureaucracy, bureaucracy has been recorded throughout human history since early civilisations as an institution of government and administration. Great empires, including the Chinese, Babylonian, Persian and Roman empires, adopted bureaucracy in their administration to which crucial developments and advancements in human history have been credited (Fyre, 1975). Particularly, the Persian bureaucracy celebrated for its complexity, structure and effective performance became the model bureaucracy to follow (Cook, 1983). In addition to the several inventions, innovations and landmark developments, the Persian bureaucracy was also credited to have fed the world with ideas of administrative ethics, modern governance, organisation theory, and management amongst others (Farazmand, 2004). To these ends, bureaucracy was used as a public administrative tool, driven by authoritarian leadership, to create working systems for societies.

Beyond these empires, into modern times, bureaucracy continues to thrive in almost every sphere of life (Gajdushek, 2003). In the 19th Century Europe, the Germans perfected a factory system based bureaucratic organisational model (Thompson, 1969; Siddall, 1979). Their innovations included the creation of formalised and centralised control systems; these were implemented via standard operating procedures, centralised materials requirements, meritocracy, control by rules, logistics, division of labour, narrow job descriptions and sequential processing (Weinstein, 1968). Following this, Americans introduced improvements to the system through activity and cost measurements as well as workflow reconfiguration using electric motors. Taylor's scientific management (or Taylorism) surfaced and another, Ford's car assembly model called Fordism. Both were rooted in the principles of compartmentalisation and division of labour in order to make the organisations as efficient as possible resulting in price cuts and improved productivity. Employees performed single repetitive tasks, products became more standardized with better quality which also saw a growth in the middle management as planning was separated from execution (Thompson, 1988; Kimble, 2014). However, Taylorism for instance, was criticised as reducing human beings to commodities and regarded as mere machine components thereby eliminating the human element of organisations.

Its exploitative tendencies were also a downside amongst other shortcomings (Hartwell, 1971). Nonetheless, Ford's assembly model became so significant; it spread to other parts of the world (Merkle, 1980).

Weber by observing these changes during the industrial revolution alongside features of Western civilisation was convinced that society was driven by the passage of rational ideas into culture, which in turn transformed the society into a bureaucratic entity (Clegg & Baumeler, 2010). Weber saw capitalism as the rational way of organising economic life, towards the ends of calculability of likely returns (Reed, 1999). He therefore predicted excessive rationalisation would increase until its establishment as the most prevalent form of organizing due to its incomparable stability and efficiency (Weber, 1978). Today, as Wilmot (1987) observed that 'bureaucracy starts from birth (health bureaucracy) to family upbringing (social welfare), to school (educational) to work (civil service, military, commercial, industrial) to worship and death (religion): bureaucracy increasingly dominates man' (Eme and Emeh, 2012: 20).

Accordingly, bureaucracy has made large complex organisations efficient and also inevitable (Womack, James and Roos, 1990) by championing crucial achievements in the management of the economy and society (Farazmand, 2004). As such they advanced with sophistication and were simply better off, providing security, jobs, economic growth, stability and also the much-needed services of the time (Evans and Wurster, 1997). Thus, bureaucracy grew in impact and size, reaching its peak in the twentieth century (Farazmand, 2004). As Farazmand, (2014) further opined, bureaucracy during the twentieth century played a formidable role in public governance and administration and in business administration, leading to the rise of large-scale corporate organizations and multinational corporations everywhere.

In summary, throughout history, bureaucracy has often been adopted in two different ways each with different outcomes and effects: as an instrument or an institution, what Gajduschek, (2003) in his view called bureaucracy as a mechanistic tool and bureaucracy as organisational phenomenon. In the first case, it is seen as a rational tool for executing the commands of elected leaders. That is, it is the tool for achieving pre-determined purposes efficiently and effectively. The implication of this is that in the former, rationality and justice are the outcome of the system. In the

second case, bureaucracy is conceptualized as an institution, as such, bureaucracy functions with organisational and normative principles of its own based on rule of law, due process, codes of behaviour among others. In this light, it is more of an expression of cultural values and a system of governance than a mere means to an end. The implication of this second conceptualisation of bureaucracy is that rationality and justice are characteristics of procedures to follow in order to reach an outcome. Crozier, (1964) also distinguished three different conceptualisations of bureaucracies as follows: 1. Weber's ideal bureaucracy (Weber, 1947); 2. Government agencies staffed by appointed officials in hierarchies, governed by a sovereign authority and top-down implementation of strategy and rules (Waldo, 1992) and 3. The 'red tape' effects of a bureaucratic structure are ascribed to slowness, long procedures and routine (Olsen, 2004). Of these three, the Weberian model is the most relevant in business literature, as it typifies business organisations in the modern society (Farazmand, 2009).

2.2 Weber's Ideal Type and Post Bureaucratic Organisations

Coser and Rosenberg, (1976) defined Weber's ideal type as 'that type of hierarchical organization which is designed rationally to coordinate the work of many individuals in the pursuit of large-scale administrative tasks' (Page15). Weber identified the core elements of an ideal bureaucracy to include impersonality, efficiency and rationality aimed at achieving precision, speed, clarity in communication and reduction of costs of human resources in organisations (Miller, 2014). Weber further opined that these are the technical advantages of bureaucracy, made possible by published formal (impersonal) rules and codes of conduct, hierarchical authority with one level subject to the control of the other, with responsibilities at each level clearly delineated. Whilst Weber's ideal type was not a representation for every type of bureaucracy; it was simply hypothetical and served as a mental model to capture the phenomenon wherever it is observed (Weber, 1978). Furthermore, Olsen, (2008) opined that as an ideal type, bureaucracy has clear characteristics, preconditions, and effects, while practice at best approximates the ideal type.

The dominance of bureaucracy as the rational way of efficiently organising resources as well as its many perceived contributions to our societies is keenly debated in many circles especially since the last few decades. Arguments range along the

continuum of those in praise of its many abilities, especially its administrative capacities (Hunter, 1994; du Gay, 2000; Alvesson and Thompson, 2005; Reed, 2005) to those who claim it is undemocratic, unresponsive to people and normalises corruption and amorality in our economic life (Hummell, 2007, Jackal, 1983, Drucker, 1988), to the extent that its demise is often predicted in favour of newer, post bureaucratic organisation forms able to meet the needs of our changing world (Dopson and Stewart, 1990). But, bureaucracy has long been seen as a cornerstone of advanced industrial society that typifies the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Clegg, Harris, Hopfl, 2011). Campbell, (2013) further opined that large bureaucratic organizations have become a key fact of life in modern polities. And as Farazmand, (2001) & Gajduschek, (2003) further argue, bureaucracy has never had a true alternative; therefore, no organisation will ever totally replace it. Its survival through the ages, they claim, is an indication of its resilience and relevance (Farazmand, 2007).

In Weber's own words, bureaucracy is 'from a technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally that most rationally known means of carrying out imperative control over human beings' (Weber, 1946). It is the rational-legal type of authority that characterises Weber's concept of bureaucracy, as it is premised on a legitimacy of patterns of normative rules and the rights of those elevated to positions of authority (Stillman, 2000). The resultant system is meant to be one that detaches any form of personal attachments, leaving little or no room for personal favouritisms, bias or arbitrariness and relying solely on a professional decision-maker (du Gay, 2000; Stillman, 2000). Morally, this can be advantageous as strict rule-based compliance with an adherence to rules can be a measure of objectivity to get tasks done. As du Gay, (2000) further opined, rules and procedures that are in place are intended to bring about equality and fairness in how workers are treated as much as it brings about control for management. As such, Du Gay, (2000) is of the opinion that bureaucracy allows for impersonal fairness within the organisation, for example with equal opportunities and that this in itself provides an important political and ethical resource in liberal democratic regimes because it separates the administration of public life from 'private moral absolutisms' (Watson, 2003 pp. 91). Bureaucracy's indifference to certain moral ends, according to du Gay is therefore its strengths and not its

weakness. In the absence of this, office-holders could do their work in ways, which prioritise their private advantage, to the detriment of organisational objectives (du Gay, 2000). Besides, the clear demarcation of roles and hierarchies is known to help solve the problem of maintaining order over an organisation as it grows in scale. King and Lawley, (2013) further explained that bureaucracies do this by creating clear roles and responsibilities, outlining clear lines of authority and the limits of the authority.

In spite of these positives, Weber however also shared his concerns about a disenchanted world characterised by the decline of substantive rationality and shared values based mostly on commonly held religious and societal beliefs. Instead, as Miller, (2014) opined, bureaucracy advances instrumental rationality and therefore the focus is on ends and not the means. Also Spicer, (2013:10) asserted that 'although Weber was pessimistic regarding the effects of rationalisation and bureaucracy on human life and freedom, he saw the disenchantment of the world that results from the ascent of science and rationalism and the decline of religious and mystical interpretations of human experience as expanding the capacity for human freedom and moral responsibility', resulting in the loss of meaning (Gronow, 1988). Implicit in Weber's opinion is the allowance of value pluralism that blurs the boundaries of shared values and has the capacity to degenerate into fragmentation of values since shared values are replaced by myriad of individual/subjective belief systems and opinions (Latsis, 2013; Weber, 1974). As a result, modern men /women in business roles may find it ok to be cynical, trapped in procedures, or less motivated by the pursuits of moral principles (Latsis, 2013). Therefore, under capitalism for example, its adoption in private for-profit businesses operating in free markets produces totally different ramifications from shared value-based societal development objectives.

The above implies that this Weberian model could also result in a system metaphorically termed the 'Iron Cage' (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980). The term 'iron cage' describes a system based purely on teleological efficiency, rational calculation and control in which one set of rules and laws that must be adhered to without room for flexibility. This kind of system is able to limit human freedom and capacity to think independently since all rules have been clearly demarcated hence Weber's own assertion that it could be a control/power tool of the first order (Jackall, 1988).

Therefore, without considerations for the ends for which Weber's model is being used, the fact that human freedom is curtailed in the system often draws a lot of criticisms in literature and can be argued to have moral implications. Bauman, (2001) in his view argued that the iron cage as it is designed aims to 'leave erratic passions out of bounds, giving no room for any irrationality, human wishes included' to the extent that any passion is seen as dangerous and destabilising to bureaucratic organisation, i.e. its emphasis of hyper, unmoderated rationality. This according to Derlien, (1999), is 'the most formal, rational mode of exercising domination', which Hummel, (2007) argued has dehumanising effects, in that organisations totally control the thinking of their employees towards desired ends, giving them no room or control over their personal decisions.

Thus, there are two distinct views on the rationality of bureaucracy: that of a 'super' rationality which allows no irrationality and another rationality that leads to a form of irrationality. Critiques such as Jackal, (1988), Merton, (1968) and Hummel, (2007) often build their arguments around the latter view, arguing that the rationality espoused by Weber's bureaucracy has the capacity to imprison and control 'cage' employee's ability to recognise moral issues and to make free ethical decisions. This can result in what Merton, (1949) referred to this as 'occupational psychosis' or 'deformed professionalism' in which bureaucracies make employees become so biased they normalise ideas or behaviours that are supposed to be considered abnormal. Although Gajduschek, (2003) argued that Weber's concept of rationality is often subject to misrepresentations, he believed that Weber's position on rationality was that of 'uncertainty reduction' instead of 'efficiency' although he argued uncertainty reduction could imply efficiency in some ways. Nonetheless, Merton, (1968) in his study on bureaucracies discovered what he called 'unintended consequences' associated with bureaucracies. For instance, 'ignorance', where it is impossible to anticipate everything, and 'error', which lends employees to incomplete analysis of problems following from a monotonous approach to problem solving even in different scenarios, amongst others (Merton, 1968). These, Merton believed could significantly reduce the capacity of employees to recognise moral issues or respond appropriately to them.

Based on these flaws, the demise of bureaucracy has been anticipated and

demanded throughout the history of management thought as well as in modern social and political theory (du Gay, 2000) in favour of post bureaucratic organisations (Heckscher, 1994). According to Heckscher, (1994), ideals to be espoused in post bureaucratic organisations, as different from Weber's bureaucratic organisation include rules being replaced by consensus and shared values; responsibilities being assigned on the basis of competence rather than hierarchy and treated as individuals rather than impersonally; the organisation has an open bureaucracy, flexible in the way work is done such that work is no longer done in fixed hours or at a designated place. This newer form of organisation tends to favour flat structures and not hierarchical ones for instance and a more cordial organisation culture that thrives on social accountability. However, this organisational type also comes with its shortfalls including the problem of control. With shared values, Knights and Wilmott, (2007) argue that this offers a fragile form of control, resting on self-control rather than external monitoring. Also they argue that trust may be difficult to sustain and can be easily betrayed. Furthermore since post bureaucracies advocate for free movement of labour in and out of organisations, they have the tendency to degenerate into anarchies. All of these are precisely the problems Weber's ideal type seems to solve with its characteristics. Thus, in spite of the heavy criticisms of bureaucracy, indications are that it is far from dead in contemporary management circles. Despite claims by key management authorities (Castells 2000; Giddens, 1998; Heckscher and Donnellon, 1994; Leadbeater 1999; Peters 1989) there is a need to be cautious in claiming a substitute for bureaucracy has been found because as Farazmand, (2004) argues, the survival of bureaucracy through the ages indicates we cannot do without it.

2.3 The Morality of Bureaucracy

"The greatest threat to the bureaucratic system—as Weber sees it in a historical context—is that personal emotion and moral judgment may distort the system. The ability to work without affections, thus, is the personal precondition of the existence of bureaucracy" Gajduschek, (2003)

According to Gajduschek (2003), personal emotional experience and emotional sharing and moral judgement alike are all feared to distort bureaucratic systems' functioning, because they are incompatible with the "rule" of hyper rationalism's façade (cite) which sustains the whole edifice of bureaucracy. But often, strong

personal emotion can produce virtues such as courage, integrity, generosity, collegiality, temperance which threaten the fragmentation and control (from the top) of the administrative core in a bureaucratic organisation. Thus, discussions on bureaucratic morality can start from some of the consequences of rationality Weber may not have actually envisaged. His original concept of bureaucracy is seen as a rational means of exercising control to get jobs done efficiently (Weber, 1948). Implicit in this statement is the fact that workers are expected to think and act in certain pre-determined ways, working without affection, amounting to a desired end. This reduces humans to some form of machine or robots. Gouldner, (1954) described this as the conceptualising of humans as objects and subjects, which is often captured by their aggregation in the general category of “human resources” in addition to other technological and financial resources that make up assets of organisations. In the purely formal aspects of Weber’s bureaucracy, people recruited in positions are guided by predefined tasks, rules and assignments. Also, with clear division of labour, humans are treated as objects, as they are “resources” that contribute to the higher or lower organisational efficiency. However, in exercising authority based on technical competence and skill, humans are treated as subjects with evaluative capacities.

Thus, workers in a subjective position of authority may be unable to identify moral issues involved in their work roles and even if they do, the capacity to act morally is often restricted by set rules. Studies by (Bauman, 1983, 1993) and Ten Bos (1997) have indicated the likely negative impact of bureaucratic structures on ethical decision making; they put forward four ways they could do this:

(1) Suppression of moral autonomy, in which written rules guide every action taken and no decision can be made outside of those rules, thereby limiting ability to act in ways deemed morally appropriate by actor in the circumstance, and they limit the moral questioning of any rules as rules must be taken for granted and obeyed

(2) Instrumental end-oriented-morality (an act is right in so far as it satisfies a need) which de-emphasizes normative inquiry on the means by which ends are being reached,

(3) Moral distancing, in which as long as rules are followed, responsibility is not

taken for any unanticipated consequences since actors have functioned within required boundaries, and

(4) The denial of moral status, which is the inability to realise, reflect upon, and take accountability of, or accept the moral undertone and the significance of actions and of decisions taken. An implication of this is that individuals at the lower levels are not sufficiently able, nor are they empowered, to make informed decisions as most of the details needed to make such decisions do not trickle down. So, when moral issues are involved in the decisions to be made, there is an obvious handicap in either recognizing them or even raising any alarm in cases where they are detected. This phenomenon of isolation is heightened by the tendency of some organizations to structure work relationships so that group members have little contact with members of other work groups. Hence, such activities as comparing of notes is not allowed, thereby impeding moral responsibility in the process.

Hummel, (2007) in his book, '*Understanding Bureaucracies*' offered several examples of how bureaucracy limits peoples' capacity to adhere to their broader professional identity or abilities to make the right decisions based on the contexts and situations they face. For instance, in a hospital setting, a doctor was forced by a Medicare program to discharge a very sick patient prematurely to save bed space, resulting in the death of the patient. (Pg.10). Another study by Epstein and O'Halloran, (1999) revealed how lawmakers used bureaucracy to reduce the discretion provided to agencies thereby limiting their abilities to make policy decisions (Huber and Shipan, 2002; Lewis, 2003; Wood and Bohte, 2004). These effects of bureaucracy limits the capacity of people to reflect and decide how they ought to act as virtuous moral agents (Koehn, 2001)

Therefore, as Jackall, (1988) in his study of bureaucratic work environments queried, 'how is morality defined in corporations?' it was simply answered as follows: "What is right in the corporation is not what is right in a man's home or in his church. *What is right in the corporation is what the guy above you wants from you.* That's what morality is in the corporation." (pg.36). This answer has been further proven and supported by other empirical and conceptual studies (Anand, Ashforth and Joshi 2004; Trevino et al, 2006, Schein, 2004).

Hence, understanding the kind of moral climate bureaucracies create and the subsequent impact on individual actors begins with the appreciation of the fact that bureaucracy is/becomes a 'world apart' separate from the broader society (Hummel 2007). In Hummel's view, there is a social atmosphere created by bureaucracies that breed unique sets of pressures - social, cultural, psychological and cognitive (linguistic) types that shape bureaucrats and determine their behaviours. These pressures play huge roles in determining how individuals think, construct their sense of identity and behave at all times.

Hence, organisations are more than places of work but environments that *make* "...the men and women in them come to fashion an entire social ambience that overlays the antagonisms created by company politics..." through rationalism (Jackall, 1983 p.37). In this sort of setting, managers and employees are inclined to treat one another and themselves instrumentally, as objects, analysing mutual strengths and weaknesses and deciding based on the instrumental calculation of what needs to be done in order to survive and ascend in the organisational order (Goodpaster 1978). The outcome is a systematic reconstruction of the workers' images into the person the system demands, a process that can be argued to have identity and moral implications.

In describing this process, this reconstruction process is often regarded as a form of 'dehumanisation' (Mintzberg, 1979) whilst the likely actions of the 'reconstructed' workers would thus be questionable (Clawson, 1980). Given this, it is hard to see a place for 'personal' ethics as opposed to impersonal ethics. Besides, in such contexts, there is no use for universal higher abstract ethical principles but conformity to the requirements of bureaucratic functionality. Furthermore, Merton, (1957) made a bold assertion that 'Bureaucracy may actually contain the seed of its own destruction'. First, on social grounds, Weber posited that "Bureaucracy is the way of transforming social action into rationally organised action" (Weber, 1968), thereby creating a 'new world' that seems distant from the real world lacking strong normative foundations (Habermas, 1971). This claim of bureaucracy being a new world is buttressed by the established fact in literature that people generally make ethical decisions at a lower level of cognitive reasoning at work than they do outside of work (Hummel, 2007). The transition between both worlds may come with wider

implications including having to learn not just a new set of behaviours but also a new mode of life (Jackall, 1983). In this regard, bureaucracy could give birth to a new species of dehumanised beings whose norms and beliefs are replaced with technical rationality and related means. This process which Hummel, (2007) described as a conversion from social relations to relations of control is exemplified in the way corporations expect their employees to learn to talk, act or think in particular ways. Thus, employees or bureaucrats are locked up in particular patterns of behaviours.

Gouldner's (1954) opinion leads to the next criticism of Weber's bureaucracy on psychological and cognitive grounds as having the ability to dehumanise its workers in what Weber himself called 'crippled personality of the specialities' (Weber, 1946). Although as Mintzberg, (1979) argued, Weber did not intend his description to imply rationality devoid of morality, but merely implying a tough stand in getting things done in predetermined ways. Hummel (2007) disagrees, picking on Weber's own very prediction that the future could be populated by "specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved." Further, Weber in Gronow, (1988) admitted that values have gone from public life through parallel processes of rationalisation and intellectualisation thereby resulting in loss of individual freedom and meaning. Therefore it is often agreed that the mechanistic tendencies of bureaucracy detach a bureaucrat from his or her humanity/emotions, society and even individual thinking. In addition, human identity and character is replaced with organisational identity, substituting his/her sense of right or wrong whilst performing his daily duties (Lefort, 1974). This degeneration from a human to more of an organisation's robot is regarded as horrific at least. Finally, the cultural provision of rules to strictly follow without discretion leaves out any opportunity to have an input or lend a voice to the direction of the organisation thereby hindering the freedom democracy brings. The tension that arises in this case leads to discussions about the legitimacy of bureaucracy, power, discretion and judgement especially since workers norms and beliefs are torn away from them as, Goodpaster, (1991) concluded in his study on ethical imperatives and corporate leadership.

In summary, at the very core of these critiques are two basic issues: First that bureaucratic rationalization is a dominant organizational logic, producing different

degrees of inefficiency, dehumanization, and ritualism (Ackroyd, Batt, Thompson and Tolbert, 2005) and could stifle creativity, foster dissatisfaction and demotivate employees (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990; Adler & Cole, 1995; Adler & Borys, 1996). So, bureaucracy may ultimately create its own inefficiency and this may suggest in the long term it is not as efficient as its supporters want to present it. This is also supported by the significant theoretical and empirical research in the principal-agent problems linked to management's opportunistic use of power asymmetries for self-interested gains (Hill and Jones, 1992). Second, that perhaps the recorded positive and negative impact of bureaucracies could also be contextually dictated. For example, du Gay (2000) argues that particular industries can only thrive when strict rules are enforced and that before critiquing any bureaucracy, it is useful to look into the context in which it is thriving. Thus, with the several interpretations and adoptions of the bureaucratic concept in literature and reality comes a lot of ambiguity such that in critiquing or accepting any arguments, bureaucracy has to be clearly understood in the light of Weber's original thoughts and in the context in which it is being practiced.

2.4 Summary of Studies on Bureaucratic Morality

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 below summarise the different theoretical and empirical studies on bureaucratic morality. Beginning with the theoretical and conceptual studies, a larger proportion of these studies were published based on author's experiential knowledge of the workings of the bureaucracies to which they had been exposed. Also, these bureaucracies were not all in business organisations, but cut across public offices, state agencies amongst others and yet reported consistent findings.

2.4.1 Theoretical and Conceptual Studies

Table 2.1: Theoretical and Conceptual Studies on Bureaucratic Morality

Author	Findings/Conclusion
Merton, 1949	Bureaucracy and its overtly legal rationality leads to 'unintended consequences' such as trained incapacity in which employees are made to approach every issue the same way even when those issues require different responses; occupational psychosis, in which rules and values of the system produce a pronounced

	character of the mind in the employees in conformity with the bureaucracy and professional deformation in which the bureaucracy hinders the professional duties of employees.
Milgram 1963, 1964	Established the uneasy relationship between bureaucracy and the ethics of personal responsibility easily leads to institutionalized immorality. Using the Nazi and holocaust example, he indicated that the atrocities were perpetrated by ordinary people who believed they were working within the lawful limits. Only after the world war were the huge moral ramifications uncovered.
Thompson 1985	He defined the ethics of bureaucracy into two: ethics of neutrality in which bureaucrats act on behalf of the organization in order to serve the needs of society; and the Ethic of Structure, in which the organization itself is responsible for ethical decision-making, and that individuals can only be responsible for the direct results of specific actions. He criticised both and concluded that: the contention that policies are right because the organisation says so is a violation of liberal democracy; decision and policy making in bureaucracies are so ethereal that it is difficult to know when an ethical Rubicon is crossed. Also, that in bureaucracies, individuals are immune to shared moral liability action simply because of their membership in the organization.
Gronow, 1988	Bureaucracy comes with parallel processes of intellectualisation and rationalisation leading to loss of individual freedom and values. Result is value pluralism in which legitimacy is not on shared norms but on procedural and formal rules.
Dwivedi, 1988	Admits to the failure of bureaucracies in upholding moral standards. Recommended that the moral resolve of employees be assisted through the use of a strong code of ethics as a guide to 'proper behaviour in the face of ethical dilemmas'
Olowu, 1988;	Pointed out the abuse of power and position of office as the key

Dunsire, 1988; Rohr, 1988	driver of bureaucratic morality.
Sherrer, 2000	Reviewed behaviourism in bureaucracies and identified individuals often end up with sadistic behaviours, mindless obedience to authority, conditioned, robotic behaviours, conformity and the categorisation of people based on their conformity. "...the explicit rejection of human autonomy and the role of consciousness in human behaviour is ingrained in bureaucratic systems and in the thinking of those who administer them" (P. 253)
Hummel, 2007	Bureaucracy is a separate world from the 'real' world. Socially, it brings people together only to cause separation by replacing mutually oriented social action governed by shared human concerns and moral norms with rationally organised action. Psychologically, it takes over the conscience and imposes organisational identity on employees. Culturally, it replaces ordinary human values with values of its own, compatible with the objective of the bureaucracy. Cognitively, it defines what things are. Politically, it is a power tool for controlling people towards the objective of the bureaucracy via increasing amorality.
Macalagan, 2007	Reviewed the conflict of hierarchical control and moral autonomy. He concluded that control over ethics stifles individual potential for moral imagination, moral responsibility and capacity for moral judgement.

From these theoretical and conceptual studies, there is a consensus about the adverse effect of bureaucracies on the moral capacity of those working in them. While the majority seem to establish this negative relationship, only one study (Dwivedi, 1988) proffered the solution of improved code of ethics, which has also been subject to varying findings in both theoretical and empirical studies. The studies in Table 1 may not be an exhaustive list of all theoretical studies on bureaucratic morality; they however accurately reflect the findings of most studies on bureaucratic

morality. Table 2 below summarises key empirical studies on bureaucratic morality.

2.4.2 Empirical Studies

Table 2.2: Empirical Studies on Bureaucratic Morality

Author	Objective/Methodology	Findings and Conclusion
Jackall, 1988	How bureaucracy shapes moral consciousness. Study was carried out across 4 organisations with over 100 semi structured interviews	'Bureaucracy breaks apart substance from appearances, action from responsibility, and language from meaning'(p. 130). It erodes internal and external standards of morality and rationally justifies amorality and even a conscious neglect of ethics, especially amid managers. Success is capricious, the original protestant ethic is lost to sheer individualism, and a quest of success through markets and superiors. 'Bureaucracy makes its own internal rules and social context the principal moral gauges for action' (p.130)
Ferrell and Skinner, 1988	Investigate the relationship between ethical structure and ethical behaviour in marketing research organisations. Self-administered questionnaires were sent by post out of which 600 were returned.	The presence of an ethical code explained the most variance there was in ethical behaviours in all firms.

Empirical studies on bureaucracy have been predominantly focused on its form, type conceptualisation, specific dimensions e.g. hierarchy, formalisation, centrality etc, (Hall, 1963; Goulter, 1959 etc). Very few studies are known to have empirically studied the theorised impact of bureaucracy on morality. As at the time Ferrell and Skinner, (1988) published their study, they claimed there were no empirical studies on the impact of bureaucracy on ethical behaviour until Jackal (1988) adopted a purely qualitative method published his work in the same year. Since then, there have been huge advancements in the evolution of organisations and in the development of descriptive ethical theories. Therefore, the need for empirical studies on bureaucratic morality becomes more pronounced as both the subject of bureaucracy and ethics continues to generate a lot of debates. As Merton, (1949) concluded in his work, there is a need to study empirically the real impact of bureaucracy on employee morality. To this end, he proposed the following possible study focuses: 'To what extent are particular personality types selected and modified by the various bureaucracies (private enterprise, public service, the quasi-legal political machine, religious orders)? Inasmuch as ascendancy and submission are held to be traits of personality, despite their variability in different stimulus-situations, do bureaucracies select personalities of particularly submissive or ascendant tendencies? And since various studies have shown that these traits can be modified, does participation in bureaucratic office tend to increase ascendant tendencies?' Thus the dearth of empirical studies on bureaucratic morality leaves a huge gap, which this study aims to fill.

2.5 Moral Impact of Weber's Ideal Bureaucratic type

In an age characterised by top level scandals and ethical issues in high and low places, understanding the role of the most dominant organisational arrangement in enhancing or impeding moral agency becomes necessary. One of the very few studies that have empirically tested the direct impact of bureaucracy on moral agency is the work of Jackall, (1988), a summary of which was offered in the previous table 2.2. More specifically by interviewing 100 managers, Jackall discovered that the world of bureaucracy is not as straightforward as it appears. In fact he called it a 'moral maze' and concluded that bureaucracies are not helpful to individual moral agency. But, generalising all bureaucracies, as impeding moral agency is a bold claim that must be empirically verified. Besides, perhaps not all

'types of bureaucracies' are stifling to moral autonomy. And if they are, could there be any good in them? As Hummel (2007) argued, if the moral ramification of bureaucracy is found to be true, it therefore transcends a mere psychological challenge into an ontological one in which our very being is questioned.

Therefore, building from the arguments of early scholars such as Hall, (1963) and Gouldner, (1959) on how bureaucracy ought to be conceptualised, a multidimensional approach which measures bureaucracy as an entity with multiple characteristics to determine the extent to which each one exists in the studied organisation will be adopted in evaluating moral issues in bureaucracy. As such, the documented impact of Weber's ideal attributes on employees will be explored. The focus of this section will be based on two attributes of Weber's ideal bureaucracy, at the heart of legal-rationality and also documented to have significant influence on employee morality Gajduschek, (2003): Rules (Structures, procedures and responsibilities) and Managerial Control. These also are critical within the industry context within which this research was conducted.

2.5.1 Rules

Formalisation is the extent of rules, procedures and instructions in place in organisations (Adler and Borys, 1996). It is also the standardisation of procedures, streamlined into statements of procedures and operations (Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1969). Formalisation is a central feature of Weber's bureaucratic ideal type (Jaffee, 2001) and one that has been extensively researched (Pugh and Hickson, 1976; Mintzberg, 1979) especially in line with efficiency, employee satisfaction (Arches, 1991), innovation and improved ethical conduct (Ferrell and Skinner, 1988). Organisational rules including codes of ethics are a part of the formal structure in organisations. They define relationships and guide activities thereby creating sets of mutual expectations as well as reducing uncertainties (Zhou, 1993).

In practice, formalised rules have been reported to activate role conflict among professionals because of the discrepancy that exists between the norms of a profession that ought to be espoused by its community of members across different organisations and economies and each single organisation's norms and rule (Organ

and Greene, 1981; See also discussions on Professional Codes from Chapter 6 onwards later on). This is also known to create a moral tension between employees and their organisation. Merton, (1968) further explained that often the presence of formalised rules implies the need to strictly adhere to those rules, a behaviour called compliance. He then argued that the impact of compliance on employees is that following the rules becomes an end in itself and could cause them to lose focus on the bigger goals of the organisation. Therefore, Gouldner, (1954) in his work recognised two types of compliance: compliance based on the desire to achieve goals efficiently and compliance based on an obligation to obey the command of superiors unquestioningly. He then further argued that in the latter case, authority based on formal positions may not be sufficient to enforce the compliance of subordinates especially in cases where the subordinates are more skilful than their superiors.

Also, Thompson, (1967) and Lawrence and Lorsch, (1967) found that employees will react positively both when high levels of formalization are associated with routine tasks and when low levels of formalization are associated with non-routine tasks. This is because employees and average human beings like to be told what to do to succeed and be rewarded which makes life less hard and more conformist. This finding is in line with the prevalent presuppositions that standardising routine work in organisations should boost efficiency thereby guaranteeing employee satisfaction. However, critics still disagree with this argument because it assumes a high level correlation of goal congruence between employees and employers, a situation many have argued is rarely obtained (Pfeffer, 1981). Hence, these buttress the need to see each organisation as a unique entity with at best shared features with other organisations, therefore, care must be taken in making generalisations.

From an ethics perspective, rules have also been subject to mixed findings. For instance, rules have often been argued to grant organisations more control over the ethical behaviours of their employees (Ferrell and Skinner, 1988). In their finding, they concluded that formalisation explained the most variance in ethical behaviour with the existence of an ethical code as the major factor explaining the variation. In affirmation, corporate policies, usually codes of ethical conduct have also been linked to increased ethical conduct (Ferrell, Weaver, Taylor and Jones 1978;

Fritzsche and Becker, 1983; Hunt, Chonko, and Wilcox 1984). Tsalikis and Fritzsche, (1989), Murphy, Smith and Daley, (1992) concluded in their studies that corporate ethics inhibits unethical behaviour and that employees in these organisations were less aware of unethical or illegal activity in their organisations. Whilst this could be a positive, the fact that moral awareness is reduced is a major point of criticism, whereby employees' individual moral agency is replaced by rules thereby limiting their capacity to recognise moral issues and make sound judgements. Therefore, this has often raised concerns about the presence of code of ethics being a mere façade to mask the real ethical issues and struggles in organisations.

A link here may be established with the theory in the previous chapter of my literature review with a focus on cognitive moral development theory (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg's cognitive moral development theory offers key insights into the moral ramifications of the rule based morality bureaucracies espouse. According to Kohlberg's, (1969) typology of cognitive moral development, rule based morality places individuals at the pre conventional level of moral reasoning. At this basic level of moral reasoning, morality is defined in terms of avoiding to break the rules and a propensity for excessive rule conformity by the majority of (conventional) employees and managers in organisations (Kohlberg, 1969; Colby and Kohlberg, 1987), beyond which every other concern is obliterated. This behaviour may produce indeed both amoral and immoral behaviours. Employee orientation would be on reward, punishments and obedience only. However, Kohlberg's categorisations suggest higher levels of moral development, that is the conventional and post conventional stages are more adequate in resolving significant moral dilemmas (Kohlberg, 1981). Therefore, Kohlberg's theory argues that at the pre conventional level bureaucracies expect employees to function, orientation would be towards keeping the rules, a reasoning level that renders them incapable of making critical moral judgements. Whereas, anyone reasoning at the higher stages could for example recognise a moral issue and make a decision to leave the job based on the violation of some higher moral principle they hold in high regard. As such Kohlberg's theory would presume from a moral standpoint that strict rule compliance in bureaucracies creates a false conscience and a rule based moral code that keeps employees bound at a lower level of cognitive moral maturity (Kohlberg, 1969; 1987). Hence, moral

capacity to see moral issues and make autonomous moral judgement is significantly curtailed.

This position has been substantiated by some empirical studies. For instance, Weber, (1990) in his study of moral reasoning among managers (which was in response to three distinct moral dilemmas given) discovered that managers typically reasoned at the conventional level, implying their thinking is done at the level of conformity. Weber, (1990) also discovered in his study that managers that worked in large organisations reasoned at a considerably lower level than those working in small self-employed firms thereby validating the role rules play in limiting moral capacity of employees (Jackall, 1988). Also in a review of literature by Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield, (2000), seventeen studies were found to have studied the role of code of ethics in decision-making. Results varied from those who found code of ethics as useful to the improvement of ethical behaviour (Weaver and Ferrell, 1977) to those who discovered it increased a sense of awareness and subsequent reporting of unethical incidents (Trevino and Youngblood, 1990; Barnett, 1992; Kaye, 1992) and to those who concluded it was less effective in helping ethical behaviours (Bruce, 1994; Glenn and Van Loo, 1993). However, Beneish, and Chatov, (1993) opined the contents of code vary according to industries and this could explain the variations in the findings.

2.5.2 Managerial Control and Hierarchy

Hierarchy is defined as 'a rank ordering of individuals along one or more socially important dimensions' (Gruenfeld & Tiedens, 2010; Magee & Galinsky, 2008; Parsons, 1940). Ranks are a system in which each level controls a lower level and itself controlled by higher levels. From this, the concept of managerial control arises which is the legitimate control managers can exert on their subordinates towards certain ends based on their position in the firm. Therefore, there can be different forms of hierarchy, based on the dimensions upon which the hierarchy is defined. For instance, hierarchy could be power or ability to influence others (French & Raven, 1959), knowledge structure (Downs, 1969), or leadership and ability to drive shared goals (Bass, 2008; Van Vugt, 2006). Hierarchies can also emerge formally in the case of power and authority being vested in some positions more than others

(Mills, 1956; Mintzberg, 1979; Tannenbaum, 1962; Anderson and Brown, 2010) or informally when differences in status, experience age and influence develop among peers working together (Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; Blau, 1955). A formal hierarchy or vertical structure is thus the basis of central planning and centralised decision making.

Most scholars agree that the existence of hierarchies in organisation tends towards some form of control (Maclagan, 2007). For instance, Downs, (1969) opined that hierarchical structures exist to settle conflicts via automatic rules of hierarchical status and power, which are inevitable in any large organisation, and also to promote efficient communication and the minimization of losses of time and resources that increase uncertainty and reduce productivity and thus short term efficiency. These conflicts could arise from differences in goals of employees even if all parties perceive reality identically and could also arise from their mode of perceiving realities even when they share the same basic goals. For instance the latter conflict could arise from differences in technical expertise as most bureaucracies tend to have mixed expertise on board. In order to settle these problems, power must be delegated to a few members of the organisation. These members are thereby given 'superior' authority, which is the concept of hierarchy. There could also be a communications hierarchy in which there are different knowledge levels or privileged information at each stage of the hierarchy. This is often aimed at controlling data flow or protecting sensitive data.

Studies on managerial control through hierarchies like any other bureaucratic feature have been studied in line with varying outcomes such as work satisfaction, work coordination, group performance and often with varying results (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). For instance, some studies on hierarchy have shown managerial control facilitates better group performance and coordination, yet a larger number of studies have proven hierarchies and ensuing control lead to poor group performance (Anderson and Brown, 2010) in the case of slowing down transaction or process speed (Ackroyd, Batt, Thompson and Tolbert, 2004). Also, the phenomenon of groupthink by (Janis, 1982) suggests that in groups, 'loyalty requires each member to avoid raising controversial issues' (p.12) which advances the need for conformity among members even if the decision made is dysfunctional, weak in even

conventional aspects and irrational. This limits individual moral autonomy and capacity, particularly when such groups have hierarchies and superiors exercise control, the tendencies for the group think effect is often more pronounced as group members may not want to openly oppose their leaders, thereby producing morality of the herd to the detriment of individual morality (Janis, 1982). These have often led to the conclusions in literature that managerial control is not universally good or bad for organisations but that its effects could depend on a variety of factors including personalities, organisational objectives, culture, and industry among others. (Argyris, 1973; Burns & Stalker, 1961; Galbraith, 1973; Hage, 1965; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Pugh, et al, 1969).

Likewise, the role of managerial control in the ethical behaviour of employees has been variously studied in different dimensions. It is often discussed under what MacLagan, (2007) referred to as a control oriented position implied in most of business ethics. Thus, it is a correlate of ethical behaviour and can give managers leverage over individual behaviours. It therefore logically follows that hierarchy, like training programs, codes, leadership style influences employee decisions and conducts (Weber 1993, Trevino & Nelson 1995, Ferrell and Fraedrich, 2014). Brenner and Molander, (1977) in their study concluded that the behaviour of senior managers served as a signpost for the ethical choices of junior managers. Likewise, Harris, (1990) McDonald and Zepp, (1989) and Trevino, (1986) submit that top management in emphasising and clarifying appropriate behaviour can overtly influence subordinates' behaviour. Harris, (1990) studied businesspersons using their years of business experience as a surrogate for managerial position within organisational hierarchy. He found significant differences in the ethical values of managers by years of experience for all five constructs he measured. Respondents with over 21 years of experience were found to be less tolerant to questionable business practices than the junior level ones. However more recent studies (e.g Anand, Ashfort, and Joshi 2004) have discovered trends to the contrary. As Posner and Schmidt, (1984) submitted, the longer individuals stay in a firm and rise through the ranks, the more blurred the distinction between personal and organisational values get. The moral ramifications of this transformation are huge especially regarding moral awareness and capacity to make objective moral judgements at such levels of management.

In a study of fortune 500 executives, Lincoln, Pressley and Little, (1982) reported that a majority of organisational employees admitted compromise in personal values to achieve other organisational goals relevant to efficiency linked with individual performance objectives. In a study of organisational pressures at different hierarchical levels, Posner and Schmidt, (1984) submitted that first level managers, that is supervisors felt more pressure than middle level managers and the senior managers. This finding collaborates that of Jackall, (1988) who posited that in the bureaucracies he studied, senior managers often pushed down the work load and pressure whilst the accolades rise up to them. The logic as Jackall explained is to get the subordinates (including lower /middle level management) to do any dirty work and there can be then some 'fall guy' when things don't go as planned (Jackall, 1988). Furthermore, Anand, Ashforth & Joshi, (2004) in their study observed that most immoral acts reported in corporations are perpetrated by individuals (usually top executives) who are upstanding members of society, giving to charities, are caring parents and don't share the image of typical criminals. More puzzling also is the finding of Elm and Nichols, (1993) that older managers have lower moral judgement scores than younger, less experienced employees, a position that has since been confirmed by other studies like that of Trevino and Weaver, (2003). According to Kohlberg's cognitive moral development theory, the reverse of these findings is meant to be the case, as older, more experienced employees are expected in principle to hold themselves accountable to higher moral standards. This is further buttressed by empirical findings that confirm moral reasoning to be lower in work-related dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas (Weber, 1990; Elm & Nichols, 1993).

Thus, managerial control through hierarchies undermines the genuineness and quality/frequency of moral discourse in organisations (Jackall, 1988). Besides the documented impacts senior management have on their subordinates, varying demands and pressures at different levels of hierarchy could also have varying moral implications. At lower levels, for instance, full integration into the system and its ways may not have fully occurred hence some measure of individual morality can still govern action. Whereas, as employees rise through the ranks, the demands of their roles could cause a blur between individual ethical reasoning and moral values in the moral code the organisation. As Jackall (1988) claimed that 'organisational life

makes managers unable to see most issues that confront them as moral, even when the problems they face are presented in moral terms' Tsahuridu, (2006). At that height, the dilution of values creates complex individuals whose capacity to make objective moral judgements could be significantly hindered.

2.6 Conclusion

This review has explored the evolution of bureaucracy in business organisations through history. Arguing that the demands of technological advancements and access to resources during and after industrial revolution era necessitated change in organisation arrangements, bureaucracy rose up as the rational, most efficient means of ordering resources in a largely capitalist Western world. With its rise also came a decline in substantive rationality and the ascent of instrumental rationality, a trend that implied absolute values gave way to pluralism. This opened a pathway for moral discourse. Also bureaucracy in action revealed the wrong side of rationality or efficient systems that seemed to have every rule and procedures set in place, in the iron cage phenomenon. The fact that rules could suppress moral autonomy and limit the capacity of employees to at times see moral issues involved in their decisions, thereby rendering them incapable to respond appropriately also opened another channel for the discourse of bureaucratic morality.

Also, Weber's ideal type, which is the most popular conceptualisation of bureaucracies amidst a few possible ones, was further scrutinised and was found to have its several merits and demerits. In line with the discourse on employee morality and the role of bureaucracy, very few empirical studies for instance, Ferrell and Skinner, (1988) and Jackall, (1988) have explicitly studied the link between bureaucracy and morality. Both discovered that bureaucracies indeed have a way of limiting the moral capacities of their employees and could even go as far as replacing their identity. Yet, none of both studies employed any ethical theories in making sense of their findings. But with advancements in the field of descriptive ethics there is a better opportunity for richer empirical insight into how bureaucracies actually interact with individuals to affect their morality. Finally, in investigating how bureaucracies do this, two of its components, rules and hierarchies were further investigated and found to affect morality in different ways.

CHAPTER 3

ETHICAL DECISION MAKING: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE

3.0 Introduction

This chapter presents and critically discusses descriptive ethical theories with a focus on individual factors. They aim to be used as lenses in understanding processes that drive morality at the individual and group levels within bureaucratic contexts. Of particular importance is the understanding of ethical, unethical or amoral behavioural responses of actors in bureaucratic contexts based on my choice of moral identity and cognitive moral development works. Both streams of literature are situated within a broader literature looking at moral agency based on situationally defined identities (Ashforth, 2001) and social frameworks stifling individual moral agency (Bandura, 2001). Randall and Gibson, (1990) in a critique of business ethics research commented that only about 35% of studies they reviewed offered any kind of theoretical development, whilst 75% lacked hypotheses or propositions to be tested (O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Whilst theoretical improvements in ethics may have increased the number of studies focusing on theory development as reported in a more recent review effort by Jennings, Mitchel and Hannah, (2014), the study of bureaucratic morality still lacks studies with strong theoretical grounding and empirically tested hypotheses or propositions. This presents a gap in literature for this study to make a contribution. The first part will offer a critical justification of the descriptive ethical theories: Kohlberg's cognitive moral development theory (CMD) and the socio-cognitive moral identity theory chosen for this study. Then each theory will be separately reviewed in the second part. Focus will be on the strengths and shortcomings of each, empirical applications and potential contributions to the discourse of bureaucratic morality from which propositions to be tested will be drawn.

3.1 Theoretical Approaches in Descriptive Ethics

The study of business ethics is usually divided into two realms: normative and descriptive ethics (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Normative ethics offers guides on how to behave (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994) while descriptive or empirical ethics attempts to predict and explain the actual behaviour of individuals (Trevino and Weaver, 1994; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). The latter has been the focus of ethical decision making in the social sciences and business literature (Trevino,


Weaver and Reynolds, 2006) with studies relying heavily on an ethical decision-making framework by Rest, (1986). Rest's, (1986) framework posits that in descriptive ethics, the focus is on an entire decision making process involving first being morally aware of an ethical issue, before moral judgement can be made, followed by moral motivation and moral behaviour (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau and Thoma, 1999). This framework (that appears in figure 1.1 in the intro chapter) was a revolutionary understanding on processes that guide moral agents to actually act ethically, as it is much broader from a focus on moral judgement alone which normative ethics espouses and has been argued cannot fully predict moral behaviour (Trevino and Weaver, 2003).

Other individual factors such as age, gender, education, nationality, locus of control amongst others as well as contextual variables such as opportunities, code of ethics, rewards and sanction, hierarchy, leadership etc. have often been tested (Ford and Richardson, 1994; Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield, 2000; Cottone and Claus, 2000; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005). Interestingly, the most tested individual variables; age (Jones and Gautschi, 1988; Barnet and Carson, 1989; Muncy and Vitell, 1992; Razzaque and Hwee, 2002 etc.) and gender (Chonko and Hunt, 1985; Ferrell and Skinner, 1988; Brady and Wheeler, 1996 etc.) have often reported no significant impact on ethical decision-making. Studies that have reported significant impacts often found women to be more ethical than men (Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield, 2000; Weber and Wabieleski, 2001). Other individual factors studied in this regard have also returned varied findings (Cottone and Claus, 2000) often with no clear consensus on how they affect ethical decision-making.

Advancements in theories spanning the last four decades, focusing on the individual have enhanced our understanding of the dynamics that enable a higher or lower quality of individual moral reasoning and action patterns in organisations. For instance, theories and frameworks such as cognitive moral development (CMD) (Kohlberg, 1969); human integrity theories (Akrivou & Oron, 2016 in press), individual-context interaction (Trevino, 1986); moral intensity (Jones, 1991); and socio-cognitive moral identity (Blasi, 1983, 1984; Aquino and Reed, 2002; Hardy and Carlo, 2005) have all contributed immensely to the discourse on conscious level moral reasoning. However, some other studies have also highlighted the role of unconscious reasoning and bias in ethical decision making such as the works of

Guadin & Thorne, (2001) on emotions, and cognitive affect models in ethical decision making as well as Woiceshyn's, (2011) Intuition approach (see figure 3.1 below). Intuition for instance was found in a study of 19 CEOs by Woicheshyn (2009) to be actively deployed in business decision-making and it played a salient role in the quality of decisions. The majority of these advancements stem from the cognitive approach to ethical decision making with early research focusing primarily on the individual and their ability to reason through dilemmas. I choose to focus on two theories that both emphasize the cognitive understanding of moral behaviour.

Figure 3.1: Theoretical Approaches to Ethical Decision-making.



Hence, Kohlberg's (1969) CMD was heavily relied upon as this cognitive approach to ethical decision-making 'emphasizes the importance of moral reasoning to explain moral behaviour' (Jennings, Mitchel and Hannah, 2014) where moral reasoning is seen as a function of a person's overall cognitive maturation (Akrivou, 2013; Kohlberg, 1969). In other words, this approach aims at understanding the underlying thought patterns, or cognitive equilibria which can help decipher the structure of the reasoning processes of individuals while undertaking ethical action, or when making ethical decisions. To date, Kohlberg's, (1969) CMD theory is often argued to be the most influential cognitive-based theory (Aquino & Reed, 2002). O'Fallon and Butterfield, (2005) reported that from 23 CMD based studies covered in their review, 19 reported very significant findings on the impact of CMD on moral behaviour. Prior

to their report, two other review articles by Ford and Richardson (1994) and Loe et al. (2000) did not report any CMD studies, suggesting increasing interests in the application of the CMD in modern business ethics studies, particularly individual ethical decision making. Therefore, Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, (2006) concluded in their review that it is indeed proven that the CMD theory proposes moral reasoning as the strongest predictor of ethical behaviour and has paved the way forward for studies in this field (Ford and Richardson, 1994; O'Fallon and Butterfield, 2005).

A second strand of the literature is the (more recent) concept of *moral identity* (Blasi, 1983, 1984, 2005; Aquino and Reed, 2002). Since it surfaced it has become increasingly popular as another explanatory variable in the behavioural ethics literature. At the identity level of studying individuals, the question to be answered is "Who am I?" This is the whole concept of self which according to Markus & Wurf, (1987) is the interpretive structure that mediates most significant intrapersonal processes (including information processing, affect and motivation) and a wide variety of interpersonal processes (including social perception, choice of situation among others). It is also essentially regarded as a self-regulation mechanism of how individuals control and direct their own actions. Many recent studies (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Carlo and Hardy, 2005; Blasi, 2005) have begun looking actively into identity based moral motivation for greater insight into the complex human ethical action and decision-making processes from which the construct of moral identity emerged.

This approach proposes that when moral traits are central to self-definition, it increases the chances of acting morally (Blasi, 1999). If however he falters, it translates as a betrayal of self. Thus as Erikson, (1964) posited that as identity is rooted in one's being, moral actions result only when morality is integrated into one's self (Blasi, 1984). Therefore, a person has moral actions to the extent to which moral values, ideals and concerns are central to self-understanding and self-definition (Blasi, 1993, Carlo and Hardy 2005). This in turn motivates a sense of responsibility to behave consistently with those notions. Aquino and Reed, (2002) developed this work further by creating a tool to measure moral identity in individuals along two dimensions internalisation (the degree to which moral values are considered central to self) and symbolisation (the degree to which these traits are expressed publicly through the person's actions) (Reynolds and Creanic, 2007). Empirical studies that have used Aquino and Reed's (2002) tool have reported significantly positive

correlations between moral identity and ethical decision-making (Aquino et al, 2009; 2011; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004). In addition, moral identity has been found to be critical to moral processing and behaviour (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Weaver, 2006) and has also been found to be an important construct in explaining the link between moral judgement and moral behaviour (Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007).

Thus this study will be employing both Kohlberg's CMD and moral identity theory together to provide a rich theoretical underpinning for understanding how morality in individuals interacts with bureaucratic contexts. Both theories, as discussed above will potentially bring unique contributions into this study. This approach has the potential to make contributions to existing knowledge. The next sections critically explore both the CMD and moral identity in greater depth. The unique contributions each can bring to the discourse of bureaucratic morality will be underlined from which propositions to be tested will be drawn.

3.2 Kohlberg's Cognitive Moral Development Theory

Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development took its roots from the assumptions on the moral development in children by Piaget, (1932). Piaget's research viewed and established morality as cognitive and developmental, implying that the development of children in making moral judgements is based on interactions with the social environment and how it affects the cognitive moral development patterns of children¹. Kohlberg, (1969) building on Piaget's theory assumptions developed a theory of moral development in adulthood, with a longitudinal research on fifty-eight American boys (Kohlberg, 1981). Although his choice of an all-male sample has often been criticised (Murphy and Gilligan, 1980) and argued may have returned varied results had female samples been included (Gilligan, 1982), further studies (Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield, 2000; Weber and Wabielecki, 2001) on CMD in both

¹ From this, he identified development spanning through two separate moralities that characterised children from age six through twelve (Trevino, 1992). The first, he called morality of constraint in which the children are subject to another's law and where rights are defined by obedience to authority in their earlier development and the second, he described as morality of cooperation or autonomy, where children in their later development understand and internalise rules independent of adult authority (Fleming, 2005). The transition from constraint to autonomy is aided by peer interactions and cognitive development and thus, they begin to see rules as mutually beneficial to maintain order in a social construct (Fleming, 2006).

male and female have reported insignificant differences between both sexes (Bussey and Maughan, 1982).

Nonetheless, Kohlberg's aim to study changes in moral reasoning as growth and development occurs over the course of a lifetime resulted in the following key assumptions:

1. The theory is universal and non-culturally specific (Fraedrich et al 1994)
2. CMD is based on how moral maturity capacity progresses in a staged and unidirectional process in the context of the surrounding, culturally conditioned rules and conventions towards more principled and universal ethics (Akrivou, 2013). Kohlberg's arguments lie within the construct of moral relativism in view of how individuals are able to use their cognitive moral faculties to respond to the surrounding morality in a given context.
3. Higher stages of moral development are psychologically more adequate than lower stages. (Levine, 2007)
4. Higher stages of moral development involve higher maturity in cognitive terms, i.e. they involve more nuanced and rigorous reasoning capacities upon which moral reasoning may identify increasingly more universal and complicated ethical dimensions and solutions.
5. Formal qualities of moral judgements can be defined or agreed upon regardless of agreement on substantive matters (Fraedrich et al 1994)

These assumptions provide a foundation for his study in which he followed his sample aged between 10 and 16 years, for a twelve-year period, interviewing them every three years (Trevino, 1986). He tested the response of his sample with hypothetical moral dilemmas from which he delineated a structure for moral reasoning and observed how changes occurred as the boys grew older. He discovered that changes in moral reasoning result from the cognitive disequilibrium that occurs when an individual perceives a contradiction between a current pattern in his or her moral reasoning level and the next higher one (Turiel, 1969).

In Kohlberg's view, the essential ingredient of moral development is not social pressure, the superego or habit, but rather a certain mode of reasoning and

judgement that are neither innate nor environmental, but arise through the interaction of the child with his social environment (Aron, 1970) resulting in personal choices and cognitive responses. In his widely read publication, Kohlberg (1969, p.352) further explained that the cognitive development assumption is that basic mental structure is the result of ‘an interaction between organismic structuring tendencies and the structure of the outside world’, rather than reflecting one directly. This interaction leads to cognitive stages, which represent continuous transformations through exposure to the external environment. Kohlberg’s arguments lie within the construct of moral relativism in which the morality of an action is relative to context and in which no action is moral or immoral but are justified by the reasoning behind such actions. However, reasoning is not stagnant, but changes from childhood to adulthood.

Kohlberg’s CMD model identified six stages of cognitive moral development as follows (See Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of the CMD stages and a breakdown of the Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) profiles of all participants. See also Chapter 4, Page 79 for a detailed description of how Kohlberg’s CMD stages were adapted empirically to determine the CMR levels of participants):

Figure 3.1: Kohlberg’s CMD Stages and Social Perspectives

Stage	What is considered right	Social Perspective
<p>1. PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL</p> <p>Stage One – Obedience and punishment orientation</p> <p>Stage Two – Instrumental purpose and exchange</p>	<p>Sticking to rules to avoid physical punishment. Obedience for its own sake</p> <p>Following rules only when it is in one’s immediate interest. Right is an equal exchange, a fair trial</p>	<p>EGOISM</p> <p>Blind Egoism</p> <p>Instrumental Egoism</p>
<p>2. CONVENTIONAL LEVEL</p> <p>Stage Three – Interpersonal accord, conformity, mutual expectations</p>	<p>Stereotypical ‘good’ behaviour. Living up to what is expected by people close to you.</p>	<p>BENEVOLENCE</p> <p>Instrumental social relationship perspective</p>

<p>Stage Four – Social accord and system maintenance</p>	<p>Fulfilling duties and obligations to which you have agreed. Upholding laws except in extreme cases where they conflict with social duties. Contributing to society, group.</p>	<p>Instrumental Social systems perspectives</p>
3. PRINCIPLED LEVEL		
<p>Stage Five – Social contract and Individual rights</p>	<p>Being aware that people hold a variety of values; that rules are relative to the group. Upholding rules because they are social contract. Upholding non-relative values and rights regardless of majority opinion.</p>	<p>PRINCIPLE Contractual / Principled Perspective</p>
<p>Stage Six – Universal ethical principles</p>	<p>Following self-chosen ethical principles. When laws violate these principles, act in accord with principle.</p>	<p>Mutual respect as a universal principle</p>

Source: Adapted from Kohlberg, (1969, 1971) Victor and Cullen, (1988) and Trevino, (1986)

Based on these stages, Kohlberg, (1977) argued that the higher stages were objectively better in terms of the rigour and relevance to important ethical standards and therefore more desirable than the lower stages. Thus, a higher level of moral cognitive maturity implied more nuanced and more integrated ethical decision-making which embraces broader humanistic and ecological ethical responses via dialogue internally in the self and externally, while it abandons ego-driven moral choices (Kohlberg, 1981; Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang, 2013; 2015). This is a major contribution of the Kohlberg theory, which makes it relevant today. By operating on a higher level, one’s overall moral reasoning becomes more complicated and nuanced in that it balances harmonically yet ethically various social-citizenship and professional ethical identities principles (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977; Akrivou, 2008) while the opposite is true for pre-conventional and early conventional stages in particular, hence, his theory allows a unidirectional flow upwards. Therefore,

individuals reasoning at stages five and six for instance are expected to be morally sound and able to make decisions consistent with their beliefs, even in difficult situations (Trevino, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006) as different from those operating at the lower stages who are more inclined to the 'obedience and punishment', 'conformity' or 'law and order' orientations, all of which restrict moral reasoning and behavioural capacity.

Kohlberg's theorised unidirectional flow of cognitive maturity has however drawn criticisms from other scholars. For instance, Bussey and Maughan, (1982) observed that from Kohlberg's initial longitudinal studies (Holstein, 1976; Kohlberg and Krammer, 1969) some of the adults did regress to lower stages of moral development, which contradicts Kohlberg's unidirectional position. Also, as understood by Kohlbergian scholars, 'an individual may be cognitively capable of reasoning at the highest stages of the moral development scale but does not always operate at the highest stages given various individual, organizational, and context factors' (Malinowski and Smith, 1985; Weber and Gillespie, 1998; Weber and Wasieleski, 2001). For example in bureaucracies where strict adherence to set rules is compulsory, the likelihood of a regression to lower CMD stages is a possibility since the pressure from such contexts could force individuals to operate at lower CMD levels than they would for instance in non-work scenarios.

In a study by Elms and Nichols, (1993), older managers were discovered to have lower moral judgement scores than younger, less experienced employees, a position that has since been confirmed by other studies like that of Trevino and Weaver, (2003). According to Kohlberg's cognitive moral development theory, the reverse of these findings is meant to be the case and the power of socialisation of individuals within organisational cultures that are weak in ethical reflection terms is salient, which may indicate the progression in moral development can also take both directions (an ascending and a descending one). This is further buttressed by empirical findings that confirm moral reasoning to be lower in work-related dilemmas compared to non-work dilemmas (Weber, 1990; Elm & Nichols, 1993; Adewale, 2011). Thus, some of Kohlberg's unidirectional claims remains contestable, especially if the individuals have not reached the principled level at which it could be truly difficult to regress to lower stages (Kohlberg, 1981). Yet from literature, it has been widely reported that the highest level managers often operate at is stage four

(Weber, 1990), which would imply the likelihood of fluctuations in their CMD levels. Therefore, Aron, (1970) argued that moral reasoning alone cannot predict moral behaviour, especially within organisations.

Hannah, Avolio & May, (2011) for instance also criticised Kohlberg's CMD as addressing one aspect of cognitive abilities, that is the capacity to recognise and judge moral issues, whereas it fails in helping us understand self-regulatory capacities that 'promote how an individual engages his or her full cognitive capacities in a given moral dilemma' (p. 666). Neither does the CMD help our understanding of why an individual will stand up and act in the face of adversity whilst another with equal cognitive capacity would not (Bandura, 1999). Furthermore, some other key empirical studies (Blasi, 1983; Bergman, 2004; Hoffman, 2000; Walker, 2004; Shao, Aquino and Freeman, 2008) have also claimed that the strength of the relationship between moral reasoning and moral action is small or at best moderate in all tested scenarios. Therefore, other mechanisms besides moral reasoning also affect the ethical decision making process (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Trevino, 1990; Rest, 1991; Weaver, 2006).

Further, Bandura, (1999) identified forms of ethical reasoning failure associated with human cognition, for instance, moral disengagement which he explained is the process of people deliberately disengaging or freeing themselves from self-sanctions and guilt that would normally come from unethical conducts (Moore and Gino, 2013). Indeed, there are times human decision makers would fail to follow rational principles, alternatives or give importance to what really matters (Guzak, 2015). Finally, Kohlberg's CMD is based on the philosophy of justice, whereas other philosophical principles such as virtue (McIntyre, 1981) and equality (Pojman, 1995), amongst others are totally ignored. Therefore, there is more to ethical decision-making than moral reasoning (Blasi, 1984; Higgins et al 1984). Blasi, (1983) in his study of ethical decision making introduced the concept of identity in explaining the failures of cognition in the ethical decision making process and thereby claims to expound on Rest's (1986) last two stages – moral motivation and moral behaviour. In addition Kohlberg's theory is initially tested entirely within western assumptions and may not have salience for other cultures. However, an exploratory CMD study on Nigerian managers (Adewale, 2011) revealed the salience of the CMD within that African

context and also found consistent with literature that indeed several managers reason at the conventional level.

Based on these contributions as well as criticisms, Kohlberg's CMD has been severally tested in empirical studies and is strongly linked to moral behaviour. Studies like those of Green and Weber, (1997) and Bass, Barnett and Brown (1999) found very strong positive relationships between CMD and ethical judgement or that CMD positively influenced the decision making process. Trevino, (1986) in a study empirically tested the interaction between cognitive moral development in individuals and contextual elements (work roles and immediate work context) in affecting ethical decision-making. She discovered varied moral reasoning capacities in her respondents based on their CMD level according to Kohlberg's theory. This position has been confirmed in other studies for instance Weber, (1990) and Trevino, (1992) who also found very positive relationships between levels of CMD in managers and varied responses to ethical dilemmas in a business context thereby affirming the applicability and credibility of the CMD in business oriented moral dilemmas.

3.3 Moral Identity Theory

More recent theorising in the study of moral development focuses on identity based morality, or moral identity (Bergman, 2004). Increasingly, this line of study is influencing studies in the broader ethical decision making literature (e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2005; Weaver, 2006). The express claim behind this growing line of work is to bridge the gap between moral judgement and moral behaviour (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007), as some critiques of Kohlberg's theory noted it may be weak in this respect, as noted earlier. As Damon, (1984:110) argued, "we must know about not only the person's moral beliefs but also the person's understanding of self in relation to those moral beliefs". Therefore, as far as morality is central to self-understanding, failure to act in accordance with one's moral traits creates a moral dissonance and emotional discomfort (Blasi, 1999). It is in effect a betrayal of self and as Bergman, (2004) argued, 'the motivating power of morality resides in its degree of integration with the self'. This implies that regardless of situational variations, decisions emanating from the root of one's being (Erikson, 1964) will likely hardly ever vary in different contexts.

Thus, self-identity has been closely linked with cognition, affect and behaviour. For instance, Weaver and Agle, (2002) theorised while Bolton and Reed, (2004) have empirically verified that judgements that harmonise well with one's identity are more stable than those not in harmony with one's identity yet how individuals value their options is not explained by this approach hence it is weak in this respect.

3.3.1 Conceptualising Moral Identity

There are two broad perspectives to the conceptualising of moral identity (Shao, Aquino and Freeman, 2008) namely: the character perspective and the socio-cognitive perspective. The character perspective took its root from the 'self-model' of Blasi, (1983; 1984) and has been described as befitting in understanding the disposition of moral exemplars (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim and Felps, 2008). The socio-cognitive approach however relates with the complex structures of moral functioning as well as the social dimensions of morality and identity (Rai and Fiske, 2011; Moore and Gino, 2013) more relevant to everyday morality within organisational contexts.

The socio-cognitive approach conceptualises moral identity as a schema of moral values and traits often leading to the building of cognitive representations and behavioural scripts (Aquino and Reed, 2002). In this approach, identity is formed through social cognition processes and therefore draws on theoretical contributions from social cognition, memory, identity and information processing to explain moral functioning (Bandura, 2001; Shao, et al, 2008). The socio-cognitive perspective assumes that individuals are an embodiment of multiple identities (Shao et al, 2008), often defined through association with different social structures (Bandura, 2001). Hence, moral identity is one of several possible identities individuals possess and has to be 'triggered' by situational cues to play a part in affecting behaviour (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Reynolds and Ceracic, 2007).

This approach however has its roots in postmodern tradition which promotes the idea of identity as non-unitary and self-concept as fragmented and plural e.g. Markus and Nurius's, (1986) the plural selves. This tradition presupposes various self-definitions are not held together or integrated by an overarching synthesis (Schwitzer, 2004) and explains why moral identity can be construed as a standalone identity whereas, having moral values as central to one's self, which Aquino's (2002)

advocates, could also be a part of other identities. For instance, being kind is not an isolated moral value we simply acquire but could stem from other identities such as being a mother, father or Christian. As Schwitzer, (2004) further argues that what follows with reference to the concept of plural selves is an openly different way of interpreting and of valuing the self. Morally, this will 'liberate the person from oppressive expectations of cultural and personal integration' (p.50), normally central to the position of the unitary self and stable identity. This approach thus limits the concept of individual integrity and could facilitate multiplied reasons for any moral or immoral actions to be justifiable based on a particular identity since the individuals are fragmented and believe they are different persons in different circumstances and contexts. Whereas the concept of unitary and consistent identity proposes a holistic approach to personality, which makes individuals more accountable to themselves under different circumstances.

However, moral identity exists alongside a host of other possible identities that can guide ethical behaviour, hence not every moral outcome may be attributable to an 'independent' moral identity. For instance, an act of 'kindness' may have its root in the actor being a father, mother or a member of a group as different from assuming kindness is a stand-alone moral virtue that can be integrated into oneself independent of other identities. Also, this approach does not explain moral development and seems to assume internalising a virtue translates into full moral maturity, a position that tends to ignore elements of an individual's growth and development within a polity. Nonetheless, some propositions of the moral identity theory will potentially enrich our understanding on the discourse of individual ethical decision-making within bureaucratic contexts.

Also, a critical mechanism in the socio-cognitive moral identity approach is knowledge accessibility, which presupposes that the more accessible (readiness for activation), a given schema or cognitive representation is, the stronger its influence in affecting subsequent behaviour (Higgins, 1996). Therefore, a person's moral identity is considered a central part of their self-definition if their moral knowledge structure is easily accessible in given situations and can therefore impact information processing and subsequent behaviour (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Lapsley and Lasky, 2001; Lapsley and Narvaez, 2004). This process underpins the concept of self-importance (Damon, 1984) that is the centrality of an identity to self-definition. It

then also follows on the other hand that where a person's moral identity is not readily accessible, its 'activation potential' is limited and would therefore play a minor role in regulating moral behaviour (Aquino et al, 2009).

However it is also possible to have a salient moral identity, which is at the same time incongruent with for instance, a professional identity, as in the case for managers in their organisations. This kind of conflict exposes another potential flaw in the socio-cognitive approach, as it does not explain how such individuals would make a moral decision in the circumstance. One way such managers resolve the conflict therefore would be to find some means of rationalising their actions. Thus for a person to maintain self-consistency according to the Higgins' (1996) model they would try to convince themselves they are a moral manager if they are following the rules their superiors and a bureaucracy sets for them. This is indeed what Jackall, (1988) found and no coincidence managers in Jackal's sample exhibited early level conventional moral development stages. They had no moral discomfort nor were even fully aware how they manipulated their self-system to behave conformably while re-labelling them "ethical" to get away from the guilt originating in their moral identity that they have failed morally while at work.

Nonetheless, Aquino and Reed, (2002) defined moral identity as 'self-schema organised around a set of moral trait associations' for instance, being honest, caring, compassionate etc or as simply the 'embeddedness' of certain characteristically moral traits in ones' self-concept and behaviour' (Reynolds and Ceranic, 2007). They defined these associations as relating to distinct mental image of what a moral person is likely to think, feel and do in any given situation. Aquino and Reed, (2002) further developed a construct to measure moral identity following from Erikson's (1964) definition of identity as being rooted in one's being. Aquino and Reed theorised that there are the private and public aspects of identity and came up with two dimensions: Internalisation and Symbolisation. As Reynolds and Ceranic, (2007) observed, "Internalization reflects the degree to which a set of moral traits is central to the self-concept, whereas symbolization reflects the degree to which these traits are expressed publicly through the person's actions".

As such, a person characterised as having a high internalised moral identity is one whose 'morally relevant knowledge is chronically accessible in terms of quantity and

speed within the self-working concept' (Aquino et al., 2009). Thus, when a person is regarded as high in moral identity internalisation, it simply means that their moral traits are quickly and readily accessible in any given situation, whereas when an individual is termed low in moral identity internalisation, this does not imply that such persons lack any cognitively accessible moral trait but that such traits are not readily accessible, consistently, quickly or easily as someone who is high in internalisation (Winterich, Aquino, Mittal and Swatz, 2013). Moreover, being high or low along the internalisation dimension according to Aquino and Reed, (2002) does not indicate whether a person is a moral person in a normative sense, that is, this does not refer to a moral capacity to determine right and wrong; and is also unlike Kohlberg's (1984) stages for instance where moral development is hinged on a particular ethical system. On the other hand, a person high on symbolisation, the public dimension of Aquino and Reed's (2002) moral identity dimensions, is someone who 'tends to engage in visible activities that can convey to others his or her commitment to certain moral goals and ideals' (Winterich et al., 2013). Therefore, a person low in moral symbolisation is simply someone who is less inclined to engage in public displays. Aquino and Reed, (2002) further explain that symbolisation level does not necessarily correspond to a person's level of internalisation, although both should have some kind of positive relationship. Also that the terms 'high' and 'low' as used in this theoretical model does not refer to comparison of strengths of these elements across dimensions but rather within each dimension.

However, in line with Aquino and Reed's, (2002) submission that moral identity internalisation and symbolisation do not refer to whether individuals are moral in a normative sense, it can therefore be argued that the moral identity approach ignores the fact that individuals have to make judgements in any given situation and assumes that moral judgement is already carried out once an individual chooses to behave in accordance to internalised moral values. And it also seems to assume that this would always translate into moral behaviour, which may not be true especially within the capricious setting of organisations. The moral ramifications of this is that every action is moral as long as it can be justified with a moral trait held as central to one's self definition. This kind of approach creates a subjective kind of morality that is not related to the main normative ethics norms of judging morality thereby creating a perfect setup for employees to completely alienate themselves from the moral

consequences of their actions and still justify such actions as moral, which was Hummel's (1998) argument of the 'dehumanising tendencies' in organisations. Also since employees adapt their morality to suit the demands of their organisations, the satisfaction derived from being 'moral' is actually that of conformity to organisational norms and the acceptance, rewards and associated benefits. This therefore stifles employee moral inquiry capacity and ability to rise above the status quo habitus in their organisations.

Also, in this approach, the individual who has better capacity in making 'moral' decisions is one whose moral values are readily, quickly and easily accessible in any given circumstance and vice versa. This also seems to ignore moral development in individuals and as Schwitzer (2004) argues 'the assumption that the achievement of a firm identity, or the followership of what authority figures in power expect to see from employees or lower level managers is the basis for mature intimacy leaves out and deeply underestimates, the need for genuine interpersonal and community relationships and related ethical deliberations which are indispensable for healthy development' (p.50). This may also lead to the avoidance of the real moral content or issue involved in any morally sensitive situations.

Nonetheless, both internalisation and symbolisation have been empirically proven to predict moral behaviours with internalisation found to be more predictive than symbolisation (Aquino and Reed, 2002; Reed and Aquino, 2003; Mulder and Aquino, 2013). The critical role contexts could play in the functioning of moral identity has also been widely reported. For instance, several studies (Weaver, 2006; Weaver & Agle, 2002; Bandura, 2001) have identified that 'contextual influences can reduce the salience and influence of any particular identity' (Ashforth and Mael, 1989) by activating or deactivating knowledge structured including the moral self (Shao et al, 2008). For instance, observing a moral exemplar may activate moral self, making it more prominent in decision making whilst on another hand, large financial rewards for a simple task may activate other aspects of an individual's identity and could deactivate the moral self (Aquino et al, 2008). However, empirical studies addressing the impact of contexts on moral identity are scant (Weaver, 2006) hence this study will be contributing to knowledge in this regard by investigating the impact of bureaucratic environments on moral identity of employees.

3.4 CMD and Moral Identity in Bureaucratic Contexts

Following from the previous chapter and section, it is well established that bureaucratic contexts governed by the strict rules and hierarchical control create environments emphasizing strict compliance and conformity. This social setting could have different implications on both cognitive moral development and moral identity.

3.4.1 CMD in a Bureaucratic Context

Bureaucracies have been theorised to have stifling effects on the morality of those working in them (Jackal, 1988) and as such varied behaviours can be expected from individuals reasoning at different levels of Kohlberg's CMD. Victor and Cullen, (1988 pg. 105) developed an 'ethical climate' typology based on Kohlberg's three reasoning levels. Their framework, which described different types of ethical climates created at each of Kohlberg's CMD level, predicts moral behavioural inclinations by individuals reasoning at those levels. They submitted that at the pre-conventional or egoist level of reasoning, the ethical climate created is centred on 'self-interest' at the individual level (Victor and Cullen, 2002). In the 'self-interest' climate type, individuals within the organisation perceive that it is expected of them to relate to others on the basis of more instrumental or formalised exchange, or follow what is being asked of them with no moral questioning of demands while they seek to maximise their personal interests (Maesschalck and Vanoverbeke, 2005). "As such the (individual) usually seeks the alternative with the consequences that most satisfies his/her needs, ignoring/neglecting the needs or interests of others" (Parboteeah and Cullen, 2003:140). At the local or organisational locus of analysis however the ethical climate is aimed at maximising economic interest of the organisation based on how a given authority group defines it, referred to as 'company profit' towards organisational 'efficiency' (Victor and Cullen, 1988). All these seem to suggest bureaucracy may be very compatible with early and middle level conventional (Kohlberg 1971) thinking patterns in organisations.

Au and Wong, (2000) commented on the inadequacy of this level of moral reasoning as well as the kind of ethical climate it creates. He submitted that the avoidance of punishment or an excessive focus on individual gains could encourage submission to authorities and execution of commands regardless of ethical values, especially within bureaucracies where obedience and respect for set authority are customary.

Therefore individuals reasoning at the pre-conventional level would be expected to maintain a 'child-like' adherence to rules or do so for just merely personal gain (Kohlberg, 1971; Trevino, 1992). In other words, they follow through an organisation's rules as they are to avoid sanctions, queries or dismissal from their jobs and to get great personal benefits such as good reputations with the bosses, promotions, awards, bonuses amongst other possible rewards the system offers. Hence, moral capacity is essentially absent at this stage of reasoning, but individuals are willing to comply with what are asked to do to avoid punishments and gain rewards to have an easy life, without paying genuine attention to the moral consequences and dynamics of action.

At the conventional level however, Victor and Cullen, (1988) described the kind of ethical climate created by this level of moral reasoning as that of superficial 'friendship' loyalty ties at the individual level and 'team interest' negotiated against at the organisational level. Consequently, the moral implications of this in a bureaucratic system is such that the desire and imposed necessity to conform makes it difficult to rise above the status-quo or norms even if they are personally perceived as immoral (Trevino, 1992). This conformity is of course safe as Kohlberg (1971) critiques, while its conformity bias (Prentice, 2007) starts with newcomers' socialization for example who observe others to learn office protocols and that rules should be guiding action. A key characteristic of these stages is that rule compliance is not distinguishing meaningful or less meaningful rules and the ethical aspect of rules but absorbs and behaves compliantly vis-à-vis any rules. Often the concern is to look good, be perceived as loyal and a strong need for social approval, while this level capacities pressure people to endorse any behaviour from those in power roles just to find endorsement by authority or a sense of belonging in communities in the organisation (Asch, 1951) as employees assume those behaviours are inescapable norms (Dobson, 2003). In the worst cases this can lead to system level immorality; Byrne, (2002) explained for instance that an Enron employee admitted the organisation's fast and loose corporate style wasn't 'so bad' since 'everybody else is doing it'. It is for this reason that a 'corporate code of ethics cannot effectively compete with actual corporate cultures that are inconsistent with the code's stated values' (Dobson, 2003) hence no code of ethics can be effective when employees daily observe its breach.

Accordingly, within a bureaucratic organisational context, characterised by strict rules, procedures and hierarchical domination, it can be argued that an environment of strict rule based compliance could force employees to operate at lower levels of cognitive moral reasoning, regardless of their 'usual' CMD level. Bureaucratic environments achieve this by imposing compliance, providing rewards for abiding by the rules and sanctions for violating set rules, with little emphasis in the broader participation of employees to question, critique and/or change the rules. Thus, employees are constantly put on their toes to ensure their daily activities are carried out in line with company procedures or to please their superiors, which could then take their attention away from any moral red flags. Even when any 'conflicts of interests' are found, they may likely follow company rules for their own 'security'. The end result is to keep being 'good', avoiding any problems with the organisation and hoping to get associated rewards in salaries, benefits, job security and promotion.

This theory on alignment with authority was further buttressed in a laboratory experiment carried out by Stanley Milgram in 1963 in his studies on obedience in social settings. Participants were asked to carry out increasingly injurious shocks on innocent, protesting victims, who were merely pretending to be harmed (Milgram, 1963). Contrary to initial predictions that less than 1 percent of participants would obey, more than 65% obeyed (Milgram, 1963) therefore Prentice, (2007) concluded that people tend to be more deferential to authority than they realise. Prentice, (2007) further argued that if mere individuals in lab coats could wield such an influence, how much more could bosses with the power to determine the economic future of their employees? Pleasing authorities comes with its rewards whilst displeasing them comes with heavy penalties. This further explains for instance, the emails of Blodget, an employee of Merrill Lynch who had publicly praised a series of stocks but had privately wished he could express his firm beliefs that they were all nonsense (Prentice, 2007 p.18). Thus, two issues emerge: First that for hierarchical authority to have effect on employees, bosses need not expressly instruct employees to carry out unethical activities, but that employees are 'intuitive politicians' who can infer the wishes of their bosses and will be willing to carry them out to save their heads (Tetlock, 1991). Secondly, from Blodget's case, employees may realise the unethical nature of their intended behaviours but the desire to satisfy personal desire or those of their bosses takes over. This Tetlock, (1985) referred to as 'acceptability

heuristics'. The result is that employees frame answers that are acceptable and pleasing to their bosses rather than an ethical one.

Also, group level associations could lower moral reasoning at the individual level by the concept of 'group think' (Janis, 1971). The groupthink instils a tendency in members of a group to avoid introducing stress into the group and to foster cohesiveness (Janis, 1982) by following the direction of the majority or their seniors in higher positions in spite of any perceived irrationality in such decisions. It often comes with pressure from superiors as well as peers, both of which are observable in bureaucratic systems through vertical and horizontal relationships. This desire not to transgress or bring jeopardy to the efforts of a group for instance limits the moral ability of the individual actors (Janis and Mann, 1977). Janis and Mann, (1977) explained further that the illusions of morality that comes with group think makes members believe that their decisions are morally correct thereby ignoring the consequences of such as in the Ford Pinto case Giola, (1992).

A post conventional level thinker embraces ethics as an important feature of social and organisational life. In the early post conventional stages this starts by embracing a more principled and more independent approach to decision making often relying on self-chosen moral principles (Kohlberg, 1969). Thus, within the bureaucratic system, a strict adherence to personal moral principles is expected (Victor and Cullen, 1988). A next progression may display a contractarian approach to relate to others and act following universal ethical principles. Victor and Cullen, (1988) further explained that at the organisational level, post-conventional level thinkers would abide by company regulations and procedures except once they question these on ethical grounds. But it is not clear yet how early post conventional moral reasoners approach conflicts of interests, which is often the case in large complex organisations. . It may also well be that in the case of organisations with rigid bureaucracies that face often conflicts of interests that are more related to financial and performance aspects undermining ethical dimensions of the issues at hand higher post conventional reasoners' integrity may motivate them to eventually leave (Akrivou and Huang, 2015), which further accentuates the power of contextual morality dimensions of organisations.

Following from these, CMD has helped our understanding of the likely moral judgemental dispositions of individuals' thinking at each level of Kohlberg's CMD within bureaucratic contexts. What remains unclear is whether corresponding behaviour will follow the above predictions, a gap that is addressed by borrowing from the socio-cognitive based moral identity theory.

3.4.2 Moral Identity within Bureaucratic contexts

Moral identity as theorised by Aquino and Reed, (2002) conceptualises moral identity along two dimensions – Internalisation and Symbolisation. Following this approach, a number of empirical studies have studied the role of moral identity in unethical behaviours (Mulder and Aquino, 2013), moral elation (Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 2011), religiosity (Vitell, and Patwardhan, 2008), moral behaviour (Aquino et al, 2009) and so on. However, within organisational contexts, particularly bureaucratic contexts, identity is prone to influence as long as any form of schematic cognition can be influenced by the attitudes and behaviour of organizational members and even fine details such as the “who we are” elements in organizational cultures (Weaver & Agle, 2002). Also, the functioning of rules and hierarchy within bureaucratic environments demand and could easily activate moral traits such as ‘loyalty’, ‘obedience’ and ‘respect’ among others, which although are laudable traits, could however be easily misguided in such contexts. One way it does this as Moore and Gino, (2013) argued is through the ‘anonymity’ bureaucratic offices promote ‘which could facilitate negative moral outcomes structurally and psychologically’. Through anonymity, individuals are protected from the consequences of their actions by the office they occupy and by the very “rule” of obedience to the chain of command in authority relations and are psychologically shielded from personal moral responsibility (Bakan, 2004).

Therefore, employees behaving in accordance with the aforementioned moral traits could believe they are behaving consistently with their moral identities when in fact the ends to which they are contributing their ‘morality’ could be amoral and even immoral. It therefore implies that ‘unsuspecting’ employees could reinforce their positive self-images to consistently act in ways they believe are moral, or in ways their superiors want them to behave with obedience to authority valued higher than one’s ethical conscience. This is because employees may feel coerced into submission due to the power of their superiors to control rewards and penalties, or

simply because they are disconnected from the moral consequences of their decisions, hence misdirecting their morality. Moore and Gino, (2013) illustrated this using the example of a moral compass with a 'true north' and that the true north can be distorted as much as the moral compass can be lost in a social setting (Pasha, 2006). They argued that 'a present but misdirected moral compass could seduce us with the belief that we are behaving ethically when we are not, while allowing us to maintain a positive moral self-image' (Moore and Gino, 2013 pg.55). This kind of misdirected morality is a possibility in a bureaucratic setting where even employees with strong moral identities can be disconnected from the moral consequences of their actions. Furthermore, hierarchies create ranks of greater and lesser powers as well as social status (Magee and Galinsky, 2008). This too has moral consequences, for instance, Jackal, (1988) submitted that passing moral responsibility up through the chain of command, leads to the shift in sense of responsibility where one feels one is acting on behalf of another person (Milgram, 1974; Bandura, 1999). It also enforces behavioural expectations such as obedience to set authority which could also result in conformity.

Interestingly also moral identity has often been linked with pro-social behaviour. Pro-social behaviours are ways organisational members behave because they perceive them as benefitting to others (Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005; Winterich et al, 2013). It must be highlighted that the concept of pro-social behaviour refers to 'socially acceptable behaviour promoted by empathy, moral values and a sense of personal responsibility' (Kidron and Fleischman, 2006) without necessarily paying attention to their moral ramifications. As such, Moore and Gino (2013) argued that there is the temptation to conform to requests by superiors in bureaucratic organisations that push people to act in a certain desired way valued by the hierarchy, but which may disobey one's inner moral compass; because of the power they have over their subordinates. Jeter, (2003) for instance cited the example of Scott Sullivan who quickly rose through the ranks of WorldCom partly because of his willingness to do whatever the then CEO asked him to do. It eventually resulted in a 5-year prison term after the WorldCom scandal was probed and Scott was among those found guilty (Searcey, Young and Scannell, 2005).

Aquino and Reed, (2002) in another study had argued that there is every reason to believe that people high in moral identity internalisation (that is those whose moral

values are readily and easily accessible) will more likely behave in pro-social ways, than others. Hence, they would act in ways consistent with their self-understanding regardless of the 'anticipated public or private nature of their acts' (Winterich et al., 2013) because of the need to maintain self-consistency at all times (Blasi, 1984). Winterich, et al, (2013) concluded in their empirical study of moral identity and pro-social behaviour that symbolisation, the public dimension of moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002), motivates recognised pro-social behaviour amongst those with low moral identity internalisation. Hence, when the moral values individuals hold are not easily accessible in any given context, actions are driven by the desire to be seen as pro-social because of the recognition that comes with it. It would therefore imply that within a bureaucratic system for instance where strict obedience to rules and hierarchies are expected, people low in moral identity internalisation but are high along the symbolisation dimension would always want to openly demonstrate pro-social behaviours because of their desire to 'verify an important facet of the self through the reflected appraisal of others' (Felson, 1985). And one way this is done is to act in socially acceptable ways of mutual benefits where others can witness or acknowledge the behaviour (Grant and Patil, 2012) which can be argued is synonymous to 'playing to the gallery' for social approval. Therefore, Winterich et al., (2013) argue that those who are high in moral identity symbolisation would be more sensitive to the recognition of their behaviours within the organisational construct when making decision whether to act pro-socially or not. This phenomenon can also be explained as 'conformity' and from Kohlberg's point of view is no higher than stages two and three, at which desire to play along for instrumental gains are at work. Thus, people low in moral identity internalisation and high in moral identity symbolisation would readily 'conform' to any organisational demands for social acceptance.

Conversely, people who are high in moral identity internalisation are expected to be intrinsically motivated to act in socially acceptable ways regardless of expected recognition (Winterich et al., 2013). Thus, when individuals are high along the internalisation dimension, it is anticipated that symbolisation would be less effective in motivating such persons to act in socially acceptable ways (Winterich et al., 2013). Instead, self-consistency, which is the desire to act in ways known as congruent to self-understanding, is the driving force (Blasi, 1983). Within the bureaucratic

environment therefore, such individuals would have their moral values readily accessible by contextual demands. Hence, for example, moral ideals such as loyalty or respect or others would be easily triggered and any action carried out would be justified based on these moral traits held as central to self-understanding. The problem with this however is that the moral outcome of behaviours is not the focus, rather it is self-rationalisation based on the centrality of moral values that justifies moral choices. Ethically therefore, this could lead to moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) since there are no other moral standards to which individuals hold themselves accountable from the lens of this theory. Also, since individuals are different and hold different moral values as central to their self-definitions, it therefore implies that different actions, including those with unethical consequences can be easily justifiable based on personal moral values. This makes individuals susceptible to being used by organisations to advance any ends including unethical ones since such individuals are distant from the moral consequences of their choices (Hummel, 1998). Thus, what is unknown by the socio-cognitive moral identity theory is how individuals carry out moral judgement, since it can be argued that behaving according to personal moral values and beliefs does not necessarily translate into moral outcomes. And also since moral identities are built around cognitive moulds or schemas, they are exposed to distortions by contextual demands if such schemas are not grounded in some personally held universal law for example as Kohlberg's (1984) theory suggests. From these, it follows that having a strong moral identity within a bureaucratic context does not necessarily guarantee an overall moral outcome.

Therefore, the critical contributions of moral identity to the discourse of ethical decision making is in its exposure of the likely role of multiple identities (Shao et al, 2008) in the negotiation of moral choices amidst plenty, difficult options. Moral identity theory is useful in that it shows how the demands of bureaucratic organisations for instance are embedded in professional identity and how this identity is such a core aspect of our other identities as much as it has the tendency to become the dominant identity. Professional identities are important and it is very natural in a way to find key roles and different professional categories having moral components to them and the moral component would be aligned to what the in-group would want them to do. For example job roles or responsibilities of an office in a

bureaucracy come with a set of behavioural expectations such that if that manager has a high need to be ethical, they could call giving in to organisational demands as ethical. Thus, the focus would be more towards aligning with their broader professional identities within the social construct and not on moral outcomes. It can then be argued that this positions them to act in ways that could advance the cause of the bureaucracies they work for regardless of the moral consequences of such ends. This was implied in the Ford Pinto case (Gioia, 1992) in which employees involved in deciding to keep the faulty Ford model on the road in spite of reported fire mishaps reported scripts in their roles dictated what they were to respond or ignore when making recalls. They followed the scripts to the letter and it resulted in several deaths (Gioia, 1992). Thus, to be ethical is to be a good bureaucrat and these translations are made that way because of the need to for esteem, acceptance and survival within the context.

Thus, to be recognised and to find esteem in their particular groups, individuals would often go towards the values of their professional group. Matherne and Litchfield, (2012) argue that having strong emotional and social bonds with organisations could direct the moral identities of individuals working in them to conform with prevalent social organisational norms and in-groups or elite groups with whom they seek to maintain affective ties, which has been empirically proven to have a negative association with lying, implying conformity and possibly group think (Janis, 1972). That is, members of the same group are less likely to lie to one another and act in the 'best interest' of their teams (Winterich et al, 2013).

On another note, when a professional group has a clear professional code of conduct, moral expectations may be clear but in management for example, moral boundaries are blurred in competitive environment, sales, functional roles or managerial roles. In the context of bureaucracy, it does wash out other personal moral identity elements. For example when doctors, lawyers etc are absorbed into managerialist ways of thinking it distorts their sense of professional balance. This was explained for instance, in the study by Oakes, Townley and Cooper, 1998; Kawashima, (1999) where in museums, professional archaeologists were asked to adopt strategic planning and suddenly had to create plans that translated into specific organisational outputs, distracting them from the core role of caring for artefacts. These professionals were thus made to compete with marketers as part of

the new managerialist orientation of museums and heritage sites, which undermined the professional identity of people with PhDs in Archaeology. Their core professional identities as curators, anthropologists, archaeologists etc were displaced by managerial and marketing identities.

Similarly, the context of the current study provides a dilemma in which professional pharmacists are sent into stiffly competitive markets with clear sales targets to gain customers. These commercial realities undermine the morality that comes with their professional identity. Pharmacists are known to have some professional moral identity but since these persons are now absorbed into the managerial/bureaucratic ethics, the quest for success and competition logics instils the adoption of different views of right or wrong and also distracts from the core functions of pharmacists e.g. to succeed beyond any other or to sell more rather than developing a new drug for the purposes of curing diseases for instance. This replacement of core professional identity by a more managerial identity imposed by pharmaceutical organisations would play huge roles in affecting moral choices.

3.4.3 Contributions of both CMD and Moral Identity

In summary, the likely role of both the CMD and moral identity in affecting moral choices especially within the bureaucratic context has been critically discussed. Kohlberg's CMD understudies the capacity to make moral judgement, which he supposes, is not socially constructed, but results from an interaction of individual cognitive processing responses and the influences of a given social context moral and broader characteristics. So for example, in families with more intellectuals, children pass quickly through the stages because they are groomed to be like that. This is the idea of Kohlberg, (1984) that an individual may be high up in moral reasoning but may be in the wrong environment and if they don't have the character, maturity and skill, they may actually learn to operate at a lower level because they survive to get recognised. Thus, moral judgement capacity may not always result in following through with corresponding moral behaviour, for which we turn to moral identity theory. Moral identity theory adds value in a different way in that it espouses the interplay of multiple identities and their functioning in making moral choices. More importantly, that within organisations, there is the aspect of professional identity that takes over, making people's values align with in-group demands especially with roles that value success, achievement and competition, which may

satisfy their moral desires but the final consequence may be unethical. Thus, this kind of replacement of identities and values indicates how individuals with moral judgement capacities and a strong sense of moral identity may still end up behaving in morally questionable ways.

Furthermore, from Kohlberg's CMD perspective, Reynolds and Ceranic, (2007) in a study of managers found that 'ethical behaviours were at the highest reported level when moral judgements interacted with an individual's strong moral identity' (Matherne and Litchfield, 2012). However, Reynolds and Ceranic's (2007) position can be argued is possible in cases where individuals reason at the post conventional stage, which has been found to be extremely rare in any modern business organisation, where average moral reasoning level is at the conventional level (Weber, 1990). Instead, what seems plausible in bureaucratic settings is that having a strong moral identity could in fact confine individuals to operate at the conventional level of moral thinking, which comes with its own moral implications. Individuals operating at the conventional level typically adjust to the morality around them in the bureaucracies but outside, behave in ways they feel is consistent with their own understanding of morality. This explains why employees engage lower levels of moral reasoning at work than they do in non-work scenarios (Elms and Nichol, 1993).

Following from this, the capacity of bureaucracies to make employees with either strong or weak moral identities to reason at the lower conventional or pre-conventional levels is also not in doubt given the right situational pressures and individual peculiarities. This position is confirmed in a study by Aquino, Freeman, Reed, Lim and Felps, (2009) for instance where it was observed that 'situational cues can promote self-interest behaviours even among people for whom moral identity has high centrality'. However, this cannot be asserted as a universal possibility since the strength of moral identities varies in individuals and the moral traits held as central to self-definitions also vary. Also, high and low internalisation or symbolisation of moral identities also affects these outcomes, for instance, people with low moral identity internalisation are more likely to symbolise recognised pro-social behaviours (Winterich et al, 2013). These scenarios only reinforce the fact that bureaucratic context indeed create 'moral mazes' (Jackal, 1988) in which what is considered moral capacity as in CMD or moral desire as in moral identity could be exploited by the demands of the system towards immoral ends.

3.5 Propositions

Following from the observed impact of bureaucracies on the morality of employees, moral identity theory (Aquino and Reed, 2012) reveals the likely role having moral traits central to self-definition (Markus, 1977) could play in this phenomenon. However, given the need for esteem or rewards amongst other contextual demands, such as 'loyalty' to team members or obedience to rules and set authority, individuals regardless of the strength or weakness of moral identity could find themselves succumbing to the demands of the bureaucracy. This is to the extent that moral identity strength or weakness could become inconsequential in affecting the moral choices individuals make at work. It can therefore also be proposed that:

Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers equally in all cases of moral identity (both stronger and weaker MI scores)

The possibility of individuals especially managers and other individuals occupying key roles conforming to the prevalent demands of the bureaucratic system implies that they hardly transcend the imposed norms and morality of the system. Since from Kohlberg's point of view, employees are prevalently categorised as conventional level thinkers. From the literature on bureaucracy, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 (see Chapter 2 pages 22-25) summarised the known negative impact of bureaucracy on individual employee morality from both theoretical and empirical studies. It was established that core bureaucratic features of strict rules and managerial control predominantly have negative impacts on individual morality by coercing employees to operate within permissive organisational tenets, whilst de-emphasising personal ethics. This, coupled with overwhelming evidence from the literature (Weber, 1990, Elms and Nichols, 1993) and from within the broader context of this study - Nigeria (Adewale, 2011) that most employees in organisations reason at Kohlberg's conventional level, it can thus be proposed that:

Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with a Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders

Moreover, the critical pressure of what professional bodies for instance say a professional should be versus what a firm wants such professionals to be is also pronounced. Professionals, particularly within bureaucracies are often referred to as persons who exhibit a high level of competence, skill and knowledge in a field of endeavour. In other words, professionals are deemed to be experts in their chosen fields. Expertise then would suggest that general intelligence, competence and technical excellence would suffice to explain that a professional is ethical. This would be a narrow understanding of how people in professional roles can be ethical. However, there have been objections to the sufficiency of expertise as the sole qualifying criterion for professionals. Koehn, (1994) in her book "*The Ground for Professional Ethics*" argues extensively that the concept of professionalism transcends expertise alone. For instance, Koehn argues that our decision to trust professionals is not often based solely upon cleverness or skilfulness since a skill could be complimentary to harmful service. Therefore skill alone may not be entirely sufficient and the need arises for us to review our judgement of professionalism to 'look beyond skill to some trust engendering feature of professional practices' (Koehn, 1994: 11). Such trust engendering feature of professional practice as Fagermoen, (1997: pg.434) posits are the outward display of the 'values embedded in meaningful practice'. Therefore in a study of the Nursing profession, human dignity and altruism were found to be the most prominent moral values patients identified with whereas intellectual and personal stimulation were the most significant work values (Fagermoen, 1997). Therefore, the conceptualisation of professionals does not rest on skill alone as but also on moral values that should underpin the ethics of such profession upon which trust is found (Postema, 1980; see also *Appendix 4, page 334 for more on professional identity*).

However, within bureaucracies, in order to be liked, employees have to know and act in accordance to how their managers want them to act. What it is to be a good professional in the firm's context may differ from how professional bodies for instance construe their members to be professionals. Individuals in organisation learn through socialisation, through their formal qualifications and earlier experiences within other context, they learn what it is to be a professional in the context of their firms, often inclined towards loyalty to the organisation's management.

On these grounds, if professionals were only experts, no moral duty necessarily exists between such persons and their clients. Since experts are knowledgeable or skilled people, knowledge of how to do an activity does not create an obligation to do that duty in as much as having a thorough knowledge of a nation's constitution does not make one a lawyer able to represent criminals in the court of law. Esoteric knowledge and applying it continuously cannot be a distinguishing trait of professionals. Koehn further argues that with experts, their aim is at perfecting technique, which is their main focus as it gives them power to exercise greater control. With greater control comes the possibility of furthering private agendas by displacing the client from the moral centre of the professional-client relationship. Along these lines also, Koehn argues that being a member of a professional group or body still does not constitute professionalism as it doesn't insulate people from greed, lusts and morally objectionable practices as several examples in history reflects. But Koehn argues what she described as the essence of legitimate professions from a virtue ethics perspective and it is that the grounds of professionalism rises above the competence of professionals which she acknowledges into concepts of duty, public good and trustworthiness. Therefore, it is proposed that:

Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with the value of organisational loyalty (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has justified the choice of both Kohlberg's (1964) CMD and Moral Identity (Blasi, 1983, 1984; Aquino and Reed, 2002, Carlo and Hardy, 2005) as theoretical tools in the study of individual morality in bureaucratic contexts. Kohlberg's (1964) CMD posits three distinct levels of moral reasoning each with its own peculiarities that have been argued come with moral implications in bureaucratic contexts. The pre-conventional level is characterised by self-interest and obedience to authority to avoid punishments; the conventional level espouses conformity to prevailing social norms and the post conventional level deals with morally autonomous individuals using universal ethical principles as yardsticks in weighing their moral decisions.

The socio-cognitive based moral identity theory (Blasi, 1983, 1984) postulates that if moral traits were central to self-definition or self-importance, the tendency for such moral traits to affect moral behaviour would be high (Aquino and Reed, 2002). Hence, there are two dimensions – internalisation which is the degree to which moral traits are held as central to one’s self-definition and symbolisation, the degree to which these traits are publicly expressed. Therefore, individuals can be said to have weak moral identities or strong moral identities, both having varying consequences in varying situations as established in the previous section. However, it is also established from the literature that more empirical studies are needed to advance our understanding of these theories (Weaver, 2006), since contextual influences such as bureaucracies (Weber, 1974, Jackal, 1988, Moore and Gino, 2013) can either reduce or enhance the salience of moral identities for instance (Ashforth & Mael, 1989, Weaver, 2006; Weaver & Agle, 2002; Bandura, 2001) or levels of cognitive moral reasoning (Weber, 1990). From these, three propositions were finally presented which will be explored in this study.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.0 Introduction

This chapter introduces and critically discusses how this research was designed and executed. It begins by reiterating the overall aim of this research and the research paradigm employed in this study. Subsequent sections provide discussions on the choice of a qualitative research approach; the case study design employed in the study as well as all data collection tools including interviews, questionnaire, and field notes. Further, details of participants in this study, sampling methods employed, and a comprehensive description of interview settings, are also discussed. Beyond these, the final sections of this chapter present thematic analysis as the data analysis method and how themes were generated in this study. Other issues to be discussed include the ethical considerations for this study, researcher's bias and limitations in the process of executing the study. It concludes with a reflexive piece by the researcher.

4.1 Aim of the Study

Contexts are known to influence behaviour and ethical actions (Weaver, 2006), especially with findings in the ethical decision making literature that have established employees adopt lower levels of morality at work than they do at home. As such, bureaucracy being a major contextual fabric in organisations by which work is organised has been widely reported to have negative impacts on the moral capacities of employees working in them (Merton, 1968; Jackall, 1988). However, there is little empirical evidence for this (Hummel, 1998; Weaver, 2006). This study therefore aims to investigate the interaction between bureaucratic contexts and employees' moral identity in affecting moral behaviour.

4.2 Research Context

The choice of a context for this research in accordance with its overarching objectives was predicated on two factors: a well known corrupt context and a fast-paced, economic hub for firms in different industries, both of which Lagos, Nigeria offered. A detailed description and discussion of the context is given in the proceeding chapter, chapter 5.

4.3 Research Paradigm

Research in the social sciences is interested in generating knowledge about the social world. A paradigm is a way of looking at the world and often comprises a set of philosophical assumptions that guide thoughts and actions (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Lather, 1992). This research sits within the constructivism or interpretivist paradigm in line with its overall objectives to understand how bureaucratic contexts create social environments that impact on the moral perception and capacity of those working in them. With the aim of the study being to understand the interaction between individuals and their contexts from the perspective of the individuals themselves in affecting their own moral capacities, constructivism best captured the essence of this study. Within this paradigm, social scientists seek to uncover meaning from observable actions. Thus, we make sense of the world from the perspective of actors by uncovering their meanings. As such, this approach presupposes that individuals construct their own realities thereby implying multiple interpretations in any given situation (Mertens, 2005). This in turn makes analyses very subjective, contextual and perhaps incomparable. The key essence of this paradigm is to seek *understanding* of others and *explaining* their actions (Morgan, 2007).

Furthermore, within the constructivism paradigm, reality is socially constructed (Mertens, 2009). According to Eichelberger, (1989) this paradigm has its roots in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and other studies of interpretive understanding called hermeneutics. Hermeneutics itself is the study of interpretive understanding or meaning (Mertens, 2009). The concept of hermeneutics as used by historians tried to uncover what an author was attempting to communicate within the time period and specific context in which the texts were written (Mertens, 2005). However, within constructivism, researchers use hermeneutics as a way to interpret something from a certain perspective or situation. Thus, all meaning, including the meanings of research findings is fundamentally interpretive (Clegg and Slife, 2009) and therefore the basic assumptions underpinning this paradigm are as follows: that as participants in a research process socially construct knowledge, so the researcher must understand the world of lived experience from the perspective of those who live it (Schwandt, 2000).

The ontological position of this tradition is that since reality is socially constructed, multiple mental constructions can be found on the same subject, some even in conflict with each other with the perception of reality likely to change throughout the study. For instance in the case of this study, the concept of morality, what is right or wrong is a socially constructed phenomena meaning different things to different people. Likewise the concept of individual moral values meant different things to different participants in the study. Therefore as Schwandt, (2000) charged, since constructivist researchers reject the notion of objective reality, the goal of the researcher is to understand the multiple constructions of meaning and knowledge. Epistemologically, this paradigm makes the assumption that 'data, interpretations, and outcomes are rooted in contexts and persons apart from that of the researcher and are not figments of their imagination' (Lincoln and Guba, 2000). As such data can be tracked to their roots and logic used to read explicit meanings into them in a narrative (Burnard et al, 2008). Also, claims to objectivity cannot be made as the researcher is personally distant from the participants in the study, rather the validity of claims made can be traced back to the multiple sources of data as well as multiple methods used in collecting data. Multiple direct quotations were made from the data to support any inferences drawn. Thus, Lincoln and Guba, (2000) posited that the concept of objectivity known in the positivist paradigm is replaced by confirmability in the constructivist paradigm.

It therefore follows as Morgan, (2007) reckoned that qualitative methods such as interviews, observations and others are the most prevalent within this paradigm. These were applied with the understanding or assumption that the social constructing of reality is only possible through the interaction between the researcher and respondents (Lincoln and Guba, 2000) as also espoused in this research. Our understanding of how bureaucracies interact with the moral identities of respondents in affecting their moral dispositions was only possible when the researcher interacted with respondents within their own contexts in order to see through their eyes the effect of this relationship. This approach is referred to as hermeneutical in nature since it can produce multiple perspectives that can be compared and contrasted to yield a more thorough understanding of reality through 'a dialectical interchange involving the juxtaposition of conflicting ideas, forcing reconsideration of previous positions' (Mertens, 2009). Therefore in the words of Eichelberger, (1989), the

methodological works of a constructivist researcher can be described as wanting to “know what meaning people attribute to activities... and how that related to their behaviour. These researchers are much clearer about the fact that they are constructing the “reality” on the basis of the interpretations of data with the help of the participants who provided the data in the study.” (p.95).

4.4 Research Design

In planning this research’s design I made a number of decisions regarding sampling, methods and their implementation. The case study design was adopted as the specific strategy of inquiry. In line with its broader objective of studying how bureaucratic contexts affect moral identities and subsequent moral behaviour, the case study as Baxter and Jack, (2008) opined “affords researchers opportunities to explore or describe a phenomenon in context using a variety of data sources” (p.544).

Case studies are based on the constructivist paradigms (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2008). The choice of case study approach in this study was informed by Yin’s (2003) suggestions of the factors to consider when deciding on the right research strategy as follows: The focus of the study is to answer how and why questions; the behaviours of those participating in the study cannot be manipulated; coverage of contextual conditions because of their perceived relevance to the phenomenon under study and finally when the boundaries are not clear between phenomenon and context (p.13). Likewise in this study, a case study design was chosen because the study was about understanding the impact of bureaucracies on the moral capacities of its employees. But understanding this would have been impossible without the context of bureaucratic organisations, where these employees spend at least a third of their day on a daily basis for weeks, months and years. Moreover, from the literature, it is established that all organisations offer slightly different bureaucratic settings (Gouldner, 1959; Hall, 1963) as earlier established in chapter two. Therefore, the need to study the phenomenon in their specific contexts becomes even more pronounced as it was anticipated that each group of organisations might present varying bureaucracies, and that particularly the manifestations of the bureaucratic features to be investigated in this study could vary in each context.

In addition to these is the determination of the case or unit of analysis defined by Miles and Huberman, (1994) as, “a phenomenon of some sort happening in a bounded context”. For this research, that phenomenon is the widely documented impact of bureaucratic contexts on the moral capacities of employees working in them. More specifically, the case was about understanding the interactions between bureaucratic contexts and moral identities of employees and how this interaction ultimately affects moral behaviour. Thus, the boundaries of the case (Stake, 1995) were defined by its context (Miles and Huberman, 1994), in this case bureaucracy and its many moral issues (e.g bribing officials, inducements, drug trials amongst others possible ethical issues) known to affect employee moral identities. This clarity helps to avoid the common pitfall of attempting a topic too broad for one study (Yin, 2003).

Following from these is the determination of the type of case study to be conducted (Baxter and Jack, 2008). As this study sought to find answers to explain the links between bureaucracies and individual morality, it was an exploratory case study (Yin, 2003). Furthermore, this study reviewed the bureaucratic phenomenon in multiple contexts hence a multiple exploratory case study design. As earlier advanced, our understanding that organisations have unique bureaucracies could imply a varying impact on employee moral capacities hence the justification for multiple case studies. Also, as Yin, (2003) further posited, “a multiple case study enables researchers to explore differences within and between cases such that the researcher can predict similar results across cases, or predict contrasting results based on a theory”.

Thus this study applied the multiple case study approach by studying bureaucracies in three different firm nationality groups present within the context: American, Indian and Nigerian firms. The choice of these three case groups was informed by a comprehensive study of the African pharmaceutical landscape by IMS Health, (2012) in which three major types of pharmaceutical industry players were identified as follows: Western multinationals, Indian and Chinese pharmaceutical companies and local manufacturers (pg. 4). This categorisation already implied the crucial role firm nationality would play in the multiple case study design.

For the first group, the IMS study explained that Western firms are known to have had a long-standing presence in the African pharmaceutical market and have generally succeeded in 'marketing, branded innovative and generic drugs to the private sector in urban areas' (IMS Health, 2012:4). Examples of these western multinationals included Sanofi (French), GSK (British), Roche (Swiss) and so on. Since firms in this group were from different countries of origin, issues of validity and reliability of the overall research implied firms to be selected had to be comparable and very similar in size, length of presence in the market and most importantly nationality. The latter point of nationality immediately implied countries represented by one or two firms were not suitable for this study because there offered no comparable national firm and because they potentially would cause the violation of the ethical obligations this research had to meet. For instance, a crucial ethics of this research involved anonymising the identity of all firms and participants in the study to the extent that the data collated in this research or issues discussed will be untraceable to a particular firm. This was a particularly serious and difficult point of consideration at this stage of the study. Therefore, Western countries represented by singular firms were immediately disqualified leaving the researcher with American and British firms both represented by four and five multinationals respectively within the Nigerian market. This firm population offered a sufficient buffer to pick two firms to participate in this study without breaching the ethics of the research. The researcher then applied a pragmatic strategy based on access to make a final choice resulting in the selection of two American firms within the context based on ready access after all potentially explored British firms denied the researcher access. This therefore set the pace for the use of two firms in each of the other case groups to ensure anonymity and uniformity across all three case groups. Besides Yin, (2003) in discussing multiple case studies posited that for any meaningful research using this particular design, maximum firm population should not exceed six. This also implied this study could not study more than two firms in each case group.

Within the Indian and Chinese broader group, a United Nations Comtrade, (2012) report recognised the rising influence of Asian firms in the African market. Indian firms were reported to have accounted for 17.7% of African pharmaceutical imports in 2011 alone, compared to 4.1% from the Chinese firms. Within the Nigerian market, the dominance of Indian firms over any other firm with Asian origin was also well

documented in a UNIDO,(2013) report on the Nigerian Pharmaceutical sector, as there were no reported Chinese firms in the study. Instead, the report included up to five major Indian players, with several others known to be present in the Nigerian market but not covered in their study. With the focus clearly on Indian firms, about five different firms were contacted for this study using emails provided in the UNIDO report. None of these replied to the emails and further efforts to gain access using the researcher's professional network proved abortive. However, a referral to a manager in one of the many Indian firms by a colleague of the researcher opened access to this group and a second referral to a manager in a second pharmaceutical company by the first contact ensured two Indian firms were covered in this study. To ensure reliability and validity, a background investigation of the Indian firms revealed they were both comparable in size and had a combined presence in over thirty countries predominantly African nations. With both firms reporting turnovers in hundreds of millions of dollars as well as similar staff strength (about 50 each), and length of presence in the Nigerian market, both in excess of 10 years, comparability was established, thereby qualifying both firms as eligible for this study. Also to fulfil the ethical consideration of anonymity, these two firms were from a population of over nine well-established Indian multinationals within the context thereby fulfilling the ethics of the research.

The final group of players in the market are the indigenous firms. The UNIDO, (2013) report identified increasing competition in the Nigerian market owing to the uprising of some big indigenous firms able to effectively compete with even the foreign multinationals. The success of some of these indigenous firms has been highlighted by their establishment of local manufacturing plants that have met World Health Organisation standards and are now also attracting manufacturing contracts from Western multinationals to ease the manufacturing costs and logistics costs of their generic brands (IMS Health, 2012). So for this study, the researcher focused on contacting about seven of such successful indigenous pharmaceuticals identified from the UNIDO, (2013) report. Of these, only one firm showed keen interest in the research and was the only firm that granted an official access to the researcher amongst all participating firms in this study. In choosing a similar second firm, the researcher focused on exploring other avenues of gaining access into any of the other six firms identified in the report. After a series of exchanges with the Human

Resources department of one of such firms, access was denied, however, referral to an internal lead eventually helped the researcher gain access to a second firm. Both indigenous firms were similar in size, posting profits in excess of tens of million and are both also quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange (NSE, 2015). Furthermore since these two firms were drawn from a very large population of existing indigenous pharmaceuticals, the ethical requirement of anonymising firm identity was readily and easily met.

Table 4.1: Summary of Case groups and Firm Characteristics

Category	Size	Age	Turnover
American Firm A1 Firm A2	175 employees 130 employees	40 years 35 years	\$40 Billion \$32.5 Billion
Indian Firm I1 Firm I2	150 employees 175 employees	15 years 15 years	\$230 million \$180 million
Nigerian Firm N1 Firm N2	250-300 employees 250-350 employees	25 years 54years (since becoming a wholly owned Nigerian company)	9.7 Billion Naira 8.0 Billion Naira

Source: Firms' Websites

Thus, primarily the three broad types of players in the industry determined the choice of the three case groups in this study. Yet a second crucial criterion that validated the choice of this research design was based on the anticipated differences in the bureaucracies created in each case group. Since the firm nationality typified each of the case groups, it was expected based on a study of national bureaucracies by (Knill, 1999; Evans and Ruach, 1999; Evans and Ruach, 2000) that all three case groups have very different types of bureaucracies. According to Evans and Ruach, (1999), in their study of the impact of bureaucracy on economic growth, a Weberian scale based on 'certain structural features that were key elements in Weber's original characterisation of bureaucracy' (p. 749) revealed there are considerable differences in the bureaucratic structures operating in all three firm nationalities under consideration in this study. Their Weberian scale comprised variables around key

features such as red tape, two measures on corruption (the likelihood of government officials to demand kickbacks and the degree to which business transactions involve corruption), speed and efficiency of processes as well as autonomy from political pressure (Rauch and Evans 1999; 2000). These were studied in the context of 35 developing countries including India and Nigeria and both nations were found to have very different bureaucratic setups. Although American firms were not covered in the Rauch and Evans, (1999) study, it was only reasonable to assume that the same can be extended to America and her bureaucratic system, which would be different in its own ways. Whilst the Rauch and Evans, (2000) Weberian scale did not explicitly state the specific differences in the bureaucracies created by each of these countries, it has however offered some much needed evidence to the expectation that each case-group differed in their bureaucratic features. Based on this, this study attempted to uncover the differences in bureaucracies more specifically by investigating the dominant Weberian features driving the operations of all firms being used in this study before it reviewed the impact of these on the morality of participants in the study. Evidences of dominant bureaucratic features in each case group are discussed in the findings and analysis chapters to follow.

Overall, the multiple case study design is known to generally be robust and reliable (Eisenhardt, 1989; Baxter and Jack, 2008), but it also has its drawbacks, as it can be really expensive to conduct as well as time consuming. For instance, executing this research design within the context required several hours of driving, car rental for months, expenses in telephone bills and other consumables, besides the three months it took to navigate through the terrain to conduct all interviews.

4.5 Propositions

Propositions are known to be generally useful in case studies but may not always be present. However, where they are present, Baxter and Jack, (2008) posit that it helps “the researcher place limits on the scope of study and increase the feasibility of completing the project” (p.551). Propositions for this study were drawn from the literature on bureaucracy as well as from the two ethical theories of Kohlberg’s CMD (1961), and Aquino’s Moral Identity theory, (2002) which were adopted as lenses for

a deeper understanding of the phenomenon. The following are the working propositions in this study:

Proposition 1: *Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers equally in all cases of moral identity (both stronger and weaker MI scores)*

Proposition 2: *Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders*

Proposition 3: *Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with the value of loyalty to management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity*

4.6 Data Collection Tools

A trademark of case study research is the use of multiple data sources, which also enhances data credibility (Eisenhardt, 1989; Patton, 1990; Yin, 2003). Thus, this research relied on multiple primary data sources and where necessary, secondary sources. Primary sources included in-depth interviews, survey questionnaires and field notes were used. Secondary sources included news articles and expert reports the latter were relied upon in defining some of the historical antecedents of the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry, its structure, features, moral issues, and scandals. Also, the description of the broader context of this study drew heavily on secondary sources as well as interview data. Combining all these data sources in the same research allows for triangulation. As Bryman, (2003:1142) explained, 'triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the ensuing findings'. Hence the adoption of multiple data sources in this study is simply to enhance confidence. Moreover, triangulation is not only restricted to data sources as Denzin (1970) identified, but could also cover theoretical triangulation, methodological triangulation, investigator triangulation and data triangulation. Of these four types of triangulation, three were used in this research as follows:

4.6.1 Data Triangulation

Data triangulation according to Dezin, (1970) entails gathering data through several sampling strategies to ensure a more accurate coverage of data at different times and situations as well as persons involved. In this study, the simple, stratified and cluster-sampling methods were employed in selecting participants from their population. Specific details of how these sampling methods were employed are discussed in the 'participants' section (see 83).

It was discovered that the use of data triangulation in this study was an effective means of controlling selection bias, as the researcher enjoyed a wider coverage of participants from within the population, which implied greater reliability of data as representative of the phenomenon being studied. This was also discussed in greater detail in the 'participants section' (Page 83).

4.6.2 Theoretical Triangulation

Theoretical triangulation refers to the use of more than one theoretical position in interpreting data (Bryman, 2003). Denzin, (1970) describes theoretical triangulation as 'pitting alternative theories against the same body of data'. As established in preceding chapters, this study adopted Kohlberg's (1981) CMD and Aquino and Reed's (2002) moral identity theory as theoretical lenses applicable to the individual to offer unique insights into our understanding of the interplay between bureaucracies and such individual's moral capacities. As Denzin, (1970) further argued, triangulating theory avoids the risk of researcher's reaching atheoretical conclusions, selecting only data, which suit their biased views, or developing small-scale theory, which has little reliance beyond the immediate situation. Thus, theoretical triangulation as applied in this research and consistent with the view of Denzin, (1970, 1978) was about using two well respected theories in the field of ethics, the first being the old and reliable Kohlberg's (1961) CMD and the other a relatively newer, yet fast growing theory that is gaining a lot of legitimacy in literature, Aquino and Reed's, (2002) moral identity theory as predictors of the moral capacities of participants in this study. Both theories are able to explain moral behaviour in accordance with their theoretical traditions and as such are able to bring fresh perspectives and richer understanding to our knowledge of morality at the individual participant's level. Both theoretical lenses were used to examine the same body of data to further understand the interaction of bureaucracy with personal morality and

the likely impact of this on moral behaviour. How relevant data to assess each of these theories were collected is discussed in the methodological triangulation section below.

4.6.3 Methodological Triangulation

Methodological triangulation is the use of more than one method of gathering data. In this study, different methods of data collection were employed. This included: in-depth interviews, survey questionnaire and field notes. As Bryman (2001) observed, triangulation could be taken to mean the combined use of quantitative and qualitative research to determine convergence in findings. Denzin (1970) described this as the 'between-method' triangulation in which contrasting methods are employed. However for this study, the adoption of multiple data sources is best explained by Baxter and Jack, (2008) who explained the use of multiple data sources in case study design employed in this research as forming different pieces of a larger puzzle and not as a multi-method strategy in the classic sense. In other words, the potential of triangulation in this study offers utility in terms of adding richness and complexity to inquiry (Bryman, 2003). For instance, in capturing the most dominant bureaucratic feature in each of the case groups, a reliable and valid measure developed by Ferrell and Skinner, (1989) was used in the survey questionnaire, for which each respondent filled out based on their understanding of the context. Subsequent analysis on the questionnaire data revealed clearly the most dominant Weberian features of their work environments. But also, interview questions were targeted at getting participants to comment on the detailed structure of their organisations from which opinions were collated on the bureaucratic features of each case group. Details from both sources were then compared in order to have a clearer picture of the whole bureaucratic set up for each case group to discover the most dominant Weberian traits. This led up to a first level "typology" based on a dominant bureaucracy characteristic in each firm of the sample. The accurate linkage of information from all data sources was achieved by using self-generated codes to identify all data collected from the same participant. This tactic ensured for instance that the researcher could compare responses from each participant on the bureaucratic tendencies in their organisations, as well as their moral identities from all data sources. Then correlations or variations were easily detectable across all

three data sources and such issues were further probed where necessary. By this, discrepancies were easily identified and data reliability was greatly improved.

In assessing moral traits at the individual level, standard methods that is, the appropriate measuring tools were employed in the survey questionnaire. For instance, a moral identity scale developed by Aquino and Reed, (2002) and widely used as a very reliable scale for measuring moral identity was included as part of the measures in the survey questionnaires all respondents were required to answer. The moral identity measure was slightly re-phrased on the permission of the authors (See Appendix for their approval letter) whilst retaining the exact content of each element of the measure. This slight alteration was done to help potential participants comprehend the questions more easily and to ensure the questions suited issues relevant to the context of the study, where necessary. For example, the measure “I constantly give to charity” in the original Aquino and Reed, (2002) study became “I give to good causes” in this study. This was because the use of the word ‘charity’ could be ambiguous in the setting, where ‘charities’ are known as ‘Non-Governmental Organisations’ (NGOs) and could as such be confusing to others. Also charity in the context, due to the prevalence of religions could be construed to mean different things. So, to cover these ambiguities, the researcher instead used the phrase ‘good causes’ to describe every scope of charitable giving the participants might be involved in. Based on these responses, participants could be easily categorised as having weak or strong moral identities.

Even though the survey questionnaire was the most effective way of identifying the moral identity of participants, interview questions were also targeted at understanding this further. This was to control for the tendencies of social desirability bias from self-reporting measures in the questionnaire, although this bias was also checked in the questionnaires by negatively wording some of the items in the moral identity measure. Such were reverse coded at the analysis stage to account for what the respondent actually intended for such item. In most cases, interviews first took place before the questionnaires were filled. The researcher included questions around personal values, the most important things to the participants at work and outside of work amongst other questions that gave clear insights into the moral values these individuals held as central to their self-definition. Furthermore in accordance to theory, how these moral traits were easily accessible within the work

place were investigated by asking participants to cite examples of issues they have had to deal with, how they dealt with them and why they went about them the way they did. Other emerging issues of interests in this regard were also explored as deeply as possible to get clearer pictures. These responses were then matched with survey responses to have a bigger picture of each participant's moral identity. This paralleling of responses was done using codes generated by the researcher to match participant's interview and survey responses. At the analysis stage, combining these two sources of data ensured an accurate understanding of each respondent in the light of theory before further analysis was conducted.

In assessing the CMD level of the participants, the second theory used in this study, the researcher had the option of using the standard Defining Issues Test (DIT) quantitative measure (Rest, 1991, Trevino, 1992) to determine the CMD level of the participants. However, the researcher employed other means on two grounds: First that the researcher had conducted a study using the same DIT tool on Nigerian managers (Adewale, 2011) within the context of this study and had discovered an average manager reasoned at the conventional level of moral reasoning, consistent with literature and also concluded on the cultural neutrality of Kohlberg's CMD. The finding from this research implied the researcher already had some bias as to the likely CMD level of the participants, which is also widely reported in literature to be conventional in nature. Thus, to test this prevalent position, the Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) level of each participant was instead carefully investigated using responses from the interviews, rather than the use of another self-evaluation tool subject to social desirability bias. At the interview stage, since participants were unaware that their responses would clearly depict their CMR level, their responses were more reliable. The researcher also allowed a natural progression of the interview discussions by not asking any leading questions but rather allowed issues raised by the participants themselves to suggest the next questions, whilst ensuring coverage of all salient issues in the semi-structured interview format. By this, the researcher's own bias as well as the participants likely bias in self-evaluation questionnaires was controlled.

Kohlberg's (1981) theory offered comprehensive insights into behavioural traits of persons operating at each CMD level and how these persons construct their thinking, for instance conformity to societal norms, avoidance of punishments and so on.

Using these as clear guides, such evidence as provided by Kohlberg's theory was sought from each participant's interview data to uncover the CMR level at which they operated. This was achieved by using their responses to create a cognitive map, which was compared with each of Kohlberg's reasoning levels to determine the level at which such persons reasoned. Detailed evidences of these categorisations can be found in Appendix 1 page 310. Besides, including a DIT measure into the questionnaire meant a lengthier questionnaire which would have discouraged volunteer participants all of whom had spared precious times to be a part of the study. The final questionnaire used in the study was four pages in length including the consent form at the front page. This was about the optimum length that seemed reasonable and encouraging to the participants knowing they had also granted approximately 90 minutes of interview to the researcher. Thus, robust measurement of participants in the light of the theories employed in this study was done.

4.6.4 In-depth Interviews

Interviews are the most common method of data collection in qualitative analysis (Bell and Bryman, 2007). They usually offer one-on-one question and answer sessions where the researcher is expected to employ a variety of techniques to uncover real information about the phenomena being studied. Interviews help uncover the world from the view of a particular individual or individuals in the case of group interviews. Among the different options (Bell and Bryman, 2007), this study adopted the semi-structured interview format. In executing semi-structured interviews researchers are typically expected to have a list of questions that serve as an interview schedule but variations can be introduced at the discretion of the researcher. The questions also are always general and the interviewer is expected to ask further questions to probe any interesting responses. Using the research objectives and theoretical lenses as guides, a list of questions were generated by the researcher as a guide. More often than not, throughout this phase of the research, there were questions that seemed to be potent in uncovering issues of interest to the researcher and these were marked as a staple in every interview. However, questioning using other questions on the list was done in addition to the researcher's discretion who often took time to probe further into matters of interest linked to the overall research objectives. As (Surrey, 2015) also explained, the use of semi-structured interviews works best when a researcher has a number of areas they

want to be sure are addressed in the interview in addition to the freedom to probe or follow new line of inquiry. These advantages proved relevant to the nature of investigation this research aimed at achieving, hence justifying the choice of the semi-structured interview format. As anticipated, crucial issues, which the interviewer did not consider during preparation, came up during interviews and were further probed at will before the exploration of other written questions.

However, as also experienced in this study, interviews are known to be very time consuming, at times very expensive, especially where the researcher had to cover long distances to get to his potential interviewee. As it was in the case of this research, the researcher had to travel on the average of between 30 - 40 miles daily to meet up with set appointments in different parts of Lagos. This also came with challenges of driving through heavy traffic for several hours which was subsequently minimised by timing travels to specific windows to reduce travel time based on known risks of plying roads in the specific appointment locations. It also required a lot of preparation and time including time taken to secure appointments, time to reflect on interview questions and so on, after which the process of transcription, which the researcher executed using a combination of software was also excruciating in some instances especially in the early stages. As the researcher did more transcription using the software, a 90-minute interview, which took about 270-300 minutes to transcribe initially, fell to between 150-180minutes subsequently.

4.6.5 Survey

The second data collection tool relied upon in this study is a carefully designed survey questionnaire (see Appendix). By carefully combining a mix of open-ended questions with closed questions with options or scales to rank, a survey tool was developed. The rationale for the use of a questionnaire as an additional data collection tool was to ensure robustness and accuracy of data to be collected on some of the crucial elements of this research. For instance, in measuring bureaucracy in participating organisations, the researcher had tactfully covered this at the interview stage for all interviewees, yet a reliable and valid measure of measuring bureaucracy from the study by Ferrell and Skinner, (1988) was also adopted in survey questionnaire. Results from both instruments were subsequently

compared for patterns. Also, moral identity being one of the elements being studied in this research was covered at the interview stage, yet upon the permission of Aquino (2002), the same measure used by him was also employed for the context to test the moral identity salience of each participant. Validation of this survey instrument was carried out by a pilot study, which helped the researcher identify problematic questions from the perspective of potential respondents. Also, a group of experts led by the researcher's supervisors critically evaluated the instrument before it was approved for use in the field. Surveys are known to facilitate clear measurement of issues and elements and are also easily administered. Also, in some cases in the course of this research, some respondents were eager to complete the survey before being interviewed.

However, this approach is prone to some weaknesses. First, is the problem of social desirability bias especially since there were self-reported measures in the survey tool. Fisher, (1993) defines this bias as the tendency of the respondent to represent themselves in the best possible light especially on sensitive topics for ego defence or impression management reasons. The result of this is data that is systematically biased towards the respondent's perceptions of what is correct or acceptable in social terms (Maccoby and Maccoby, 1954). In this study however, social desirability bias was checked through triangulation of responses as the researcher had interview questions covering crucial self-reported measures. Thus, at the point of analysis, the survey answers and interview answers of respondents are matched to check for any discrepancies with the interview data likely to be a more accurate depiction of reality since participants were unaware of these checks and balances in the interview process. There is also the challenge of unanswered questions or in some cases misinterpretation of questions by some respondents. Regardless, the triangulation technique adopted in this research ensured the reliability of data collated.

4.6.6 Field Notes

In addition to both the interviews and survey, field notes were also created in the course of the research to record salient facts that were of interest. The importance of note taking in the course of an interview or research is crucial as it helps record tacit knowledge (Wolfinger, 2002). These could become crucial in making greater sense

of the main data collected especially in qualitative analysis. For instance, in the course of this study, the researcher noted interesting points about the interview setting, body language of respondents, countenance, and other facts of interest. All of these were recorded against the interviews of respondents and attached to their transcribed files to ensure these are taken into consideration at the analysis stage. Also, on two occasions, the researcher could not audio record interview with participants and in those cases, copious notes had to be taken detaining interesting and useful responses to the questions asked. These actions and reactions as experienced by the researcher in this study bring more realness and life to collected data such that in the course of analysis, the researcher can almost relive the experience of the interview all over as the transcripts are being read. For example, during an interview with a senior executive of one of the firms, the researcher was rudely sent out of the executive's office mid-way through the interview due to no fault of the researcher. However prior to this incident, the researcher had observed how the executive seemed a bit uneasy and sounded very firm with the questions being asked, most of these building up from issues he had himself raised in the course of his prior responses. It was some sort of mind game and perhaps as the executive sensed he would divulge sensitive information, he quickly terminated the process. This kind of tacit knowledge was recorded in the researcher's field notes and contributed towards the researcher's understanding of the participant's actions. Field notes are known to offer some measure of objectivity although they may still be subject to the bias of the researcher. In some cases, they could be distracting to the researcher as full attention is always required to follow closely interviewee's responses and to pick on issues that should be further probed. To forestall this, the researcher made mental notes of salient points, issues or emotions considered important and wrote them down very quickly after each interview on an electronic note.

4.7 Participants

Participants in this research are employees of all six pharmaceutical companies, with a large percentage of these being pharmacists or scientists. However, given that the pharmaceutical firms are very large, often with multiple departments, some participants were professionals from other departments including the accounting, information technology, and logistics departments amongst others.

With this spread of participants, the study was able to capture more accurately the nature of interactions between the specific bureaucratic context and the moral identities of its employees. Also since it can be argued that every employee, regardless of position within the firms is exposed to ethical issues in different ways; they all are potential participants in this study.

To narrow down the population to a sample able to capture the essence of this research, sampling had to be applied. According to Lohr, (1999), the sample should be “representative in the sense that each sampled unit will represent the characteristics of a known number of units in the population”. Thus, there are two broad categories of sampling methods: probability sampling or random sampling and non-probability sampling or non-random sampling (Latham, 2007). The choice of which sampling method to be used depends on the goals of the researcher. As MacNealy, (1999) suggested, when a researcher needs to have a certain level of confidence in the data collection, probability sampling should be employed. As such, Frey, Botan and Kreps (2000) further explained that the difference between both sampling methods differs in “how confident we are about the ability of the sample to represent the population” (pg.126). Since a fairly decent level of confidence is required in this research, probability-sampling methods were adopted. Probability sampling allows every unit of a population the equal chance of being selected hence; it eliminates the danger of researcher’s bias in the selection process (Frey, 2000). There are four types of probability sampling as follows: simple random sampling, systematic random sampling, stratified random sampling and cluster sampling. The table below summarises the selection strategy of each of these types of probability sampling:

Table 4.2 – Probability Sampling Methods

Type of Sampling	Selection Strategy
Simple	Each member of the study population has an equal probability of being selected
Systematic	Each member of the population is first listed. Then, sampling begins with a random start, then members are

	selected at equal intervals
Stratified	Each member of the study population is assigned to a group, and then simple random sampling is employed in selecting sample.
Cluster	Each member is first assigned to a group, then groups are selected at random and all members of selected cluster are included in the sample.

Source: Adopted from Henry, (1990) and Latham, (2007)

In this study, three of the probability sampling types, simple, cluster and stratified sampling were employed in different instances across the three different case groups. The choice of sampling method in each case was dependent on a number of reasons: access through an internal contact, the cooperation of firm with the researcher and the willingness of volunteer participants in the research process. In almost all the case groups in this study, a combination of different probability sampling methods were employed even within the same participating firms. For instance, in five of the six firms studied in all three case groups, having an internal contact made access easier and as such the leads of such internal contacts were followed in randomly selecting participants for the study. This can be argued to be some form of cluster sampling in which members of the organisation were first categorized into the 'friends network' of the internal lead before random selection of all those within that network ensued. But this approach immediately raises bias concerns in which those within that friend's network may all have similar opinions about the firm and would therefore give similar responses to the researcher's questions, thereby generating a lopsided dataset. The researcher was aware of this and reduced this tendency by not relying only on the 'friend's network' of the internal leads alone, but by using his people skills to interact and engage other 'neutral' employees within the firms to extend the participants for the research. This obtained extra interviews outside of the 'friends' network' and easily controlled this likely bias problem. Besides, it was very interesting to note that even within the networks of the internal leads, there were obviously noticeable variations in their responses to almost all the questions asked. This further implied that the likely bias that could skew dataset in one particular direction was

significantly reduced in this research process.

The internal lead approach is very similar to the snowball method, a type of non-probability sampling method except that as group members identified additional members to be included in the sample, the researcher still had the choice of randomly selecting from among this group and others outside of such groups. For instance, in all five firms accessed through internal leads, the researcher capitalised on physically being granted access into the firm's premises to gain legitimacy by chatting with other employees using the names of previous participants, and in some cases, the continual physical presence of the researcher in the firm created an informal familiarity with some of the staff who had been seeing the researcher entering offices and moving about freely. As earlier explained this gave the researcher opportunity to get more participants for the study, which turned out to be a good way of controlling bias all around. Since the additional participants were not particularly within the network of the internal lead, and the researcher had no bias in selection whatsoever as simple random sampling was employed in such cases. Simple random sampling also known as straight random sampling, as MacNealy, (1999) explained requires that each member of a population stand an equal chance of being selected. Thus, each member of the population is "selected one at a time, independent of another and without replacement; once a unit is selected, it has no chance of being selected again" (Fowler, 1993:14). This was the case with the extra participant secured by the researcher, as the researcher simply randomly walked up to employees, explained the research and was often granted audience. In cases where participants turned down the researcher's proposal, it was often on the grounds of time, since the interview process and filling of survey questionnaires often lasted up to two hours and beyond, a lot to demand of an individual out of their busy time schedules. As such, a combination of both simple and cluster sampling were employed within these firms.

However in one of the firms in case-group three, where the top management had granted the researcher full access to all members of staff, stratified sampling was employed. In this case, employees were first split into different groups based on their department within the firm and then the researcher randomly selected

participant from each of the departments to participate in the study. Also, in one of the firms used in this study, the snowball technique was employed with the researcher relying on the lead of group members to identify additional members to be included in the sample. In such organisation the snowball method was employed, access was highly restricted and with the help of an internal lead who had presented the researcher as his personal guest, several interviews were conducted by strictly following the lead's choice of additional participants in the study. Although it is understood from literature (Henry, 1990; Fowler, 1993; Lohr, 1999) that each of these sampling techniques could be used to achieve different outcomes, adopting them in this research was strictly based on reduction of selection bias. As earlier explained, the use of multiple sampling techniques within the firms enabled the researcher reach a wider range of participants with whom the researcher had no prior contact nor were within the network of in internal leads thereby lending greater credibility to the data collected from all participants. Secondly, the adoption of different sampling techniques in each firm was in response to the different internal scenarios presented by each firms. Since the core strategy to gain access was to be pragmatic, the researcher had to devise the best possible ways of selecting participants in each of the firms but as each firm was a different environment, it called for different sampling strategies. As such, the researcher could not have stuck to a particular sampling method but had to be flexible and adaptive to different scenarios posed in the firms.

A total of 36 participants took part in this study as detailed in table 4.3 below:

Table 4.3: Summary of Participants

s/n	Participant	Job Role	Background
1	A1a	Pricing and Access Manager	Pharmacy
2	A1b	Sales Manager	Pharmacy
3	A1c	Marketing Manager	Pharmacy
4	A1d	Logistics Manager	Biology
5	A1e	Fleet Manager	Engineering
6	A1f	IT Manager	Computer Science
7	A1g	Medical Representative	Pharmacy

8	A2a	Sales Representative	Sciences
9	A2b	Medical Representative	Pharmacy
10	A2c	Country Manager	Pharmacy
11	A2d	Senior medical representative	Pharmacy
12	I1a	Human Resource Manager	Management
13	I1b	Sales representative	Pharmacy
14	I1c	Medical representative	Bio-Chemistry
15	I1d	Senior Medical representative	Pharmacy
16	I1e	Medical Representative	Bio-Chemistry
17	I2a	Regional Manager	Pharmacy
18	I2b	Sales representative	Chemistry
19	I2c	Senior medical representative	Pharmacy
20	I2d	Medical Representative	Bio-Chemistry
21	N1a	IT Manager	Computer Engineering
22	N1b	Operations Manager	Pharmacy
23	N1c	Product Manager	Industrial Chemistry
24	N1d	Human Resources Officer	Management
25	N1e	Administrative Assistant	Marketing
26	N1f	Audit Manager	Accountancy
27	N1g	Corporate Services Manager	Journalism
28	N1h	Administrative Assistant	Secretarial Studies
29	N1i	Regulatory Officer	Pharmacy
30	N2a	Brand Manager	Pharmacy
31	N2b	Regional Manager	Chemistry
32	N2c	Trade Marketing	Marketing
33	N2d	Trade Business Manager	Pharmacy
34	N2e	Sales Executive	Pharmacy
35	N2f	Sales Executive	Chemistry
36	N2g	Business Development Manager	Pharmacy

Source: Fieldwork

4.8 Interview Setting

There were three major types of setting in which interviews took place namely: Within office premises with an open setting; office premises with closed setting; and off-site. Each of these settings had noticeable effects on the interviewer and their responses to the interview questions. Those in the offices – were a bit cautious and very professional in their responses. This was further accentuated in settings where there were chances of other members of staff listening in on the conversation between the researcher and the interviewee. A large difference was observed in other interviews that took place inside the same organisations but behind closed doors. There was a noticeable greater sense of freedom and privacy with participants that were interviewed under this condition and they easily opened up to answering interview questions. However, the most interesting responses were obtained from interviews that took place outside of office premises in neutral places like restaurants, inside the researcher’s car, shopping malls or just outside office premises etc. The choice of such neutral off site locations was informed either by the itinerary of the interviewer or as it was noticeable in employees of Indian firms, the fear of insecurity in participating in such interviews. With these employees, there was a sense of apprehension and unwillingness to hold interviews within office premises for the fear of being caught and victimised by their superiors or by fellow staff that may be loyal to management. Yet, once such participants were outside of the office premises, they fearlessly spoke with strong opinions about the firm in the light of the researcher’s questions. Two interviews that took place within the premises of an Indian multinational were the most intense of all interviews in this study. The tension in the atmosphere as the interview was conducted was so real; respondents were jittery at times almost speaking in hushed tones for the fear of being heard. Freedom of speech was indeed curtailed in such settings. However, most of the interviews in this study were either conducted in closed settings, in office premises or off site thereby lending some credibility to reliability of the responses to the interview questions.

Table 4.4: Interview settings

Setting	Number of Interviews
Office premises (At the respondent’s desk, a	27

separate meeting room or reception area of the firm)	
Offsite (office car park)	3
Offsite (Other locations including various sales points, shopping malls, and restaurants)	6

Source: Fieldwork

4.9 Procedure

A full description of the research procedure is available in Appendix 3, page 328.

4.10 Data Analysis

The initial stages of data analysis required the transcription of all collated data. In all fifty-six interviews were collected from 8 firms initially, but narrowed down to thirty-six interviews from six firms. This was due to the fact that only six of the eight firms were comparable in size and in capacity within the industry. Transcription of all data took about 3 weeks overall. On the average, an hour-long interview is often predicted to take four times longer to transcribe using manual means than using a combination of transcription software. However, the researcher devised an electronic means of transcribing data thereby significantly reducing transcription time. Two software packages: 'InqScribe' and 'Dragon Speech Dictator' were purchased for this purpose. Dragon is a speech dictation software able to work with any installed software on any computer with the feature of it being trained to recognise the researcher's voice and accent if any. InqScribe on the other hand is a transcription software that allows the import of interview audio files into a work space and also allows the use of keyboard shortcuts to playback, stop and rewind with ease whilst also allowing the researcher to transcribe as this is being done. So by combining both software, the researcher simply had to listen on InqScribe, repeat what is heard into an external microphone (Blue Yeti Microphone) previously owned and used by the researcher for podcasting and dragon does the typing on InqScribe. With this tactic, a lot of transcription was done with a short period of time. Also, this allowed the researcher to listen to all interviews and also read at the same time allowing for greater immersion in the details of each interview. In cases where particular emotions were expressed, the researcher simply paused the audio file and dictated in words to indicate emotions

which dragon inserted into the text files. Also, these emotions where expressed had also been recorded in the researcher's field notes. All transcribed interviews on InqScribe were exported into a Microsoft Word document for spell checks and corrections where necessary. Also, all Microsoft Word files were securely saved using the same codes that had been apportioned to each audio file and its corresponding survey response. These cleaned files were then used at the next stage of the analysis process.

The next phase of the analysis process involved the use of qualitative research software, NVIVO. Nvivo is arguably the most widely used qualitative research data analysis software in recent times (QSR, 2015). Nvivo's ability to electronically resolve tasks such as coding, highlighting, word counts, text search query amongst other immensely useful functions makes it a useful tool for any qualitative research. Thus, MS Word versions of transcribed interview data were imported into NVIVO for further analysis. First an initial coding process was conducted to skim through all the data to capture emerging themes. This gave an overall picture of key trends within the data. For instance, at this stage, the external context of the research as described by the participants was captured as well as the description of the bureaucracy within which participants work. Each participant's moral values and dispositions within their various bureaucracies were also captured at this initial stage. Overall, this level of analysis gave room for a succinct descriptive narrative of the issues of interest to this research. A crucial advantage of this approach as described by Baxter and Jack, (2008) is such that the researcher at this stage need not work with any theoretical bias in mind as this preliminary review of data is being done hence, allowing for some good measure of objectivity. Beyond these initial stages however was the comprehensive analysis to take place. At this level of analysis, propositions generated from both the literature on bureaucracy as well as the CMD and Moral identity theories guided the codes generated for a deeper level analysis.

4.11 Thematic Analysis

One of the few, shared skills in qualitative analytical methods is thematizing meanings (Holloway and Todres, 2003). Building themes from a data set is understood as a fundamental process in any qualitative research analysis and as such Thematic Analysis (TA) can be defined as 'a method of identifying, analysing

and reporting patterns (themes) within data' (Braun and Clarke, 2006:6). Hammersley and Atkinson, (1995) describe TA as aiming to generate descriptions of behaviours through identifiable themes and patterns in living and talk. There are two major conceptualisations of TA in literature. It is on one hand categorized as a mere tool used in the process of performing major analytical traditions (Boyatzis, 1998) such as discourse analysis or narrative analysis (Meehan, Vermeer and Windsor, 2000) and on the other hand, it is regarded as a method in its own right (Ryan and Bernard, 2000; Attride-Stirling, 2001). Even though thematic analysis (TA) provides core skills that are useful in conducting other forms of qualitative analysis, scholars like Braun and Clarke, (2006) have defended the latter position on the grounds that TA differs from other methods (e.g. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis or thematic decomposition analysis) that seek to describe patterns across qualitative data and are also theoretically bound. Therefore, since TA does not require detailed theoretical knowledge of approaches compared to grounded theory for instance, it is thus a more accessible method of analysis. Also, since TA does not exist within a pre-established theoretical framework, it is applicable with different theoretical positions and can be used to do different things within those frameworks (Braun and Clarke, 2006), hence its flexibility. In addition to all these, TA according to Willig, (1999) can be used as a realist method (reporting experiences, meanings and realities of participants) or a constructionist method (examining how realities, meanings, events affect series of issues) or 'contextualist' method (ways in which individuals make meaning of their experiences and the impact of broader social settings) in its application. Thus, TA is useful beyond just creating 'themes' but in reflecting reality and to uncover the surface of that reality as emerging themes then become categories for analysis (Fereday and Muir-Cochrane 2006). Therefore, the adoption of TA as the qualitative analytical tool in this study rests on a tripod of reasons: (1) Its flexibility and applicability in different research paradigms; (2) Its ability to generate unanticipated insights (3) Its allowance for social and psychological interpretation of data.

The flexibility of TA, arguably its greatest strength, makes a very useful research tool that is applicable across a range of theoretical and epistemological traditions, thereby offering potentially robust and complex account of data. This is unlike other qualitative analytical methods, such as discourse analysis (Willig, 2003), grounded

theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) narrative analysis or interpretative phenomenological analysis, known to stem from particular theoretical or epistemological positions and as such offer one-way rigid approach to analysis with both limited variability of how the methods are applied and in some cases ‘different manifestations of the method from within the broad theoretical framework’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006 p. 4). Besides, its flexibility, TA is also known to be a ‘useful method of working within participatory research paradigm, with participants as collaborators’ (Braun and Clarke, 2006:37), as is the case with this research. It can also generate unanticipated insights whilst also allowing for social as well as psychological interpretation of data, all of which are essential to the success of this study.

However, the flexibility advantage of TA has often been subject to criticisms of ‘anything goes’ (Antaki, Billig, Edwards and Potter, 2002) in cases where it is poorly applied without clear guidelines on one hand and without clear stipulations of the researcher’s epistemological and ontological positions on the other. Yet as other scholars (Attride-stirling, 2001; Tuckette, 2005) argue, applying TA within clear and concise guidelines ensures its robust applicability in qualitative studies. On these grounds, Holloway and Todres, (2003) submitted that beyond applying method to data, it is essential for researchers to make all their assumptions both epistemological and others explicit, in addition to stating clearly what is being done, why and most importantly how the analysis is being conducted. To meet these crucial requirements for a sound analysis, this study has adopted Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six-phase guide to carrying out a rich and thorough thematic analysis (see figure 4.1 below) in addition to a declaration of the epistemological assumptions of this study.

Table 4.5 – Six-Phase Thematic Analysis Process

Phase	Process Description
1. Familiarization with the data	Transcription, reading and re-reading as well as noting down of initial ideas
2. Generating initial codes	Coding interesting features systematically across each the data set

3. Search for themes	Collection of codes into potential themes
4. Reviewing themes	Level 1: checking themes work in relation to coded extracts Level 2: checking themes work in relation to the entire data set, hence generating a 'thematic map' of the analysis.
5. Defining and naming themes	Continuous analysis to refine the specifics of each theme, and the overall story the analysis tells; generating clear definitions for each theme
6. Producing the report	Selection of vivid, compelling extract examples, final analysis of selected extracts. Relating analysis back to the research question and literature and finally, producing a scholarly report of the analysis.

Source: Adapted from Aronson (1994), Braun and Clarke (2006)

In applying TA to this study, a theoretical thematic analysis was employed. As Braun and Clarke, (2006) argued, a theoretical thematic analysis is driven by the researcher's theoretic and analytical interests. This provides a more detailed analysis of some aspect of data tailored to meet the gap the research aims at solving from the theoretical perspective. As such coding and analysis in this study was guided by propositions already generated from literature and theory. Further, TA was applied as a contextualist method (Braun and Clarke, 2006) to aid our understanding of the interactions between bureaucratic contexts and employee's moral identity in affecting ethical decision-making abilities. Collected data is thoroughly examined and themes are generated along the key constructs of bureaucracy, moral identity and ethical behaviour or dispositions. From these descriptions, explanations and relationships between these are categorised and are further explored and refined by application to other participants, cases and contexts. The result is a well-developed narrative explanation that can account for or accurately describe the phenomena, which this research is interested in namely how bureaucracies affect moral capacities in employees. This thematic analysis approach is different from a grounded theory approach in that 'it summaries data into themes that are then

explained, rather than necessarily developing a novel theory to describe the findings' (Ryan and Bernard, 2000).

However in the use of TA, a few pitfalls had to be taken into consideration. Braun and Clarke, (2006) identified five common errors researchers make in the application of thematic analysis as follows: failure to analyse the data at all, use of questions as 'themes' that are reported, weak and unconvincing analysis, mismatch between the data and the analytic claims that are made about it and finally the mismatch between theory and analytic claims. The first three pitfalls are avoidable by following the clear guidelines provided by authors such as Attride-stirling, (2001); Tuckette, (2005) and Braun and Clarke; (2006) who have specified how to execute a thorough thematic analysis. The last two however lie within the honest judgement of the researcher whose objectivity is required at this stage. A potentially useful practice is to revisit the theory section as much as possible during the analysis and discussion stages to ensure the theory is well represented using the data available and that no falsehood or bias has been introduced by the researcher to alter the outcome of the research.

4.12 Generation of Themes and Sub-themes

With all data gathered, interviews transcribed and imported into NVIVO, the first theme generation process in this research was aimed at having a big-picture of the whole data set. By this, emphasis was placed for instance on participant's descriptions of the broader context, their organisation and self. Similar opinions were gathered together into separate nodes on NVIVO and labelled accordingly. As other interviews within the case groups were perused, participant's responses that matched the main nodes earlier created were further included into relevant nodes. At the end of this first review, contents of each broad node were carefully revised and new subthemes were created based on the core content of such statements. This process was repeated until under the broad node 'Nigerian Context' for instance, about five subthemes were generated, each depicting different features of the Nigerian context will all corresponding references to each one carefully arranged in the relevant sub nodes. This same process was repeated for the firm context as well. Thus, this first round of analysis was adopted for the descriptive analysis section of this study. It was at this level, the researcher for instance could draw out five domain features of the broad context, Nigeria that was consistent with the descriptions given severally in theory. Also, at this level, practices and cultures, norms etc of firms in

each case group were very clear and also gave clear insights into how firms in each case group ran their affairs. This pointed towards the kind of bureaucracy within them related to dominant Weberian features. For instance, it became obvious that the American firms that took part in this study were driven by strict rule orientation as it came across in all interviews within the context and the Indian firms had a strong preference for hierarchical structure in their organisation, driven by racism such that Nigerians are never allowed into top management to in order to preserve their control from the top. Table 4.6 below summarises samples of themes and sub themes generated from data in this study.

Table 4.6 – Sample themes generated from data

Theme	Subtheme	Sub-Sub theme
General Context	Country description	Economy Political environment Corruption The People
Industry Context	General description	Key players Challenges Opportunities Key stakeholders
Firm Context	Structure Culture	Reporting lines, hierarchy Strictly formal, informal and relaxed, cordial, company's reaction to issues, punishments, rewards, tacit norms
Bureaucracy	Rules Managerial control Relationships	Forms of rules – formal, informal Forms of control – authoritarian, personal Cordial, rule-based, transactional
Self-description	Value system Demography Moral reasoning	Values central to self- defining Age, Experience, Number of years working in the firm Pre-conventional, Conventional and Post-

		conventional
--	--	--------------

Source: Fieldwork

4.13 Ethical Considerations

In maintaining the ethics of this study as agreed with the school's ethics research committee, all participants in the study signed consent forms before interviews were conducted. It is also noted that all participants were expressly informed about the nature of research, its aims and that all interviews were to be recorded on the premise of full anonymity. On these grounds participants signed and agreed that their interview could be audio recorded. Therefore in upholding the ethical requirements of this study as agreed with participants and the researcher's institution, names of firms that were used in the study were anonymised. Achieving this ethical requirement was a serious consideration at the research design stage as all the firms that were targeted in the study from the UNIDO, (2013) report were big firms that were easily identified in the industry. But, dividing case groups by nationality and choosing two firms from the broader population in each case group as discussed in preceding sections ensured this requirement was met. At the end of this research, all collected data and evidences will be destroyed to fully protect the identity of those that took part in the study.

4.14 Trustworthiness

The trustworthiness of this research is hinged primarily on the multiple triangulations tacitly employed throughout the execution of the research. As discussed in earlier sections, the validity of this research was at the methodological level as well as the data collection levels such that at each stage of this research, multiple sources guaranteed greater validity of the whole project. Also, I cross-validated the interview content with field notes in making sense of data for all the interviews. In some other instances, I crosschecked responses on the same issues by different respondents to assess any significant differences. This helped me assess the frankness and openness with which the interviewees responded.

4.15 Potential Research Bias and Subjectivity

Bias cannot be completely eliminated from any research, more so a qualitative research that is dependent on judgement and experience and on largely subjective epistemologies regarding both the subjects/participants and the researcher(s). Bias

is an 'unhealthy' influence a researcher can have on a study at different levels which may distort the results of such study. Bias could be design bias, selection/sampling bias, procedural bias, measurement bias, interviewer bias, response bias and reporting bias (Shuttleworth, 2009). For this study, the researcher had no personal contacts or familiarity with the subjects in the industry or firms chosen for the study thereby significantly reducing possibilities of bias at the execution stage. However, due to a good knowledge of the corrupt context in which the study took place and the knowledge of its impact on everyday morality, care had to be taken to avoid the interviewer's bias as much as possible. This was avoided by using a semi-structured interview format that allowed objective questions to be asked and where necessary probe participant's responses honestly without asking any leading questions to get what the researcher 'thinks' is going to make the research 'interesting'. Also, the possibility of selection and interviewer's bias was further reduced by the fact that the researcher met most participants for the first time at the point of interviewing them, as explained in previous sections. This limited the chances of bias that could have come from familiarity and cordiality and leading the respondents to certain types of lopsided responses. Besides this, the researcher had no methodological, sampling or design bias as the broader objective of the research dictated the direction and designs chosen for its successful execution.

4.16 Reflecting on my cultural / personal proximity with the context

4.16.1 My Background

I have lived all my life in Nigeria until 2010 and have always been a part of the culture of corruption having given bribes myself on a number of occasions to get through red tape and bottle necks with speed. For instance, paying to get documents from government agencies in a couple of days instead of going through the usual process, which could take weeks. My first encounter with ethics was in my final year of undergraduate studies where I was introduced to professional ethics as a real estate surveyor. I found this module very intriguing as it presented in plain language the conducts of professionals in the real estate profession. Yet, having worked with a lot of firms as a contract surveyor, I could easily cite countless examples of violations of these professional ethics. This got me a bit curious but also uncomfortable. I desired to investigate this trend but did not have the opportunity. I wanted to know why in spite of knowing the right things to do, people chose to do the exact opposite.

Growing up in a Christian home, we were taught the value of truth, integrity, honesty, excellence and so on. And these were further reinforced into us at Sunday school and in our various schools. These values were regarded as the binding fabric of our society and those who violated them were often subject to disgrace. But with time, I realized the world was not black and white and to my own amazement I found myself doing the things I was told were wrong even though I thought I did not have an option. At this point I had little knowledge of corporate scandals in multinationals until 2008 when crisis rocked the Nigerian banking sector and highly respectable figures were sentenced to jail terms. Although all of these may have made me less neutral and distanced to the context of study, I hope my “subjectivity” helped with research quality and insight, rather than hindered with additional bias.

4.16.2 My Motivation

Upon resuming my master’s program here in the UK, in 2010, a lot of concerns I had held about ethics re-surfaced in the ethics module. My curiosity was heightened to the extent that I chose to do my dissertation in this field which led to my interest in pursuing a PhD in it as well. My quest was to simply find out why good people ended up being bad in our organisations, even though they know the ‘right’ things to do.

4.16.3 My Approach

If there are any biases I had going into the field, they were three major ones: first my understanding of corrupt Nigerian context and that therefore, nothing is straightforward and secondly that multinationals are deceptive about the actual impact of their roles in the contexts they operate in. Thirdly through my knowledge of theory, I had come to expect certain types of responses. At least I had come to embrace the latter through my exposure to ethical case studies in various modules here in the UK. However, I had no preconceived ideas about the pharmaceutical industry even though I knew it was riddled with moral issues in various ways. The specifics of this remained elusive to me until I started interviewing the participants who began to describe these issues. My quest to understanding what I had always wanted to know was now becoming a reality and my mind-set as an interviewer as I worked hard to gain access to the firms was to be as open as possible and to also get as much out of the participants as possible through open and honest research.

Even though I could anticipate certain types of responses from my participants, I wanted them to tell these things without my prompting or undue influence. At least, the fact that I was meeting all my participants for the first time implied I had to be careful with my approach to them as I had one chance to make an impression. With these at the back of my mind, I therefore paid particular attention to the questions I asked and the way in which I asked them, when I asked them and how I asked them and also reflected on these as I progressed. I wanted each interview to be a unique journey with my participants in charge, taking me through a terrain I did not know, rather than one I may have thought I knew. I therefore kept a consciously distant and (I hope) open mind to all I thought I knew from the literature knowing that research is not always an accurate description of reality, else there would be no need for this research.

I practiced a daily reflection and wrote down all my direct impressions and events/stories before and after each interview day. Knowing that I could unconsciously affect the interview process with my bias, I always indulged in self-reflection questions before and after each interview. To check my intent, I often asked myself – What do you want to see in today’s interviews? Initially, I thought of so many things I desired to see based on my knowledge of theory and the various contextual issues but would often curtail any unnecessary desperation by ensuring the interview questions were not leading in any way towards this direction. I consciously allowed responses from my participants during each interview to birth newer questions that further led to newer questions and issues. I discovered this semi-structured approach took us from one point to a series of related issues that proved very relevant to my further understanding of the process. After each day’s interview, I reflected carefully on the day and often asked myself the question: What did you see today? In all cases, I could not articulate exactly what I had heard save for striking examples and interesting characters I had met. For instance, a participant was surprisingly honest to explain that he is ‘double faced’ at work and that although his religion is against it, he still would continue to play the devil’s advocate in his firm. On another occasion, a couple of respondents were open to say they give bribes and that it was encouraged by their firms. Such responses to me were a positive sign that I hadn’t collected data that reflected what I simply wanted to hear but that I had allowed all interviews to follow a proper course of investigations. This also meant I

had to wait for the transcription to get the richness of the discussions I had with my participants even though I had some highlights of our discussions. As the interviews progressed daily, I realised that I actually didn't have anything I wanted to hear save for the issues surrounding the research and for that I wanted the true picture of the situations in each of the firms and not my own picture of the place. I wanted to be surprised by my findings and to do this, I was very open throughout the process. I also practiced continuous reflection during the interview process. For instance, as interviews progressed, I noted questions that seemed to generate a lot of discussions and often opened up fresher interesting issues relevant for this research. I noted these and often applied them in subsequent interviews with much success. Also because all interviews were very different in their own way, through how I started engaging the participant from a common history we shared, or an opinion about something I knew interested them etc., I had to constantly rearrange questions in my mind to ask the participants. No particular order was therefore applicable in the course of each interview.

On an interesting note and consistently with a previous observation in this section, I realised also that some of my bias had very positive effect on me during the process. For instance, knowing that an average senior manager could be a loyalist to their firm implied I shouldn't simply accept all they told me but to find clever ways of probing issues deeper. I developed tests of confirmability throughout my interview processes whereby I noted questions that I had asked them and asked the same questions later on in the interviews an hour into the interviews when they would have forgotten their previous responses and checked if both responses matched. Where I found any new 'twists' to their answers, I probed these new twists further. I also learnt that asking 'how' questions made interviewees describe issues and processes, which often also led to further interesting issues and insights.

Also, whilst my understanding of the terrain could be said to introduce some elements of bias into the research, I actually leveraged on this to do a thorough job as a researcher. First, my knowledge of the context was actually a positive tool as it helped me word my questions appropriately to suit the research context in a way that I could get the real things happening within them. Also, I knew exactly how to ask questions and how to get participants into the place where they would see me not as an outsider but a 'brother' they could trust without getting too personal with them as

well. At times I gained credibility and respect to get to this level in their eyes because they saw me as a young man from the UK doing a PhD research and that to them was impressive. Coupled with my usual amiable personality, I was able to penetrate all participants who felt very comfortable opening up to me about the firms and how things worked. I believed the connection I had with my participants was so strong that in many cases many would share with me the wrong things they did and why they did them. Overall this allowed for transparency in the processes and I was satisfied through it all that I had collected good and rich data able to help further this research.

CHAPTER 5

PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY CONTEXT IN NIGERIA

5.0 Introduction

This chapter offers a critical description of the research context. It begins by profiling the economic, social and institutional environment of the country, Nigeria. The context has been marked as I show by a history of scandals within the Nigerian context. This is discussed to present a context relevant canvas of immoral practices by MNCs in the pharmaceutical industry in Africa/Nigeria. Beyond these, a detailed description of the specific firm contexts in each of the three case groups is presented.

5.1 Research Context

The choice of a context for this research in accordance with its overarching objectives was predicated on two factors: a well-known corrupt context and a fast-paced, achievement driven economic hub for firms in different industries, both of which Lagos, Nigeria offered. This context is also a familiar setting to the researcher and is therefore relatively easy to navigate. Nigeria has a population of 170million people and 20million of these live in Lagos (CIA, 2013). The potential for economic prosperity in Nigeria has been particularly celebrated globally as one of the fastest growing economies in the world (Robinson, 2015) and Lagos being the commercial nerve of the nation and home to the headquarters of several multinationals is at the epicentre of this prosperity. Similarly within the pharmaceutical industry, the specific context of this study, most known global brands are headquartered in Lagos. Yet amidst these huge prospects are very weak institutions, a culture of corruption and poorly regulated industries (IMS Health, 2012) all of which validate the choice of this context as a viable ground for an ethics research. The choice of the pharmaceutical industry in particular was also guided by the ethically sensitive nature of the industry as well as a long history of ethical issues including drug adulteration, illegal drug trials, bribery, and corruption amongst other critical issues (NAFDAC, 2015) that lend the industry to the discourse of ethics within this context. Further, stiff market competition and individual and organisational drive within the industry exacerbated by the fast growing economy have also exposed firms to more and more nuanced waves of ethical problems centred around profit maximisation at the expense of

saving lives (IMS Health, 2012) thereby creating a context charged with high moral tensions.

Reports on the Nigerian pharmaceutical landscape from the World Bank, (2014) and United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, 2013) and Transparency International, (2014) reveal five crucial contextual features that typify the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry as follows: Illegal processes, corrupt government officials, greed, economic uncertainty and stiff market competition. These features have also been severally confirmed in different other scholarly studies on the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry (Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, 2001; Garuba, Kohler and Huisman, 2009). Of these five features -three of these being Illegal processes, corrupt government officials and greed - are direct offshoots of corruption in its various forms as manifested and reported in the region whilst the last two are economic factors.

5.2 A Culture of Corruption

A Transparency International, (2015) report identified corruption as one of the major reasons for the prevalence of counterfeit drugs in Nigeria, in addition to inadequate legislation, ineffective enforcement of existing laws, loose control systems, high cost of drugs, drive, greed, and ignorance (Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, 2001; World Bank, 2014). Furthermore, a United Nations report on the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry (UNIDO, 2013) also confirmed the role widespread corruption in most transactions plays in the pharmaceutical industry, attributing its effect to lack of access to quality, affordable essential medicines, illegal trading, drug adulteration amongst others (UNIDO, 2013). Examples of corrupt practices as cited by the one of the regulatory bodies in the industry, National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC) included 'extortion of bribes from applicants for drug registration, deliberate over-supply of drug samples for resale, and acceptance of perquisites and material gifts from companies being inspected', to name a few (NAFDAC, 2015). Stemming directly from this culture are three features within the industry as identified by Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, (2001):

5.2.1 *Illegal Processes*

Nothing gets done unless the process is 'helped' or 'fast tracked' and following proper procedures is tantamount to a waste of time. Hence, to get things done such as securing a major contract, register a company, clear an import, and as many other activities covered in the gamut of the industry's value chain, people expect to bribe their way through processes to get speedy response. Garuba, Kohler and Huisman, (2009) in a study of the industry reported that every aspect of the industry – registration, procurement, distribution and so on are susceptible to corruption by up to 89% of the time.

5.2.2 *Corruption amid Government officials*

Akunyili, (2005) explained that active players in the pharmaceutical industry have to constantly liaise with government agencies as part of regulatory requirements. This could be for different reasons including inspection, procurement, and registration amongst others (Cohen, 2006; Garuba, Kohler and Huisman, 2009). But owing to the culture of corruption, government officials often fell entitled to extra income from the roles and responsibilities assigned to them and would often not perform their statutory duties unless they are tipped (Erhun, Babalola, Erhun, 2001). This prevalent extortionist behaviour in government officials has often made easy processes unnecessary cumbersome, increased transaction costs for industry players and often hindered many firms from doing well, besides the broader impact it has on drug prices (Akunyili, 2006).

5.2.3 *Greed*

At the centre of both illegal processes and corrupt government officials is greed. There is a prevalent culture of greed within the context often stemming from a sense of 'entitlement' by all stakeholders (Akomah and Nani, 2016). For instance, Pharmaceutical representatives complain doctors always find clever ways of extorting them. Corrupt government officials are driven by the greed of wanting to make more money than they ought to (Cohen, 2006). The Pharmaceutical firms too are also driven by the desire to maximise profits by setting financial targets. The result is a system of different pressures and misconducts characterised by doctors

requesting for pay-outs to prescribe drugs and companies putting doctors on pay checks for prescribing certain volume of drugs periodically.

5.2.4 *Cut throat competitive drive*

A lot of generic drugs have flooded the Nigerian market from different parts of the world (IMS Health, 2012). This is fuelling the already stiff competition amongst local and foreign pharmaceuticals currently doing business in Nigeria (UNIDO, 2013). For malaria alone, there are over 200 drugs that claim to be very effective in malaria curative and preventive treatment. Other categories of ailments likewise have a lot of competing brands from established pharmaceuticals and generic brands. All these tend to make pharmaceutical representatives engage the context outside ethical norms to meet their sales targets. Only the multinationals with patented drugs enjoy some measure of immunity in this regard.

5.2.5 *High Economic Uncertainty*

In spite of anticipated prosperity, a large percentage of Nigerians still live below poverty line whilst the fears of economic dividends not trickling to the bottom abound (World Health Organisation, 2007). This creates constant fear in the middle class who feel the pressing need to survive. With rising living costs as well as few jobs to match this pressing demand, the sense of insecurity has gripped many thereby limiting their chances of changing jobs (World Bank, 2015). These five features depict the kind of ethical context in which this research was conducted and these will be taken into consideration during the analysis of all interviews.

Figure 5.1: Features of the Nigerian context



Source: Adapted from World Bank, (2014), UNIDO, (2013), Transparency International, (2014)

In the section to follow, I present an example of a scandal within the context reflecting how all the aforementioned contextual features played out through the actions of a multinational and Nigerian officials resulting in devastating effects.

5.3 The Nigerian Pharmaceutical Industry: Firm X's Scandal

'We did not suspect that our children were being used for experiment'

Victim's Dad (Murray, 2007)

One of the aftermaths of the weak institutional context in Nigeria is a celebrated clinical trial scandal case. In the 1990s, following the outbreak of a disease in a major city in Nigeria, a major multinational (Firm X) reportedly moved in first hand inside a few weeks of the outbreak to administer a drug, Drug Z on infected children. Drug Z was in its last stages of development and a test on human specimens would validate its potency as a potential 'blockbuster' drug as had been predicted in Wall Street (Stephens, 2006). However the clinical trial was soon riddled with lots of

controversies including the death of many children and the deformity of several others.

Arguments surrounding Firm X's actions have generally been categorised as either a genuine move to save lives or a greedy drive to make profit, with evidence skewing more towards the latter than the former (Stephens, 2006). First, Drug Z had been predicted to generate \$1billion in revenue (Brichacek, 2001). Given the huge sums that go into drug development often spanning ten years or more, a real time epidemic offered the perfect platform to test the drug, get final approvals for global deployment and make predicted profits. Further investigations soon also revealed Firm X had falsified consent letters to carry out the trial, that they had administered lesser doses than required by law and that the parents of the victims were not properly informed before their children were administered the unregistered drugs (Abdullahi, 2002). A parent famously retorted, '*The white people and some local doctors gave Anas this evil drug*' (Murray, 2007).

Furthermore, a World Bank report in 2002 ascribed the scandal to the repressive and corrupt regime of the era, which had weakened all institutions, including the drug regulatory agency in Nigeria, rendering it incapacitated to carry out its statutory duties of protecting lives (World Bank, 2002). This made it possible for Firm X to obtain 'quick' permissions from the authorities without any delays, although it can be argued that the urgency of the matter could have contributed to this. An initial response to the epidemic by a charity medical organisation in the region was administering another antibiotic, which reportedly had some success (Murray, 2007). But it was the allegation that Firm X kept the children on their drugs even when improvements were not observed that further accentuated their motive in the trial.

Firm X in response to accusations claimed Drug Z reduced mortality rates from 20% to 10% and that they sought oral consents due to low literacy in the region using interpreters to communicate their intentions to parents. Firm X also claimed to have sought appropriate consent from regulatory authorities and insisted that 'Drug Z helped save lives' (Firm X, 2007:1). Finally, Firm X denied that Drug Z was responsible for the death of the children in question but that the disease killed them coupled with the fact that they had supported the state government with 18million Naira in contributions and support towards the epidemic.

Whilst Firm X would not claim responsibility for the children's deaths and insisted their actions were 'ethically justifiable' the company suppressed every attempt to allow a fair hearing of a lawsuit levelled against them in the United States (Stephens, 2006) since there is an accusation here that they "suppressed" evidence. Initial hearings of lawsuits brought against Firm X in the United States were dismissed on grounds that the case be heard in Nigeria (Stephens, 2006). However in 2009, the Nigerian government filed a \$7billion lawsuit against Firm X following which Firm X was found guilty and subsequently fined (Goldacre, 2013).

Firm X's actions and responses opened up several debates, including the appropriateness of carrying out experiments during epidemics amongst others. What perhaps is of more interest in this study is the involvement of local medical staff, particularly Firm X's employees in this case. This kind of interaction between firm context and employee morality will be the focus of the discussions in subsequent chapters.

5.4 Case Group 1 – American Firms

5.4.1 Company Profiles

This paired case-group comprised of two very similar American pharmaceuticals (Firms A1 and A2) in the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry. Historically, both Firms A1 and A2 have been operating in the African pharmaceutical landscape for over 50 years with evidences of strong operations and proven brand reputation within the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry. For instance, both firms have a track record of owning production facilities and manufacturing drugs locally in Nigeria and in other parts of Africa. They also have both extended investment into other strategic businesses such as consumable and veterinary products. In terms of size, both firms have similar workforce strength globally, each having about 70,000 each and specifically within the Nigerian context, both having less than 100 employees each. Furthermore, revenue wise, Firms A1 and A2 are among the top 20 highest earning pharmaceuticals globally as well as within the African context. Both also have comparable strength in research and development as well as marketing and distribution on the continent. The drug portfolios of both companies also address the same diseases with both having more strength in different disease categories than the other. Most importantly in relation to this study is that both firms have had to

navigate arguably very similar weak institutional contexts over five decades and have had their fair share of scandalous activities. These include allegations of bribery, illegal lobbying and patent-related scandals. All these make both firms A1 and A2 suitable choices for studying how their bureaucratic practices interacts with employee morality in affecting moral behaviour.

5.4.2 Bureaucratic Context in the American Firms

American Pharmaceuticals are considered among the strongest players in terms of profit and market share in the Nigerian industry. From analysed survey data, confirmed by interview data, managerial control and formalisation (Standard Operating Procedures, SOPs) are the most dominant elements of the bureaucracies in these American firms. Both of these features exist as means of quite rigid formalized controlling of most firm activities and employees' transactions within their professional settings, especially since there is a common knowledge of the corrupt business landscape, and to help the mother firms effectively do business in a weak institutional environment. As such, the need to be seen as 'ethical firms' within the corrupt Nigerian context is the principal driver of this bureaucracy type in the American firms. SOPs exist for every category of firm activity and they are set rules governing actions and decisions employees must make, when and how to make them. As such in engaging with stakeholders on the field, there are selling models that guide how sales calls are to be made, how different categories of stakeholder are to be approached and handled under different circumstances and so on.

Doing business ethically implies the necessity to avoid fines, scandals and damage to brand reputation, all of which drive the need for strict rules and managerial control. Therefore, the only way the American firms believe this can be achieved is for employees to be compliant to all SOPs. Implicit in this approach is that employees must have faith in the efficacy of the SOPs in helping them do business ethically besides the need to avoid the punishments that could arise from violating such SOPs. Penalties include heavy fines, suspension without pay or even being laid off without benefits, all of which are unwelcomed in a particularly difficult economic context. Hence there is little or no latitude for employees to make independent decisions on behalf of the firm and this is believed will leave little room for error. This is a widely held belief by the employees too, who see adherence to SOPs as the way of doing

business ethically but also as adequate 'cover' in case of unexpected consequences, in which investigations would begin from whether such employee adhered to the SOP guiding related activities. One way compliance is instilled into employees is through frequent training, used as a means of getting employees to imbibe SOPs for different activities. For instance, ethical case studies are often used during trainings to test how employees would respond to certain issues on the field, to which set scripts on what to say and how to act are taught to employees. In strange situations, employees are not allowed to make decisions on their own but to refer such cases to their bosses who are expected to tell them what to do. This is one of the roles of managerial control in this setup.

Internal work environments are very structured yet are also experienced as cordial. It was a common expression throughout this process in one of the firms used that change is the only constant thing and therefore change agility is a crucial skill to have on the job. You could occupy a position today and the next it is gone leaving such persons to apply for other internal positions or leave the firm. It thus seems to create an environment of uncertainties. Very warm vertical relationships exist among ranks, respondents described the environment as 'family' 'cordial' and 'open' with all employees encouraged to 'say it as it is' yet the environment has zero tolerance for disrespect of colleagues and any breach of compliance. Punishments for such are extreme and very harsh, hence as an employee, focus is on doing things right. As such, American MNEs believe in continuously training their staff periodically and also exposing them to case studies that test their ability to effectively apply SOPs to real life scenarios. In addition, these firms have some of the best welfare packages in the industry with employees receiving all possible incentives – new cars, high salaries, among others to give security and discourage any unethical practices on the field. A solid welfare package, strong emphasis on compliance, robust marketing, strong brand reputation, patented drugs and qualified professionals guarantee that employees would hold up to very high moral standards within and outside of the organisation. Thus, American firms are known to create highly secure environment for their employees with less monetary pressure, less emphasis on sales targets and opportunities for personal development and career progression.

It is widely believed also that the strong interconnectedness that exists among departments also encourages high standards, whilst employees are not expected to physically handle company products during any sales transactions, unlike several other pharmaceuticals. They are simply expected to generate orders and third party agents close up the deals. Many employees believe this kind of context makes them feel protected from the tough business landscape by instilling confidence in them that they are working in an organisation that not only pays well but also encourages them to do things right by adhering to laid down rules. Employees tend to believe that integrity is one of the core values of the organisation that is doing what the rule says and being an ethical organisation in a very tough corrupt context. Some who aspire to start off their own company in coming years also submitted that they are modelling their businesses after what that have learnt because they believe it will produce a solid brand. Many went ahead to suggest they are comfortable on their jobs because it doesn't allow them do things that contravene personal moral beliefs. Many employees cited the 'alignment' of personal values with organisational values as a major reason. Others posited that their job espouses values they personally esteem and are therefore happy with doing their jobs daily. In response to the weak institutional setup, American firms therefore encourage their employees (who are all Nigerians), in a compliance driven environment to respond in the following ways: Creativity in marketing their products, Building Relationships, Avoidance of identified agencies, Leveraging on brand power, and Firmness in dealing with doctors on the field.

Also, American MNEs adopt a common industry practice of sponsoring a select few doctors to international conferences and subscribing to medical journals on their behalf as contributions towards increasing awareness of global medical trends. They also organise free screening workshops open to the public. However, concerns were raised as to the influence these gestures have on doctors who may feel indebted to the firms and respond by continually prescribing their drugs. But, the American firms claim they insist all doctors sign an agreement that their acceptance to be sponsored for a trip abroad is not in any way an inducement to make the doctors prescribe company products. They go as far making them declare that these gestures are for their professional development only and that they still maintain full discretion to prescribe drugs they feel will help their patients the most. The documentations and

processes involved are also quite long and tedious for obvious reasons and many doctors have been reported to complain bitterly about the processes involved thinking it is almost an insult on their pride. Thus, only few are able to wade through the maze to get the prize. Whoever is eventually sponsored is however not for employees to decide but the senior management.

Table 5.1: Summary of Participants in Case-Group 1

<i>s/n</i>	<i>Participant</i>	<i>Job Role</i>	<i>Background</i>
1	A1a	Pricing and Access Manager	Pharmacy
2	A1b	Sales Manager	Pharmacy
3	A1c	Marketing Manager	Pharmacy
4	A1d	Logistics Officer	Biology
5	A1e	Fleet Coordinator	Engineering
6	A1f	IT Officer	Computer Science
7	A1g	Medical Representative	Pharmacy
8	A2a	Sales Representative	Sciences
9	A2b	Medical Representative	Pharmacy
10	A2c	Country Manager	Pharmacy
11	A2d	Senior medical representative	Pharmacy

Source: Fieldwork

Table 5.1 above summarises the participants within this case group, their current job roles and their backgrounds. Of these 11 participants, two are in the senior management, three were mid-level managers and all others were the lower level within the organisations Also, majority of employees engaged in the sales of the American firms' products were also registered pharmacists with their professional affiliations with the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria.

5.5 Case Group 2 – Indian Firms

5.5.1 Company Profiles

This second paired case-group comprises two very similar Indian pharmaceuticals (Firms I1 and I2) in the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry. Historically, both Firms I1 and I2 have been operating in the Nigerian pharmaceutical landscape for about 15 years, solely marketing and distributing drugs manufactured abroad by their parent

firms in the region. With a similar structure, both firms have their senior management comprising only of Indian nationals and believe in employing only Nigerian nationals to do their selling on the field. In terms of size, both firms have similar workforce strength globally, each having about 10,000 each and specifically within the Nigerian context, both having less than 100 employees each. Furthermore, revenue wise, Firms I1 and I2 averagely gross between \$230-250 million globally, including the Nigerian market (Reuters, 2015). The drug portfolios of both companies also address the same diseases with both having the same strength in different disease categories. Most importantly in relation to this study is that both firms have had to navigate arguably very similar weak institutional contexts, employing very similar approaches – ensuring the senior management are only Indian nationals in order to maintain a strong control of all firms' activities. This stems from a history of a series of internal frauds within both firms that has led to the employment of tighter internal regulations in order to control the companies effectively. All these make both firms I1 and I2 suitable choices for studying how their bureaucratic practices interact with employee morality in affecting moral behaviour.

5.5.2 Bureaucratic Context in the Indian Firms

Indian pharmaceuticals are largely marketing and distribution firms within the context of the industry value chain. With production facilities in India, subsidiaries in other parts of the world service the marketing and distribution of parent company products to local markets. In a highly competitive business environment known for its institutional frailties, the Indians are very unpopular for their low-cost approach to business. With this approach, they employ mostly non-pharmacists to do the job of pharmacists as a way of reducing overhead to be incurred by paying qualified, registered professionals. Internally, there are strong cultural and racial divides within the Indian firms. This is evident in the composition of the upper echelon within the firms, structured such that only Indian expatriates occupy the mid and senior managerial positions with minimal job progression opportunities for Nigerian employees. This is explained by the fundamental assumptions Indians have of Nigerians as follows: The first (who most usually occupy more senior / management roles) don't trust the latter (who occupy employee roles) and vice versa, second, the Indians seem to believe that Nigerians cannot successfully run businesses if put in charge hence their firm control of key positions. Also there is a belief among the

roles higher in this hierarchy that Nigerians are best used to deal with Nigerians whilst the expatriates oversee operations, which may indicate chances of promotion despite being from the less privileged national group in this organisation's sociology. Once, a Nigerian was appointed as national sales manager but was soon removed on grounds of being vocal and confrontational. Generally, Indians may not be open to such confrontations from Nigerian employees regardless of their position within the firm. As a result of this, internal collaboration among employees is not allowed such that during meetings with senior management from India, employees are not allowed to air their views collectively for the fear of rebellion. Thus, freedom on jobs is highly curtailed for office staff whilst sales force has plenty of autonomy with no clear punitive measures in place to curb any excesses. Thus, there are no clear boundaries outside of the office environment and internal rules that exist protect only the interests of the company. Also, with very uncordial vertical relationships smeared with issues of mistrust, low wages (less than £100 a month), very tight management control on internal processes, the resultant context is one which is aggressive and frustrating as most employees describe the contexts of the firms.

At the foundations of these issues also are some unpleasant stories the Indians have had among themselves and with their Nigerian employees. In times past, there have been series of internal high profile defrauding that have often led to constant changes at the top, and also some Nigerian employees have absconded with huge sums of money and have remained at large. Interestingly, the Indians have not responded with force nor were law enforcement agencies engaged for fear of being further exploited and perhaps also because of tax offenses as an employee pointed out. This informed a rather interesting bureaucratic model the Indian firms in this study have adopted in response to these issues – one in which rules are employed as a control tool in regulating all internal firm activities. The most prominent of the rules is that employees are expected to service all orders they generate from the market with their money before clients pay. That is, when an order is generated, before the company releases products to the client, the representative in charge must pay the order sum, thereby shifting the risks 100% on their employees. This has also often led to some employees cutting corners and entering into deals with potential customers to reduce their risks.

In all of these, employees have responded in two major ways: decision to quit or to remain had to be made. Those who confessed they are contemplating quitting have done so because of their personal moral convictions which they believe has been eroded and professional aspirations for which they believe their current job cannot give them. They cited that they are beginning to do things they would never have considered doing by virtue of their upbringing, religious convictions and personal integrity. On the other hand, employees who have chosen to remain have done so by focusing on the money they make from soft deals on the field in place of wanting to rise up the ranks. Also, the helplessness many feel from prevalent economic conditions have forced them to stay for fear of losing a secure means of livelihood in a scarce jobs market.

Table 5.2 – Summary of Participants in Case group 2

<i>s/ n</i>	<i>Participan t</i>	<i>Job Role</i>	<i>Background</i>
1	I1a	Admin/HR Manager	Business Admin
2	I1b	Sales Representative	Pharmacy
3	I1c	Senior Sales Representative	Bio-Chemistry
4	I1d	Senior sales Representative	Pharmacy
5	I1e	Sales Representative	Bio-Chemistry
6	I2a	Sales Manager	Pharmacy
7	I2b	Sales Representative	Engineering
8	I2c	Sales Representative	Microbiology
9	I2d	Sales Representative	Chemistry

Source: Fieldwork

Table 5.3 above presents a summary of participants in this case group. All employees interviewed in this case group are categorised at the lower level based on the structure of the Indian firms and are all locals. As such they all have reporting lines in the senior management (all ethnic Indians). None of the managers were accessible to be interviewed in this study and as such interviews were conducted only with Nigerian employees. This was a limitation in this particular case group. Of the nine employees interviewed, only three are trained and registered pharmacists

with a majority having science related backgrounds and only two having a non-science background. However,

5.6 Case Group 3 – Nigerian Firms

5.6.1 Company Profiles

In the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry saturated with foreign multinationals, there are eight 100% wholly owned Nigerian plc, quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange with turnover in billions of naira. These local firms are also known to be strong enough to effectively compete with the foreign firms in the context. The two Nigerian firms used in this study are examples of such firms. For instance both are similar in size and capacity, as well as owning fully functional, World Health Organisation (WHO) standard local production facilities. In terms of employee strength, both firms have a work force of about 500 each and also have similar pay packages for their employees. In terms of age, firm N2 has been in Nigeria for a 100 years but first as a wholly owned British company. However in the 1970s, the British sold the company to Nigerians who have since run the organisation even though it can be argued that not all of the inherited culture would have changed over time. This may have important ramifications for the existing culture in the firm. Firm N1 on the other hand is a 21-year-old organisation, which started as a small firm and has now grown into an industry giant. Interestingly however, both have two different cultures, internal structure and approaches to the market.

5.6.2 Bureaucratic Context in the Nigerian Firms

5.6.2.1 Firm N1

Firm N1 is a 21-year-old organisation that is also publicly quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The organisation has been judged as the best indigenous pharmaceutical firm in Nigeria and is also reputed to be in the league of top multinationals in the industry. A culture of excellence and integrity has been deliberately built and instilled in employees through the visible modelling of such virtues by the senior management of the firm. Employees within this context typically show a lot of admiration and respect for the leadership of the firm, particularly the Managing Director (MD), known for his charisma. The MD has been described as humble, friendly and approachable such that any of the firm's 250 employees can

walk up to him at any time. This trait is also found in the entire senior management team such that employees also respect all their leaders. Therefore, the atmosphere within the organisation is very calm and cordial with top management often freely interacting with all levels of employees. An employee submitted that their HODs are the face of the values of the organisation and that as employees typically embrace the values that see in the leaders they respect. Interestingly, this firm does not have SOPs in place to govern processes however employees have a common understanding of the values that bind them as an organisation.

Also, the board of trustees of Firm N1 include some notable figures in the medical field including Nigeria’s first professor of medicine known for his moral values. Besides the cordiality and warm relationships, there is a Christian fellowship for employees within the organisation. Some of the staff point to the fellowship as a strong moral reinforcement for them and one that is held in very high esteem within the firm. An employee also submitted that the way the system is run, any fraudulent act is thrown up almost immediately hence they know it is not an option to even think of any dubious acts. The kind of context this has created is that which is free, inspiring and ethically sound and the company prides itself in having over 100 employees who have served for more than 10 years. In response, employees feel very comfortable working in such a huge establishment and would often use the words ‘privileged’ ‘honoured’ with a sense of joy that a Nigerian firm is stepping up with strong values in a poor institutional context. One complaint that however seemed to come up a few times was that the cordiality at times breeds an atmosphere of unprofessionalism and some form of looseness in executing daily tasks. A respondent who had worked in a highly bureaucratic establishment most of their career opened up that it took them 2 years to adjust to the free culture of Firm N1 and that they still wouldn’t mind returning to a regimented setup for the sake of clearly defined daily objectives and outcomes.

Table 5.3 – Summary of Participants in Firm N1

Participant	Position	Background
N1a	IT manager	Engineering
N1b	Operations Officer	Physiology
N1c	Product Manager	Pharmacy

N1d	HR Officer	GCE
N1e	Admins Assistant	Management
N1f	Internal Auditor	Accounting and Finance
N1g	Corporate Services Manager	Marketing and Communications
N1h	Secretary	Secretarial Studies
N1i	Compliance Officer	Pharmacy

Source: Fieldwork

5.6.2.2 Firm N2

Once partly owned by a British firm but now wholly Nigerian, Firm N2 is a 100 year old organisation trying to regain relevance in the modern market having lost a lot of ground to advancements in the industry. In times past, the company's products were household names, but with changes to the industry, it has become a name among the crowd trying to get its reputation back. The company's vision is to become one of Nigeria's biggest pharmaceutical companies by 2020. Termed a very complex organisation with red tape, access into the organisation was difficult. There are no clear rules or SOPs within Firm N2 hence employees tend to play by their own rules. As such, the context of this firm is largely unregulated. In comparison with other companies, an employee who had worked in top multinationals opined that working for the multinational firms keeps one in a 'cocoon' of ideals where it is impossible to bribe or do anything wrong. However in Firm N2, ways of doing things are not written in black and white, everyone is expected to 'know' what to do and this could include giving bribes to secure deals amongst others. In fact, a manager opined that it is a common practice to provide a budget for bribing doctors to prescribe their products under the guise of promotion.

Table 5.4 – Summary of Participants in Firm N2

Participant	Position	Background
N2a	Brand Manager	Pharmacy
N2b	Regional Manager	Marketing
N2c	Trade Marketer	Pharmacist

N2d	Trade Business Officer	Pharmacy
N2e	Medical Representative	Pharmacy
N2f	Senior Medical Representative	Pharmacy
N2g	Business Development Manager	Pharmacy

Source: Fieldwork

Tables 5.4 and 5.5 above present a summary of participants in firms N1 and N2 this case group. A higher number of interviewed participants in Firm N2 are registered pharmacists. Interviewed participants in Firm N1 on the other hand were picked across departments of the firm, out of which only two had registered pharmacists occupying them. Also, this sample had a good mix of managers and lower level employees within the context.

In conclusion, the capricious nature of the external context in which these firms operate has been discussed. Also case specific contexts have been presented with each case group showing some distinctness. The chapters to follow present the analysis and findings on how the bureaucracies espoused in each of the case groups affect employee morality.

CHAPTER 6

CASE GROUP 1: AMERICAN PHARMACEUTICALS

6.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis and findings on the first paired cases - the two American pharmaceuticals. Two major bureaucratic features typify the American case group: Formalised rules through standard operating procedures (SOPs) and managerial control. Formalised rules refer to strict SOPs guiding every employee activity. Employee effectiveness and efficiency are often tied to complying with these rules. Managerial control however exists to enforce compliance to the SOPs, often through informal means. Both of these features function together to create a “*Traditional Bureaucracy*” context. Evidence that shows this will be presented alongside a critical discussion of the impact of this traditional bureaucracy on the moral capacities of employees. To this aim I shall be using evidence from interview data and secondary sources to present relevant findings.

6.1 Formalised Rules - Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

'We have standard operating procedures for everything. They train us on the SOP...'
(A1b)

Standard operating procedures (SOPs) are set rules and detailed guidelines on every aspect of firm activities. As stated on the website of both American firms, SOPs exist in the form of manuals referred to as ‘Compliance Guidance documents’. They cover employee conduct within and outside the organisation and could be quite detailed such as in several instances offering prepared scripted responses to questions and scenarios faced whilst executing job activities. For instance, ‘selling models’ are a type of SOPs that detail all the processes that must be followed in engaging doctors and other potential clients in the field. They cover crucial aspects such as ways of approaching clients, how sales calls must be made including specific elements that must be involved, answering objections, selling approach, and so on. Included in some of these are also prepared scripts on how employees are meant to approach any ethical challenges faced on site.

More importantly however to report amid key data themes is the measure of compliance employees are expected to accord to these set rules. The salience of

SOPs in this case group is such that they provide the yardstick by which the 'accuracy' of job execution are measured and are considered as the reality check for any job related activity. That strict adherence is required of all employees and violating them could attract disciplinary consequences is a theme that appeared not just in interviews but even more so on the website of one of the firms:

"Our Compliance Guidance documents educate colleagues about our company's commitment to compliance. The Guidance documents put all colleagues, including management, on notice that failure to adhere to our compliance standards may have disciplinary consequences, up to and including termination of employment. If an investigation suggests that discipline may be warranted, appropriate action is taken..." (Firm A1 Company Website)

This theme was evident in both A1 and A2, where, employees understand the different compliance guidance documents and other SOPs to be the 'holy grail' of working effectively within the American firms. Employees appear to justify the need to accept the strict compliance culture as a way by which the firms' respond to the Nigerian context as explained below:

'Well, today Nigeria is the seventh or ninth most corrupt country of the world and they tell us that the country is already in the red light...and they really want us to be different from what is perceived...so, things you are not clear about that are still not spelt out you still want to ask... Have I been compliant? Am I doing the right things?' (A2a)

"...It's also a place where compliance is very very important. We value compliance ahead of business, rather forfeit the business if it is filled with weaknesses of compliance...." (A1c)

Therefore, strict adherence to the SOPs commands an environment characterised by rule / impersonal compliance. Employees also rely solely on the rules as their standards in measuring not only their performance but also what is and what is not right in the moral sense, since following the rules is expected to result in doing the 'right things' at work. With this, a rule-compliance driven morality is created by which both performance and morality are measured using checklists generated from the (formalised) rules.

Rules are communicated to employees through very frequent training whilst top executives are also meant to help enforce all rules. Firm A1's website stated:

“ Firm A1 is committed to providing effective training to employees, managers, officers, and directors on the Compliance Program. Training resources include online compliance education, as well as online access to policies...” (Firm A1 Company Website)

A respondent categorised the training as thus: *“Product trainings, scientific trainings, sales training, marketing trainings, capability trainings etc...”* (A2a). Obviously training is a more direct way of imparting firm rules and ideologies into the employees, and as such training is meant to act as a compliance-socialisation mechanism. Therefore what is right within the context of the American firms is what the rules say. This kind of system creates different mechanisms that ultimately affect the morality of employees in this case group. I start with the following perceptions employees have about the rule-based system as follows:

“Yes, the beauty of it is that you are always confident you are working in a company that will not ask you to do things that are not compliant...It is a company where your conscience is clear especially that the drugs you give to the patient, they are the best quality, you are not doing anything unethical even with government officials...”(A1c, Marketing Manager)

“...I guess for me I think being straightforward, getting things right, and organised and a straightforward system, those are the kind of things that I appreciate and admire and expect to see in any place. I guess that was what drew me to Firm A1, like I said the fact that they have this compliance thing, they have standards, which they work by and it's the kind of person that I am...” (A1g Medical Representative)

From the quotes above, it seems clear that functioning effectively within a rule-based rational bureaucracy creates a general sense of both professional and moral self-esteem in employees. Competence in this context is the feeling of proficiency arising from the belief employees have that they are working for organisations with high

professional standards and a commitment to ethics. However, when it comes to morality, it is noteworthy that quotes such as the above do not seem to say something about what specific values are the source of being ethical and why people would wish to aspire to these. Yet the rule based system could easily create a perception within employees that the bureaucratic rules align with their own personally held beliefs thereby reinforcing the feeling of competence. This could easily distract them from any personal moral inquiry since employees trust the rules as indeed sufficient in safeguarding their morality.

Also, the strict compliance and rule-based environment tends to create a sense of generalised fear to act in compliance in order to maintain one's job in employees who do not want to violate set rules because of associated punishments. An employee simply explained the implications of not following the rules as, "*For us it is as bad as you can lose your job*" (A1g). Examples of such violations and subsequent punishments were described below:

"You also have when consistently things don't happen the right way, people get fired...We had the case of a lady who fights everybody practically, yeah, fights her boss, fights her direct report, fights her peers, fights her customers, that is even the biggest, that's suicide..."
(A1a)

"...I think we've had one and the guy lost his job. It had to do with...something about receipts... You know there are some filling stations you go to especially in Lagos and they don't have receipts, if you ask for a receipt they just look at you 'weirdly' so he went to print receipts for a filling station so he was using it for his expense. Whenever he buys fuel he just uses it to get his reimbursement. And he's a pharmacist. (How was he caught?). It was very obvious, all your receipts are the same, the numbers are probably the same and they were following each other and you know those things are not usually obvious..." (A1g)

Also as earlier quoted, the implications of violating set rules especially in relation to financial transactions with externals is explicitly written on the websites of these firms, ranging from suspensions to outright termination of appointments. Employees

typically want to avoid such embarrassments and ascribe professionalism to doing things right according to the rules. Within this also comes a sense of safety, whereby employees feel secure as they comply with set rules. As an employee said, *“I like the covering the rules provide for me...”* (A2d). This sense of safety comes with a feeling of being covered and protected as long as rules are upheld. In summary therefore, it would follow that employees are expected to derive legitimacy within the system by strictly following set rules. Through mechanisms of competence, fear, and safety, the rule-based system encourages strict compliance to set rules in order to do things right.

6.2 Managerial Control

Managerial control in this case group manifests to enforce rule compliance behaviours. Whilst SOPs are the most visible entities in the operations of the firms, managerial control is subtler yet critical in this case group. Rules are tools, albeit powerful tools but power also lies in the hands of those who wield influence with the rules as one of their many tools. This is where the superiority and subtlety of managerial control lies as the following quotes show:

“...Everything is based on (personal managerial) approval...if approval is not given you wait and it helps things better because once you do things without approval and issues emerge from such, the penalties are usually very high...”(A1d)

“The thing is that they are more attentive to Nigeria even the little things you do, you even have a manager that will monitor you and because you already know so, things you are not clear about that are still not spelt out you still want to as - Have I been compliant? Am I doing the right things?” (A1c)

“Even if issues happen and policies don't cover it, you might have to seek your supervisor's consent.” (A1f)

From the above quotes, the mechanism of managerial control seems to aim at creating a personalised monitoring system via management approval requirement of most actions that ensures employee compliance to the set rules in all their activities. Employees are asked to defer to their bosses for any uncertainties faced on the field

instead of figuring it out themselves. This implies that the managers are the 'enforcers' of the rules with a seemingly 'superior' understanding that comes with the latitude to make decisions on behalf of the firm based on this. This disempowers employee moral judgement, while by extension it seems to overly empower managers as the sovereign guardians of morality that perhaps disempowers employees to do so equally. In other words, managers are the 'eyes' and the 'nose' of the system which creates a very authoritarian work climate. As a manager explained:

"I have days when I am on the field working with my colleagues...Tuesdays to Thursdays I'm on the field with my direct reports ensuring they are delivering what is expected of them...We run a system called mobile intelligence so your next level manager sees what you are doing without being on the field with you. He knows who you are calling on, he knows what product you are talking about, and he knows what activities or events you are doing without being on the field with you so long as you are reporting..." (A1b)

As the eyes, managers constantly follow up on their direct reports on the field through different means (including daily field reports, frequent phone calls, impromptu field inspections etc) such that they have constant updates on happenings on the field. As the nose, they are expected to 'sniff-out' any faulty, non-complaint behaviours in the activities of their direct reports and to set things straight based on the SOP. Furthermore, the extent of power and responsibility given to managers also implies they are the go-to persons by other employees in case of any issues whatsoever. This tends to put excessive power in managerial hands and as noted earlier disempowers non-managerial role holders from exercising moral agency. This is stated on the website of one of the firms:

"Firm A1 adheres to an "Open Door Policy," and encourages colleagues to discuss all issues, concerns, problems and suggestions with their immediate supervisors or other managers without fear of retaliation and with the assurance that the matter will be kept as confidential as possible..." (Firm A1 Website)

It may therefore also follow that managers themselves are less under scrutiny of the same rules they enforce thereby conferring on them enormous powers and responsibility. For instance, managers are able to allow obvious violations of SOP go unpunished as implied by an employee who spent lavishly on certain marketing activities beyond the stipulations of SOPs:

“...We can have our meetings somewhere and if it is more than a certain amount of money, your boss asks you why do you do it in such a location, you just say this was the best option you had in this vicinity and its done! And they just sign it off since they can defend it also with their boss. They just give you a verbal warning to say be careful because it is really expensive...” (A2d)

Hence, it seems clear that managers are able to manipulate the rules such that as long as they say an action is okay, it is okay, regardless of the SOPs. This could easily create a lax morality within the system, whereby manager’s endorsement of certain non-compliant acts could legitimise them with employees.

Interestingly, the mechanism of managerial control in this case group thrives in an environment of informality, which is in contrast to the more formalised experience of working under the rigidity of SOPs. In other words, when it comes to the management and employee relations control is not achieved through force or hierarchical distance amongst members of different ranks but through subtle means central to which are respect and close bonds. Hence, within this case group, there is strong cordiality between senior managers and their direct reports, a family-like feeling that creates a sense of bond, respect and trust, which is acknowledged by all employees in this case group. In the words of a manager:

“...The Firm A1 system is more like a family where everybody operates, we are connected one way or the other which is okay which is the best way to function. For that working relationship to be as impactful as possible there has to be some social relationship that kind of family setting where everybody feels responsible or accountable to one another so it's a beautiful family, a beautiful house...” (A1c)

From the quote above, a lot of emphasis is placed on being a beautiful ‘family’ defined as being accountable and responsible to one another. This may serve as a

mechanism for normalising and rationalising obedience as it easily fosters a collective group mentality and morality able to suppress individual moral agency. Through these, managers are able to connect closely with their direct reports in such ways that they are able to further mentor, coach and instruct them along the tenets of the bureaucracy. However, most of this does not seem to serve the development of a shared yet independent moral responsibility but instead seem to exist to shut down inquiry, or criticisms or disagreement. More in depth data however has not supported this. A likely result is to have employees who find the 'cordial' bureaucratic environment appealing such that their trust is easily earned, thereby lowering their resistance towards the demands of the bureaucracy. An employee below stated:

"...One thing for me again is that the way this organisation is designed it make the work to flow so we don't have stress, it is not like a bureaucratic set up. In a bureaucratic set up you get things done very difficultly, very difficult to get things done but in this kind of setup we have here we can get things done faster and especially also when you have to relate with people, interpersonal skills need to constantly come to play..." (A1e)

The norm of cordiality as construed by these employees even makes them feel they are not working in a bureaucratic organisation. Consequently, employees see cordiality as a 'comfort' factor and a good feature of their organisation such that they feel safe raising any objections they may have about anything or being able to defer to their superiors for counsel and/or more rigid monitoring direction set by superiors on any work related matters as shown below:

"That is very cordial (referring to relationships with superiors). I must admit that that is one thing Firm A1 tries to promote. We have a cordial relationship, if you notice everyone is on a first name basis..." (A1g, Medical Representative)

"Oh! Firm A1 does not condone jerks at work place... We have what we call straight talk policy in Firm A1 whereby I can address an issue with the person about the matter even no matter how highly placed you are within the organisation...there will be a reason why you will say you did not agree with his point of view so it's a place where you will not feel threatened...it's

a place that does not encourage you to talk anyhow or behave anyhow to colleagues...” (A1c, Marketing Manager)

Also working in this sense is the mechanism of respect as the respondent above stated. But in reality, this kind of ‘cordial’ setting could create an environment where things seem right on the surface but the real issues are masked, and employees are unable to speak up on some of their core concerns as an employee explained:

“Okay yeah...previously cohesion used to be better. We used to be much more close and bonded than we are now. I think people don't really have faith and trust in the organisation like before. We feel like we are not being protected we feel like our needs are not being met, we raise issues with them they sweep them under the carpet... it's just another little teams of individuals everyone is driven so as to achieve something... but really the culture thing I don't really think is as strong as it used to be...because I am not really enthusiastic about work anymore and that's just a truth. I am not excited...despite the fact that we talk on a first name basis, there is still a lot of subjectivity...”(A1g, Medical Representative)

Thus, it seems clear from the quote above that there are unvoiced feelings of mistrust and dissatisfaction amongst certain employees which are ‘swept under the carpet’ within the environment of cordiality that claims to encourage freedom of speech. Also, within the environment some employees seem unable to objectively voice their concerns for perhaps certain fears that may not be disconnected from the power managers have over the employees. However, there was insufficient data to prove this connection. Furthermore, employees are made to believe that they are working in a near perfect system where following the rules is sufficient and this makes life and career easy and good. In reality however, managers are still unable to totally monitor their employee activities on the field. As such the only way they claim to measure compliance is when there are zero-incidents of non-compliance as a manager explained below:

“So, if you train your reps well, giving them scenarios and how to handle objections and all that then to a large extent you are ensuring compliance. (How do you measure that?) It's a difficult one because the only way to measure compliance is if you have zero incidences of non-compliance. If

we have none for the year that's a very good year. If I have one it then depends on whether it is manageable internally or to escalate it to the top... How would I know when there is an issue, the answer to that question is really difficult. Unless I stumble on a doctor who would tell me I wouldn't know because there is no tracking device on them. I keep saying prevention is better than cure. So the aim is to avoid it by getting the right person training and communicating..." (A2c)

Nonetheless, that there are zero incidents in a year does not imply that employees have been fully compliant. They could have violated the rules of the bureaucracy and may have gotten away with such either by themselves or by the endorsement of their managers as earlier established.

In summary, managerial control functions when managers excessively monitor activities within the system based on set rules often to the detriment of individual moral agency. Control is however achieved through subtle means of cordiality over work matters and respect between managers and their direct reports with clear lines of seniority that maintain that managers and SOPs are the moral arbiters in the firms of this sub-sample. This in turn facilitates working relationships based on supervision, coaching, mentoring and trainings, all of which are channels of propagating bureaucratic compliance morality to employees. Yet, there was clear absence of any other conversation or interaction regarding moral inquiry such as more subtle aspects of professional ethics, or any moral dilemmas, as if there were none. These however appear to disempower moral disagreement or inquiry and independent moral agency even though employees tend to see compliance as a way of ensuring their jobs are properly done.

6.3 The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees' Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities

As previously established, the morality of the studied employees in this study is evaluated from two theoretical lenses: their cognitive moral development levels and moral identities. From preliminary findings, the moral identity (MI) scores and assigned cognitive moral reasoning (CMR) level of each employee are presented in table 6.1 below.

Table 6.1 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants

Participant	CMR Path	Moral Identity Strength
A1a	Conventional Level (stage 4)	6.47 (strong)
A1b	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	5.18 (strong)
A1c	Post-conventional Level (stage 5)	6.06 (strong)
A1d	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	5.00 (strong)
A1e	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	4.71 (strong)
A1f	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	6.76 (strong)
A1g	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	-
A2a	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	5.47 (strong)
A2b	Post-conventional Level (Stage 6)	4.29 (strong)
A2c	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	-
A2d	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	5.11 (Strong)

Source: Field Work

The table above shows that the CMR levels of participants vary significantly (from pre conventional stage 1 to post conventional stage 6). However it must be noted that these CMR levels were allocated based on the researcher's subjective evaluation following a few yet carefully observed patterns of thinking in interview data for each participant and not with the appropriate tool. Hence, it could have some errors prone to researcher bias. On the other hand however, MI scores show all participants have predominantly strong moral identities, which is unexpected and immediately raises some concerns. First, the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure was used in getting the MI scores of each participant. This measure has been documented to have very high reliability and validity (Aquino and Reed, 2002, Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 2011). Also, studies (Reed and Aquino, 2003, Aquino et al 2007, Shao et al 2008, Aquino et al, 2009) that have adopted this measuring tool have found significant variations in the moral identity scores of all tested samples. The results in this case group however reveal an anomaly that could imply there is inflation in the moral perception of participants. Whilst this indicates some weakness in the MI measure as a self-scoring measure, it also points to the likely effect a rule-based bureaucracy could have on employee understanding of their own

morality. In this next section, this possibility will be explored along three key propositions:

Proposition 1: *Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)*

This simply means that the subjectively perceived moral identity strength in the oral interviews seemed to be “inflated” compared to the “actual” scores of MI found when using the relevant measure (Aquino and Reed, 2002).

A justification for this proposition is: Moral identity theory presumes all individuals have moral traits they hold as central to their self-definition. Thus, people with a strong sense of moral identity are those who prioritise moral commitments above other commitments, obligating themselves to live consistently in integrity to their deeply held moral beliefs. In principle, such persons have their moral traits easily and readily accessible by situations and contexts, which in turn affects how decisions are made in those circumstances. Individuals with weak moral identity on the other hand do not prioritise moral commitments and have their commitments in other ideals such as having wealth and so on. It also therefore follows that their moral traits would not be readily accessible in situations making such traits less likely to affect their decision-making.

Thus, within a bureaucracy driven by compliance to rules and managerial control, it is likely that employees with strong moral identities would more readily obey set rules for the sake of acting consistently in accordance to their moral values. Those with weak moral identities could also follow the rules but for benefits such as self, public praise and rewards where they feel they follow the bureaucracy’s rules without questioning them at all.

Proposition 2: *Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders*

The justification for this proposition is: Kohlberg’s theory suggests that conventional level thinkers are more inclined to show uncritical obedience and conformist

behaviours to social norms. This implies that employees reasoning at this level are less inclined to critical moral inquiry and are more likely to embrace set rules, norms and standards without questioning them. Within bureaucracies, such employees see issues only through the lens of the SOPs and are often unable to bring other perspectives to bear in their decision-making. Post-conventional level thinkers on the other hand are expected to employ universal moral principled concern expressed in reasoning and their reporting of action in their organisations, while it is also expected to find a more nuanced and sensitive moral inquiry relevant to the post conventional moral reasoners. Within bureaucracies, they are able to see issues not only from the firm's perspective but also through the lens of higher moral principles. Since it is typical of bureaucracies to be characterised by formalised rules and other qualities often requiring strict compliance from its employees, it would therefore follow that bureaucracies would more likely reward conventional level thinkers hence this proposition.

Proposition 3: *Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity*

The justification for proposition 3 is that there are potential conflicts between how professional bodies define the nature and role of their members versus how firms want such professionals to behave within their contexts. A profession is an independent body (outside of any organisational interests) which advises people who undertake a particular strand of work and which provides some core ethical criteria and norms about the essential purpose of this profession for society, independently of the context/employer where the professional exercises this (Hall, 1968, Freidson, 1973, Forrester, 1988). A profession is beyond and above an institution within which professionals work, while professional bodies are the guardians of very long lasting ethical traditions about practicing a particular profession (McCloskey and McCain, 1987). There is therefore a clear difference between looking good (doing what the bureaucracy wants) and being ethical (following professional code of ethics). Outside, acting 'ethically' in accordance with the professional guidelines of the Pharmacists Council of Nigeria or personal integrity guides a sense that one pursues "the good"

and is a person who seeks to act in ethically good ways on the basis of their personal professional integrity. However, inside this bureaucracy that combines rule compliance and close personalised managerial control mechanisms, most employees - with strong and weaker moral identity- have no other option than to comply with firm's policies and rules. This could be rewarded as "good" behaviour insofar as it is successful and this may inflate a false sense of stronger moral identity even for employees with weak moral identity, once they adopt a moral relativistic way of valuing such as "when in Rome act as the Romans". Similar mechanisms may also influence employees with strong MI towards more compliance behaviours.

6.4 Proposition 1

Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)

As noted in moral identity theory it is presumed that all individuals have moral traits they hold as central to their self-definition. Thus, people with a strong sense of moral identity are those who prioritise moral commitments and integrity responses, while people with weak moral identities maintain moral duties as less of a priority. As within this bureaucracy rule compliance and managerial authority decide on what is right to do irrespectively of moral dimensions of the matter, there could be an avoidance of self-shame by employees with weak moral identities to assume what is right in managerial and operating procedure terms should be also named "ethical", which enables these person, to maintain a sense of acting consistently in accordance to their moral values (which reduces obviously cognitive dissonance). Those with weak moral identities substitute a lack of moral conscience strength with a more passive rule followership behaviour. This also grants weak moral identity employees public praise, recognition and rewards whereby they feel "I am moral because I follow the SOP, although being moral is not significant for my identity if it comes as a side effect of something I would anyway do (to succeed/keep my job) why should I not celebrate it?"

Interestingly, as earlier discovered, all participants in this case group have reported to have strong moral identities based on the Aquino and Reed, (2002) moral identity

measure so there was no gap between the orally self-reported and the measured moral identity scores. But all the scores of the latter were high. This can be a weakness itself of the moral identity operationalization as a self-report measure, in that it may be that contextual factors can easily “contaminate” (inflate or deflate) the self-reported scores. In this case, I assume that a compliance driven bureaucratic context will want to maintain a belief they have strong moral identities. On another hand it could also be because of the individual’s desire to reduce any guilt/self-doubt if following the rules may be at odds with their moral instincts in some cases when their moral faculties tell them they should question or break the rules thereby distorting their real moral identity strength.

The possibility of the latter is tested in this section accordingly and findings are presented below:

6.4.1 Finding 1: Employees with strong moral identity see SOP and overall managerial compliance as synonymous with displaying a strong morality. This creates a sense of moral self-righteousness, which in turn influences how employees perceive/esteem their own moral identity

The first finding within this proposition is that employees all of whom have strong moral identity scores see ethics as part of SOP. It is interesting to observe that this finding may manifest gradually after the passage of a certain period of time when people become gradually used to passively following all the rules and when compliance becomes internalised and not just a contextual demand. In this case a process or longitudinal study could yield more in depth and detailed data on this phenomenon. This finding is particularly crucial in that it offers the foundation upon which subsequent findings of the effect of SOPs on employee moral identity scores are based. Table 6.2 below presents evidence of how employees take ethics as a part of standard operating procedures.

Table 6.2: Seeing Ethics as part of SOP

Participant	Quote
A1f	<i>“For example, let me come down to my level, you go to hospital, and you tell a doctor that you shall sponsor him for a particular program and that he would prescribe your drugs more, what should he or she do? The answer of course is NO (based on the SOP).”</i>

	<i>You would tell him, of course it isn't the proper thing to do, sponsoring the doctor would imply that you are influencing him and inducing him to prescribe your drugs which is not what we do, we are a company that stands for quality as in what you offer should sell for you and not trying to induce anybody."</i>
A1d	<i>"...And everything is based strictly on compliance and you don't do things because you want to do it. You might be doing it and somehow to the applause of every other human it is okay and will evaluate it by looking at the laid down rules in terms of compliance, were the rules followed? So you might more than be penalised. You may be saying that okay you've done so well but did you get the approval before you went ahead so that's the issue... But in the case of the multinational like ours even if you get the job done the question we ask is did you follow the procedure?... Some of us in terms of looking at Firm A1 as a company we like to impose strictly by the rules and follow the laid down rules set by the mother company in America." "...So policies and procedures put in place help us to be morally alert and sensitive to the environment and the people concerned that is the end users..."</i>
A2d	<i>"...I like the rules, they offer me protection, a covering so I know I will not get into trouble..."</i>
A1a	<i>"...Now, if you are talking to a government official, there are set guidelines. For a smart employee what you would do would be to come back to the office before meeting the person and have a scenario painting and say okay this is the best case, this is the worst case then you go, if you need any approval, you go with the worst case approved..."</i>
A1e	<i>"...Even if you want to get the job done you have to follow strictly written rules in getting it done. You need to perform based <u>only</u> on set rules...We have policies in place that guide some of the decision-making that has to do with the fleet management...Even if issues happen and policies don't cover it, you might have to seek your supervisor's consent. Once it is granted your fine..."</i>

Source: Fieldwork

From the evidence above, what comes across very readily is the emphasis of each participant on how things ought to be done by following the rules and a sense of compliance that comes with each response. Compliance to the set rules means everything 'proper response' to ethical issues on site according to participant A1f means responding how they have been told to respond at SOP training. There has

been no evidence of moral inquiry on why these rules are important in all cases, or cases when they may be questioned. Likewise ‘doing things well’ according to participant A1f means strictly adhering to set rules, without which results could be considered null. In abiding by these rules comes a sense of security and righteousness in the responses of the employees, a confidence that suggests that once the rules are followed, everything else, including morality falls into place. As such, employees tend to see compliance to SOPs as synonymous to displaying a strong moral identity, since the rules are the ultimate guidelines and following them is meant to always guarantee moral outcomes.

Following from this, it is also discovered that as employees comply with the rules of the bureaucracy in their daily duties, it confers on them a sense of moral self-righteousness as shown in table 6.3 below:

Table 6.3: Perception of employees’ to SOPs in relation to personal moral values

Participant	Quote
A1b	<i>“...Yes, there are challenges with the Nigerian markets and there are things most of your clients would expect you to do to you know gets the business rolling... We have rules. You cannot bribe... You cannot induce a client to get business with anything whatsoever be it cash or kind. You can’t do that so when you understand these rules which in many cases for me aligned with my personal values. That is not something I want to do even if the organisation allows me to do so. So whatever kind of business advantage we are trying to get or gain is secondary to your personal values. I would rather lose the business advantage than go against what the company set for me...”</i>
A1d	<i>“...Everything we do as a company also affect you as an individual because of either having a cordial relationship with my customers, it also affects... I as a person, I also value them. They’re very key to us apart from any other thing...”</i>
A1f	<i>“The core value of the organisation that breeds the kind of culture that we have that I appreciate is also impacting on the as an individual positively because if in an environment whereby you cannot steal, then it is going to help you stand firm that this is an environment and I love it. So you live for that every day, it is incorporated into you that these are the norms that’s why I said</i>

	<p><i>that I like what we have here.”</i></p> <p><i>“...We have core values that guide our culture. Okay one of our core values as customer services, integrity and performance. All these links make the culture the relation so strong because everyone is striving for excellence, because you have to do your best, you don't want anyone to see that you are the one making the progress to be slow or to have a flaw...”</i></p>
A1c	<p><i>“...For us, integrity is very important [you hold that too as an individual?] I do too...that's why for me I can work in Firm A1. The company itself, the policy somehow dovetails into what I personally hold as what ought to be done. Where I may get a bit concerned is when I feel, oh this is too much, you can't do this. It is not... Sometimes some issues are not because it is a compliance issue...”</i></p>

Source: Fieldwork

From the evidence above, following the rules appeals to a good subjective sense of moral identity strength in all the employees/managers of this sub-sample, even though in some instance as in the response of participant A1b, moral inquiry was either missing or naïve when analysing the speech and thought patterns of the person via the interview material. For example to illustrate, participant A1b talks of the important ethical norms around the rules not allowing bribes and inducements, which he claimed he also believes in. Participant A1f on another hand also explained how the rules and values of the bureaucracy would not allow employees to steal; whilst some others explain how they believe the rule-based system helps keep their integrity intact. Hence, the rules seem to appeal to desires of the employees to for instance be seen as loyal, honest, upright etc that wins their trust that the rules surely enhance ‘shared’ moral values between them and the bureaucracy. They therefore exude a sense of knowledge of the rules, and the system in such ways that they believe it’s a perfect moral setting for them. The result of this is that employees completely buy into the values of the firm, as seen in their claims that the rules and values of the bureaucracy ‘impacts them positively’ and that it ‘strengthens their own personal value system’.

Subsequently, lines between values of ethical nature on one hand and rules of the bureaucracy on the other hand become blurred, hence the claims that

personal/shared normative values are in alignment with what bureaucracy values in terms of its standard operating procedures. As one of them explained, (s)he would rather not get a business deal than go against what the company has set for them. Such is the trust employees have in the rules and values of the system that they believe it perfectly aligns with theirs. It therefore follows that individuality is potentially lost or misplaced within the broader ethic of the bureaucracy. Yet it is at this point where employees believe the rule-based bureaucratic system aligns with their own moral values that their sense of moral competence originates. With this sense of moral competence, they believe they know their left from right and are able to make informed ethical decisions based on the belief that the rules of the company buttresses their personally held moral beliefs. This feeling as seen in each participant's response drives a sense of strong moral identity and this shows a first direct link between following the rules and the sense of strong moral identity employees claim to possess. However, CMR results show each participant reasons at different CMR levels, which explains the degree of sophistication across the participants' moral self and context of ethical awareness.

6.4.2 Finding 2: Managerial sanction trumps SOPs

Within this case group, managers are expected to be enforcers of the SOPs. The system expects managers to echo the SOPs and ensure they are followed to the letter. However, it was discovered that there is a possibility for managerial sanction to trump SOPs and that the approval of certain activities by managers could validate those actions as being 'right' regardless of what the SOPs say. For instance, a participant who is a senior medical representative in one of the American firms identified an obvious gap in the rule system of his firm as shown below:

“One issue is in Nigeria, what we term a gift. It does not align with SOP. Standard procedures see that it should not be an extravagant gift. They just kept it like that. They don't put a price tag to it...So extravagance is very very ambiguous. So what is extravagant to one it may not be extravagant to another... They have it like it should not be extravagant and all this fanciful terms...” (A2d)

“...But we will still sponsor doctors to education conferences even though we make them sign. The truth is we make them sign, everyone

makes them sign that it's not only give an undue advantage but it's an unwritten... After we have taken you to Barcelona, put you in a four-star hotel for one week why will you come back to Nigeria and see medication for my drugs and write and other drug? That African thing just to say thank you, human sentiment.” (A2d)

The participant above indicated that there are ambiguities in the SOPs regarding gifts and what is permissible. But it is also implied that as long as certain gifts are approved by top managers as implied in the second quote, they become okay even though such acts may confer undue advantage which is a clear violation of SOP. In another instance, the same employee made reference to another incident as earlier mentioned (see page 136 above). Again on this occasion, the participant's manager waived what seemed to be an obvious violation of set rules. SOPs gives a presumption of moral righteousness, because as the organisation claims to forbid certain acts and actions, in reality, there is an underlying mechanism in which management could say yes if it suits an objective of the bureaucracy, for instance, meeting target sales figures. The possibility of managerial sanction to trump SOPs able to create a sense of being morally upright in employees was further highlighted in another incident as follows:

“...before you do something, always confirm with your boss...Like I had a situation on Friday, I was talking with my boss. There was a consultant haematologist; he is the chairman of the Nigerian HIV/AIDS task force, quite big. We sell ARVs and we are trying to get into the market. We have some generic competition so I was talking to my boss about it and he was telling me that we should come and make a presentation somewhere and talk to him. I asked my boss, what's in it for this man?...Before we go any further...” (Participant A2d)

From the above incident, the question being asked by the participant of his boss about the person in question indicates that managers can decide what will be deemed correct in that situation, even if it violates SOPs as earlier shown but as long as it furthers the objective of the bureaucracy. On another note is the behaviour of the participant who clearly shows that following the sanction of managers is critical to

surviving in this bureaucracy. The deference to the boss for how to act in such a situation is typical within this bureaucracy and further demonstrates how employees could also gain their sense of strong moral identity by doing what the bosses say, which becomes the right thing in that instance.

From the following findings, it seems clear that indeed following the rules of the bureaucracy as well as the sanction of managers confers a sense of strong moral identity in employees. In some cases, the enhanced moral self-esteem of employees was really good and thoughtful and in some cases naïve and morally dubious. The CMD levels of these participants may help distinguish whether the enhancements in MI level increased moral awareness or completely shuts it down. Overall, these findings confirm proposition 1 to be correct.

6.5 Proposition 2

Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders

I test this proposition by attempting to show that what SOPs and managerial control require of managers is consistent with conventional level thinking. It can be said that this proposition is partly true and partly false. It is partly true in that bureaucracies deliberately appoint conventional level thinkers into managerial positions within the firm. However, responses to ethical issues faced by the participants suggest that individual CMD levels may have a stronger influence, contrary to what this proposition suggested. The proposition suggested that the bureaucracy drives conventional level reasoning observed in middle managers however, individual reasoning abilities had a stronger influence than the bureaucracy. Evidence and findings are presented below:

6.5.1 Finding 3: Bureaucracies seem to prefer individuals with conventional level moral reasoning in managerial roles

It was found that bureaucracies tend to deliberately appoint and prefer conventional level thinkers into managerial positions. Table 6.5 below show quotes from managers in both American firms to this effect with some explaining how this is achieved from the recruitment stage to expectation whilst on the job as follows:

Table 6.5: Conventional level thinking in Managers

Participant	Quote
<p>A2c Marketing Manager</p>	<p><u>“...So, ultimately we make sure first and foremost that we have people were really wanna take ownership of the business. We're very centred about the result...”</u></p> <p><u>“...So what I mean is that it begins with the interviewing process, where you're bringing in someone into the organisation you have to look for that from the beginning Firm A2 is not a single entity we make Firm A2. Every single staff is eminently wherever you are you representing the organisation so right from the interview that's what we look for. We want to know exactly what you're VABs. Values Attitudes Beliefs. We make sure that is an alignment between what you stand for and what the company believes in. If there is something about alignment, You are most likely going to be a perfect candidate, It starts that way. When on the job of course there's series of trainings making you understand what is obtainable so there are no assumptions of course...”</u></p>
<p>A1a Senior Manager</p>	<p><u>“Quality, customer focus, community focus, integrity, respect for people, they are there on our website. And personally there are a number of them I also see reason for one individual to adopt - collaboration. I like collaboration and I know that I like collaboration. How I know I like collaboration is first of all, the coordination, I could see and even when I am playing games, I can be a good midfielder, and midfielder if you don't collaborate, if you don't pass those balls, if you don't recognise who to give at any given time, you just be messing up the game. You will just be holding the game to yourself and everybody will be suffering so I play that midfield very well and sometimes guard. If I play football, midfield, if I play basketball, I play guard so the whole thing is that I respect that whole collaboration and why wouldn't you collaborate since the work is too big for one person.”</u></p>
<p>A1d Logistics Officer</p>	<p><u>“Actually that XYZ case although (long silence) we have been advised not to say much about that because anything like that this channel to the legal department but we are aware that it has been settled. It was some it was a case about some years back about an outbreak. The drugs were administered but for me I just see it all as political blame you understand, because Firm A1 doesn't cut corners...but the good thing is that a case has been settled. We're really not told and I don't really want to say much but rather to be channelled to the legal department...But the beauty is that the case has been settled and we have been told not to say much but rather but to be channelled to the legal department.”</u></p>

<p>A1g Senior Medical Representative</p>	<p><i>“...Like these are online trainings, they give us Case studies of situations and ask what we will do, we will give them the answer and they tell us either yes or no this is what you should do in such situations and then if you have such situations you report them so basically it is like trials, they tell you what to do more situations more often than not they are telling you this is how you shall handle this,...For example, let me come down to my level, you go to hospital, that you shall sponsor him for a particular program and that he would write your drugs more and then the person and as to wish on what should he or she do? The answer of course is NO...”</i></p>
--	--

Source: Fieldwork

The above quote suggests the American firms are careful in selecting people who share the values attitudes and beliefs of the firm. This would ensure there is some measure of alignment between such individual’s values and those of the firm. The result would be that such employees would readily conform to the norms of the bureaucracy. And as participant A2c further explained, such persons will be able to take ownership of the business. These criteria clearly suggest that bureaucracies carefully select and prefer persons who are conventional level thinkers into position. That is, employees who show the most prospect of conformity to the demands of the bureaucracy. And when on the job, series of trainings further help mould such employees into the employees the bureaucracy wants them to be. This conformity to its tenets is what the bureaucracy tends to encourage and reward.

6.5.2 Finding 4: Employee’s responses to ethical issues varied according to their individual CMD levels

Firms A1 and A2 have both been involved in series of scandals in their several years of existence within the context. Hence as part of the interview process, the researcher probed the opinion of employees on one of such scandals involving their firm. Of the three managerial role holders that refer to this scandal during the interviews, two were conventional versus only one post-conventional level reasoner. It was discovered that the conventional level managers did not show signs of moral inquiry in their perception of the scandal in question. They rather approached the issue based on how the firm instructed employees to approach it in a show of conformity. The post-conventional level thinker however showed some signs of

moral inquiry by indicating where the firm went wrong and was able to indicate the goal of the firm as profit driven in spite of claims by the firm's headquarters that that was not the case. The responses of the three participants are presented in table 6.5 below:

Table 6.5 Sample of Participants' responses to their firm's scandal

Participant	Quote
A1g Conventional level, Stage 3	<i>"...honestly speaking, I know, I can't say I have the full details of what really happened of course because I work in the company, <u>they claim to have gotten the required information that was needed but apparently someone who wanted something just decided to... Because they were not offering, they decided to rise against them and made it look like they didn't get the required permissions. Probably because I have had the story from Firm A1's end I feel that the Nigeria factor came to play... Let me say the company had to pay some money apparently...</u>"</i>
A1c Post Conventional level, Stage 6	<i>"...<u>It was like more of an improperly managed arrangement err, some people saw it (the situation) as an opportunity to make money and apparently falsified things because apparently Firm A1 too didn't, may be people who handled it did not cover their tracks too early, they didn't go through certain things, they didn't document things well because you want to give people something...because ooh you saw a loop hole to make money and so make people who were not involved also come to lay claim...</u>"</i>

Source: Fieldwork

On one hand, it has been established that the bureaucracies demand compliance from employees. As shown from the sample quotes above, the response of participants A1g reasoning at the Kohlberg's conventional stages 3, showed a strong inclination towards complying with how the firm want issues addressed. Participant A1g also responded in a way that showed some allegiance to the firm in a somewhat clever defence of the firm. But more importantly is that the responses of participant A1g to this issue indicates strong signs of conventional level thinking (conformity) and that this CMD level dictated how they responded to the query. In other words, the bureaucracy was less of the driver of the employees' responses to the question asked.

This becomes clearer with the response of participant A1c, a post conventional level thinker whose response shows some measure of moral inquiry. His approach showed he did not see the issue through only the lens of the narrative provided by the SOP or managerial dictates but through the lens of other moral principles. For instance, he was able to state his firm did not manage the situation well, a position not many other employees declared. He also was bold to declare that the intention of his firm was to exploit a situation to make money, a position his firm denies. Subsequently, he adopted a diplomatic approach that seemed not to directly apportion blame but also highlighted his firm's wrong doing. Although his diplomatic approach to answering the question can be understood given his interview took place in an open area inside the firm in question, his response did however reveal the weaker influence of the dictates on the bureaucracy on his responses and a stronger role of his individual CMD capacity was more pronounced. The different responses obtained from these participants based on their CMD level suggests the role individual factors could play within the bureaucratic context as different from the suggestion in this proposition that the bureaucracy drives conformity.

6.5.3 Finding 5: Post-conventional level thinkers seem to be less directly influenced in their moral reasoning / behaviour patterns by a bureaucratic context.

As established throughout this chapter, bureaucracies expect certain behaviours from employees and as the case may be, employees show different reactions to these demands. It was discovered in this case group, that post conventional level thinkers seem to be less affected in their moral reasoning/behaviour patterns by a bureaucratic context. Therefore post-conventional level thinkers showed strong signs of moral autonomy on their job and effectively create different strategies to survive in the bureaucracy. This could be a self-chosen 'moral defence mechanism' (see table 6.6. below).

Evidence was drawn from the interview data of participant A2b, one of the two post-conventional level thinkers in this case group. She made no reference to SOPs in her explaining how she handles ethical issues on her job. Rather, her moral point of reference was in a higher conscience rooted in her religious belief in God.

Table 6.6: Participants A2b's moral point of reference in reacting to moral issues at work

Participant	CMD level/ MI	Quote
A2b Senior Medical Representative	Post- Conventional level, Stage 6 Strong Moral Identity	<p><i>"...Because you yourself you know that okay for example, the most common one is when the doctors want to be bribed to prescribe your drugs, first of all my conscience is there to judge me, I wont be at rest and secondly, the doctors too, they are not your friends."</i></p> <p><i>"God first and is centre for everything, then your relationship with people, being trustworthy like being reliable, owning up to what you can do and what you can't do you say it there."</i></p>

Source: Fieldwork

Furthermore, in her detailed account of handling difficult ethical situations on the field, it was also discovered that this participant relies on strategies to survive in the bureaucracy. The scenario in question was one in which a key entity in a major hospital was constantly seeking bribes from them. This person is highly placed and the hospital in question was also crucial to a bulk of their financial target. The table below shows three key strategies employed by this post conventional level thinker in handling the issue:

Table 6.7: Coping mechanisms employed by Participant A2b

Strategy	Quote
Focus	<p><i>"So for me, meeting my target all I do is that I have quantities, how many doctors can give me this prescription, how many pharmacies and I work around even if I don't meet it, I fall within 80% or 90% of the figures."</i></p> <p><i>"Well, it was just discernment and intuition, what was just coming up and I use it to act and I was calm and I was just confident. I didn't want to play like he was doing me a favour, I still will always talk about this patient the drug and all of that."</i></p>

Avoidance	<i>"... The person is sold out because of the quality and not just because you're bribing so what I try to do is that I avoid them because I know that me, my own strategy is that, it's not all doctors that must prescribe my product..."</i>
Diplomacy	<i>"I'll make sure that I greet him well. Sometimes I may even 'blackmail' him that he has forgotten about our product. I just try to balance it and when I am doing meetings, I let him know if there are refreshments."</i>

Source: Fieldwork

With the focus strategy, this participant understood how to meet her targets by focusing on what worked for him/her on the field and by keeping her conversations solely on the benefits of the drugs being marketed. Besides focus, this participant explained that she would often deliberately avoid any doctors that are known to be corrupt by understanding that not all doctors must prescribe her products. Finally, this employee explained (s)he employs high measures of diplomacy in their dealings with doctors. Diplomacy as she uses it capitalises on a cultural principle of mutual respect such that when one is properly greeted as though highly esteemed, the tendencies to want to ruin such honour with frivolities is reduced. These three strategies are the coping mechanisms employed by participant A2b, a post conventional level thinker based on other ethical principles outside of SOP which she made no mention of in her discussions. In summary therefore, it can be said that individual reasoning abilities had a stronger influence than the bureaucracy.

6.6 Proposition 3

Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity

The key indicator from the data to test this proposition is to observe whether there are any differences in the definition and roles of a pharmacist according to the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN), the governing body for pharmacists in Nigeria and how this bureaucracy defines a pharmacist and their role. The characterisation of a pharmacist by the professional body to which all pharmacists are expected to swear an oath is the broad professional identity meant to govern the

activities of pharmacists anywhere in the context. Evidence from the literature (Hummell, 1998) suggests it is possible that the broader professional identity could be lost within the agenda of bureaucracies such as profit maximisation or managerialism. In such an instance, the view of a pharmacist projected by the bureaucracy and embraced by participants, as compliance to SOPs would require a narrower professional identity. However since all employees in this case group all have strong moral identities, only one part of this proposition’s focus will be tested. This is investigated by observing whether participants in this case group describe their jobs as more in line with the stipulations of their governing body or with that of the bureaucracy.

6.6.1 Finding 6: Bureaucracies narrowly define employees’ professional identities to demonstrate organisational rather than professional loyalty and integrity.

As the Pharmaceutical Society of Nigeria, states in their code of ethics, “The code of Ethics which has been designed by PCN is a means of assisting Pharmacists to discharge their moral and professional obligations resting upon them to observe standards of conduct appropriate to their callings.” (PCN, 2015) The emphasis is first on moral obligations yet; bureaucracies tend to distract registered pharmacists away from this overarching objective. Table 6.8 below presents some of the descriptions participants, who are pharmacists, gave about their jobs to prove this:

Table 6.8: How participants describe their jobs

Participant	Quote
A2a Sales Manager	<p><i>“Basically I promote the company's product, I detail doctors, health care providers generally and I also engage in marketing activities, I do roundtable meetings and also do clinical presentations”</i></p> <p><i>“I think most part of my life has been sales and sales so I have come to enjoy sales and marketing which I think I will like to grow along that line so it's something that keeps driving me I actually want to see myself on top of the sales chart 1 day been like maybe the country manager or the managing director and all that so it's something that is driving me”</i></p>
A1c Marketing Manager	<p><i>“And remember that I am a marketing person, there is money involved in taking the product from one point to the other, there is money involved in taking the message of the product from one place to another so if those people are not doing their work, there</i></p>

	<p><i>will be problem.”</i></p> <p><i>“...as a marketing colleague, you develop the message, the material, the programs that this person will use to pass on the message and generate prescription. So you develop strategy, you develop the tactic, you monitor the businesses day to day and you are responsible for certain products not for every product. I want to know who are the customers we need to meet, where do we find them, what do we tell them. How do we support them, how should I bring the message to them...”</i></p>
A1b Sales Manager	<p><i>“As a sales manager, it’s clear, your work is basically to manage direct reports, in other words you want to engage talents and by so doing. I have 8 direct reports and ermm I am expected to coach them and ermm based on the Firm A1 selling model [okay]. What exactly are their deliverables or objectives on a daily basis? You want to ensure that each of them is on track in their personal objectives which of course is in line with the organisational objectives.”</i></p>

Source: Fieldwork

From the respondents’ understanding of their job role(s), their emphasis is on ‘promotion’, ‘marketing’ and ‘sales’ rather than a commitment to a more clearly professional universal ethical value, such as saving lives for instance. This finding was found even though the subjects here are trained pharmacists. The above quotes also show elements of loyalty to the bureaucracy and its tenets, which can be argued is distracting from the broader identity of pharmacists. Also implicit in the descriptions above is a performance-oriented culture, which typifies these bureaucracies. It is seen as part of the expectation of any employee based on the rules and managerial duty within the bureaucracy. A sales manager said:

“...I am going to put it more like expectations. This is what is expected of me and by so doing weekly basis; I have days when I am on the field working with my colleagues...I’m on the field with my direct reports ensuring they are delivering what is expected of them...And then also of course, the overall objectives is to ensure that everyone delivers on their numbers. It is a sales organisation whatever you are doing; your total overall picture is to impact results. That also you want to ensure so these are very straightforward

expectations. Nothing ambiguous or complex about that.” (Participant A2c)

As such with employees seeing their firms as sales companies with clear sales targets given to every employee, managers are meant to ensure these targets are met. By this employees understand that the measure of their competence as pharmacists is by their figures as agreed and stipulated by the rules and demands of the bureaucracy. Consequently, the notion of success within these firms is tied to narrow job performance objective and the role in the context of the employer. This is much narrower to and potentially also in conflict with the broader notion of ethics and integrity for the profession of healthcare/ pharmacist; for instance relevant to this latter notion is the oath professional pharmacists are made to pledge to upon induction in the profession and their accreditation by the major professional body.

Accordingly with the data patterns in this case, rewards are attached to being the kind of pharmacist that is appropriately “loyal” to the employer organisation according to the job performance objectives that is a sales persons bringing in profit as this senior manager explained:

“...Well basically a lot of things have been rewarded. Like I mentioned there are sales calls that we need to make so these are like activities and there are rewards for activities. We have a target for number of clinical meetings that you should do, were you able to do them, in what centres did you do these meetings, there is a particular number of doctors and pharmacists you shall see every day so did you see these doctors? Then also, like the bulk of the reward is actually from the target - What percentage of your target or you would to meet? Which enables you to win an incentive.”
(Participant A1a)

Yet another observation from this case group is the fact that patients are treated as ‘customers’ and not ‘patients’. The notion of a customer is synonymous to that of any organisation that trades in the exchange of goods and services. Within the pharmaceutical industry however, it can be argued that the patient should not be treated within the category of a customer, yet as a participant said:

“We hold our customers first on our top chat or top on our list... It's our customers we have different customers we have customers like patients. External customers the patient is highly esteemed....” (Participant A1d)

It may also be worthy of mention that the names given to roles within both American firms in this case group would easily place them on a par with any other type of sales organisation in any other industry. Ranks and positions such as ‘marketing manager’, ‘sales manager’ and the likes are the roles in this case group yet trained pharmacists occupy these. Furthermore, pharmaceutical representatives are often referred to as ‘reps’ akin to any other sales organisation with no clear differences except for the fact company products in this case are drugs. As such, the role of a pharmacist is not encouraged by the job descriptions. Hence, being a pharmacist could be easily lost under the job role of a ‘sales director’ in which job specifications are defined along this line able to easily alter the disposition and perception of employees occupying such roles as the quotes in table 6.8 above showed.

These kind of effects that narrow the broader professional identity as defined by the governing body of pharmacists into a ‘narrower’ identity suitable to the objectives of the bureaucracy is the ‘narrow professional identity’ of a sales manager that this proposition is putting forward. As a reminder, all employees in this case group reported to have strong moral identities based on the self-measure tool of Aquino and Reed, (2002). Therefore, it can be said that employees with strong moral identity display organisational loyalty by sticking to narrower sets of professional identity espoused by their bureaucracy. This sense of narrower professional identity as observed in all the evidence above is prevalent in all employees from the senior managers to the medical representatives at the bottom of the organisation.

In summary, it has been established from the data that there is a discrepancy and in some cases a clear disconnect between who the American bureaucracies want pharmacists to be and who the professional regulatory body for instance requires them to be. Hence, employees adopt a partial view of their profession in order to satisfy the demands of the bureaucracy.

6.7 Conclusion

In summary, both SOPs and managerial control were identified as the dominant features of the bureaucracies in this first case group. Whilst the SOPs drive a

compliance culture, managerial control exists to enforce this compliance orientation through excessive monitoring that often puts a lot of power in the hands of the managers. As such, employees tend to derive their morality by following all set rules and by obeying their managers, with individual moral agency stifled in the process. This implies that following the rules within bureaucracies creates a sense of moral competence in employees. This sense of competence is one of the crucial mechanisms that instil a sense of strong moral identity in them. However, the CMD level of individual employees in this case group was flagged as a crucial determinant of the real moral capacity in individuals.

In the second proposition it was discovered that bureaucracy does deliberately select conventional level employees to advance its objectives. Conventional level thinkers were discovered in line with theory to show little or no moral inquiry in their relationship with the set standards of the bureaucracy because they are conformists. This was different as expected from theory in the case of a post conventional level thinkers in this case group who make moral decisions based on their own universal moral belief system. In this case, individual CMD levels were found to be more influential than contextual elements of rules and managerial control in the behavioural disposition of participants, hence this proposition was partly correct and partly false. Finally, based on the prevalent rule system of the bureaucracy in this case group, it was discovered that this bureaucracy actually does influence those with strong moral identity to adopt a narrow professional identity aligned with organisational norms. Bureaucracies were discovered to achieve this by adopting job categorisations that enhance their profit orientations, whilst distracting unsuspecting employees who are mostly trained pharmacists from the core of their calling.

CHAPTER 7

CASE GROUP 2: INDIAN PHARMACEUTICALS

7.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis and findings on two Indian pharmaceuticals, the second case group in this study. Unlike the American case group, this case presents a different scenario in which both rules and managerial control have an intertwined influence that creates a 'Caste Bureaucracy'. Caste bureaucracy is a culturally dominated system that employs both rules and managerial control in a way that creates a stratified organisational dynamic and boundary between upper management role holders who are predominantly Indian nationals and other role holders, predominantly Nigerian nationals. In subsequent sections, I shall be using evidence from interview data and secondary sources such as organisations' websites to critically present my findings.

7.1 Management Control

"Management is faceless..."(I2d)

Management control and formalised rules wield intertwined influence in this case group. This coupling and combined dynamics of both features that is found in this case may be due to the history of fraud and lack of trust existing within this bureaucracy's context as discussed in earlier chapters (see Chapter 5). The structure of this bureaucracy is such that there is a narrow span of control, with about three direct reports to senior managers. These firms show a preference for maintaining a clear boundary between the upper management layer and lower level roles. So, in each of the firms, an Indian director is the overall head overseeing all firm operations in Nigeria. He represents the interests of the organisation in Nigeria and has been given a great degree of freedom to make decisions but reports to the group CEO back in India. The entire senior management team under him are also Indian nationals consisting of the superintendent pharmacist, national sales manager (NSM) and the regional manager who collectively supervise and monitor all medical representatives. Representatives also have been given a direct access to the director, who is also involved in the supervision of all lower level employees as well as overseeing internal firm processes. Hence, management control within this

context manifests in the form of close monitoring of all employees and internal firm activities and processes.

The above sociology of this organisation creates both a quite stratified organisational dynamic and a boundary between the (more homogeneously Indian) management role holders and other employees. This often involves the physical involvement of managers in actively micro-managing the organisational activity. Accordingly, various steps of approvals and decisions as some employees are found, as explained below:

'...the way the system is run...the way it is structured there is nothing you can do in the system that they don't know about... they monitor everything that goes on here, they monitor from the sales right to the distribution so there is no how you can come in and say you want to play pranks because that is why they place themselves everywhere, like in finance they are charge of the finance, then in charge of the stock, they are in charge of most of the things...' (I1c)

"Most times he (the director) tells you what to do, I work based on instructions that's why I don't have the final say so whatever he says even if anyone comes around and needs something I only pass it on to my boss so whatever he says is final. So everything that comes up I have to follow up on the matter and give feedback...there is no freedom" (I1a)

From these quotes, it seems evident that the internal system is highly regimented and monitored such that the senior management are actively monitoring and controlling every process. Managerial approvals for every stage of all internal processes are strictly required, for instance stock acquisition and payment processes without which orders are stalled. This is a more closely personally monitored method employed in this bureaucracy to ensure the firms' internal business processes alone are duly followed by the employees (Indian version of Western Bureaucracy). This was also evident in the second quote, which appears to suggest that employees have little or no decision-making autonomy within the firm. Participant I1a above is a

manager whose duties are more office-based. She claims to work only based on instructions, which are to be executed without questioning. From her narrative, the understanding is that the director and his senior management team are constantly in charge and that in their absence, all processes are delayed. They make all decisions within the firm.

The managerial control system also dictates the kind of rules and policies in place within the bureaucracy, as it appears appropriate. For instance, the most significant mechanism employed by the Indian firms to maintain control of the context over people's personal and group action is by ensuring mainly their nationals occupy all core strategic decision making positions at the top management as these participants explained:

'Yes very close system, that is why the national sales manager has always been an Indian man because the time they tried to bring in a black man, the man was really confronting them telling them what to do and they felt... it can't allow them to succeed... One thing I notice is that ... they don't always give room for we the representatives, like now I expect to be a manager by now by all rankings... I don't see the reason why a national sales manager can't be a Nigerian, so that is the thing that I see about the company" (I1c)

"Well, they (Indian managers) want it (not having Nigerians in senior management) like that... I think I know for Indians whilst I was in XYZ as well I got to a stage where I should have been the next person that should have gone for things like regional manager but they still kept us as area manager." (I2a)

"What I think is that they just don't want to put Nigerians in those key positions for reasons... it beats me as well... I have asked myself why and it was actually something I fought a lot over in Firm I1. I worked in there for like 9 years, they made me area manager when I was seven years there and I was like in other companies you work two years three years you do well you become a manager somehow, before you

know it you're a general manager in a region before 6-7 years ... but Indian companies run by Indians they would rather call someone from there (India) to sit in the position you are supposed to be sitting so they would either be paying somebody else.” (I1d)

These quotes show that the rules set cynically serve one group only of organisational members, which creates an experience of separation and injustice (by the lack of equal chances for people to rise in managerial careers). Hence, there may be a non-explicit norm whereby Nigerians may not easily rise to senior positions within the bureaucracy. Medical representatives who have been working in the firm for an excess of seven years have only been promoted once to senior medical representative roles, whereas, equivalent experience within the industry commands higher roles. This reflects a broader issue of in-group of managers based on the culture of Indians that generally affects how appointments into senior positions are made. As Reed Elsevier, (2008) reported in their *cultural navigator*, usually, Indian firms tend to hire based on caste and other social profiling attributes, which limits the kind of people allowed in certain top management positions. In the past, when a Nigerian was hired into senior management, he was eventually sacked for being vocal and challenging lots of internal processes. Some participants in their interviews explained that the Indian managers do not like confrontations of any kind and also actively discourage any form of collaboration among employees as explained below:

“...They (Indians) don't like confrontations. Like now if we are to have a meeting with the board (consisting of top management in Nigeria and shareholder representatives from India)...we expect that the talks would be in groups, so what they usually do is that they talk to us individually so that we won't be able to confront them so they always try to limit us from coming together, they find it a threat to them so they always try to curtail it. They think by doing that (allowing collaboration among employees) we might go against them, which they don't like...” (I1c)

'... Each time they (representatives from the Headquarters in India) come around that is, once a year, they tend to like shield us from

some questions that you want to ask them about the system, it's like telling you what to tell them so if you like want to talk about the system... they will not want you to pronounce what is really going on, that's one thing that is really going on...' (I1d)

All employees meet with the board of the organisation, comprising the senior management team in Nigeria and representatives from the firm's headquarters in India annually. Employees believe such a board meeting is the best place to collectively express their concerns in the presence of the more senior members of the organisations from India with a view to enforcing some change to the system. However, they are often not allowed by the senior management to speak as a group to disallow collective protests as the employees above implied. These reflect the Indian management style Reed Elsevier, (2008) referred to as 'autocratic' and 'authoritarian' in which Indian managers like to maintain a centralised power structure and exert their influence on subordinates. They do not expect to be questioned about any decisions made (Reed Elsevier, 2008). However, the motive for this kind of control as most participants opined is driven by profit maximisation as these employees explained:

"...I think it is more driven by let us maximise profit and the fact that they are not confident... that if you give this representative any product or money he's going to use it for the agreed purpose. They are not that confident, because they don't follow you everywhere..." (I1e)

"That is one thing about organisations particularly let me say the Asian guys. Most of these Indians, you know, they are so much concerned about what they will take and will fly back to their country. (I2d)

Another result of all the above is an environment where there seems to be no genuine social-professional relationship between the managers and their employees. Such relationships require a clear respect of professional expertise and the empowerment of the professionals rather than the opposites, what is currently the case. As a lot of employees describe their relationship with the organisation even after more than five years of service, they believe it is a purely instrumental

relationship, one that functions on a sort of 'give and take' system that does not require respect, friendship or trust, as explained by these employees:

"No it is not (cordiality of relationship with management) ...There is no relationship, relationship is just on the business... they just want it as business so you have the feeling they don't like Nigerians; they just want to take something and go. I believe relationship should exceed that sometimes..." (I2b)

'I think it basically boils down to the relationship with the top managers, the relationship is not cordial, the man prefers for you to call him and tell him sir, I am off duty today I wont work today and tomorrow so that he will be glad to target your accounts that this guy did not work, so deduct your salary...' (I2c)

As implied from the quotes above, the aftermath of the close, personal managerial control style adopted in this bureaucracy is a kind of suppressive control in which employees are restrained from freely expressing themselves or challenging the authority about their grievances such as their remuneration packages, career, fair treatment. More relevant to this dissertation, employees become rationally convinced that expressing any ethical concerns or objections, or moral reflections is clearly neither wanted, nor it will serve them any good as depicted in the quote of participant I1c above (see page 156). What is more apparent hence as noted is that this bureaucracy seems to create a stratified and divided organisation in which there are free, sovereign despots who are seen to be the managers and representatives of the owners on one side versus the 'not so free' and fully monitored employees on the other. The obvious ethnic division between both groups that fosters an artificial and unjust society, largely influences this. How employees respond to such a system is explored later.

7.2 Formalised Rules

'There are no rules as such for this job, just go out and sell'

Formalised rules are the second dominant feature of the bureaucracy within this case group. Although it appears that both formalised rules and managerial control are two independent features of this bureaucracy, in reality rules prove to be a mechanism that helps senior management implement control within the bureaucracy. Due to the prior history of fraud in this context, it seems that rules are employed as control mechanisms to forestall future occurrences by regulating all internal firm activities and how lower level employees can function within the bureaucracy, for instance, how they can obtain stocks or process orders. It must be noted however that the management themselves are not neutral nor their positions and decisions are value-free, since they are mainly Indian nationals wanting to maintain a firm control of the organisation. Thus, organisational rules or SOP are the rules put in place by the Indian firms to regulate internal activities and processes as they see fit, without any evidence whatsoever that there is an effort for value neutrality, justice or virtue in how rules are implemented except an evident concern for some additional efficiency. As a participant explained:

"We have company imposed rules. The company imposed rules is that you go through the distributor when you want to pick stock..., there were times when using our names, you just use your name if you want to buy bring your money and use your name but thereafter they said no, you have to go through a distributor, get a distributor and make sure the distributor is registered with them, ... so this is one of the rules". (I1d)

"...You must bring your money to buy whereas other companies will give cash, credit facilities to the sales representatives and say after may be a certain period say 30 days, turn over this thing, return back the money, turn it over, it gives you room to operate..." (I2d)

Following from the above quotes, table 7.1 below shows a list of some of the rules within the bureaucracy:

Table 7.1: A list of major Internal rules within the bureaucracy

Rules	Type
Every order must be cash and carry sales, i.e. all employees must bring in their cash to process orders	Sales policy
Stocks cannot be obtained in the absence of any of the senior management members	Sales Policy
Orders must be ratified by the director before they are processed	Sales Policy
Only the director can approve monetary transactions.	Monetary Policy
Employees are required to meet set sales targets on a monthly basis	Monetary policy
Car loans are to be deducted from employee salary until agreed sum has been fully paid. Maximum sum that can be borrowed for car purchase is 300,000 Naira.	Monetary policy
All monies owed through defaults in meeting up with sales targets are to be deducted periodically from employee salary until full sums are paid	Monetary policy

Source: Field notes & Companies' Websites

It is interesting to note that the major internal rules as highlighted in the table above are more inclined toward economic transactions and gains. It is therefore rather surprising that in a post-fraud context, there are no ethical rules within the bureaucracy. This highlights a major internal inconsistency and also demonstrates that organisational rules within this case group are more instrumental, towards economic gains in contrast to the previous American case group where rules were seen as the ultimate moral guide. Also, the rules are many yet simple with the 'cash and carry' rule (No 1 rule in the table above), being the most significant one because it seeks to protect the firms' economic interests. This also has the greatest impact on how employees function within the bureaucracy as an employee explained:

“...if you (sales representative) wants to buy your products you must bring your cash, except you're coming from a government hospital that is recognised, that they can verified the order... But as a representative, if you want to buy it must be cash..., if you don't have capital if you don't have someone to borrow you money, if you don't have a bank to loan you there is no way, you will lose your job at the end of the day...” (I1d)

As seen from above, employees have to service orders with their own money, without which such transaction will be forfeited thereby jeopardising the efforts of the employee in a highly competitive market. Yet the Indian firms emphasize stringent sales target on their employees such that not being able to service orders to achieve sales targets will also often result in the loss of their jobs. In fact it was explained by one of the participants that a criterion for getting employed within the bureaucracy is to check whether potential employees have the cash to do business. This shows that rules within this case group are instrumental mainly towards the ends of protecting the economic interests of the firm whilst shifting all financial liabilities and risk to employees. On the contrary, outside of the firm, in dealing with different stakeholders, there are no clear rules guiding employee actions as these employees explained:

“The rules are not complex, very simple. There are no rules as such for this job, just go out and sell... I am allowed freedom of judgement on my job...we might be in the same place but it depends on how you relate to your boss” (I1e)

“Yes they do have some rules [are they clear rules?] (Very hesitantly) Will I say they are clear? I just say sometimes they do go against it sometimes in a way...” (I1c)

The quotes above show two interesting trends. First, the simplicity of the rules referred to by participant I1e implies that all internal rules are algorithmically clear and it is expected that all employees memorise and remain aware of these as the way to do business within the bureaucracy following this bureaucracy's convention of looking rule-compliant and non questioning (as listed in table 7.1 above). Of course,

there is an equally simple logical explanation to justify each rule, which may also discourage ethical reflection and conversation. This creates an internal environment of very standardised way of working. But outside of the firm, there are no rules at all governing how representatives are to sell. This external context is governed by a “laissez faire” approach that anything that can be done to gain business is ok, and there is not much support in how to do this.

Secondly, within the firm also, as participant I1c explained, senior management have freedom to bypass the rules despite their expecting everyone else to comply with them. So at times it was found that management ‘go against’ set internal rules which participant I1e implied to mean that rules are very relative – they are for employees but are bypassed by management. Bypassing the rules in the first case brings legitimate penalties and sanctions that managers impose which increases their power. In the second case of management bypassing the rules there is no consequence as it appears that their superiors in India are either not informed or they do not care enough. This is often determined by how individuals relate with their direct supervisors who can sanction certain actions outside of the set rules. That is, if the managers particularly like an employee, rules are applied differently and rather unequally.

The implications of the quotes above suggest that employees must manage two realities in executing their daily duties. The first reality being that they work for companies that have strict rules on how to carry out internal processes: Specifically, on how stocks can be obtained and cash policies. But once outside of the firm, where most employees who are sales representatives are expected to sell drugs to different customers and stakeholders, they face a different reality. One not controlled by any firm ethical rules but a personalised subjective and transactional sense as the person who applies rules and the freedom provided as to how key professional ethical values learnt (via education or earlier career) apply. Regarding this, individual employees face different moral dilemmas in engaging with the different stakeholders on the field. For instance, the common industry practice of whether to bribe doctors to meet their sales targets, or making promises of periodic stipends to doctors who prescribe their company products amongst others are such examples. Decisions and actions of individuals regarding matters such as this transcend the simple technical component

of marketing the science behind the drugs being sold to making moral decisions to which such employees may or may not comply with any professional ethical values, where available or their personal subjective sense of morality as the participant below explained:

“...Your discretion basically...because there are the ethics of the profession we don't sell to anyhow people. You must sell to accredited distributors... the registered pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria, they know them you can Google the name on the website to see your distributors if there's anything you can trace them and if it is anything they can trace you. That's one of the rules, ethical rules...” (I1d)

“...They have a clear-cut rule as in it is not like you mustn't do it (give bribes), you're not supposed to say you do it... not really that it is a rule, No, it is not like however you like, there are rules, you must not do anything like offer a doctor money or stuff like that ... a lot of people still do it...” (I2a)

From the two statements above, it is clear that Participant I1d who is a registered pharmacist with the Pharmacists Council of Nigeria (PCN) highlights one of the council's ethical rules of 'who to sell to' in detail. However, nothing exists about the matter of 'how to sell'. Most moral and action dilemmas faced by all employees in this case group are often on 'how to sell' in a competitive market known for its various informal forms of incentives employed in making good sales. The Indian firms on the other hand as implied by Participant I2a would often state on paper that employees are not supposed to give bribes but there is an absence of clear enforcement mechanisms of this 'rule' since employees can still do what they want to do and get away with it. Also, since cash purchase policies already protect the economic interests of the firms, it can be argued that the firms do not seem inclined to regulate the activities of their employees outside the firms, more so in providing moral guidelines for them. Therefore, employees have the latitude to decide how they sell on the field and have to rely on their own sense of right-wrong applying professional discretion, as they learn and internalise broader professional values via

their academic professional education and prior experience as the employees below explained:

“I came here to do supply and they told me when coming to buy lunch. I got there and I discover she (the lady on duty) has been working since morning, she's been the only person, seeing so many crowds, she was exhausted, I need to drop money for her. On whose accounts is that? If you discover the amount I do that with every month, you will be surprised. There was one particular order and I had to drop one million naira to get the order. Fine! I would still get back the one million in the deal but this is what you have to do to get the big order. I will still get it back which we know but I still need to do it.” (I1d)

“...When you tell them (the management) I have to take a doctor to lunch, you ordinarily should be telling the doctor what he needs to know, some doctors may ask for recharge cards... you can at your own discretion be willing to spend your money even though you still make money off the products... you know we are all different when it has to do with giving. The one who is generous may feel that I still make money so I can take care of this but the one who is saying I am in Firm I1 just to make money for myself may not want to do that...” (I1e)

The actions in the quotes above are examples of scenarios that require the use of personal discretion whilst on the field selling drugs. For instance, the decision to buy or not buy items for doctors from their personal finance is a very common one. Secondly, the decision to part or not to part with huge sums of money to secure huge deals, both of which are examples of moral dilemmas employees face on the field. For these kinds of decisions, employees have to rely on their personal discretion in the absence of clear professional and firm guidelines for making decisions in such situations on the field. Here, the personal subjective morality of the employee is employed in deciding the best line of action. Hence, decisions made are rationalised based on individuals' subjective interpretation of the situation and desirable outcome.

In summary therefore, rules as they exist within this context are employed as tools of managerial control. They are used to regulate internal activities of employees and processes within the bureaucracy in order to protect its economic rationale. This can be easily inferred from internal cash policies put in place requiring reps to have paid the company upfront before products are released to them. Outside of the firms however, where employees are expected to sell to different stakeholders and where they face a lot of moral dilemmas, there are no clear ethical rules guiding their actions. Instead, employees are left to their personal discretion of choice between professional values where available or a personal subjective sense of morality to guide their decisions.

7.3 The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees' Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities

As previously established, the morality of employees in this study's interviewed sample is evaluated from two theoretical lenses: their cognitive moral reasoning levels and moral identities. The moral identity scores and assigned moral reasoning level of each employee are presented in table 7.1 below.

Table 7.2 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants

<i>Participant</i>	<i>CMR Path</i>	<i>Moral Identity Strength</i>
I1a	Conventional Level (stage 3)	6.53 (strong)
I1b	Conventional Level (stage 4)	2.18 (weak)
I1c	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	6.76 (strong)
I1d	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	5.71 (strong)
I1e	Post-conventional Level (stage 6)	4.94 (strong)
I2a	Post-conventional Level (Stage 5)	5.53 (strong)
I2b	Conventional Level (stage 4)	4.82 (strong)
I2c	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	5.00 (strong)
I2d	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	5.53 (strong)

Source: Fieldwork

The table above shows that all but one of the participants in this case group claim to have strong moral identities based on the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure employed during this study. Whilst it is interesting that the results show a rather skewed distribution of employees towards those with strong moral identities, it must be noted that self-reported measures such as the one used in this study are liable to participant bias and prone to contextual influences (Howard and Dailey, 1979; Spector, 1994; Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997). But generally, the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure is widely documented to have high validity, reliability and significant variations in large samples (Aquino and Reed, 2002, Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 2011). On a general note however, the fact that all but one employee claim to have strong moral identities could be an indication that the bureaucracy's intertwined complex interaction between the two contextual (bureaucratic) features of rule compliance and followership (no matter what rules) can inflate employee moral identity. How this is achieved will be further investigated.

Participants' cognitive moral reasoning however shows a close to normal distribution of moral reasoning levels across the conventional and post conventional levels. It must be noted that the CMR levels of these participants were determined using their dominant patterns of thinking from interview data and not through an established measuring tool; hence it may not be entirely accurate due to researcher's bias. In the sections to follow, the effect of the bureaucracy on the employees' moral identity and CMR levels is explored along the three propositions of this study as follows:

Proposition 1: Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)

Proposition 2: Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders

Proposition 3: Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity

7.4 Proposition 1

Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)

The proposition simply means that in certain cases and contexts contextual variables are so strongly influencing the subjective employee experience that they may well create an inflated moral identity general pattern. This is totally true in this case. The bureaucracy espoused in this case group is driven by an intertwined influence of both organisational rules and personalised managerial control. This proposition therefore suggests that employee behaviour in accordance with both organisational rules and management control enhances a subjective sense of an inflated (stronger) moral identity in both employees and their managers. In this sense having both strong and weak moral identity will be affected within the bureaucracy to the extent that there may be no differentiating results in employee moral identity insofar as everyone is compliant with the rules of a bureaucracy (see also chapter 6). A longitudinal study will however be required to further establish this claim.

On one hand, the strict organisational rules within this bureaucracy are for internal processes mainly and seem to protect the interests of the firm as earlier established, whilst employees are left to their professional discretion on the field. On the other hand, the managerial control style of the firm as also earlier discussed signified an environment of total control maintained by a senior management team comprising only Indian nationals via internal rules. Thus, within this bureaucracy, it is likely that employees with strong moral identities would readily feel some internal pressure to unquestionably obey set rules for the sake of acting in accordance with a need for social validation that they are “morally good”. Also obedience to authority is a driver of compliance obviously (Milgram, 1963) and this may be in line with African tribal culture. Therefore in this case a confused sense of morality is experienced between what actually acting ethically is/means i.e. pursuing ethics and integrity as ends in themselves, and engaged in authentic moral inquiry versus what behaviours comply to the morality of this bureaucracy in order to succeed and be liked. The “morality” of this bureaucracy is really about pursuing actions that increase external gains or a sense of approval, or being part of the in-group (belonging) in terms of social moral

identity recognition. These are further examined using interview data and the key findings are presented below:

7.4.1 Finding 1: Employees are not comfortable but act to follow rules- i.e. action driven. There is a lack of any evidence of moral contemplation and moral awareness to take full responsibility for actions, rather than pursue them because the rules say so. This also involves the employee-management relations that seem to be rather transactional.

First it has been established that in this case group, binding rules exist only for internal organisational processes. Outside of this, all employees are expected to use their professional discretion. However, it was discovered that all employees are not comfortable with organisational rules but act to follow them without any evidence of moral contemplation and moral awareness. This reflected in evidence indicating that employees do not take full responsibility for their actions within the ethnically divisive, stratified system. Reviews of employees who claim to have strong moral identities suggest that majority of them resort to finding ways of 'adapting' to the system as participant I1c explained:

“Well, like I said the environment isn't that conducive, I just have to adapt, adapt in the sense that whatsoever comes my way, as long as I'm in the system I just have to play along with it. I'm not happy but there is nothing I can do about it and in Nigeria now the job opportunities are so slim so anyone that you have, you just have to get hold of it except you get a better one and you leave that's just what I'm doing.” (I1c)

The quote above suggests that even though employees are not comfortable with the rules and control of the bureaucracy, they act to follow them. Adapting and playing along with the system is a typical mind-set amongst employees in this bureaucracy, which also comes with an absence of any personal moral inquiry as much as it results in a rather transactional employee-management relationship. This results in different moral responses including for instance cheating the organisations, contrary to what might be expected of persons who truly possess strong moral identity in theory. Participant I2d, explained as follows:

“...Let me just try to come home a bit you know the company, because of this welfare problem, people also find a way to cheat the organisation,

they create loopholes, avenues to cheat the organisation. Company does not take it lightly with anybody, so they believe in men and women of high integrity... and to be frank it is far from it, far in the sense that what could have actually enhanced that is not even on board so people are actually creating an avenue probably to beat the system... they make some claims which are actually fictitious ...” (I2d)

Participant I2d in the above quote implied that unethical practices of cheating the organisation are justifiable on the grounds of poor welfare, even though, the Indian firms expect their employees to act with integrity. However, poor employee welfare, which is one of the side effects of this bureaucratic context, conditions employees to initiate ways to cheat the organisations in a bid to make up for the unfair treatment. One way some employees do this as further explained by participant I2d is by selling other companies' products for a fee:

“...Some of my colleagues sell other company products... you can't question this person because it is the person you have not been paying his expenses for months and you expecting them to cooperate he can't do magic... I will not, I will not. I will only query in areas where I feel that you know they are unfair enough to the company if the company is 80% to 90% fair to you... if you cannot get hundred per cent from all these guys, if with this poor response of the company they still give you 60% 70% or 80% of your target I think they are on track. So I put all these into consideration, so for reasons like that I don't report such things...”(I2d, strong moral identity)

It would seem from the above quote that participant I2d who is a manager and claims to have a strong moral identity, sanctions the reaction of his subordinates to the bureaucracy on common grounds of poor welfare and opportunism to which he is also exposed. And this kind of sanctioning also denotes the tendency of employees to leverage the poor welfare system as an excuse to do unethical things. These indicate that individually held moral traits could be contextually sensitive, especially within contexts such as this bureaucracy in which taking a bold immoral stance is easily excusable justified with the use of logical arguments. For instance, another manager, who also claimed to have a strong moral identity, in a clear case of

rationalising his unethical practices explains how he ‘bends’ the rules but does not break them as follows:

“...What you do is... you don't break the rules but you bend it, that's one of the things you do as a sales man you have to work smart. You don't only work hard but you work smart...there are times when a hospital needs order, and the order is just 50,000, you can ask at the pharmacy to write another 50,000 because you need it to meet up your target and you need the products so you can ask the pharmacist to add your own to it which are some of the unethical things that the office has forced you to do which ideally shouldn't be.” (I1d, strong moral identity)

The mentality of ‘bending the rules’ or ‘working around them’ is ethically problematic as it implies he consistently fails to engage in genuine moral inquiry of what is right and good versus what is not right and ethically bad. This can be argued to make ethical concerns less and less relevant in the given context. For instance, in the case of the participant above, inflating orders to make extra money to meet a target is seen as ‘working smart’. The result is that a practice such as above is easily rationalised, as much as it is done in a way to ensure internal organisational rules and protocols are duly followed. However, as noted earlier “bending the rules” is consistently experienced as the practice for management versus non-management incumbents that is a second source for the gradual rationalisation and adoption of this practice in the organisation.

Another employee who claimed to have a strong moral identity openly admits to taking from monies to be remitted without telling his superiors as follows:

“...the company at times they haven't paid you for like two months and it's the third month I have not been paid, sometimes you just wonder how you're going to eat. Goods pass through us to the final consumer... if I am remitting money I'll have to use my head, like I don't have money and company also wants work done, there is no way that is easy. I don't have money to go for work today because I don't have fuel in my car, sometimes I just take money from the money I am meant to remit, I don't score my manager for that so I just take it...” (I2b, strong moral identity)

“...Every organisation has ways in which they achieve results. We all have core values what we believe in or principles, but all in the name of you want to achieve your targets you compromise some things. One of the things I can actually say is, going through the back door to get some things done but naturally it is against my faith but because of my job what will I do?”(I2d, strong moral identity)

Therefore, the reactions from the employees above suggest that the bureaucracy does put employees in a difficult state of moral choice and responsibility in which the predominant reaction from employees who claim to have strong moral identity is to use the shortcomings of the bureaucracy as an excuse to remain conformist and avoid ethical behaviours (e.g avoid to display ethical courage or systematic ethical inquiry) and engage in and rationalise unethical conduct as necessary rule followership. In all of these also, the role of the unregulated, free-for-all industry standards in which employees are not bound to any rules per se contributes to the ease with which employees may or may not assume moral responsibility for their actions on their jobs. Furthermore, it was also discovered that even though employees do not willingly follow the bureaucracy, their actions to follow the rules had an instrumental drive behind it. These are shown in table 7.3 below:

Table 7.3: Instrumental reasons for remaining in the bureaucracy

Coping/rationalisation Mechanism	Quote
<i>Career Drive</i>	<p><i>“...but for people like me am not looking at that welfare direction why because I really want to achieve one or two things with these guys, get the exposure get the experience, very vast with the job and can compete with my contemporary in the industry... I actually want to develop myself, achieve some things...but over the time I'm trying to build the experience and get the exposure...”(I2d, strong moral identity, sales representative)</i></p> <p><i>“I am an entrepreneur, I am a businessman, I was a businessman before I joined this company, I was working for a fashion place, I wasn't hungry so what I am on in this company is like someone that is going for an industrial training, am trying to learn everything because one am not going to stay in this company forever, I just want to learn, I just believe I want to learn and I just want to learn that is it...” (I2b, strong moral</i></p>

	<i>identity, sales representative)</i>
<i>Monetary benefits</i>	<p><i>"...You know the good thing is that thank God you're making money so if you want to balance it, if you're the type that you're career conscious not money conscious, Firm I1 is not the best place, you look out. But if you're the type that after a while let me get the money and set up my own I'll say to good place because the Avenue is if you hard-working you will make money..." (I1d, strong moral identity)</i></p> <p><i>"...We have freedom to mark up. So you can make profit from there..." (I1b, weak moral identity, sales representative)</i></p>
<i>Personal/Socio-economic reasons</i>	<p><i>"...what will I do? I told you I'm a family man... in Nigeria now the job opportunities are so slim so anyone that you have, you just have to get hold of it except you get a better one" (I1c, sales representative)</i></p> <p><i>"In this present-day Nigeria I would say the economy is bad... You and I drive cars and we know how much we spend...costs are very expensive for public transport... So we keep talking about these things." (I1A, Admin/HR Manager)</i></p>

Source: Fieldwork

Employees' provide financial and economic reasons to justify their unwillingness to engage in moral inquiry in this case. This is akin to the theoretical prediction of the behaviour of persons with weak moral identity as much as it may be a sign of the weakening effect that the bureaucracy may have on moral identity across time since employees do not exercise moral decision-making to leave the amoral environment. Interestingly, the same reasons applied to employees who claimed to have weak and strong moral identities excluding one participant (participant I1e) who was the only participant exercising moral decision-making in the context and hence showed signs of non-conformity and willingness to leave the bureaucracy. The context created by the bureaucracy in this case group is one in which moral responsibility is by choice and not obligatory. But in this case the underlying drive was to be seen as morally good. To this effect employees pursue actions that increase external gains expected by the bureaucracy, for instance to meet their financial targets or acting in a way that is liked by management to appear both doing what management requires and maintaining a moral justification, which may itself serve to justify "how things are done around here". The result is that compliance to rules replaces a sense of personal trust, mutual respect and a sense of freedom to think, act and decide, such

that employees do not take full moral responsibility for their actions, often citing the weaknesses of the bureaucracy as excuse for their actions.

In summary, it seems clear that the context created by the Indian firms is one that does not necessarily encourage or nurture morality and ethical being. Employees on their part react to this bureaucracy by showing strong signs of discomfort at its dominant mechanisms, which in turn invokes a sense of conformity often tied to instrumental ends, such as meeting financial targets, acting in a likeable manner for the Indian managers. This expects individuals to act not only to be seen as a good employee but also to make more money but this is often seen as normal given the poor remuneration package offered by the bureaucracy and the weak promotion opportunities to management roles. Generally, all but one employee showed signs of non-engagement in any critical individual moral inquiry, which is a major indication of conformity and in all cases; they also did not take full moral responsibility for their actions. As such, they would often blame the system for their actions and even rationalise it citing excuses of poor welfare, injustice and issues of mistrust underpinned by ethnic divisions inflicted by the mechanisms of the dominant features of this bureaucracy. Further signs of weakened/weakening moral identity were demonstrated in all employees who mostly cited non-morally inclined reasons of career drive, monetary benefits and personal social economic reasons as their motivation for conforming to the demands of the bureaucracy knowing that most of these employees are basic wage earners with families to support in a difficult economic context. Moreover, these findings could be also be linked to the fact that six of nine employees in this case group were non-pharmacists and that these six do not to have a professional code of ethics as part of their background which limits their ability to see broader than the notion of what is right within the bureaucracy. This will be explored further in proposition 3. Besides, the fact that only one person with strong moral identity takes full moral responsibility for his actions as pressured by the bureaucracy implies others are operating with a subjective sense of strong moral identity and also indicates the probability that CMR is a stronger predictor of moral reasoning.

7.5 Proposition 2

Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders

As explained in chapter 6, Kohlberg's theory suggests that conventional level thinkers are more inclined to show uncritical obedience and conformist behaviours to social norms. This implies that employees reasoning at this level are less inclined to critical moral inquiry and are more likely to operate around the rules and conventions in showing a convenient compliance with set rules, norms and standards without genuinely embracing moral inquiry at individual or community levels. This they do even when there are no consequences for obedience or disobedience unlike post conventional thinkers who employ universal moral principles in their reasoning processes and are more inclined to critical moral inquiry. Within bureaucracies, they are able to see issues not only from the firm's perspective but also through the lens of higher moral principles. Since it is typical of bureaucracies to be characterised by formalised rules and other qualities often requiring strict compliance from its employees, it would therefore follow that bureaucracies would more likely reward conventional level thinkers, who do not actually think too much about their everyday behaviour besides what is convenient and comfortable and given, based on the CMD theory (Kohlberg, 1961), hence this proposition.

In the previous case group (American Firms), rewards are often tied to compliance whilst punishments are associated with non-compliance. However the bureaucracy in this case group as earlier explored is different. Its compulsory rules are internal and therefore inside the firm one has to act around red tape to succeed. Also, the management control employed within this bureaucracy is considered very rigid from employees' perspectives whilst they have wider degrees of freedom to decide how to act on the field. In this proposition I explore whether acting in alignment with both these aspects of this bureaucracy is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in middle/lower managers. Evidence will be presented to show whether the bureaucracy encourages uncritical obedience to set rules thereby encouraging conformist behaviour and whether the bureaucracy then rewards such conformity. The following is the key finding:

7.5.1 Finding 2: This bureaucracy encourages conventional level thinking but it neither rewards conformity nor does it punish non-conformity. Instead it rewards being liked by management a personalised reward mechanism that is less transparent.

Amongst the participants in this case group, seven out of nine were adjudged to be reasoning at the conventional level (see table 7.2 above). This may immediately suggest that this bureaucracy is congruent with conventional reasoning level since most participants' reasoning is at that level. However, as discussed in the opening sections of this chapter, the bureaucracy demands obedience to its rules and it employs rules as a personalised managerial control mechanism to enforce this obedience. As such, employees tend to obey the rules but do so grudgingly with instrumental reasons in most cases (See table 7.3 above). On one hand, this is due to the fact that the internal rules safeguard the acquisition of stock without which employees cannot do business hence they are often bound to complying with those internal rules aimed at protecting the interests of the firm. Yet, as also discovered from the first proposition, some employees devise clever ways of circumventing those strict internal rules to obtain stock, which they sell to make extra money. It must be noted however that internal rules are essentially cash policies and other rules relating to how stocks are obtained (see table 7.1 above). These are aimed at protecting the firm's profit/interests and not necessarily moral rules creating moral guidance for employees. And as earlier established, employees are expected to use their discretion on the field, based on personally held moral beliefs, professional affiliations and so on. Therefore, what's right or wrong in this context is not derived from the firm but from personal and wider society's moral values.

Following from above, it was discovered that there is no clear evidence that compliance with the rules and tenets of the bureaucracy attracts any rewards from the bureaucracy. If anything, it is only required for employees to keep their jobs in a difficult job market. Also, it was not evident that the bureaucracy rewards appropriate moral conduct on the field. An employee explained that the reward system is almost non-existent as follows:

"... Reward is meant to come in 2 ways – there is promotion, a long-term reward and there's what we call incentives. Promotion comes maybe when you at least achieve 70% to 90% of annual target and at the end of the day the company will promote you but apart from that also there is this kind of reward called incentives. We expect to get incentives for making some payments to the company, achieving targets, selling some products etc. But even those are not there..." (I2d)

On the other hand, there are also no punishments associated with non-compliance as indicated by most participants. "...Are there any punishments? I don't think so, they don't have that, there is none." (I1c). Another employee explained, "...there is no disciplinary action, it all depends on what the person has done..." (I2b). This can however be traced to the fact that rules could be personal in the system as noted earlier (see rules and formalisation section) such that if a manager likes an employee, different rules apply. Participant I1e also explained as follows:

"I would tell you that the executive director is a very rigid person, is a very very rigid person and for him to change a rule, you must have to address them or approach in person, explain why he has to do certain things... but his rules are his rules and most representatives do not like to approach him. Whenever I have had to approach him I think have come to discover that he is as soft as it can be. But then he carries this hard man look to keep the representatives off so you don't always have to go to his office... It has to do with trust and I'm one of the reps he trusts the most." (I1e)

This implies that the bureaucracy could be neither explicitly rewarding nor explicitly sanctioning based on clear and transparent criteria that apply fairly. But in this case it is a more subtle, personalised and less meritocratic way whereby recognition and belongingness at work is for employees who act as obedient followers. This is so that increasingly it is broadly evident that the right thing to do as expected by this bureaucracy is to conform to set rules and regulations. By so doing, employees could become less and less inclined to engage in any critical moral inquiry since managerial sanctions gained through personal relationship with the superiors trumps the need to engage in such high level thinking. Whereas, those who actually engage in higher degree of moral inquiry and reflection may be left out and not recognised but actually feel very uncomfortable with the bureaucracy and show willingness to leave the amoral environment for such reasons. This was depicted in the response of the only employee who reasoned at the post conventional level as shown below:

"...This job is changing, it is getting to me, and I'm beginning to do certain things I think I'll never do so it's part of the reason I want to leave. I am beginning to do certain things that have always been against my

own value system because to be honest if you're here long enough, you would lose who you are and become something else even if you didn't use to be that sort of person who believe in tips and bribes for doctors. That is one change the job is bringing to me making me think at least I've had enough here..." (I1e, strong moral identity)

The participant above highlights that this bureaucracy pushes people into 'acting' and 'doing' without integrity-based thinking and conscience and on the grounds of reasons. Thereby this is consistent with encouraging conventional level thinking and not providing opportunities for personal moral growth beyond this level, which is another problem in itself. However, this participant was the only one who did not only admit to conforming to the bureaucracy's standards but assumed a position of moral responsibility by engaging in personal moral inquiry resulting in him taking a moral stance against what he clearly identifies as a violation of his moral values. Interestingly, this participant is also the only one adjudged to be reasoning at Kohlberg's stage six, which also indicates that CMR could be a better indicator of moral reasoning capacity in employees. Rather this bureaucracy seems to reward people on a personalised basis, whereby being liked (disliked) by management can enforce a way of acting in the service of idiosyncratic needs or wants of management. And it characterises a personalised reward mechanism that is less transparent and unclear.

In summary therefore, it can be seen within this case group that this bureaucracy encourages conventional level thinking in its employees by pushing people into acting and doing things without any moral reflections. Also, the bureaucracy creates an environment where personal relationships with superiors tend to trump any need for personal moral inquiry since employees benefit from having sense of belongingness and recognition within the system. The result is a system that neither explicitly rewards nor punishes its employees for conformity or non-conformity. Furthermore, it was also discovered that employees' responses to ethical issues varied according to their individual CMR levels. Post conventional level thinkers seemed to be less affected in their moral reasoning/behaviour patterns by this bureaucratic context as it was with Participant I1e one of two post conventional level thinkers who clearly admitted the wrong doings whilst also taking a firm moral stance of choosing to leave the system. His reason was that the bureaucracy is making him

to do things against his personal values, things he thought he would never do, that are beginning to get to him in a negative way. Other employees who operated at other levels of moral reasoning complied with the bureaucracy's stipulations, and where they did show concerns, they did not seem to have the capacity to take a stance against it as Participant 11e. Therefore the findings above support the first part of this proposition that conventional level thinking facilitates acting in alignment with this bureaucracy but this is neither explicitly rewarded nor explicitly sanctioned.

7.6 Proposition 3

Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity

Within this case group, there are three registered pharmacists and six non-pharmacists. One way of testing this proposition is to observe whether the bureaucracy in this case group affects how pharmacists make sense of their role within the bureaucracy in relation to their professional obligations stipulated by the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN), the governing body for pharmacists in Nigeria. And this will be done in comparison to the effect of the bureaucracy on how the non-pharmacists in the case group make sense of their role within the organisation. As Koehn (1994) suggests that the ground for moral authority for any profession is in public pledge or oath, which is binding on the professionals. Hence, the characterisation of a pharmacist by the professional body to which all pharmacists are expected to swear an oath is the broad professional identity meant to govern the activities of pharmacists regardless of their employer within the context.

Evidence from the literature (Hummell, 1998) suggests it is possible that the broader "learnt" professional identity (via education, socialisation and oath in a specific profession) could be lost within the self-interest agenda of bureaucracies such as firm profit maximisation or managerial rationality. Managerial rationality in this case means what is good is what enhances the managers' goals and agendas and makes a practice appear successful. In such an instance, the view of a pharmacist projected

by the bureaucracy and embraced by participants, would require a narrower professional identity. Also, the bureaucracy within this case group provides no clear moral or professional rules guiding conduct hence employees are expected to use their discretion, which may or may not employ their broader professional identity in moral decision-making. Furthermore, within this bureaucracy that combines rule compliance and close personalised managerial control mechanisms, most employees - with strong and weaker moral identity- have no other option than to comply with firm's policies and rules. In so doing, they will more likely adopt a moral relativistic way of valuing such as "when in Rome act as the Romans" for which they will have to employ the narrower professional identity as demanded by the bureaucracy in making moral decisions.

Also, outside of the firm where most employees who are sales representatives are expected to sell drugs to different customers and stakeholders, they face different moral dilemmas. These could be such as choosing to or not to give money to secure large orders or whether to keep servicing personal needs of stakeholders in order to show commitment to the business relationship. These kinds of scenarios transcend technical or professional expert judgement into realms where moral decisions have to be made. Instead it appears again that there is a personalised dynamic whereby agents of the firms and external agents or stakeholders mutually are trying to serve each other; this is consistent with applying conventional CMD in the external stakeholder relationship arena. At this level, decisions are not clearly subject to any firm ethical rules but a personalised subjective sense. This creates a sense of transactional rather than professional behaviour, as the person who applies rules and the freedom provided as to how key professional ethical values learnt (via education or earlier career), if available, apply. Since most employees in this case-group are non-pharmacists without professional backgrounds, they are lacking the requisite professional ethical values that could contribute towards making informed moral choices on the field. This could therefore significantly impact their capacity to engage in critical moral inquiry thereby making them more inclined to doing the easier things on the field that gives them the recognition of being loyal employees to the bureaucracy's objectives. This also creates an impression that they are being good employees and are 'professionals' on their jobs even though their actions could

be more inclined towards satisfying the demands of the bureaucracy. These are further investigated with findings presented below:

7.6.1 Finding 3: This bureaucracy encourages ‘expertise’ (narrower professional identity) over ‘professionalism’ (broader professional identity) in pharmacists and non-pharmacists

As reviewed in chapter 3, Koehn, (1994) argues that even though professionals are often referred to as persons who possess a lot of knowledge and skill in a field, merely possessing esoteric knowledge makes one an expert but not necessarily a professional. As she further argues, knowledge alone does not confer moral obligation or duty, essential to be a professional. Therefore, expertise could readily foster a narrower professional identity and as such ‘experts’ could be inclined to using their knowledge as a tool to further advance self-motives which in this case of this bureaucracy could be to advance personal agendas, or to sell drugs and to make money for the firms. Professionals on the other hand as Koehn, (1994) argue function by public pledge or oath, which confers a moral duty to act in accordance to the stipulations of such oath. This as earlier discussed is the broader professional identity, expected to guide the actions and decisions of employees who are affiliated with any regulating professional body, in this case PCN. As such, ‘experts’ are not bound by any moral obligation per se and can therefore act in ways that advance the objective they wish to serve.

The bureaucracy in this case group employs pharmacists as well as non-pharmacists to do the job of pharmacists. Out of the nine interviewed participants, three were pharmacists and six non-pharmacists. However, of the six that were non-pharmacists, four have science related backgrounds for instance, degrees in microbiology and biochemistry. Two have non-scientific backgrounds, with one of them having his previous work experience as a sales person in the fashion industry. As one of the managers who is a pharmacist explained:

“...If you see a lot of pharmaceutical companies right now do have a lot of representatives that are not pharmacists you see they believe if they train you on the job as time goes on you will know how to market it and all they care about actually is how to sell this product ideally. You are I know that pharmacists should be the ones handling stuff like

this because he knows pharmacology...a fresh pharmacist is even allowed with his licence to import poisons as long as you're graduated as a pharmacist you can do that but a lot of these companies feel pharmacists always request for plenty amount of money so they want to pay little for what they want and you know as it is right under a lot of people looking for jobs so for people were requesting N150,000, there's someone that is looking for N100,000 but is ready to do that job and there is someone that is also looking for N50,000 to do the job the N100,000 guy can do and you are here as a pharmacist waiting for N150,000. Before you know it, the job is given to someone else ...”
(I2a)

According to the manager above, the Indian bureaucracies favour a low cost strategy, thereby facilitating the employment of non-pharmacists into their fold. But more importantly as he also highlighted is the fact that the bureaucracy believes non-pharmacists can be trained to do the job of pharmacists. To the Indians, the crux of their business is selling products (drugs) and it can be done by anybody as long as such persons acquire the knowledge of the science behind drugs. In this regard, the bureaucracy does not distinguish between sales requiring technical knowledge and non-technical knowledge; in other words, they could be selling anything else besides drugs. This focus aligns with the 'expertise' concept highlighted by Koehn, (1994) as an insufficient model of professionalism. Under this concept, employees are more inclined to obtain a vast knowledge of selling drugs in order to advance the profit maximisation cause of the bureaucracy, as expressed by the manager above. Since such employees do not have any professional code of ethics guiding their actions, their understanding of who they are is defined mostly by the bureaucracy steering them towards the narrower professional identity and ultimately towards taking actions that recognise them as loyalty to the organisation. The bureaucracy was discovered to achieve this in two ways and was also found to affect pharmacists and non-pharmacists as presented below:

7.6.2 Finding 3a: First, the notion of a client in the bureaucracy differs from the notion of the clients registered pharmacists have sworn to protect.

Below are quotes from two of the registered pharmacists in this case group. In their interviews, they described their clients on their jobs as other stakeholders besides those they have sworn to protect, besides describing themselves as ‘sales men’ instead of pharmacists:

“...We have three clients, we have the doctors in the hospitals, we have the pharmacists and then we have the main business people based in ‘Idumota’ (a large public market). Those are the three major groups we deal with so basically we are doing the redistribution to all these people because the major ones are the ones in Idumota, that is the drug market...” (I1c)

“...We are the sales representatives, the distributors are people that come to buy from us, they buy in bulk they don’t sell retail, all the small pharmacies around go to them...”(I1d)

According to Koehn’s (1994) study, the client is anyone desiring a public good, for instance health. Hence, ‘the client cannot be reduced to the person upon whom a doctor decides to bestow health... rather the client is the person seeking health who has come to the doctor because of the doctor’s public promise to promote health, which is the good the client desires (pg. 54). Registered pharmacists in Nigeria swear to protect the health of the ‘patient’ (PCN, 2015) similar to Koehn’s concept of the client, which in this case refers to persons who are pursuing the public good of health through the guidance of a medicine expert. However, the clients referred to in the above quotes are not patients whom the pharmacists have sworn to protect but other stakeholders who in this case are not directly seeking the public good of health but other goods such as profit. Hence the bureaucracy’s notion of a client is clearly not the same as the notion of the client under professional oath the pharmacists are meant to practise by. The focus of the bureaucracy on sales, marketing and distribution shifts the focus of registered pharmacists from those they have sworn to protect to the market segments the bureaucracy expects them to serve. The professional ethos of PCN does not cover this client type thereby leaving even registered pharmacists to their personal discretion with the option of doing things in ways that satisfy the bureaucracy in order to be seen as ‘professionals’. For instance one of the pharmacists when faced with a moral issue of whether to pay an entity in

order to secure a huge deal opted to make the payment in order to meet his sales target, satisfy the demands of the bureaucracy and also to make some more money for himself. Thus, it seems clear that the notion of a professional is not governed by oath but by salesmanship and this fits the narrower professional identity.

It can therefore also be argued that the relationship between the employees of the bureaucracy (including those who are registered pharmacists) and the 'clients' in this case (that is the three client groups mentioned in the quotes above) is purely transactional, which according to Koehn is the kind of relationships 'experts' and not professionals have with their clients. This transactional relationship is driven by the profit motive of the bureaucracy, which the employees, in this case registered pharmacists have bought into making them behave as experts instead of professionals. This becomes more of a self-serving relationship. Also as Koehn (1994) argues, clients should not be treated as market segments, but in this case, it seems clear that the clients are market segments these pharmacists are meant to sell to in order to meet the sales targets imposed on them by the bureaucracy. These two violations of the concept of the client by the bureaucracy buttresses the finding that it encourages expertise over professionalism and one way it does this is by distorting the notion of who the clients being served are. As it was expected, non-pharmacists in the context also show very similar traits. Since they do not have any professional oaths to which they have sworn, their allegiance is thus fully with their organisation or the furtherance of any personal agenda.

7.6.3 Finding 3b: Both pharmacists and non-pharmacists in the context refer to their firms as 'marketing companies'. As the following employees explained:

"I see Firm 12 pharmaceutical as a purely marketing company. They believe so much in marketing and the ideology of marketing is so much in because within the shortest period of time, I have to be a pioneer member of the company, they have been able to achieve..." (I2c)

"This firm is just a sales company, just sales sales sales." (I2b)

"We are dealing with more of relationship marketing...we are selling products, we sell science... as a representative of the company it is more of relationship marketing" (I2d)

This notion may not be entirely surprising as the Indian pharmaceutical companies within the context of the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry engage primarily in sales and marketing of drugs produced by the parent companies. But the import of this is that little emphasis is placed on the pharmaceutical aspect of the business and a lot of emphasis is placed on sales and marketing. So, it can be argued that another way the bureaucracy succeeds in deconstructing the broader professional identity of registered pharmacists to fit its narrower professional identity agenda is through job roles and description. For instance, one of the pharmacists above (I2c) alludes to the fact that the company he works for is a marketing company and not a pharmaceutical one. Also, non-pharmacists like participants I2b and I2d above say the same. This construction of organisational identity and their job roles as 'sales representatives' and 'distributors' can be argued affects how employees see themselves as sales persons rather than pharmacists. In the case of non-pharmacists, they are employed as sales persons and therefore have no other professional identity. As one of such participants explained:

"...I am an entrepreneur, I am a businessman, I was a businessman before I joined this company, I was working for a fashion place ..." (I2b)

"I have been a representative for some time now... I sell products... the doctors need the product... our products are always having an edge in there was something in the market already, as will offer something that is much more..." (I2c)

From the quotes above, the first participant shows clear interest in advancing his knowledge because he wants to become an expert in his job and he sees the bureaucracy as the place to achieve his aims. Likewise the second participant describes herself as a sales person. The job here is not being a pharmacist but being a sales person because that is the identity the bureaucracy has given to them and it seems clear that such roles are devoid of any clear moral obligations as Koehn, (1994) rightly argued. The result is that neither the contextual moral codes, which seems non-existent in this case nor personal moral standards (internalised via contemplation and personal earlier socialisation and learning if a person has been exposed to ethically demanding contexts and institutions) can produce effective and good ethical responses and ways of valuing. Within this context therefore,

compliance seems to replace true professionalism in Koehn's terms such that in as much as employees act in accordance to the rules of the bureaucracy, they tend to see themselves as professionals.

In summary, it can be said that this bureaucracy does influence towards abiding strictly with behaviours that show a sense of loyalty towards it rather than towards broader professional codes and values. The bureaucracy in this case group was identified in this proposition that not all employees are registered pharmacists, the moral implication of which is that not all employees have a professional moral point of reference to guide their actions, which Koehn posits comes through public oath. Secondly, the fact that the bureaucracy is focused on 'sales and marketing' can be argued will have its effect on how all employees (both pharmacists and non-pharmacists) make sense of their job roles. But as Koehn, (1994) suggests, the highest form of alignment should be with the profession and that's why they come with pledges and oaths. Regardless of whom a pharmacist works for, allegiance ought to always align with one's profession based on oaths. However in this case, it was interesting to note that pharmacists and non-pharmacists alike saw themselves in the light of the narrower professional identity as espoused by their job roles within the bureaucracy. This was the case regardless of employee's moral identity. As such, there is no difference between how the pharmacists and non-pharmacists construe their job roles within the bureaucracy because adherence to the objectives of the bureaucracy is taken as being professional in this context. These also make employees less inclined to engage in critical moral inquiry of moral situations at work since adhering to the bureaucracy's objectives creates a sense that they are good and loyal employees.

7.7 Conclusion

In summary, both managerial control and rules were identified to have an intertwined influence in this second case group. Rules are employed as tools for personalised managerial control of employees and processes within the system. As such there are internal rules guiding every aspect of internal firm activities. Outside of the firms however, in engaging stakeholders in the field, there are no clear ethical rules and employees resort to their personal discretion in making moral decisions. As such, the bureaucracy in this case group is one that creates an environment in which moral responsibility is the choice of employees.

In the first proposition, it was discovered that employees showed strong signs of discomfort with the dominant mechanisms of the bureaucracy even though they still acted in obedience to its tenets. However, they often used this as an excuse not to take full moral responsibility for their actions, thereby showing evidence that they are lacking in moral contemplation and moral awareness. Besides their decisions to conform to the bureaucracy were also discovered to be associated with instrumental ends such as meeting financial targets in order to be seen as good employees and also to make more money to augment the poor remuneration package offered by the bureaucracy. In the second proposition, the role of the bureaucracy in promoting conventional level of reasoning was tested. It was concluded that the bureaucracy in this case group does encourage employee conformity to its rules and standards but it does not reward conformity neither does it punish non-conformity but is often the only option for employment. It was also concluded that post conventional level thinkers seemed to be less affected in their moral reasoning/behaviour patterns by this bureaucratic context, indicating that the CMR is a more reliable measure of morality within the context.

Finally in the third proposition, it was discovered that this bureaucracy employs a lot of non-pharmacists as a low cost labour strategy. As such it does encourage expertise (a narrower view of professional identity) over professionalism (broader view of professional identity). Interestingly also, registered pharmacists were also discovered to work with this narrow professional identity describing themselves as sales persons and distributors. This was traceable to the fact that the bureaucracy has a different notion of who its client are which shifts the focus of pharmacists to market segments as different from individuals seeking a public good of health. This was also discovered to make employees less inclined to engaging in critical moral inquiry of moral situations they find themselves since adhering to the bureaucracy's objectives creates a sense that they are good and loyal employees.

CHAPTER 8

CASE GROUP 3: NIGERIAN PHARMACEUTICALS

8.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis and findings in a sample of two Nigerian pharmaceuticals. This is the third case group in this study. Unlike the two previous case groups however, this case group presents a pair of dissimilar firms. Interestingly, both firms appeared to be similar in structural characteristics (size, employee strength and revenue) but it was discovered that each have divergent bureaucratic traits thus, were analysed separately. The first (N1) is a quasi-bureaucracy with charismatic authority underpinning its bureaucratic features hence is regarded as a '*Charismatic Bureaucracy*'. The second (N2) is an '*Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy*' characterised by a laissez-faire opportunity seeking culture. In this firm, entrepreneurship is less about innovation but more about opportunism and corrupt ways of exploiting gaps for economic gains (Cressy, 1992). Evidence of these two different bureaucracies are presented in the sections to follow. Finally, relevant findings along the three key propositions explored in this study are presented using evidence from interview data and secondary sources.

8.1 Management Control

8.1.1 Firm N1

In the two previous case groups, managerial control was found to emanate from power conferred on managers. Specifically it has been found that through their managerial roles, managers monitor and regulate the activities of their subordinate in a way that promotes the "morality" of a given bureaucracy.

In this case group however, two different patterns of managerial control were discovered. The first (N1) is stemming from a form of authority Weber called charismatic authority. The second (N2) is a rather enterprising competitive firm context that is not a typical Weberian bureaucracy as I show (see page 192). This second appears as an "unregulated" system and the traces of managerial control were not readily evident in this second firm. Evidence from these two different bureaucracies are further presented and their impacts on employee morality subsequently discussed.

Firm N1 is a firm characterised by its family-like work environment. The structure of this bureaucracy is such that there is a wide span of control, with more than five direct reports to managers depending on the department, thus, giving employees a great degree of independence. Also, this firm showed a preference for a very cordial, informal system such that even though there are clear hierarchies, upper management layer and the lower level roles naturally interact without rigid boundaries based upon formalized roles. This is not typical in classic bureaucracies because such bureaucracies are also typified by impersonality hence human personality is not often present (Weber, 1978). The firm is headed by a well-respected Nigerian director, representing the interest of an all-Nigerian board of directors, also comprising of highly reputable individuals. The senior management team also comprises only Nigerian nationals. Together, both managers and their subordinates often work very closely together without any perceived 'power distance' amongst the hierarchies of the firm. Hence, it was discovered that within this firm, managerial control exists through charismatic authority.

Charismatic authority is defined by Weber, (1947:10) as "authority resting on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism, or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him". As such within this case group, it was found that the managing director (MD) of firm N1 and his entire management team were described to exude certain levels of sanctity, which makes employees regard them as heroes and role models. In other words, the MD and his team through their character and conduct make the moral values they hold in esteem visible, such that they impact how employees perceive the team and the organisation. This notion was a dominant theme throughout the interview data gathered from the firm across multiple departments and hierarchy as shown below:

"When you see men you can look up to and I can tell you I have found several of them in Firm N1 and they are like driving forces for me. The MD has been like a huge inspiration to me and I know he is a man for God. He's being a good example and I tell it every time...I thank God for the management team... Asides from the spirituality, they are men who are focused...I could remember the MD has said several things that really played big on me, I picked them and actually applied them and I

found out that they are principles that you find in men who are actually aspiring to be great...” (N1d)

“...When I just came in, it was my first week of work I had not met the MD, I did not know him and that day I was working late with my boss. We were actually at my seat I was typing something and MD came in and was standing opposite me and he began to have a lengthy chat with me and we were all laughing he was jesting with everybody so when he left my boss said to me that is the MD, I was like WOW... he said don't worry you get to know him better and really not only the MD, you will see that in this organisation people have stayed for 9, 10, 15 years, something would have made them stay outside of salary so the relationship they're able to maintain with their staff is very very cordial...My bosses, they have made my life easy. I don't see work as work...”(N1e)

“I first thought Firm N1 was a multinational owned by foreigners then I could remember that during my interview I was telling them that when I usually pass by when I was working in an auditing firm, I would say I like to work in this place because of the environment and all of that...I never knew it was owned by a Nigerian so it was when I came by that I discovered all of that and I was so amazed and that the man (MD) is someone that is a visionary leader, I respect him a lot...” (N1f)

From the quotes above, the effects of charismatic authority can be seen in the way that employees describe and revere the leadership of the organisation. For instance, employees seem to be satisfied with their jobs because of the cordial nature of the work environment owing largely to the visionary likeable leadership of the firm as much as employees see in their leaders individuals worthy of being their role models and mentors. The MD for instance is described as a visionary leader, known for his Christian beliefs; he is also known to be quite free, approachable and easy to talk to. Further, he is described to have the ability to see potential in his employees and would often help them nurture it. For instance, one of the participants above explained that he used to be a school dropout and security official with the firm, and upon losing his job approached the MD who sponsored his education and employed him thereafter. Today, he is an HR staff with the organisation.

“...One thing I will credit this company for is that the top management have no restrictions to anybody, you can walk up to them and express your feelings and it'll be noted. If it is one that needs to be implemented you will be recognised and commended for it...They have given me the opportunity... I was a school dropout when I joined them and I have been given the platform to grow with the company, they learn to identify talents. I am now studying entrepreneurship and business management at the National Open University and I will be finishing soon. That will be my first degree, because when I dropped out, instead of being on the streets though it seemed like my world collapsed, they took me in...” (N1d)

This kind of relationship between managers and their subordinates is an inspirational one that creates an environment of mutual trust based on the mutual respect employees seem to have for their superiors and vice-versa. The quotes above also suggest that the leaders within this firm exude virtues that the bureaucracy taps into. For instance, the managing director was reported to have very strong religious roots, from which his value system is derived. This was discovered to have informed the norm of daily morning prayers and fellowship within the organisation as explained below:

“Predominantly in Firm N1 we have an ethical standard. The management team always pushes that into us. Funny enough you know we have a fellowship in this company. We do Fellowship (prayers) 8 AM to 9 AM every morning...It is not everybody that goes but no matter how important the job is, if you are not on your desk and your boss comes in asks where is this person? They say fellowship. It is more or less like an official thing... nobody would complain so I think with that and they hold on to religious values and I think religious value is the best standard for any ethical thinking person...” (N1b)

“I think they have that spirit of Fellowship, of friendliness here... We have a fellowship centre downstairs, this is the first time and I could not imagine that I will get in a Nigerian company that set aside an hour for devotion, fellowship and all that to me it is something that is out of the ordinary...the spirit here is friendliness, people are open and there is

nobody that is too big, everybody's cordial the MD can come here now, they can even eat with you, very simple, it's a really nice place" (N1f)

As such, it seems evident within this bureaucracy that the person (character and conduct) of the managing director has a huge effect on how employees perceive the organisation and its management team. The religious beliefs of the MD for instance encourage the fellowship within the firm where employees freely pray together every day without obligation. This can also be argued affects the moral conduct of employees within the organisation by increasing their awareness to moral issues whilst promoting a sense of shared values in the community. Employees also reported that leaders within the organisation lead by example, often demonstrating their deeply held values in conduct and character by the way they handle their work as a participant explained below:

"I'll give them integrity; they really try to do what they say they do. Sometimes in seeking money you can get carried away, you can't cut corners and shortcuts and all that. At least I work closely with the people that are at the helm of affairs in decision-making and sometimes when there are issues the way they pick it up like our name is at stake. We are known for integrity there is something up here even without the public having to react first..." (N1e)

The testimony of the participant above suggests that when leaders show through direct association and continuous modelling the virtues they stand for, they are further respected, admired and followed. Thus, one of the participants (N1b) above explained, a prevalent and accepted understanding among employees is that the ethics of the firm is grounded in Christian values hence there is a common knowledge that Firm N1 has high standards of morality as employees also perceive from the observable conduct of their leaders. These in turn create an environment of social accountability in which employee conduct and performance can be informally monitored, yet professionally.

This system of social accountability is a self-regulatory control mechanism based on mutual trust in which the employees themselves have a sense of shared responsibility based on commonly held beliefs acquired from their leaders to act only in ways that are in line with the firm's values. Through this shared belief mechanism, violations

are easily spotted and dealt with accordingly as one of the managers explained below:

“In a system that has been able to thrive itself for more than 19 years based on the fact that people have a high level of integrity, then definitely it will be very difficult for you to employ one younger accountant that will want to be dubious and you won’t quickly know. The system would throw the accountant up. Before you manipulate one or two figures, the whole system will see you and it will throw you up, so because...the culture is ingrained in them... The first value that is held in high esteem is integrity... this is what has been able to drive this organisation up to this point, and it based on integrity” (N1g)

“...The face of the values are all the HODs, don't look at it from the point of the directors alone, all the HODs are the value drivers... because it is not about the director, the set of people that do make it happen is the heads of the apartment, they are the ones that enforce the culture... they're the ones that enforce the principles, they are more or less like the role models for everybody who work in their Department. So, they are the value drivers or shall I say moral drivers in this system are all HODs who are also at the prime age of 30s...” (N1g)

As such, this bureaucracy ingrains certain moral values into its employees especially those that are passed down from the leaders through visible modelling and direct association. These create a moral system that all employees respect and trust because they esteem those who serve as the face of those values (the managers) and therefore have a collectively shared responsibility of watching over the system to ensure there is compliance to known moral standards. This environment of moral awareness and accountability makes it easy for misconducts or violations to be detected.

8.1.2 Firm N2

I now focus on the second firm (N2) that is a very different case. Firm N2 on the other hand represents an ‘*Entrepreneurial bureaucracy*’ that is typified by its ‘loose’, unregulated environment laced with red tape. The concept of entrepreneurship in this firm is less about innovation and more about opportunism, in which employees

are encouraged to look for 'gaps' in the market to be 'exploited' for economic gains (Cressy, 1992). This can be attributed to an historical antecedent that the once renowned brand name in the pharmaceutical industry now struggles in an increasingly dynamic, highly competitive local pharmaceutical industry context in which the firm operates (See Chapter 5 for contextual descriptions). Besides, the firm has a lofty goal of becoming the biggest pharmaceutical company in Nigeria by the end of the decade, thereby encouraging an opportunistic environment within the firm. This comes with a preference for performance driven environment with an unusually free and unregulated system driven by excessive desires for economic gains. This bureaucracy also has a wide span of control, with managers having direct reports in the excess of five employees. By this, there seems to be unnecessary layers of bureaucracy but no true accountability amongst them. This is able to create a distance between the employees and the firm thereby creating a system of levels of management that maintain power but no accountability as described below:

Bureaucracy is the number one thing that affects my job and the second thing is the no so open attitude here...it's like there are cabals and it affects my job because if for example I create a document four people or three people have to look at it and each person has to make his own different opinion... Put it to your line manager maybe he reviews it four times, your line manager sends it to his own line manager and feels some other thing should be added... You go back to the drawing table then the line manager's line manager's line manager has to go through it again... So, you find out that this speed for you to do anything is very very slow and you will still have to be measured on timeline. Did you meet the timeline? Whereas a lot of the timelines you may not have control over it." (N2a)

Thus, there seems to be no clear accountable way of getting things done within the firm as explained below:

"I can't put my hand on how we do things. In management, things are slow; things are not as fast as you expect them to work... When you're working in a multinational, they have a culture, which everybody knows.

Immediately you get into the system, you tend to fall in line with the culture. But here there is nothing really clear like that... You can do anything you feel like doing to a large extent... as long as you can justify it and of course you can always have a reason for it. Its unlike the multinationals where you have code of ethics, you can't do this, they do the anti-corruption law every time...But whilst you are here there is really no code of ethics as long as you can justify it.” (N2a)

“Our core values...it is more of just lip service, people don't understand what it is when we say integrity. So easy for us to say integrity... If you tell me we have integrity then if I tell you okay I am going to pay you your incentive on 27 May, you should pay it but it doesn't happen so that means even as a company we have team work as one of our core values but the level of internal conflicts to me is so high, I am trying to do this at times you can seek advice from someone and that is what the person we use against you up there...so in terms of the core values I'm not sure we are doing enough, and that's just a truth” (N2d)

As implied from the quotes above, employees are able to do things as they wish as long as such actions can be justified mainly along the economic objectives of the bureaucracy. Hence, what are described as firm values on paper are not practised nor enforced in reality, hence employees seem not to be guided by any clear internal mechanism. As the employees above explain, the firm seems to breed a body of individual opportunists merely functioning within an enabling fabric with no real sense of collective purpose other the quest for economic gains. This also implies a lot of internal conflicts arise in what seems like unhealthy internal competition, further buttressing the opportunistic nature of this bureaucracy. Individual inclination towards this within the bureaucracy is further expressed in the words of the following employees:

“I love results, and I am very passionate about getting results (financial results). I love getting results, getting things done like what I do I just set targets in a week, what I need to do and that drives me all through the week. I give myself targets. I just love achieving results that

summarises my person, no matter the obstacle. When I set a target, that's what I want to achieve..." (N2b)

"...Okay if we discover that...okay let's use the air conditioner example, that's an opportunity you can tie sales to, you can immediately create a promotion, possibly a soft promotion, by this promotion you ask, can you do this volume for us and we give you this? You see that he has a need for it. He says yes, what are you talking about, how does it run? By then you must have done some mental calculations, okay by 50 cartons of this product, the margin on top of it can get him what he wants or you involve the company okay I have a deal with this person, he says he can do this volume and I committed myself that I will do this in return within this period of time that I would give him an air conditioner because he hasn't got one and the Company looks at the deal you are giving to him, I think we can make this happen." (N2c)

The quotes above further reveal the nature of individuals' opportunistic behaviours and Firm N2's unregulated environment where such employee behaviour are often encouraged and supported as long as it has financial gains. But more importantly is the nature of morality depicted in the quotes above. As expressed by participant N2b above, the main focus of the bureaucracy is an orientation to maximizing economic gains within a context of blurred accountability. The management of the firm was evidencing this as it was found to be empowering employees to 'strike deals' or do anything they have to do to meet financial targets. As such morality seems non-existent in this environment as employees find it easy to thrive within the bureaucracy that does not encourage any form of personal moral inquiry. Rather, employee decisions seem readily sanctioned by the firm creating an environment in which individual employees are comfortable to do anything they choose as instrumentally necessary because their actions can be easily justified and the need for any form of moral contemplation is trumped.

In summary, the two firms in this case group present different manifestations of managerial control. One has its managerial control stemming from charismatic authority, which also drives the values embraced within the organisation thereby shaping the moral awareness and responsiveness of its employees in the process.

The second represents a bureaucracy characterised by red tape and an opportunistic environment in which bureaucratic features seem to exist at the surface without any clear functional influence in reality. As such employees are encouraged within this unregulated environment to do as they wish as long as their actions can be justified along the economic objectives of the bureaucracy. This in turn breeds a set of individual opportunists existing within an environment where moral inquiry and contemplation is insignificant.

8.2 Formalization and Rules

8.2.1 Firm N1

Formalised rules also called standard operating procedures (SOPs) are written rules aimed at guiding how employees execute their job duties. Such rules could be very comprehensive and strict as discovered in the first case group (Chapter 6) or targeted at guiding only internal activities and processes as found in the second case group (Chapter 7). It was interesting to discover that both bureaucracies in this case group shared some similarities in how rules are expressed yet differed in their functioning and effectiveness within both contexts. For instance, in both firms, there are no clearly written rules or code of ethics guiding employees' activities even though rules were often deemed 'verbal' and 'non-explicitly' written. Where rules existed as in the case of Firm N1, they weren't necessarily SOPs but 'instructions' handed down by leaders, which employees have institutionalised as rules on issues such as punctuality, work ethic and in some instances work processes as the employees below explained:

"I said that earlier that when we first came, in each of the departments that we visited we discovered that they were not having SOPs especially inventory. I can speak for my unit...I discovered that there was no system in place in terms of SOPs, in terms of stock management, timely imputing of stock and so on..." (N1f)

"There is a Firm N1 way... is it written in black and white? It is not but there is a Firm N1 way. I think the Firm N1 way, the way I see it... but if you ask everybody in this company they will give you different answers there is a way we perceive it from our own vintage point. My point is that the Firm N1 way is more of an ethical way..."(N1b)

“Are there rules? There is no law that is cast in dye. My job allows me to take initiative, there are no hard and fast rule... Yes I have a job description but it is the task given that I do...” (N1e)

The quotes above are indicative of a system where SOPs may not be explicitly written yet there is a common sense of understanding of how things work within the firm. There also seems to be a sense of shared values and beliefs guiding how employees think and do things within the bureaucracy traceable to the influence of the leadership of the firm. As earlier established, firm N1 functions under the influence of charismatic authority, such that the leaders of the firm are respected and their virtues embraced by employees who ‘idolise’ their leaders. The result is that there may not be a need for clearly written rules since the moral awareness of employees is being continually shaped by the leaders’ direct and continuous association with their employees, to the extent that there seems to be an alignment in the moral thinking of leaders and their employees. However, in some departments, for instance, sales, some form of rules exist as explained by one of the managers below:

“If you follow the laid down rules, you should be able to beat the competition. Laid down rules in that you do your part what I ask you to do, to wake up early in the morning as early as 9 AM, be in the institution, create the demand, detail this product, talk to the prospect, see a certain number of doctors in a day for this product, do clinical presentation on this product and try as much as possible to leave behind pens...these are things that generate awareness for the product. After you have done all those bits, if you see those doctors consecutively, you do your work, your clinical meetings, the doctors will remember your product and will prescribe.” (N1c)

But, as can be seen from the quote above, the rules are not written rules but more of handed down instructions on how employees within the department are being asked to go about their selling duties. Of note also is the way the manager above explained he personally instructs his subordinates on what to do and how to do them. In another environment, this approach can easily be deemed dictatorial and authoritative, however given that the managers within this context are loved and

respected, employees consider the instructions as beneficial guidance that can be institutionalised since they trust their leaders. This is indicative of the nature of charismatic authority within the bureaucracy and by this, moral virtues easily flow down from leaders to employees who may readily adjust their own moral values to conform to those of their leaders out of respect for them. An employee explained:

“I would first say we run as a family with rules guiding it. You can take the father and the son, I can say that a child would do well if the father will take interest in him...but when their child begins to exhibit some characters that don't fit into what he has been taught, he will be severely warned... so everything here is clearly spelled out...”(N1d)

As such morality is easily shared yet this environment also creates an avenue for employees who already possess moral values to freely express themselves. This was implied in by the response of several employees who described the environment as free and enabling for them to be themselves.

8.2.2 Firm N2

On the other hand, Firm N2 also did not present any clearly written down rules and procedures on how things ought to be done. But unlike Firm N1, where there are unwritten rules yet shared understanding of how things work through the influence of charismatic authority, firm N2 presents a completely unregulated context where anything is justifiable as long as it brings economic dividends. What exists, as rules in Firm N2, were administrative rules on report writing, order for document approvals, which a lot of employees complained is more of a burdensome red tape than proper SOPs. Some of the employees explained as follows:

“Yes, there are verbal rules. There is no written down rule...They won't tell you that you can do certain things but if you did it to make money, nobody is going to harass you...a lot of times, there are rules that guide my job... we have a work plan, you have an idea of what you're supposed to do, you're supposed to give a weekly report of what you have done so that is clear-cut...” (N2a)

“There aren't rules as such... and there are no boundaries per se. It's just that writing plans and other bits, it must make sense for it to be

invested in. If you want things to fly you need to know how to carry people along...” (N2h)

Given the largely unregulated environment of firm N2, employees seem to have the freedom to do anything as long as they can be justified on the grounds of economic benefits to the firm as participant N2a above mentions. That is, employees are supported by the firms to go about their duties anyhow they deem fit because firm N2 is a largely opportunistic environment that is predominantly oriented towards economic returns. This kind of system likely creates a body of individual opportunists who benefit from being part of a body that gives them collective advantages, making it easy to thrive in the bureaucracy. An effect of this as an employee explained is a model of selling called the money-medical selling in which employees are allowed to bribe potential customers or use any possible means to strike bargains since anything goes as explained below:

“Multinationals have professional-medical selling. The generic guys do money-medical selling. Most major companies do money-medical selling... they sell with money, whilst the other guys do professional medical selling...The way the Nigerian business runs really is anything goes, anything goes there.” (N2a)

This use of terminology suggests an attempt to legitimise this type of transaction by normalising it as a legitimate alternative to professional-medical selling. By this, decisions are easily justifiable based on prevalent behavioural patterns of other employees within the system and as such people easily systematically disengage from any form of moral inquiry, since groupthink is a huge possibility within the context.

In summary therefore, both bureaucracies presented in this case group seem to be free in certain ways even though one showed clear measures of regulation and the other did not. Both bureaucracies do not have clearly written rules yet in Firm N1, regulation is achieved through charismatic authority in which employees see instructions and the conduct of their leaders as guidance for their personal conduct within the system because they respect their leaders. Firm N2 on the other hand is an unregulated environment where rules don't exist and employees are given the free hand to decide how they want to do business thereby making it easy for them to

systematically disengage from personal moral inquiry and follow prevalent behaviours within the system. The periodic sales targets employees are expected to meet drive this, from which they also get incentives from sales and marked-up prices.

8.3 The Effect of both SOPs and Managerial control on Employees' Cognitive Moral Reasoning (CMR) and Moral Identities

Consistent with prior chapters, the morality of employees in this study's interviewed sample is evaluated from two theoretical lenses: their cognitive moral reasoning levels and moral identities. From preliminary findings, the moral identity scores and assigned moral reasoning level of each employee in both firms are presented below in different tables. Summaries for both firms N1 and N2 are presented in tables 8.1 and 8.2 below.

Table 8.1 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants in Firm N1

Participant	CMR Path	Moral Identity Strength
N1a	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	6.53 (Strong)
N1b	Post Conventional Level (Stage 6)	4.64 (Strong)
N1c	Post-conventional Level (Stage 5)	5.94 (Strong)
N1d	Conventional Level (stage 4)	6.05 (Strong)
N1e	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	2.59 (Weak)
N1f	Post-Conventional (Stage 5)	5.59 (Strong)
N1g	Post-Conventional Level (Stage 5)	6.11 (Strong)
N1h	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	5.59 (Strong)
N1i	Conventional (Stage 4)	3.88 (Weak)

Source: Fieldwork

The table above shows that all but two of the participants in this case group claim to have strong moral identities based on the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure employed during this study. Interestingly, both of these are in Firm N1, the more regulated of both firms in this case group with clear moral values. Overall this was the only case where weaker presence of lower and mid conventional moral

reasoning levels were clearly found, and stronger presences of upper conventional and lower post conventional moral reasoning levels.

Table 8.2 – Combined CMR level and Moral Identity score of Participants in Firm N2

Participant	CMR Path	Moral Identity Strength
N2a	Post-Conventional Level (Stage 5)	6.23 (Strong)
N2b	Pre-conventional Level (Stage 2)	5.64 (Strong)
N2c	Pre-Conventional Level (Stage 2)	5.70 (Strong)
N2d	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	6.00 (Strong)
N2e	Conventional Level (Stage 4)	5.11 (Strong)
N2f	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	5.00 (Strong)
N2g	Conventional Level (Stage 3)	5.20 (Strong)

Source: Fieldwork

In firm N2, on the other hand, it is interesting that the results show a rather skewed distribution in which all employees claimed to have strong moral identities. Given that the context of firm N2 is an unregulated one that tends to discourage moral inquiry, a feeling of strong moral identity amongst all employees of firm N2 could be indicative of the same pattern found in previous cases, i.e. an inflated sense of identity as inspired by the context whereby everyone seems to be identify themselves as “moral” just by following the bureaucratic conventions. It must be noted that self-reported measures such as the one used in this study are liable to participant bias and prone to contextual influences (Howard and Dailey, 1979; Spector, 1994; Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997). But generally, the Aquino and Reed, (2002) measure is widely documented to have high validity, reliability and significant variations in large samples (Aquino and Reed, 2002, Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 2011). On a general note however, the fact that all but two employees claim to have strong moral identities could be an indication that an intertwined complex interaction between the two contextual (bureaucratic) features of rule compliance and managerial control in both firms can disorient employee moral identity towards everyone who loyally obeys the bureaucratic rules feeling entitled to a strong moral identity. This will be further investigated.

Participants' cognitive moral reasoning however shows a close to normal distribution of moral reasoning levels across the pre-conventional, conventional and post conventional levels. It must be noted that the CMR levels of these participants were determined using their dominant patterns of thinking from interview data and not through an established measuring tool; hence it may not be entirely accurate due to researcher's bias. It was interesting however to note that the two pre-conventional level thinkers were managers in firm N2 whilst firm N1 reported a high number of post conventional level thinkers. In the sections to follow, the effect of the bureaucracy on the employees' moral identity and CMR levels is explored along the three propositions of this study as follows:

Proposition 1: *Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)*

Proposition 2: *Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders*

Proposition 3: *Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity*

8.4 Proposition 1

Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity in employees as well as in managers (equally in all cases of moral identity i.e. in both stronger and weaker MI actual scores)

The proposition simply means that in certain cases and contexts, contextual variables are so strongly influencing the subjective employee experience that they may well create an “inflated moral identity” general pattern. In this sense having both strong and weak moral identity will be affected within the bureaucracy to the extent that there may be no differentiating moral standard to distinguish employees' and managers' moral identity qualities. As noted insofar as everyone is compliant with the tenets of a bureaucracy each person is entitled to a sense of moral goodness.

This proposition therefore suggests that employee behaviour in accordance with both organisational rules and management control enhances a subjective sense of an inflated (stronger) moral identity in both managers and employees. This is tested in the context of both Firms N1 and N2 even though a longitudinal study will be required to further establish this claim.

As earlier established, the two firms in this case group are a contrasting pair. One on hand, Firm N1 is a firm driven by charismatic authority. Managerial control within the context of N1 is based on social accountability, a self-regulatory system stemming from trust in shared character values modelled by the leaders within the organisation, whom the employees greatly esteem. This case (N1) is the only case where data disconfirm proposition 1. Organisational rules are more verbal and unwritten yet a binding and common understanding exists on what the firm stands for amongst all employees. This is owing to the influence of the MD and his management team within the context, whose virtues are respected and embraced by their employees, thereby influencing how employees understand their work climate. Thus within this bureaucracy, it is likely that moral identity strength appears for the first time objective and in reference to real and meaningful character virtues that express a strength of moral identity. It is the only case where this is not a subjective and relative matter. That is, the context may not inflate employee's moral identity strength but rather genuinely contributes to the development of moral identity strength of its employees through high standards of morality championed by the leaders whose moral virtues condition the moral climate of the context. In such a context in which respect for leaders drives compliance, looking good is being ethical in accordance to shared values which may be further enhanced by the African culture of respect for people in authority especially when they role model excellent moral character. In this case therefore, what is ethical is actually demonstrated by those in leadership for which employees have an understanding that the organization clearly acts ethically at the top echelon, so employees feel they are part of a larger community of moral actors.

Not surprisingly, firm N2 presents a different scenario, and findings show support for proposition 1 in this firm. This bureaucratic context is quite unregulated and opportunistic in nature as noted earlier. As such, evidences of the main bureaucratic features (organisational rules and managerial control) were not clearly visible within the firm. In this firm therefore, employees have a free hand to do anything they feel

like as long as they can justify their actions in terms of economic gains. The bureaucracy also supports them to the extent that morality in this firm is really about pursuing actions that increase the economic gains or a sense of approval of being a part of the in-group of the organisation. Since it is easy to thrive in a system that brings together individual opportunists, moral identity strength becomes inconsequential insofar as employees act along the tenets of the firm. Thus, decisions are easily justifiable and could therefore lead to an inflated sense of strong moral identity in an environment where 'anything goes' and 'everyone does it'. These are further examined using the interview data and the key findings are presented below:

8.4.1 Finding 1a: The bureaucracy in Firm N1 contributes positively to the moral awareness and perception of its employees; hence morality is not a relative and subjective matter. Conversely, employees in the unregulated environment of Firm N2 show no evidence of moral contemplation and moral awareness, which contributes to the inflation of their moral identity strength.

In the opening sections, it was established that charismatic authority in Firm N1 has a positive effect on the perception of employees about the bureaucracy. Charismatic authority also underpins both organisational rules, which manifests in the form of unwritten but commonly understood rules and managerial control, which manifests in the form of social accountability within Firm N1. Hence, it was discovered that employees feel very comfortable about the bureaucracy; its leaders and what it stands for as the following quotes show:

"Our way is trust... a process that conforms with the most cordial environment... that cordial environment explains our way you can see how we relate and I think that is what has brought us this far. Our suppliers, our customers trust us...that's why people marvel and see you've been here for 15 years you guys have gone far. Yes, God has been with us, I think trust has been a very key factor." (N1b)

"My bosses, they have made my life easy. I don't see work as work. Inasmuch as you get tired with traffic, the hustling, I have never got to that point where I have had to wake up in the morning and complain that I have to go to work again.... I'm just lucky or I am blessed to work

with the kind of people I work with, the sales and marketing director is a wonderful person, he is the most caring man I have ever met in my life... I do know what to use for that relationship...For me they are very family friendly too..."(N1e)

The quotes above highlight that employees are very comfortable with the bureaucracy and the cordial, friendly environment it promotes and that this family-like environment fosters a system built on trust and shared values. Therefore, even though rules are not explicitly written, employees have an understanding of the moral codes that govern the bureaucracy based on the virtues demonstrated by the leaders they respect and act based on these. As such, employees make constant reference to their understanding of the firm's moral stance, indicative of the effect of the environment on their perception of the bureaucracy. This in turn is discovered to enhance employee moral awareness as much as it facilitates an environment for moral contemplation and personal moral inquiry in employees as seen in some of the quotes below:

"It's like a moral way. Basically what I was trying to say then was me, I come from a family that holds up to very high morals so on my job, I would not lower the standards of what should be obtainable at my desk so I ensure that everything that emanates from my desk is authentic, valid and I can back it up with documents and I think that speaks for every department in this organisation. That's why said there is a moral, ethical way, accountability. If you go to every department every this is what you get..." (N1b, Strong moral Identity)

I'll give them integrity; they really try to do what they say they do. Sometimes money can get you carried away, you can't cut corners and shortcuts and all that. At least I work closely with the people that are at the helm of affairs in decision-making... so if you say Firm N1 what will come to my mind would be integrity (N1e, weak moral identity)

Thus, the quotes above show that employees with weak and strong moral identity alike understand the moral stance of the bureaucracy. The participant with strong moral identity showed signs of moral contemplation and awareness in his/her response linking this to what is generally obtainable within the bureaucracy.

Interestingly, the participant who claimed to have a weak moral identity in theory should not be perceptive to moral traits, however as seen above he/she was able to identify with the integrity in the system as seen in key decisions makers. This perhaps validates the positive effect and effectiveness of charismatic authority within the bureaucracy since Participant N1e (weak moral identity) recognises integrity as demonstrated in the character and conduct of leaders within the bureaucracy. Thus, it can be said that the character and conduct of leaders within the context does affect the moral virtues employees are constantly exposed to which in turn contributes to their moral awareness and perhaps helps them imbibe those moral virtues as the quote below further explains:

“The face of these values are all the HODs, don't look at it from the point of the directors, all the HODs are the value drivers ... Because it is not about the director but the set of people that do make it happen is HODs they are the ones that enforce the culture, the rules, regulations, and principles, they are more or less like the role models for everybody working in their Department. So, the value drivers or shall I say moral drivers in this system are all HODs were also at the prime age of 30s”
(N1f)

Thus, it seems evident that the managers in firm N1 are the moral drivers of virtues within the system. By this, employees understand their firm as having moral standards rooted in Christian religious values, which in turn could reinforce personal moral beliefs where they already exist or create moral awareness in employees with weak moral identities in whom moral traits are not usually readily activated for moral decision-making. Thus, this kind of environment is unlikely to inflate moral identities in employees with weak moral identities as it reveals to such employees moral values they may be lacking in and should aspire towards. By this, employees see themselves for who they really are. For instance in the case of participant N1b who already had moral values from his strong family background, working in Firm N1 reinforces already held personal moral beliefs, whilst in participant N1e an increasing awareness to moral values could begin to strengthen their moral identity. Thus the environment in firm N1 suggests that individually held moral traits can be further encouraged in employees whilst helping those who don't have such traits to become aware of them and perhaps imbibe them through continual exposure to these values

as seen in the leaders they idolise within the context. Either way the bureaucracy in firm N1 seems to be an enabling one for all employees both with weak and strong moral identity. In this case therefore, the sense of moral identity strength can be said would be more objective than subjective. That is, the moral identity strength is not inflated since employees willingly embrace and act according to virtues visible in the top management team.

8.4.2 Finding 1b: Employees in the unregulated environment of Firm N2 show no evidence of moral contemplation and moral awareness, which contributes to the inflation of their moral identity strength.

In firm N2, employees generally do not show signs of discomfort at the context even though some of them acknowledge the environment is largely unregulated. From the lens of an employee who objectively painted the real picture of the bureaucracy, it is clear that there is a big difference between what is said on paper and what happens in reality. As such employees are allowed to act in opportunistic ways to ensure the economic objectives of the firm are met as shown below:

"...In the long run when decisions are to be made, they have to be made based on the figures than every other thing. At times, there is this conflict so at the end of the day, I feel we are more interested in the figures than the processes so at times you always find conflicts between the representatives and the managers by telling them this is a process to follow and they tell you if I follow this process my figures are not likely to add up. At the end of the day, this is what you will judge me with, that means the culture is not really there...That means most of the things we do, they are more of lip services. I want you to do this, follow these steps but when it comes to decision making do you follow those steps?" (N2d)

From the above quote, it seems clear that the environment in Firm N2 encourages opportunism expressed as a quite "laissez faire" standard of behaviour, aiming to the ends of economic gains. In this case employees are often left to play by their own personal rules in the absence of any collective rules or guidance as long as the figures add up in the end. This is the general understanding within Firm N2 such that adapting and playing along is a typical mind-set amongst employees in this

bureaucracy, which comes with a strong sense of unwillingness to engage in personal moral inquiry as is the case with the participant below:

“...For example we had a particular product that customers were complaining that its shelf off take was too slow but I did research on a particular customer and I discovered that based on the nature of his patients, if I give him 50% of what he will be worried about, he will consume it if he can get the right motivation. So I did my background check, information, everything about him... And he asked a particular question, If I do this, look at my experiences, would you do this? I said I'm already ready, he felt I was joking. He said if I pay something like 1 million, I get XYZ as agreed? I said before you pay me you would see it and he felt I was joking. I went and I came in and installed everything for him immediately. He just came back and saw everything, the guy was like surprised, shocked and that was it.” (N2b, Strong moral identity)

The result of an unregulated environment is that employees easily rationalise their decisions and thrive in the firm and outside by doing things as they please as long as they can be justified as contributing to the economic objectives of the firm. This is clearly seen in the quote above where the participant has shown no signs of moral contemplations or inquiry in describing an obvious process of inducement and bribery. This manifested an attitude in this bureaucratic context whereby “the means justifies the end”. The participant also claimed to have a strong moral identity, however the nature of the quote above seems to suggest the contrary. Thus, it can be said that the unregulated context in firm N2 does facilitate a sense of inflated moral identity strength. Also employees get support from the firm to do anything they deem fit as the participant below explains:

“...They won't tell you that you can't do things but if you did it to make money, nobody is going to harass you... You can do anything you feel like doing to a large extent... as long as you can justify it and of course you can always have a reason for it. It's unlike the multinationals where you have code of ethics, you can't do this, they do the anti-

corruption law every time...But whilst you are here there is really no code of ethics as long as you can justify it. (N2a)

“You know here, buying a digital satellite television for a hospital is not a big deal body. Is it adding value to the doctor? The answer is no. Is it adding value to the patient? The digital satellite television does not add value to the patient because you're putting it in a room. How does that improve the practice of the Dr to help the patient? So here they say I want a digital satellite television, okay buy the television no problems with that. But in foreign multinationals, it's not allowed but when Firm N2 is putting it in, we write on it that it is donated by Firm N2.” (N2a)

Thus, it seems that the largely “entrepreneurial environment” within the bureaucracy does not encourage moral contemplation or moral inquiry in the ways the employees and managers do their job and their sense of serving their personal integrity as much as serving the bureaucratic conventions. It however creates an enabling environment for employees to become systematically insensitive to moral concerns whilst also discouraging moral responsibility. And as the moral identity scores reveal, no employee in Firm N2 claimed to have a weak moral identity, implying that they may have gradually developed personal defence mechanisms, whereby their obedience to superiors and the bureaucratic rules automatically signifies a sense of strong moral identities. However, only participant N2a above showed signs of moral contemplation due to previous work exposure in top multinational pharmaceuticals where compliance was by obedience to rules as found in the American case group in Chapter 6; hence he/she is able to show some sense of moral awareness, yet his/her continual existence within the context questions the participant's true moral reasoning capacity. But generally, other employees and managers easily follow the norms of the bureaucracy, which creates an environment where things can be easily rationalised and often results in an inflated sense of moral identity.

In summary therefore, it can be said that Firms N1 and N2 present a strikingly different picture (based on the evidence presented here) regarding proposition 1. In Firm N1, it was discovered that moral inquiry is being encouraged and a sense of social accountability exists, while both these are tied not in the features of the

bureaucracy per se but in the moral character of the leader and his team. This supports a genuine moral identity concern by employees with strong moral identities. Conversely, firm N2 presents a context where the unregulated environment makes it easy for employees to rationalise their actions, thereby rendering them systematically insensitive to moral issues. This in turn results in an inflated and subjective sense of moral identity strength in employees who clearly showed evidences of weak moral identity.

8.5 Proposition 2

Acting in alignment with Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders

This case group presents a contrasting pair of firms. N1 is a quasi bureaucracy with charismatic authority as the closest reference. N2 is an entrepreneurial loosely regulated context with only limited attention to organisational rules that mainly seeks economic profitability. In this proposition I explore here whether acting in alignment with both these aspects of the bureaucracies (managerial control and rules in both N1 and N2) is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in middle/lower managers. Evidence will be presented to show whether the bureaucracy encourages uncritical obedience to set rules thereby encouraging conformist behaviour and whether the bureaucracy then rewards such conformity. The following are the key findings:

8.5.1 Finding 2a: The bureaucracy in Firm N1 encourages higher conventional level and entry level post-conventional reasoning levels in employee by empowering them to maintain a good sense of their individual moral reflection and reasoning / action “spaces”. This is the only case where more systematic instances of higher CMD are being found.

Amongst the nine participants interviewed in Firm N1, five were adjudged to be reasoning at the conventional level whilst four were adjudged to reason at the post conventional levels (see table 8.1 above). Across the three case groups studied in this dissertation, this firm alone has produced the highest number of post conventional level thinkers. This could be linked to the fact that charismatic authority underpins the bureaucratic features of this firm. As such, employees are more morally sensitive because they are more inclined to embrace moral virtues they see

on display through the leaders they respect as different from morality enforced by rules. As earlier discovered, this also has a positive impact on employee moral awareness such that employees have a common understanding of what the organisation stands for. But also more importantly, it was discovered that this bureaucracy encourages employees to maintain a good sense of their individuality, which is healthy for the development of individual moral reasoning as described by the employees in the quotes below:

“I just have to be me. I can't change myself. The system encourages me to be myself. What I came here with is what I am maintaining I can't change... you cannot change your inherent character. I don't see any reason why I should try to be what you think I should be. I am not really particular about you trying to please somebody...I am just myself...(N1f)

“There is this free mindedness here... Firm N1 is an environment whereby you're not so scared of anybody even the bosses. I would also use an example of my director who grew me up to have confidence in myself no matter how critical or terrible you are you can stand up and just express yourself...we are free with one another you know sometimes in some companies you could go up and say I want to see the MD and they say see the secretary... it is not like that here you walk up to him and say this is what I have, it is a friendly atmosphere, this freedom that is the best in my opinion, the freedom is there, expressing yourself in a well mannered way, not in an abusive way, you are free to express yourself...” (N1h)

The quotes above suggest the bureaucracy in Firm N1 encourages individuality and supports individuals being empowered to display their own moral acumen, as expressed by employee interviews. Furthermore, participant N1h above indicates that the mentoring of one the leaders equipped him to be expressive and free. This in turn seems to instil a strong sense of confidence in employees. By this, it can be said that employees are not coerced into conformity whereby it's all about following the rules, but they are allowed freedom of choice which can be healthy for moral reasoning as depicted in the following quote by one of the employees:

“I come from a family that holds up to very high morals so on my job, I would not lower the standards of what should be obtainable at my desk so I ensure that everything that emanates from my desk is authentic, valid and I come back it up with documents and I think that speaks for every department in this organisation. That’s why said there is a moral, ethical way, accountability standard that we try to maintain...” (N1b)

As depicted above, the sense of individuality not being lost but encouraged within the context of firm N1 explains why it is easy for employees to operate at higher levels of moral reasoning compared to both N2 and other cases analysed in previous sections. As seen in table 8.1 above, the lowest moral reasoning level found in this case group is conventional level stage 4. At this level of reasoning, individual employees collaborate to maintain a social order, which in this case is the social accountability system earlier discovered to be operational within firm N1. In a few more instances, employees showed strong signs of post conventional stage 5 reasoning, a level at which employees feel they are free to disobey wrong rules and act consistently with personal principles as can also be inferred in some of the quotes above. Hence it can be said that the bureaucracy in firm N1 does encourage conventional level reasoning, not at the mere conformity level but at the level where its free environment supports collaborative maintenance of social order. This also seems to support higher levels of reasoning in which employees feel empowered to have the right to disobey wrong rules (if and where they exist) and embrace personal principles as inspired by the leaders within the bureaucracy. However, there were no evidences that this bureaucracy explicitly rewards employees for acting in accordance to the bureaucracy.

8.5.2 Finding 2b: The bureaucracy in Firm N2 however encourages lower CMD kinds. Specifically evidence shows pre-conventional and conventional level thinking are being evidenced, via the opportunistic behaviour patterns found in interviewees.

In firm N2, majority of employees were adjudged to function at the conventional level of moral reasoning. This may immediately suggest that this bureaucracy is congruent with conventional reasoning level since most participants’ reasoning is at that level.

However, as discussed in the opening sections of this chapter, this bureaucracy is largely unregulated discovered to encourage opportunistic behaviours in its employees. Thus, employees are not bound by any rules but have the freedom to make their own choices as long they contribute to the economics objectives of the firms. The firm as explained below also encourages this behaviour:

“...We put things in place in order to get a government business, it is part of the norm of a typical Nigerian business. Nobody will see it as a bribe. No. It's only if you're working for a multinational that people can see you've giving government something. It is just a typical Nigerian way so there is nothing bad about it, giving a government official money so that they can put your products under government tender, there is nothing bad there as far as the system is concerned”. (N2a)

As seen from the quote above, the bureaucracy in firm N2 is described as an environment in which decisions can be easily rationalised and justified in terms of their instrumental functionality in terms of economic values (profit, sales etc). As such, a quite shocking finding was that obvious acts of inducements and bribery are being considered ‘normal’ and ‘typical’ business as usual, because the bureaucracy presents it as the norm. Whilst this can foster conventional levels of moral reasoning in which employees conform to the bureaucracy’s standards without showing any critical moral inquiry, this was also discovered to support pre conventional reasoning level in employees. Thus, the opportunistic environment of firm N2 encourages employees to reason at the level in which critical moral inquiry is not in their purview but ‘what is in it for me’ mentality or that ‘I am okay because others are doing it’ mentality all aimed at being seen as loyal employees to the firm. This kind of reasoning was shown in the words of two managers as follows:

“I enjoy selling and the figures are coming in. I calculate what I will make from transactions and I have had to give the money because there was a condition for that if you can do this we get this. So I don't have to start calling the office again. You know at times you need to get back to the office mostly because of the price issue but this particular incident there was already a provision because I've

complained that we need to take out something because of the challenge we have and they actually keyed in..." (N2b)

"We build relationships, we also work on their emotions, and we discover opportunities. You might walk into a customer shop, there are opportunities there which nobody has filled up, not only giving the person the product but there are needs in his business that have not been identified or taken care of you know so discovering does opportunities and in helping the person to meet those needs will also increase his loyalty to your brand. In marketing they call it a war at the front you must do whatever, you use all the strategy that you can ever think of in order to make sure you win" (N2c)

Signs of both pre-conventional and conventional reasoning are seen in the opportunistic nature exhibited in the quotes above. The aim is to win at all cost and the methods encouraged by the bureaucracy include *anything* necessary to get customers to buy in. This encourages employees to go all out to get what's in it for them as participant N2b suggested. Thus it seems clear that within firm N2, employees are disengaged from moral inquiry and since the firm sanctions their actions, it is easy for them to thrive in the firm. This encourages employees to reason by enforcing instrumental self and group interests. This is really what the pre-conventional levels of CMD (found in this case) are about. Only one employee reasoned at the post-conventional level and this was owing to the fact that in all the 8 years of work experience the participant has had, all have been in multinationals where rule compliance existed. Hence, coming from a more regulated environment into an unregulated one made a huge difference to his/her perception of firm N2. Lacking longitudinal data it is uncertain if the employee with the higher CMR continues this way.

To summarize, in firm N1, the bureaucracy is established to facilitate freedom for individuals to engage in genuine personal moral decision making, which also promotes a social sense of moral accountability. This was also linked to the higher CMD reasoning patterns in this firm. In firm N1, conventional level thinking was the more prevalent level of reasoning due to the collective, shared values that create an environment of social accountability hence employees work to maintain such social

order. In firm N2, both pre conventional and conventional level of reasoning are encouraged. Pre-conventional reasoning is easily exhibited in persons who are all out to make gains for themselves and the firm in order to be seen as loyal employees. Conventional level of reasoning displayed by the employees is often towards the ends of conformity to the bureaucracy's environment or maintaining the social order of being in an environment of like-minded opportunists. In other words employees' don't have the capacity to reason above the prevalent norm since moral inquiry is discouraged.

8.6 Proposition 3

Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with loyalty towards management (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity

In Firm N1, interviewed employees were selected from various departments from which two of nine participants were pharmacists. Only these two roles require pharmacists to occupy them. Other roles, for instance the audit officer had to be an accountant as much as the corporate services manager had to be a marketing and communications expert. Thus, there is a mix of other professionals other than pharmacists amongst interviewed participants in Firm N1. However, interviewed participants in firm N2 were all pharmacists except one participant despite the fact that he/she is involved in the sales and marketing of drugs for the firm.

One way of testing this proposition is to observe whether the two bureaucracies in this case group affects how pharmacists or other professionals make sense of their role within the bureaucracies in relation to their professional obligations stipulated by the Pharmaceutical Council of Nigeria (PCN), the governing body for pharmacists in Nigeria or any other professional bodies. As Koehn (1994) suggests that the ground for moral authority for any profession is in public pledge or oath, which is binding on the professionals. Hence, the characterisation of a profession by its professional body to which all registered members are expected to swear an oath is the broad professional identity meant to govern the activities of such persons regardless of their employer. Evidence from the literature (Hummell, 1998) suggests it is possible that the broader "learnt" professional identity (via education, socialisation and oath in

a specific profession) could be lost within the self-interest agenda of bureaucracies such as firm profit maximisation or managerial rationality. Managerial rationality in this case means what is good is what enhances the managers' goals and agendas and makes a practice appear successful (Shenhav, 2008). In such an instance, the view of a pharmacist or professional projected by the bureaucracy and embraced by participants would require a narrower professional identity. This is reviewed in the context of both firm N1 and N2 and the findings are presented below:

8.6.1 Finding 3a: The quasi-bureaucracy Firm N1 encourages 'professionalism' (broader professional identity) over 'expertise' (narrower professional identity) in pharmacists and non-pharmacists.

Koehn, (1994) argues that professionals are not more than mere experts if professionalism is simply based on possessing a lot of knowledge and skill in a field (See *Appendix 4, 334*) for grounds of professional ethics. From her position, it was clear that expertise could readily foster a narrower professional identity since 'experts' could be inclined to using their knowledge as a tool to further advance management motives which in this case of this bureaucracy could be to make money for the firms. Professionals on the other hand as Koehn, (1994) argue function by public pledge or oath, which confers a moral duty to act in accordance to the stipulations of such oath. This as earlier discussed is the broader professional identity, expected to guide the actions and decisions of employees who are affiliated with any regulating professional body, in this case PCN or any other recognised professional body. As such, 'experts' are not bound by any moral obligation per se and can therefore act in ways that advance the objective they wish to serve.

In firm N1, more non-pharmacists were interviewed based on their job roles within the organisation. Nonetheless, individuals who belonged to professional bodies occupied most of these roles. For example, the audit officer is a chartered accountant registered with the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN), the regulatory body for all Nigerian accountants. It was discovered that the bureaucracy in Firm N1 created an enabling environment for this audit officer to express his professional identity without interfering with his duty as an employee of firm N1. In fact, according to the audit officer, he sees himself more as a chartered accountant than an employee of Firm N2, a notion that helps preserve his

professional identity needed to execute his duties within the firm. This is shown below:

“I think what is important are your core values as a professional because that we sell you anywhere, maybe you're not in Firm N1 maybe you are an external auditor...your core values as a professional supersedes all that. But in terms of my professional core values and that of Firm N1, do they really met my expectations, yes... we have brought our professional competence into the system just to ensure that it matches with the core values here and in doing that ensuring that there is improvement as well.” (N1f)

“Yes, when you talk about confidentiality, integrity, professionalism you have to be professional... Our institution (ICAN) our code of conduct, we are guided by that so for you to be a chartered accountant or to be in the profession you have to have a high level of all those code of conduct just thinks inform our job, our daily activities... yes they do you have to find a way of streamlining your professional code of conduct with that of Firm N1 in terms of commitment, hard work and all of that....And there are no conflicts of interests...It has to be more towards my professional discipline because I can leave tomorrow but my professional discipline my core value as a profession will always follow me wherever I go.” (N1f)

As observed from the quotes above, it seems clear that the participant above spoke more as a professional with his professional identity coming out strongly in his descriptions above. The environment in Firm N1 is largely referred to as being in encouraging towards professionalism as different from expertise. Thus the bureaucracy seems to create an environment where conflicts of interests for professionals are minimal through the alignment of the bureaucracy's values and those of the professional body, in this case ICAN. Hence, the employee does not find it difficult to exercise his professional identity and can remain faithful to the oath he/she has sworn as a professional whilst being an employee of the organisation. An enabling factor as explained by one of the managers in Firm N1 is that the

bureaucracy is a 'free' environment that gives employees opportunity to express themselves as shown below:

"The culture here is such that it gives room for people you know to express yourself, to be easily seen and to grow. It doesn't have what I call a kind of limitation to the way you can aspire in your profession, the culture is such that people take you... we work as a family, we work as a team, it is like carrying everybody along you understand in doing things." (N1c)

The quote above seems to credit the free, cordial environment in Firm N1 has being an enabler of employees to be themselves as professionals. By this, employees feel empowered by the system to function in an environment where their voices are heard and one in which all employees embrace mutual respect as well as the shared values. This can also be explained as creating a less distracting environment for employees such that they can focus on being professionals as different from being pressured by management into meeting the objectives of the bureaucracy which itself could systematically distract employees away from their professional identity as discovered in case of the Indian firms in Chapter 7.

8.6.2 Finding 3b: The Firm N2 encourages a personalised instrumental sense of being an expert over 'professionalism' in pharmacists and non-pharmacists

Seven of eight participants in firm N2 are registered pharmacists. As earlier established, Firm N2 operates a largely unregulated bureaucracy with an excessive focus on economic gains. This cultivates an opportunistic environment in which employees play by no rules and are regulated by no one other than themselves. By this, employees are free to do anything as long as they can justify them based on the economic objectives of the firm. The result is that this kind of environment is able to easily distract employees from their sworn professional identity into pursuing the objectives of the bureaucracy. Focus in this bureaucracy shifts from how to be a good pharmacist to how to be a good sales person as the following employees who are registered pharmacists with strong moral identity demonstrated:

"...It has been challenging, it has been interesting. I like selling so it's the same thing, there is nothing new about it is just that there is a

change in industries for me... I came from Fast Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) where you sell whatever you like whatever you sell you promote but... the competition is stiffer here than in other industries... I enjoy myself, I enjoy selling. I love selling and selling and the figures are coming in..."(N2b)

I have also learnt a great deal about brand, brand building, we just been finished a training on market strategies, market penetration, we just finished that and also in a broad view, market development and all the strategies all the processes and everything that has to do with marketing because I love marketing than sales. I love marketing and marketing activities. (N2c)

The quote above reveal that these employees who are registered pharmacists reason and see themselves more as sales and marketing experts than pharmacists. More importantly they seem to have an instrumental personalised sense of being experts in their own rights based on their capacity to sell in order to meet their targets. With the focus on the figures coming across strongly again, participant N2b above claims to enjoy 'selling'. As a registered pharmacist, the focus of saving lives seems to have been systematically replaced by the joy of sales and making money even though employees of firm N2 have a similarly good pay package as employees in firm N1. Furthermore, the types of training employees are exposed clearly shows they are being equipped to further advance the cause of the bureaucracy - becoming 'expert' sales men/women or marketers who are knowledgeable enough to penetrate markets in meeting the demands of the bureaucracy. In this again, employees seem to be systematically desensitised from their professional calling through continuous exposure to an opportunistic environment where looking good is all about the figures and trainings are about making the figures roll in. Also, the fact that 'clients' are being treated not as clients (people seeking a public good) but market segments further contravenes the notion of professionalism as Koehn (1994) posited. Therefore, the environment in Firm N2 seems to bear a semblance with the Indian pharmaceuticals in the previous chapter. The loyalty of employees regardless of their moral identity is towards the management of the bureaucracy. It is visibly less about a sense of personal and professional integrity as presented in the theory of professional ethics (cite). This is typically encouraged by an unregulated

environment coupled with a strong focus on economic gains and rewarding and rationalisation of such behavioural motivation for action over and above professional integrity and excellence.

In summary regarding findings in proposition 3, it can be said that again this case shows contrasting evidence. The bureaucracy in Firm N1 is actually enabling towards behaviour that show a sense of loyalty to employees' professional codes and values. This is achieved through the free, cordial yet regulated environment in Firm N1 driven majorly by shared values, mutual trust and respect for the bureaucracy and its leaders. In the unregulated firm N2 however, the opportunistic environment coupled with an excessive focus on economic gains is distracting for employees whose behaviours show a stronger inclination towards the objectives of management over their profession. These also make employees less inclined to engage in critical moral inquiry of moral situations at work since adhering to the bureaucracy's objectives creates a sense that they are good and loyal employees.

8.7 Conclusion

Firms N1 and N2 are dissimilar pairs of firm within this case group. Firm N1 is a firm driven by charismatic persons that resembles the Weberian form of charismatic authority bureaucracy but is not a typical bureaucracy really.

Managerial control within the context of N1 is based on the symmetry between personal responsibility and social accountability, a self-regulatory system stemming from trust in shared values and virtues modelled by the leaders within the organisation, whom the employees greatly esteem. Organisational rules are more verbal and unwritten yet a binding and common understanding exists on what the firm stands for amongst all employees.

Conversely, Firm N2 (Entrepreneurial Bureaucracies) presented an unregulated and loosely coupled and opportunistically driven organisational context in which elements of rules and managerial control were not clearly visible within the firm. It is a performance and opportunity driven business context. Hence, employees play by their own rules often sanctioned by the firm towards the ends of economic gains.

In proposition 1, both firms present contrasting evidence on the effect of acting in accordance with the bureaucratic features on employees' moral identity. In Firm N1,

it was discovered that the bureaucracy enables moral inquiry by encouraging an environment in which employees are morally aware through the actions of their leaders. This in turn contributes positively to the moral identity strength of employees rather than subjectively inflating it.

Conversely, firm N2 presents a context where the unregulated environment makes it easy for employees to rationalise their actions, thereby rendering them systematically insensitive to moral issues. This in turn results in an inflated and subjective sense of moral identity strength in employees who clearly showed evidences of weak moral identity.

In the second proposition, the bureaucracy in firm N1 was established to facilitate freedom for individuals to express themselves, which also promotes moral awareness and inquiry. Conventional level thinking in this context was more prevalent due to the collective, shared values that create an environment of social accountability hence employees work to maintain such social order. However this firm reported the highest number of post conventional thinkers across the three case groups.

Regarding the second proposition in firm N2, both pre conventional and conventional level of reasoning are encouraged. The opportunistic environment encouraged employees to go all out to make gains for themselves and the firm in order to be seen as loyal employees. Conventional level of reasoning displayed by the employees is often towards the ends of conformity to the bureaucracy's environment or maintaining the social order of being in an environment of like-minded opportunists. In other words employees' don't have the capacity to reason above the prevalent norm since moral inquiry is discouraged.

Finally, in proposition 3, bureaucracy in Firm N1 is actually enabling towards behaviour that show a sense of loyalty to employees' professional codes and values where they have one as different from Firm N2. This is achieved through the free, cordial yet regulated environment in Firm N1 driven majorly by shared values, mutual trust and respect for the bureaucracy and its leaders.

In the unregulated firm N2 however, the opportunistic environment coupled with an excessive focus on economic gains is distracting for employees whose behaviours show a stronger inclination towards the objectives of management over their

profession. These also make employees less inclined to engage in critical moral inquiry of moral situations at work since adhering to the bureaucracy's objectives creates a sense that they are good and loyal employees.

CHAPTER 9

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

9.0 Introduction

In this chapter, a critical discussion of the prevalent themes across the three case groups explored in this study will be presented. It starts by giving a general overview of the four different hybrids of bureaucracies that typified each of the case group. The key patterns found relevant to the effects specifically of formalised rules and managerial control (representing the two Weberian bureaucracy dimensions in this study) on employee morality are also discussed². There then follows a discussion of three key emergent themes common across the case groups which are implicated by bureaucracy: respondents inflated perception of their own morality, cognitive moral reasoning as a better predictor of morality and the encouragement of expertise over professionalism which are compared and contrasted with the relevant literature. From discussion of the above, I conclude this chapter with implications for theory.

9.1 Interpretations of Bureaucracy

A primary contribution through this study is an empirical investigation of bureaucracy as an overall organisational normative context, according to research aim 1 (page 4).

The data reveal that a bureaucracy is not merely a cluster of related characteristics or general typology as it is often abstracted in the literature and relevant theory (e.g. Weber, 1978). Instead, even within the characteristics of a common type there are subtle differences. This confirms the position of Udy, (1959) and Hall, (1963) who both opined that the study of bureaucracy is more empirically valid when it is treated as a condition that exists along a continuum, with varying degrees of each of its components, rather than a condition that is present or absent. It also presents opportunities for utilising the empirical findings to further develop theory by extending key theoretical works on bureaucracy (Downs, 1964; Albrow, 1970; Weber, 1978) and its effects in human relations (Jackall, 1988; Hummel, 2007).

² The choice of these dimensions (rules and control) had been justified in Chapter 2 and a key justification for focusing on these two is that they are specifically important in the industry context.

Accordingly with the above, with the subtle differences in each of the characteristics of bureaucracy come varying effects that often result in hybrid or new forms of bureaucracy. This was the case in the bureaucracies across the three case groups in this dissertation. Moreover, this finding extends both key theory as well as earlier primarily western studies of bureaucracy to emerging markets. As foreign firms expand into new terrains (as it was in two of the three case groups in this study), bureaucracies tend to manifest new and different forms within those new contexts (Evans and Ruach, 1999). As such, within the context of this study, four different types of bureaucracies were found in the three investigated case groups namely: *Traditional Bureaucracy* (found in the American Case group), *Caste Bureaucracy* (found in the Indian Case group), *Charismatic Bureaucracy* and *Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy* (both organisations in the Nigerian Case group sample). Each of these showed different manifestations of the two major bureaucratic features explored in this study, namely Formalised rules and Managerial control. Also, the role of national cultures in each of these hybrids cannot be ignored as well since the culture of the firm's HQ is known to directly affect the ways their subsidiaries function in foreign contexts (Pahlberg, 1995; Lee and Shah-Hosseini 2013; Victoria, and Dipak, 2014; Hofstede, 2015). This could therefore have a direct impact on the type of bureaucracies such subsidiaries espouse and the specific functioning of the Weberian elements within them. However, this is outside of the scope of this research and clearly merits further study. Overall, these different types of bureaucracy are found to have different effects on the morality of the employees functioning within them.

9.1.1 Traditional Bureaucracy

The *Traditional Bureaucracy* as found in the American case group exemplifies Weber's (1974) typical bureaucracy ideal type. It is driven by strict formalised rules and personalised managerial control. According to Weber's categorisation, rationality is driven by certain characteristics of which written rules of conduct, hierarchy of authority and impersonality are central (Downs, 1964). Within this quintessential "western" organisational bureaucracy context of the American firms, rules in the form of standard operating procedures (SOPs) govern every aspect of employee activities both internally and outside of the firm, such that they are regarded as the 'holy grail' of working effectively within the context. These SOPs also originate from the US

parent firm without any or little modification for the Nigerian context. It is thus believed that compliance with set rules helps drive effectiveness and efficiency towards achieving the objectives of the bureaucracy. This in turn makes employees feel very competent on their jobs.

Also as theorised by Weber (1974), any non-compliance to rules is often sanctioned just as in this case; employees are fined, suspended or may in extreme cases be fired if found to violate the set rules. This is often achieved through personalised monitoring by the managers within this bureaucracy such that managerial control is intended to enforce compliance to rules. This often invokes a sense of fear in employees given the harsh economic realities within the wider context of Nigeria (see chapter 5) hence employees understand strict rule compliance as the basis of “survival” within the bureaucracy. The findings show that as long as such rules are followed, employees (and management itself) feel covered, and having a safe professional career future in the firms, which normatively means bureaucratic rule following is linked with being seen as good employees. The legitimacy of this approach by the American firms is often linked by management to the broader context in which the firms operate and the belief is that since this is thought to be a context with government and system corruption, it is only through compliance with rules and managerial control that employees be ‘guided’ into ‘sound’ practices at all times. This may also manifest that rules may serve as a contrast between the in-firm American multinational cultural context and the outside local cultural context; this may serve to remind employees (who in majority are locals) that the first should be valued and is superior to the latter. Hence, employees are made to believe that their compliance to set rules is for the greater good, firstly to act as good citizens who will not contribute to corruption within the context and secondly to be identified as good employees who are exhibiting ‘professional’ behaviour in their jobs.

Based on the above, correctness within the system is derived from compliance to rules, which drive a feeling of competence and safety. A sense of fear is derived by the conscious attention of the firm’s employees to clearly not violate any rule. Instead interestingly, there is a conscious acceptance that rule violation legitimizes sanctions and penalties in this bureaucracy. Rule rationality is key here. However, this comes with an unhealthy tendency that seems to align with Weber’s warning that ‘...as desire for organisational order tends to focus too much on rationality of rules in and

of themselves, over intellectualising the moral and ethical values critical to organisational lives and making decisions according to rules, without regard for the people involved becomes a possibility' (Kalberg, 1980:1158).

This may ultimately lead to the figurative iron cage: 'the rationalisation and rules that trap humans in a figurative cage of thought based on rational calculations' (Weber, 1958: 180-181). True to Weber's concerns, the *Traditional Bureaucracy* in the American case group creates an environment in which employees become 'so enmeshed in creating and following a legalistic, rule-based hierarchy that the bureaucracy becomes a subtle but powerful form of domination' (Barker, 1993:3). This is to the extent that employees show a strong allegiance to the bureaucracy on the grounds that it provides an environment where they 'do the right things' by following set rules and higher authority. Within this context it is rational to not question the rules in any way (especially once it is the rule that prescribes that rules –and being given penalties for not following these- may not be questioned), which may explain a moral disengagement linked with this bureaucracy. All actions and activities prior to execution have to be weighed on the scale of set rules and any found wanting are often referred to superiors or discarded. Such is the reverence for rules that employees see the SOPs as not just professional rules but also as moral rules that must be obeyed at all times and in all circumstances for the greater good. This therefore comes with the tendency to trap employees in the 'iron cage' whereby individual moral agency is completely tamed and rules replace human capacity to decipher moral cues and subsequent action. For instance, in handling moral issues faced on their jobs, employees are told to refer to 'model answers' they have been taught to give through moral case studies during training. As such employees are fed with the answers they are to recite and not allowed to process moral issues through genuine critical moral inquiry.

Rule compliance is further enhanced by the role managers are empowered to play in enforcing already set rules within the bureaucracy. For instance, managers are regarded as having exclusive powers of deciding the standards of what is right/wrong and moral/immoral based on already established rules while their interpretations fit rather financial/performance objective standards rather than moral matters. They have legitimacy of possessing a superior understanding of processes and procedures and are thus the enforcers of the rules. This creates a sense that

only managers are entitled to be moral arbiters or that at least their viewpoint will prevail and followed, that can gradually create passivity and lack of engagement. This tends to foster the rational-legal authority anchored on impersonal rules that have been legally established such that employees are expected to defer to their managers in situations of uncertainty (Aron, 1970 and Coser, 1977). In literature, *impersonality* is considered critical to the functioning of managerial control within bureaucracies (Barker, 1993) however; control within this traditional bureaucracy is achieved through a subtle means of cordiality and respect between managers and their direct reports. This in turn enables working relationships based on supervision and training, all of which facilitate easy learning of the bureaucracy's ways and also fosters channels of propagating bureaucratic compliance amongst employees. In Weber's ideal type, this trait was not accounted for and as Downs (1964: pg.7) reported, this aspect of the Traditional Bureaucracy was neglected by Weber despite emphasis by 'many sociologists that informal structures of authority and communication are inevitable in any cooperating group of human beings'. However, the fact that cordiality drives subtle yet powerful means of control highlights one of the main features of this bureaucracy as much as it confirms Down's (1964) position that information within bureaucracies spreads faster and is more powerful through informal means. The above also means that there is potentially a division in the organisation between groups of bureaucrats who follow a compliant chain of command and (an out-group of) other professionals who may try to relate and communicate based on shared norms of professional ethics. This is explored in the third discussion theme later on.

As such a large amount of power is in the hands of managers who are not just enforcers of the rules but are also seen as guardians of morality and the main legitimate role holders telling what is right or wrong based on their own 'superior' understanding of the rules in force within the bureaucracy. This contradicts with that the managers may or may not be seen as the ones who truly have a superior moral and ethical status in the firm, as other "moral authorities" outside the formal structure may be seen as a threat to the sustainability of this bureaucracy itself. Consequently, employees tend to derive their morality by following all set rules and by obeying their managers, with individual moral agency stifled in the process. As Reed, (2005: pg. 2) also highlighted, the functioning of this whole fabric as characterised by a strict rule

based compliance and enforced managerial control necessitates employees 'to subordinate their own desires to the collective will of the organisation' such that 'they surrender some autonomy in organisational participation'. This often results in the tendency for rules to completely replace human moral reasoning processes to the extent that employees may actually systematically and progressively surrender all of their autonomy to the bureaucracy as they learn the ways of the bureaucracy within the social setting (Bandura, 1977). This renders employees incapable to spot discrepancies or to not over exaggerate deficiencies of firm rules since the very mechanism of SOPs requires and develops individual and group uncritical allegiance to rules and the reality of the firm. This in turn fosters an inability to decipher the broader moral consequences of their actions within the system, enabling the bureaucracy to easily use employees towards its own ends.

9.1.2 Caste Bureaucracy

The *Caste Bureaucracy* within the context of the Indian firms presents another type of bureaucracy. In Weber's (1948) description of the ideal bureaucracy similar to the *Traditional Bureaucracy* above, strict rules enforced through personalised managerial control specify and regulate desired behaviours. Employees are also rewarded and sanctioned based on their compliance to these rules. However, within the *Caste Bureaucracy*, implicit culturally charged rules underpin control. As Jaeger, (1983) posited, national culture from a firm's headquarters could be used as a tool in subsidiaries to specify and regulate behaviour of managers and employees alike. This was the case in this bureaucracy that is culturally dominated and functions based on an *intertwined and subtler co-influencing* of managerial control and rules. Like the ideal Weberian bureaucracy, there are strict rules or SOPs within this bureaucracy but unlike the *Traditional Bureaucracy* these rules regulate employee conduct only within the context of the Indian firms but not outside the firms. Coupled with the strict internal rules are implicit, unwritten cultural rules that are aimed at maintaining a total control of the bureaucracy in order to protect its economic interests owing to previous histories of fraud within the Indian firms. Also in the *Caste Bureaucracy*, managerial control is more personalised resulting in a strict status and stratification linked personalised monitored compliance. This is only as far as employees' activities within the firms are concerned but distinct from the *Traditional Bureaucracy* in being very formal and inclined more towards an authoritarian style.

Interestingly also, there are no rewards and sanctions are often minimised to meagre deductions from salaries within the *Caste Bureaucracy* disparate from the *Traditional Bureaucracy* where non-compliance attracts heavy sanctions such as being fired.

Hence, rules and managerial control within this bureaucracy are employed together in an intricate and more intertwined way. This appears to be done with an aim to maintain a clear organisational division in terms of status, power and influence. Specifically this is materialised via an explicit boundary between the upper management layer (more homogeneously Indian management role holders) and its middle management gate keepers on one hand, and the lower level roles (all Nigerian nationals) on the other hand. Thereby this is justifying the labelling of this bureaucracy type by borrowing the metaphor of a social caste system. In this case it is thereby restricting Nigerian nationals from rising into the senior management positions within the bureaucracy.

This is interesting as within traditional bureaucracies, employees would be entitled to pursue career and professional progress in the hierarchy, but in this case it appears unlikely. So for instance, whilst there are unwritten norms and rules that limit the rise of Nigerian nationals within the firm, an authoritarian managerial control style through personalised compliance is employed to closely monitor and regulate all employee activities within the firm. Accordingly employees do not have any freedom within the firm: they are not allowed to question management decisions and are expected to follow orders without complaining. This confirms the *cultural navigator* report by Reed Elsevier, (2008) in which it was posited that in Indian firms, authority is often really authoritarian and autocratic and managers display their influence by directing employees as they wish and expecting nothing but total obedience and compliance (Reed Elsevier, 2008). This is however different from the *Traditional Bureaucracy* in that this control exists only internally within the Indian firms. Outside of the firms, employees enjoy total freedom and have full discretion in deciding how to go about their business which is not so in the previous bureaucracy. Also, within the Indian management style according to the Reed Elsevier, (2008) report, Indian firms tend to hire based on caste and other social profiling attributes, which limits the kind of people allowed in certain top management positions, as discovered within this case group.

This trait of the *Caste Bureaucracy* is not uniquely relevant to Indian firms. For example it may also apply to Anglo-Saxon institutions, perhaps in the non-profit or government sectors. For instance in British universities, it has been noted that specific rules are invented in a way that a very specific culture and philosophy are served (HESA, 2015; Shepherd, 2011; Grove, 2014). Specifically, The Guardian revealed that out of 14,000 British professors, only 50 are black (Shepherd, 2011) and this was attributed to institutional norms that limit the rise of particular groups of people within the university system. Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA, 2015) also confirmed this on a larger scale reporting an over 90% disparity in the population of white employees compared to a meagre less than 10% of black employees in British institutions. This same type of disparity was also reported between male (66%) and female employees (34%) and professors in British institutions (HESA, 2015). Hence, the impersonality of the rules fits in well with the a-relational and impersonality of British culture, and in this bureaucracy, the more authoritarian kind of rule monitoring resembles the Indian culture and reproduces the Indian caste system culture.

The result of this kind of control is an environment where there seems to be little genuine social-professional relationship between the managers and anyone in non-management roles. There is accordingly rarely co-participation. Instead, such relationships across different hierarchical and role profiles (exacerbated by clear differences in gender, race and other demographics) are based more on economic grounds and the ability of employees to be eager to meet their performance targets as at when due. In this case it was the stress of meeting individual sales targets which evidence that people saw it as quasi immoral to fail performance targets, that demonstrates the effects on employee morality from this caste bureaucracy (will be discussed later). Hence a lot of employees describe their relationship with the organisation even after more than five years of service, as a purely transactional relationship, one that functions on a sort of 'give and take' system that does not require respect, friendship or trust.

Therefore, this bureaucracy's characteristics are found to create a stratified organisational dynamic that often entails the physical involvement of managers in actively micro-managing the organisational activity of individual employees via strict personalised monitored compliance. Thus, Indian management takes the form of a

Foucauldian panopticon (Foucault, 1975). The concept of the panopticon refers to a circular prison with cells constructed around a central tower from which prisoners can be watched at all times. In relation to this bureaucracy, managers who are akin to Foucault's 'considerable body of militia, commanded by good officers and men of substance' (pg. 195) are part of a 'surveillance system' that ceaselessly inspects every move made by their employees. Their gaze is everywhere and each stage of any process has an observation post to sanction the process to the next phase, without which the process falls through. Hence, managers actively monitor and control all internal firm processes.

As noted earlier in caste bureaucracy, morality becomes confused with meeting performance targets to being recognised as a good (moral) employee, which is quasi immoral to fail these. There is little surprise then that this comes across as "naturally" legitimizing a typically utilitarian culture where the welfare of the more powerful and majority prevails and there **may be** little concern for the weaker, minorities and persons as ends in themselves (Crane and Matten, 2006). A utilitarian culture suggests decisions are being made for the greater good of all. Consequently, asking for excessive compliance and personalised monitoring and excessive management interference in various and mundane decisions and actions (micro-management) seem to have been imposed under a general "rule" that it is good for the general welfare, which in this case has been linked with a rational justification that it is "good" because of the previous history of fraud. So this utilitarian culture still preserves the "rational" Weberian element of bureaucracy (Weber, 1978) while it creates a strong bureaucratic kind of utilitarian morality. Thus in this case it is evident that the overall effect of the *Caste Bureaucracy* does not allow ethical contemplation and personal reflection but instead the experience of working within it is experiencing a gigantic centralised power with a utilitarian ethic façade.

Therefore the "morality" of this bureaucracy is really about pursuing actions that increase external gains or a sense of approval, loyalty and a "feudal" kind of belonging to clearly stratified in-groups, while there is a strong rationalizing the rule of managerial monitoring as necessary in order to help prevent a repetition of previous fraudulent organisational history as noted in chapter seven. Accordingly, the morality of this organisation is a sense of legitimacy and privilege of employees being part of the in-group (belonging) of the organisational family (despite not being

able to ascend the caste system itself). This surface level “belongingness” confers social moral identity recognition from superiors to subordinates. Regarding this, individual employees are not bound by any rules outside of the firm but have a personal sense of moral authority and responsibility. Therefore, employees are expected to rely on their own sense of right-wrong applying professional discretion, as persons learn and internalise broader professional values and rules earlier via their academic professional education and prior experience.

9.1.3 Charismatic Bureaucracy

The *Charismatic Bureaucracy* is found in the context of firm N1, one of the two firms within the Nigerian case group. This bureaucracy has clearly defined hierarchical structures similar to Weber’s (1978) ideal type. There are also clear reporting lines within this bureaucracy however unlike a typical bureaucracy, relationships across the hierarchies are not impersonal as Weber theorised in his ideal type. Instead, employees relate freely with their managers and vice-versa with little or no barrier in interactions. As Merton, (1949) expressed, bureaucracies often stress the depersonalisation of relationships which he explained leads to ‘trained incapacity’, however in the case of this *Charismatic Bureaucracy*, even though clear hierarchies exist, there were no perceived power distance between the upper management role holders and their subordinates. This is also contrary to the general cultural norms of the national context in which power-distance between managers and employees is often very high (Hoftstede, 2015). Furthermore, within this bureaucracy, there are no strict clearly written rules as found in the *Traditional Bureaucracy*, instead employees and managers relate based on mutually understood implicit norms and values to guide their actions and decisions. Compliance is therefore not rule based but based on mutually shared and accepted social and moral norms enforced through social accountability. Thus, the *Charismatic Bureaucracy* presents a quasi-bureaucracy and not a typical bureaucracy governed by clear rules and impersonality according to Weber’s (1978) typology. It is instead a positive type of post bureaucracy, which Grey, (2007:480) in Knights and Wilmot (2007) defined as an organisation ‘based on trust, empowerment, personal treatment and shared responsibility’.

Thus, the bureaucratic features of this organisation are underpinned by the genuine charisma of the managing director and his management team whom employees love and respect. In this case the charisma has been clearly linked with the principled

character and conduct of these persons in senior leadership. Respecting the person who is behind the role of CEO for their personal morality and overall personality in the profession is therefore a key to the characterisation of this as quasi-bureaucracy. This bureaucracy is unlike the legal-rational type, governed by strict rule compliance, which underpins a typical Weberian ideal bureaucracy (Weber, 1958). In other words, charismatic authority according to Blau, (1964) is often dynamic and non-rational such that authority rests on the appeal of leaders to whom employees claim allegiance because of the force of their extraordinary personalities based on a pure personal social relationship (Weber, 1978; Elwell, 1996). As Shamir, House and Arthur, (1993: pg.578) further explained, the charismatic authority emphasises “symbolic behaviour, visionary and inspirational messages, nonverbal communication, appeal to ideological values, in self and subordinates”. This they explained gives meaningfulness to work by “infusing work and organizations with moral purpose and commitment rather than by offering material incentives (and a recognition premised upon compliance or in its absence) the threat of punishment” (Shamir, House and Arthur, 1993:578). With this, employees have a sense of an entirely personal devotion to their charismatic leader based on the senior leadership’s abilities to perform heroic acts (Weber, 1978).

This is the case in N1 in which the managing director and his team are the charismatic figures within the organisation. They are often described by their employees as ‘inspirational’, ‘visionary’, ‘role-model’, ‘fatherly’ and ‘amiable’ such that they freely interact with employees at every level and have personal relationships with them in different capacities. Thus, authority as found in this *Charismatic Bureaucracy* is not based on discipline and impersonal agency on the basis of rationality (as in the traditional bureaucracy), nor a “class” (Adair and Toteff, 2005) and loyalty to serve this class, as it was in the *Caste Bureaucracy* but on personal relationships and social interactions. By means of charisma, managers are able to influence and win over employees in ways only the employees can express whereby the latter are respected and free to reflect and relate to the authority as equals with no fear of penalties and not a stimulus for rewards on the basis of compliance or servitude.

Therefore, in the case of N1, employees describe the managing director and his team as men of integrity, worthy to be emulated and whose character reflects in

how they do their job, often visible to the employees. As such, the MD and his management team in this case take on the 'super-hero' figure implied by Weber. This was exemplified in the instance of a current employee whom the MD mentored and sponsored from being a delinquent youth working as a security guard at the firm's premises into a now fully educated young man who also serves as a Human Resource officer in the firm. Such gesture is widely cited amongst employees as heroic and visionary. Likewise, the manners in which the MD and his senior management team are known to personally handle incidents of complaints on the firm's products are also regarded as practical demonstration of the integrity and accountability they claim to live by. For example, the MD was said to have on one occasion left his busy schedule to fly down to a distant location to personally handle one of such complaints to the surprise of the persons involved and the entire staff within the organisation. These types of gestures don't just show acts of "heroism" but also show clear "morals" in the person of the MD and his senior management team.

Weber (1958) also expressed that charismatic authority thrived more in loose structures and that charisma itself is temporary. This could be the case in the context of firm N1 where there were few written rules and managerial control was not rigid like the traditional bureaucracy, however the temporariness of this charismatic authority cannot be determined without longitudinal data. But this charismatic bureaucracy showed preference for a very cordial, informal system based on a sense of common understanding on binding values that is prevalent amongst employees. This is encouraged by the sense of awe and respect employees have for the visible character and conduct of the senior management, which also instils a sense of shared moral values. However as Riesebrodt, (1999) opined, charismatic authority can be "routinized" in several ways one of which is that orders are traditionalised. In the case of N1, even though there were unwritten rules, such rules take the form of instructions handed down by the senior and middle management, which employees institutionalise as the way to get things done. For example how employees are to handle sales orders are not clearly documented but managers instruct their direct reports on how to do this. After a few implementations these become tacit traditionalised norms on how orders are to be processed. This is often the same for other processes such as how complaints are handled as well as how employees engage with hospitals and other potential stakeholders. Therefore, as

employees embrace such instructions from leaders they respect and are socialised within the system, they thrive more on shared values and regard themselves as part of a family, which creates a strong sense of social accountability within the charismatic bureaucracy. This is driven by the collective sense of respect and loyalty employees have for their inspirational managers that also drive genuine compliance such that no one wants to violate that communal trust (Carter, 1994). As Weber (1958) explains, employees under the charismatic authority are like disciples who show unflinching loyalty to the managers they have come to adore.

Importantly, the literature on charismatic authority recognises the possibility of charisma being a 'double-edged sword'. On one hand as Howell and Avolio, (1992) explain, charismatic managers can be destructive in which case they harness their charisma for selfish and immoral ends. Graham, (1991) cited examples of charismatic leaders who used their charisma to influence subordinates into committing heinous acts under the guise that they are being done for the common good with a confusion regarding what this may be and how it may be common. In such instances, charismatic persons may employ charisma as a façade to advance selfish interests or demand excessive loyalty and devotion of employees time and identity for the organisation's goals in a way that is all about the leader showcasing self or the leader seducing the staff to make less attention to work life balance and other important broader social and professional roles / duties.

On the contrary, another face of charisma is one in which charismatic persons genuinely use their charisma to benefit their subordinates, organisations and at times an entire society (Howell and Avolio, 1992). In this case, charisma is not a device or a hypocritical means to an end, but genuinely social tool towards a constructive collaboration for the common good. For example, leaders who use their charisma to fight for the freedom of oppressed groups in a society (Graham, 1991). Graham, (1991) further indicated that in cases where charisma is used to benefit an organisation or a society, it is often the reflection of the moral ideologies of the main character. These different faces of charisma could therefore have different implications for the sort of morality they create in organisations and also highlights the need to understand the type of charisma espoused in the case of N1.

The nature of the charisma found in N1 shows the more beneficial, type of charisma in which charisma is utilised in meaningful and ethical ways and via instilling common universal ethical values such as justice or fairness as earlier illustrated through the actions of the MD and his management team above. This type of 'charisma' put in the service of ethical ends is found in this context of N1 to be a good example of the post conventional (stage 6) level of thinking amongst employees as well as allowing personal moral inquiry amongst them. As noted in the literature review, Kohlberg's stage 6 is a generally higher level of moral reasoning that utilises universal ethical theories such as justice and fairness in reasoning processes compared to the conventional level, which is more about conformity, and maintaining status quo. Interestingly, this *Charismatic Bureaucracy* produced the highest number of post conventional thinkers across all three case groups and hybrids of bureaucracy found in this study. And although this finding was not hypothesised, it is a remarkable finding about the effect of Charismatic authority not explained by Weber, as he did not explore how this could affect morality. It is known from literature especially Jackall, (1988) that this is very rare in any bureaucracy and the expectations are that bureaucracies typically encourage conventional level thinking among employees. However, the discovery that *Charismatic Bureaucracy* has an unusually high number of post conventional level thinkers implies this particular hybrid is ethically minded and thereby contributes new knowledge to Jackal's, (1988) study as well as Weber's, (1958) theory of authority. This is however an emergent finding that may not be conclusive and needs further investigation.

The process through which the charismatic bureaucracy achieves the effects presented above could be explained in two ways: First, charismatic authority creates a mutual interaction process between the management and employees morality thereby creating a tacit diffusion of morality. This can be achieved through the direct influence of the management's morality on the moral norms of employees, which could take a process of time not fully proven in this dissertation and as such requires further research.

Secondly, since the kind of morality found in this bureaucracy is a mirror of the kind of organisational environment created by the management, the management may have the tendency to bring in people who are like themselves and these people will

recreate the identity of the organisation. This process is called the attrition-selection-attrition process (Dreher, Ash and Bretz, 1988; Burkhardt, 1994; Boone et al, 2004), which presupposes that this charismatic bureaucracy has the tendency to attract, select and retain people that are like the senior management in their personal values and perspective. Dreher, Ash and Bretz, (1988) explained this process to imply that those attracted to a particular organisation are more homogenous than the general applicant pool. The implication of this is that as like-minded employees are brought on board, the organisation becomes more conventional. Overtime, this process means that conventional level thinking will actually influence the identity of this organisation. But in so far as authority is charismatic, they will try to attract and maintain post conventional level thinkers rather than to discourage and distance such moral reasoners from the organisation. Nonetheless, the general effect of this bureaucracy on morality is that it enhances individual and collective moral reflection and engagement. There is also the issue that the moral climate of the firm is only preserved for as long as the charismatic leader is in place.

9.1.4 Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy

The *Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy* is found in the context of firm N2, the second of the firms within the Nigerian case group. Like the *Charismatic Bureaucracy*, this bureaucracy is not characterised by any clearly written rules. This is also a fundamental difference between this *Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy* and the traditional bureaucracy. However, there are clearly defined hierarchies in this bureaucracy like in the *traditional bureaucracy* even though the nature of managerial control is not based on rule compliance. Instead, managerial control is underpinned by the quest to serve the economic interests of the key groups in power, or to mutually agree and act to promote economic interests of the most dominant groups who have more clear access to resources (financial, technology, managerial support). Here, what prevails is autonomous economic agency (still of utilitarian kind), but there were no visible signs of managers interfering or restraining their subordinates on any grounds, which makes this bureaucracy also a type of post bureaucracy (Knights and Wilmot, 2007), albeit a negative type.

In this bureaucracy, the concept of Entrepreneurship is less about innovation really, but it is clearly about opportunism on the basis of rational self-interest. This clearly distinguishes this type from charismatic N1 type presented in the previous pages.

Courpasson (2000) suggests that organisations should be seen as soft bureaucracies, in which centralization and entrepreneurial forms of governance are combined, and this is the case in N2. The opportunistically driven entrepreneur(s) according to Reynolds et al. (2002) 'is driven by the achievement of success through exploiting an opportunity for some form of gain, often believed to be economic' (Carsrud and Brannback, 2011:14). Human relations are therefore subordinated to opportunistic alliances that may be there to support opportunistic relationships on the basis of self-interest. In other words, opportunistic entrepreneurs rely on exploiting 'gaps' in any space towards economic ends. This was indeed the prevalent thinking in the employees of N2. The idea of competition or salesmanship according to them begins with identifying gaps in places where they are expected to market drugs and their duty is to leverage the gaps in order to secure deals. In a clear instance, one of the managers in the firm explained that wherever they are expected to market their company's product, they look for needs that can be met. In some cases, it could be providing televisions in those hospitals, or a promise to install air conditioning in them if such hospitals are able to sell an agreed amount of their products. In some other cases, monetary commissions and incentives are offered to doctors to 'push' their products to sick patients. In doing these, employees in N2 believe they are being smart to exploit such gaps and would often meet their targets by so doing. This they are able to achieve with the support of the firm such that as Carsrud and Brannback, (2011:14) explained, 'the intention of the entrepreneur and the pursuit of the recognized opportunity are critical but still require motivation to drive those intentions or exploit those opportunities.' In the case of N2, the primary motivations are making as much money to feel accepted in the firm and also the knowledge that their firm supports anything they have to do to get whatever they want.

Furthermore, in presenting four models of corporate entrepreneurship, Wolcott and Lippitz (2007) defined the opportunistic model of corporate entrepreneurship as a model 'without any designated organisational ownership of resources, corporate entrepreneurship proceeds (if it does at all) based on the efforts and serendipity of intrepid "project champions" – people who toil against the odds, creating new business often in spite of the corporation' (page 76). As such within this bureaucracy, there are fewer rules; neither are there any visible managerial control measures in place. Employees set their own rules and operate by their own principles as

supported and encouraged by their firms. Therefore, firm N2 is an environment that nurtures and values individual opportunistic behaviour brought together by the fabric of the organisation mainly channelled to serve the purpose of economic gains.

Furthermore, opportunistic entrepreneurs are motivated by the need to achieve and to succeed (as measured in economic terms) (Walley and Taylor, 2002) and this came across strongly in N2 in which success is the measure of morality. Employees are driven by the desire to achieve and opportunistically collaborate also encouraged by set financial targets, which they are obligated to meet. Hence, their attitude and approach to their job comes across as driven but unregulated. In one of the instances cited, an employee of N2 explained how they got into a financial agreement with a senior doctor to ensure their company's products are prescribed for particular ailments and that guaranteed the doctor certain monthly pay cheques. The prevalent mentality in N2 is that there should be no problem that cannot be bypassed and that employees are to use their initiative and senses to spot 'opportunities' the firm can tap into to make money. By this, employees consider themselves as champions and competent employees in their own rights by proudly citing many examples of how they have succeeded in 'closing deals' and successfully meeting their targets. This is interesting because Downs (1967) had suggested that bureaucracies have a non-market orientation and are unable to use the objective monetary measure of profitability to evaluate the specific activities they undertake but the case of N2 and the other bureaucracies in the study disconfirm Down's position. This also adds to our understanding of Weberian bureaucratic organisations in that what is rational and efficient may not necessarily be how work is organised alone but could be by how much economic gains are being made. Just as in the case of N2, rationality is conceived more in economic terms than in how work is organised.

Wolcott and Lippitz, (2007:76) further explained that 'the opportunist model works well only in trusting corporate cultures that are open to experimentation and have diverse social networks behind the official hierarchy (in other words places where multiple executives can say yes)'. Similarly, as an employee of N2 explained that there are various cabals within the system each servicing their own interests, hence they are able to support and empower their loyalists to do the things that will bring in economic gains. By this, employees are encouraged not to critically engage their

choices and actions since their managers can easily sanction these as long they satisfy the economic interests. This further explains the difficulty in seeing a unified managerial control mechanism within N2 as different interest groups exist achieving their respective goals of economic gains in different ways through different means. Hence another employee explained that anything done within N2 is permissive as long as it can be justified as bringing economic gains.


Therefore, the context of N2 seems to allow 'anything', which is detrimental to any kind of personal moral inquiry especially insofar as it questions or places distance from the morality of opportunistic self interest and the building of in-firm professional relations mainly on this basis. Also the resultant unregulated environment that is prevalent in the context could easily encourage conventional level reasoning among employees. In a setting that brings together like-minded individual opportunists working towards a common goal, there is a greater likelihood of prevalent conventional thinking. This becomes a vicious cycle evidently, as an encouragement of conventional thinking (Kohlberg, 1971; Jackall, 1988) further enhances bureaucratic rationality and (in this case) opportunism – rather than innovation, as noted. This is to the extent that employees in N2 can easily rationalise their actions based on the expectations of the system and how other are also achieving results in the same setting. This is congruent with Jackal's (1988) finding on the prevalence of conventional level morality in bureaucracies. However, this bureaucracy is also found to be the only one to record pre-conventional level thinkers. This is because the sense of competition and recognition encouraged by the *Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy* tends to encourage reward driven mentality. As such, with an excessive focus not just on economic gains for the firm but the personal monetary gains and recognition that comes with selling more than others can easily relegate employees to the pre-conventional level of reasoning at which the focus is often on rewards and 'what's in it for me?'

As such, the effect of the context of N2 on employee morality was found to be generally negative. First, employees can easily find legitimacy in their actions based on the ease with which the setting supports their results regardless of how such is obtained thereby encouraging an uncritical moral inquiry. Secondly, constantly working within an opportunistic environment has the capacity to systematically distract employees from elements of morality causing them to focus on other things

whilst making them feel good about themselves. Thirdly, working in this entrepreneurial bureaucracy motivates people to rename (the more negatively morally charged term) “opportunism” into (the more neutral term in moral terms) “innovation”, and while there were no clear signs of the latter, it appears to enable business legitimacy to all those who act to sustain and grow this type of bureaucracy further. In the case of N2 this explains why all employees in the claim to have strong moral identities when most show no or very little sensitivity to any moral values on their jobs. Thus, pre-conventional and conventional levels of cognitive moral reasoning are mostly prevalent in this context such that the highest numbers of pre-conventional level thinkers were reported in this bureaucracy. This finding contributes to our understanding of the effect of bureaucracy on morality especially Jackal (1988) in that bureaucracies could also easily foster pre-conventional level thinking where the focus is more on economic objectives with little or no managerial control.

In summary, Figure 9.1 below presents a matrix categorisation of the four bureaucracies along the two Weberian dimensions of managerial control and SOPs explored in this study. Generally, SOPs manifested in two major ways – codified and uncoded ways whilst managerial control manifested either in personal or authoritarian ways. The four hybrids are located in these two dimensions as seen below:

Figure 9.1: Categorisations of the four bureaucracy hybrids along the SOPs and Managerial Control dimensions



From the figure above, the four bureaucracy hybrids are presented along the continuum of SOPs and Managerial Control. The *Traditional Bureaucracy*, as have been discussed in the opening section exists on the top left where managerial control is highly personalised and SOPs also highly codified. The *Caste Bureaucracy* on the other hand is at the bottom axis, at the intersection between a highly authoritarian managerial control and a neutral SOPs setting as also earlier discussed. The neutral setting implies there is a split with a dual existence in equal proportion of internal rules as well as no rules externally. The *Charismatic and Entrepreneurial Bureaucracies* however both exist in the same spot, where managerial control is highly personal and are also both more inclined towards uncodified rules. However, the different impact of these two bureaucracies on the morality of employee highlights there are subtle differences in the type of personalised managerial control function within both bureaucracies as discussed by Adler, (1999) in the distinction between enabling and coercive social structures. However, the effects of these bureaucracies on employee morality have been discovered to be generally negative

except the charismatic bureaucracy that showed signs of positive effects (see Table 9.1 below).

Table 9.1: Effects of the four types of bureaucracy on morality

Type of Bureaucracy	Type of effect	Effects on Morality
Traditional	- Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rules are regarded as the ‘holy grail’ of effective and efficient functioning in this bureaucracy and are also often expected to be valued above other ‘moral authorities’ outside of the bureaucracy. - Large amount of power in the hands of the managers who are seen as the guardians of morality able to tell ‘right from wrong’ and that their viewpoint will prevail and be followed. This can gradually create passivity and lack of engagement - Rules compliance as enforced by the managers subsequently replaces personal critical moral inquiry - Professional and moral competence is derived from compliance to rules which encourages an inflated sense of moral identity
Caste	- Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Internal rules protect firm’s interests but there are no restrictions outside of the firm and managerial control is mainly authoritarian - Relationship between managers and employees is purely transactional - Morality in this bureaucracy is about pursuing actions that increase external gains and sense of approval

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Morality becomes confused with meeting performance targets to being recognised as a good (moral) employee, which is quasi immoral to fail these - This creates a superficial level of belongingness that confers a social moral identity recognition from superiors to subordinates which inflates their sense of moral identity
Charismatic	- Positive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The charisma of leaders showcases good character and moral conducts employees often admire and embrace - The strong personal interactions between the charismatic senior management and their subordinates allows for a tacit transfer of moral values to employees - Organisation norms are collectively and mutually derived which fosters a system of social accountability that also increases the moral awareness of employees - Employees are allowed to be themselves and to question things which in itself is good for ethics - It encourages personal moral inquiry, which also results in a high number of post conventional level thinkers. This bureaucracy produced the highest number. - Through the process of attrition –selection post conventional level thinkers are attracted, employed and retained into the bureaucracy. This is because they are similar in character and conduct with the senior management and this explains their

		prevalence in this bureaucracy.
Entrepreneurial	- Negative	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Success is the measure of morality - The unregulated system of no rules and non-visible managerial control allows employees to make their choices and justify them on economic grounds - The collection of individual opportunists into the same firm encourages conventional level thinking. - This bureaucracy motivates people to rename (the more negatively morally charged term) “opportunism” into (the more neutral term in moral terms) “innovation”, and while there were no clear signs of the latter, it appears to enable business legitimacy to all those who act to sustain and grow this type of bureaucracy further - Excessive focus on profits also encourages a personalised reward based mentality or pre-conventional level thinking of “what’s in it for me?” mentality.

Now I shall be presenting three discussion themes based on all the data patterns, each corresponding to the relevant more specialised propositions I explored in this study. These three also correspond to the second, third and fourth research aims in page 4.

9.2 Discussion Theme 1: General pattern of “inflated” moral identities: A need to reflect on the potentially contaminating role of bureaucratic context over the construct/operational measure of moral identity in its literature.

This first discussion theme is linked to the first proposition explored in this study: *Bureaucratic context – as evidenced by the dominant features of the organisation in each particular bureaucracy- enhances a subjective sense of stronger moral identity*

in employees as well as in managers equally in all cases of moral identity (both stronger and weaker MI scores). In the traditional bureaucracy, large amount of power is in the hands of managers who are (but not just) enforcers of rules. Moreover they are also seen as guardians of (the bureaucratic) morality who are able to tell what is right or wrong based on their own 'superior' understanding of the rules in force within the bureaucracy. This is so regardless of any other sources of moral authorities outside the structure of the bureaucracy. Consequently, employees tend to derive their morality by following closely and without questioning or any critical reflection the set rules and by displaying obedience to managers. These both stifles individual moral agency in the process; as Reed, (2005: pg. 2) also highlighted, the functioning of this whole fabric is characterised by strict rule based compliance and enforced managerial control.

In the Caste Bureaucracy, "morality" is really about pursuing actions that increase external gains or a sense of approval, rationalizing the role of managerial monitoring as necessary in order to help prevent a repetition of previous fraudulent organisational history as noted in chapters five and seven. Accordingly, the morality of this organisation is a sense of legitimacy and privilege of employees being part of the in-group (belonging) of the organisational family (despite not being able to ascend the caste system itself). This surface level "belongingness" confers social moral identity recognition from superiors to subordinates, which also inflates a strong sense of moral identity. Regarding this, individual employees are not bound by any rules outside of the firm but have a personal sense of moral authority and responsibility.

In the charismatic bureaucracy (firm N1), the charisma of the management team underpins an environment of shared, collectively embraced moral and social values. The charismatic leaders drive, influence and shape the culture, norms and perception of their employees towards values of mutual benevolence, generosity, kindness while the senior management's faith and Christian values are followed in action by their behaving in kind and humane ways. Through visible modelling and direct association, morality is tacitly diffused from managers who are considered as heroes and their subordinates who regard their managers as inspiring and worthy of being emulated. This significantly enhances the individual and collective moral reflection and engagement of employees. Therefore, the effect of the charismatic

bureaucracy on employee morality is generally positive and this context provides a major exception amongst all the others.

In the entrepreneurial bureaucracy (firm N2), success and drive to succeed (in performance terms) is the measure of morality. This potentially confuses questions of morality for questions of performance and efficiency which is in itself a sign of ethical weak organisational context in this case. Employees are regulated in this case by fewer rules and have the support of their managers in advancing autonomous economic agency. Therefore, firm N2 is an environment that nurtures and values individual opportunistic behaviour brought together by the fabric of the organisation mainly channelled to serve the purpose of economic gains. Furthermore, opportunistic entrepreneurs are motivated by the need to achieve and to succeed (as measured in economic terms) (Walley and Taylor, 2002) and this increases the prevalence of conventional level reasoning amongst employees. In such a context, universal ethical values are almost non-existent and the need for critical moral inquiry is relegated by the excessive drive for economic gains.

In all three case groups represented by the four hybrids above, the majority of participants had inflated moral identity, which disconfirms the theory of moral identity. The moral identity theory (Aquino and Reed, 2002) suggests that people have moral traits they deem as central to their self definition and that the ease of accessibility of these moral traits as triggered by contexts/situations determines the strength of their moral identity. As such, a person has a strong moral identity if situational cues easily trigger their moral traits, which then influences their decision-making. Conversely, individuals with weak moral identity do not readily have their moral traits prompted by situational cues and would less likely have their moral values influence their decision-making. It therefore seems that the moral identity theory assumes that contexts are 'morally neutral' platforms that have no effects on how employees perceive themselves morally.

However, as discovered in previous chapters, bureaucracy seems to inflate moral identity altogether. Contextual sensitivities tend to inflate employee perception about their own moral identity such that employees who show clear signs of moral identity weakness feel they have strong moral identities. This simply means that in certain cases and contexts, contextual variables are so strongly influencing the subjective

employee experience that they may well create an “inflated moral identity” general pattern. Also, there were no signs of any differences in how employees with weak moral identity and strong moral identity behave, as if bureaucracy also conflates or spills over MI. This is assumed to be so simply because so many people in conventional firms are of conventional moral reasoning (Jackall, 1988)

This was largely driven by the rule compliance culture, for instance in the traditional bureaucracy whereby employees seem to be self-righteous identifying themselves as “moral” just by following the bureaucracies’ conventions. This also often creates a strong sense of professionalism and belief in the employees that they are working in an organisation that will not make them do the wrong things hence also creating a sense of moral competence. Thus, professional competence in this case is actually the ability of employees to imbibe set rules and deploy them effectively in executing their jobs. The more employees are able to comply with SOPs on their job, the more the system rewards them and the more competent they feel. Hence, any employee who feels competent on their job feels so because they are able to work according to set rules through which they also gain social acceptance among colleagues and superiors in working towards the overall goal of the bureaucracy. Also in this light is the feeling of moral competence employees seem to have within such rule based system. As earlier mentioned, the legitimacy of the strict rule based system is anchored on the quite corrupt Nigerian context (see Chapter 5) and the goals of firms to do business properly within the system. Thus, creating a rigid framework of rules within which employees must operate is considered an effective way of achieving this goal. Therefore, as employees obey the rules, they actually tend to believe that the ends of their actions will always be moral as long as they stay within the parameters of firm rules. Consequently, employees believe that the rules exist as safe and reliable moral guidelines. Moral competence in this instance is the feeling of ‘safety’ (e.g. keeping one’s job or more likely to be seen and promoted) and ‘uprightness’ that comes from following the rules, to the extent that employees are confident to defend their firms as ethical and safe places to work. This sense of competence legitimises the rule-based approach with employees, making them trust the system as one that brings out the best in them both professionally and morally. By placing their trust in the rules, they become uncritical of the rules, which in turn allow the values of the bureaucracy take over personal values such that employees

lose their own sense of individual valuing mechanism. By this, employees see things from the perspective of the firm, 'I' is often replaced by 'we' and also, this could easily distort definitions and meanings. Hence, employees believe that following the rules is tantamount to integrity and in the case of the firms; integrity is simply to not break the rules.

Therefore, results of moral identity scores across all case groups returned a significantly skewed distribution of employees towards strong moral identities even in contexts where employees' interview data showed strong signs of weak moral identity. This is because as noted above, insofar as everyone is compliant with the tenets of a bureaucracy each person is entitled to a sense of moral goodness. Whilst it is interesting that the moral identity results show a rather skewed distribution of employees towards those with strong moral identities, it must be noted that self-reported measures such as the one used in this study are liable to participant bias and prone to contextual influences (Howard and Dailey, 1979; Spector, 1994; Lanyon & Goodstein, 1997). This may have also contributed to the skewed results obtained but also indicates that the bureaucracies tend to incite social desirability bias in individuals whereby none would not want to admit they are morally deficient in any way in order to maintain their reputation as good employees. This is in contrast to the CMR which in the case of this study was mapped out from the prevalent thought patterns of respondents based on their interview response thereby significantly reducing the effects of bias (see chapter 3).

Also, this pattern's discovery contributes to our understanding of the huge role of contexts; particularly bureaucracies in individual subjective moral identity perceptions. At least for the conventional moral reasoners it has been found that indeed bureaucratic context dimensions and dynamics (probably in interplay with cognitive dissonance factors) can bring self-perception of employees moral identity strengths "out of touch", such that employees can be made to believe they are more morally motivated than they actually are just by complying with the conventions of their bureaucracy (like in the traditional and caste bureaucracies) or just by being driven to success and enterprise values (as in the case of the entrepreneurial bureaucracy). This implies that employees may have gradually developed personal defence mechanisms depending on how long they have worked in similar organisations, whereby their obedience to superiors and the bureaucratic rules automatically

signifies a sense of strong moral identities. Presumably, the longer they are employed, the more institutionalised they become. However, how this happens, how long it takes for such transformation to occur and whether there are any differences in moral identity vis-à-vis length of employment are interesting points for further study. This trend characterised three of the four bureaucracy hybrids found across the case groups explored in this study. The case of N1, the charismatic bureaucracy is the only case where data disconfirms this first theme.

Within N1, organisational rules are more verbal and unwritten yet a binding and common understanding exists on what the firm stands for amongst all employees. This is owing to the influence of the leaders within the context, whose presence or absence of virtue is influencing how employees understand their work and how they experience and respond to the overall moral climate they experience. In the case of my dissertation N1 was a case of presence of virtuous leadership and it may be worth examining in future research the case of its absence. Through visible modelling and direct association, leaders hand down moral values to their employees who daily see their leaders live up to the values they claim to believe in. This reinforces a feeling of empowerment in employees by encouraging a moral system that all employees respect and trust because they esteem the faces of those values. Unlike the other bureaucracies in which employee conformity to rules is critical to 'survival' in the system, the context of N1 rather encourages moral awareness in employees and a sense of individuality that isn't hinged on sheepish conformity. This may be contrary to expectations since a study by Howell and Avolio, (1992) suggests charismatic authority can make employees prone to uncritical conformity. Instead in N1, the sense of shared moral values encourages employees to be themselves, which is healthy for ethics as explained in the previous sections. Thus, the context of N1 contributes positively to moral identity strength rather than subjectively inflating it. Following from this, moral identity scores of employees in N1 were confirmed through interview data as truly objective in nature. Employees within this context presented the highest number of post conventional thinkers across all case groups and this was confirmed through the strong signs of critical moral inquiry majority of employees demonstrated through interview data within this bureaucracy.

Thus, the dominant trend amongst the bureaucracies studied in all case groups is the tendency for these contexts to escalate a subjective sense of strong moral

identity. This, as discussed above is largely encouraged through the substitution of moral identity with SOPs and management control, which instils a sense of conformity and compliance typical of conventional level thinkers. This may therefore imply that there is a strong link between reasoning at the conventional level and the ease with which bureaucracies entice a subjective inflated sense of employee moral identity strength. Thus, this first theme and the next theme to be discussed may have more symmetry that could prove useful for further studies.

9.3 Discussion Theme 2 – The CMR is a better predictor of morality

This discussion theme is linked to the second proposition explored in this study: *Acting in alignment with a Bureaucratic context is facilitated by and rewards conventional level thinking in (middle/lower) management role holders*

In all three cases, employee moral reasoning levels are a better predictor of morality. Thus, CMR was better at explaining employees' moral conduct within the context of the bureaucracy. Bureaucratic context pushes people to do/act without thinking, as a way of thinking they are okay in moral terms, but for genuine moral inquiry personal contemplation is necessary. Post conventional level thinkers however showed clear signs of moral inquiry and usually assumed moral responsibility across the cases. I link also to Kohlberg that Jackall, (1988) in his study found that 80% of sampled managers were reasoning at the conventional level. But Kohlberg, (1973) did not take into account how organisational environments influence the development (or stagnation of) people reasoning patterns. Opposite is suggested by the descriptive ethics literature – readers may find a review of it in the earlier section of this dissertation on the mutual influencing between contextual and individual variable suggests, (see Chapter 3). This explains why most adults stay within the conventional moral reasoning. It is not because there is any genetic predisposition that adults cannot move beyond conventional level thinking but that business environments discourage this development. Only persons of a higher CMD level seem to have better ways to ethically respond to the contextual influences, but I found this also has limitations as higher CMD reasoners are not part of an in-group in the typical bureaucracy and they are pushed to operating in the margins of these organisations, for example sharing their moral concerns with persons they trust and developing other mechanisms for resilience. But a longitudinal study may show how gradual and final effects unfold regarding all these groups and the organisation. It is

likely that there will be some turnover and it would be interesting to study how this relates to the topic of this theme, but it is outside the scope of this study.

As it was discovered in the previous theme, there seems to be a rather uncritical acceptance of rules by most employees who claim to have strong moral identity. And that the moral identity strength employees claim to have could actually be as a result of their conformity to the set rules of the bureaucracy. Therefore, having a sense of strong moral identity may not necessarily translate into being able to make informed moral decisions. If anything, the first theme as discussed above indicates that employees with inflated sense of moral identity reason at Kohlberg's conventional level of moral reasoning. As Trevino, (1986) explained, it is expected that managers' reasoning on work related issues is primarily at the conventional level; therefore they look outside of themselves for cues about what is right or wrong. As also explained in chapter 6, Kohlberg's (1969) theory suggests that conventional level thinkers are more inclined to show uncritical obedience and conformist behaviours to social norms. Also clearly Kohlberg's conventional CMD levels (1969) are associated with instrumental orientation to maintaining relations based on individualist narrow self-interest or/and more collectivist transactional clan self-interests. These general patterns are all indeed found in this case.

The above finding also implies that employees reasoning at this (conventional) CMD level echo managers' behavioural patterns both as they are encouraged to "habituate" themselves with the managerial norms of behaviour, and due to the attraction-selection effects overtime (Dreher, Ash and Bretz, 1988; Burkhardt, 1994; Boone et al, 2004). This means that conventional bureaucracies attract / retain conventional moral reasoners that do not question their morality. Critical moral inquiry is therefore more likely to operate around the rules and conventions in showing a convenient compliance with set rules, norms and standards without genuinely embracing moral inquiry at individual or community levels.

Therefore, SOPs are more effective through conventional level thinkers because they are driven by the desire to conform to set standards and hence will not challenge the norms. They also find ways of rationalising the SOPs by believing they actually guide them into working the right way and doing things right in the firm. This is to the extent that the SOPs are regarded as 'supreme' over and above any other

sources of moral authorities outside of the bureaucratic structure. One implication of this is that employees become uncritical of rules and see through the lens of the bureaucracies only, such that definitions and meanings are altered in alignment with the bureaucracies' conceptualisations. For instance, it would seem that certain moral concepts of worth like 'trust' and 'integrity' should have some concrete reference to universal norms that Kohlberg (1969) sees linked to a more universal (albeit of western ethics influenced) humanist ethic in his stage 6 amongst employees (a shared sense of justice and fairness, a sense of respect of human dignity, human and group rights and duties etc). Instead, in this study across all case groups, most employees who claimed to have strong moral identities but were adjudged to reason at the conventional level simply used them strategically to succeed. This may not mean that people act unethically but it means that there is a socio-structural influence whereby what is moral becomes what the senior management and the superiors like, e.g. the consequentialist type of organisational morality I described earlier in chapter 3 is such an example. But in the worst case evidence shows that indeed this pattern can lead to legitimacy for and freedom to act in unethical ways, as long as these bring the desired outcomes and results (sales, reputation etc) for the organisation. As such, acts such as promising doctors a stipend for drug prescriptions, offering free clinical trials or sponsoring doctors on foreign trips were labelled 'value added services' and not acts of inducements. Employees (who claim to have strong moral identity but are reasoning at the conventional level) often explain the motive behind some of these value added services as one of the 'potent strategies' for earning the 'trust' of doctors and 'penetrating' hospitals.

Likewise 'trust' in the language of three of the bureaucracies under study is understood to mean 'securing as many doctors as possible to prescribe firms' drugs', which is a key driver of sales revenue and profit. Similarly, reference to the concept of 'integrity' in this context also showed a similar trend of a mere use devoid of the true moral meaning of the concept. Integrity is often one of the core values of the firms cited in this case group, yet every respondent interviewed seemed to always flippantly say they have integrity as part of their own personal values. Interestingly, the crux of the findings thus far shows that these employees are not 'whole' as real integrity implies but are fragmented into entirely different people courtesy of the strict compliance culture in which they work (Markus, 1971). One would expect that people

with genuine integrity are able to maintain an integrated sense of moral self in any system and within-outside the organisation without losing out and should perhaps even build protective mechanisms against any systemic practice that could erode that sense of moral worth. Or simply use them for performance and reputation aims without any real concern of how they are feeling about being instrumentalised – This is such that in a bureaucracy there may be a dangerous belief that the minority groups have to be sacrificed for the majority well-being, where the majority is mainly who holds power via the managerial office(s). However in this study, the use of integrity often appeared as a personal façade to help reduce potential self-reflection or guilt, devoid of any careful moral reflection and implied in all cases either being loyal to the system's goal, which is profit/performance driven or simply as a cliché that is used to build a façade of morality that doesn't exist. A senior manager in the traditional bureaucracy for instance in explaining his personal values was first upfront about his inclinations towards results but as an afterthought mentioned integrity. Another manager in the entrepreneurial bureaucracy explained that trust in the context of their firm implied being able to deliver agreed monetary targets when due without any excuses. Yet reference to integrity and trust in these scenarios seemed to be about 'winning'. In this case as in the previous, the use of the term integrity is in line with the demands of the bureaucracy and not in moral terms as in maintaining one's moral self or identity. Therefore in all these instances, actions are construed, as the bureaucracy would prescribe so that employees reasoning at the conventional level may not have the level of cognitive complexity to sense any moral conflicts in spite of claims by the same employees that they have strong moral identities. This implies that their behaviour within the context is better explained by Kohlberg's CMR than they are by their moral identity which in most cases has already been significantly altered.

In spite of these, in all instances where post conventional level thinkers were found, strong signs of critical moral inquiry regardless of contextual pressures have been shown. Through this it was discovered that post conventional level thinkers often defy conventions because they are able to see through the moral fog to the rules which the bureaucracies create and deliberately choose to act based on a higher moral principle. Such higher principles as found in this study were in most cases was rooted in a personal reverence for God or religious values such that this took pre-

eminence over and above organisational rules. This ability is that of being able to respond to a system through proper inner dialoguing, a quality that is not necessarily encouraged by the rule-based system but is reflected in individuals who genuinely possess desire for true moral integrity. What theory seems to suggest is that those reasoning at the post-conventional level as well as those possessing strong moral identities would challenge the norms and status quo or at least feel uncomfortable by them. Across all case groups however, very few employees who claimed to have strong moral identity showed any signs of discomfort or moral inquiry in their relationship with the rules binding their daily activities. This is because moral identities are liable to contextual sensitivities and can therefore be significantly altered.

However, CMR on the other hand is a more grounded and solid concept of the moral self that indeed pertains to the importance of individual factors in shaping workplace morality as distinct from the sociology and organisational design of contextual factors. This captures that the overall cognitive capacity of the role holders also define a propensity for more nuanced and more mature/developed moral reasoning and action patterns (Kohlberg, 1971), which unlike the moral identity theory (Aquino and Reed, 2002) did not show signs of being inflated but rather accurately demonstrated the level of moral reasoning in respondents as reflected in the ways they handled moral issues at work.

Overall assumptions of the relevant theoretical (Kohlberg, 1969) and empirical literature (Jackall, 1988) are consistent with the overall data patterns found in this study in regards to proposition 2. Interestingly, the Charismatic Bureaucracy, one of the four hybrids of bureaucracies found in this study recorded an unusually higher number of post conventional thinkers compared to other bureaucracies. This is still consistent with the literature (Jackall, 1988) insofar it has been noted here that this is a quasi-bureaucracy, rather than a classical bureaucracy. This is probably because the environment of common values and integrity to one's belief as espoused by the charisma of the leaders in this bureaucracy attracts more post conventional people.

9.4 Discussion Theme 3 – Bureaucracies encourage expertise over professionalism

This discussion theme is linked to the third proposition explored in this study as follows: *Bureaucracy influences towards abiding strictly with the value of organisational loyalty (as opposed to respecting broader professional codes, practice and values) and this pattern will be manifested in employees with both strong and weak moral identity.*

Generally across all cases, bureaucracies were found to encourage expertise over professionalism. This can be linked to the fact that an overwhelming number of persons within bureaucracies become eager and socialised in displaying loyalty to their organisations rather than to their professions. On one hand, the CMR levels of employees as discussed in prior sections could largely contribute to this but on another hand, there are features of bureaucracies which encourage expertise and loyalty to organisations over loyalty to professions and their regulatory bodies. This creates a sense of transactional behaviour, which is strikingly different, to how professional behaviour norms are theorized. As Fagermoen, (1997: pg. 434) explains, professional identity is 'embedded values in meaningful practice' and this Koehn, (2006) suggests is regulated by an external body independent of any firm. Therefore, Fagermoen's (1997) study concluded that in nursing; human dignity and altruism were the most important values binding the identity of professional nurses. This, Koehn, (1994) would argue is linked with the welfare and well being of a 'client' (those who seek a public good of health, for instance). However, the bureaucracies in this study tend to have strong economic motives that overshadow the values of meaningful pharmaceutical practice and also demote the public good of health, which pharmacists have sworn to provide as secondary to economic gains. Through this, it was discovered that the bureaucracies are able to distract employees from their professional calling as pharmacists, making them function more as expert sales persons across all three case groups. Thus, the professional identity of being pharmacists, trained to save lives is lost within broader bureaucratic objectives such as profit maximisation and managerialism. This can also be challenged under broader and imposed bureaucratic rules and compliance oriented environment even within pharmaceutical organisations expected to preserve the professional ethos of

pharmacists. Therefore, who employees are supposed to be as pharmacists shifts from the conventional understanding of the profession to the sales persons the bureaucracies want them to be.

Thus, in the case of the entrepreneurial bureaucracy for instance, each person freely acts as economic “agent” who applies rules and the freedom provided as to how key professional ethical values learnt (via education or earlier career), if available, apply. Since most employees in N2 (entrepreneurial bureaucracy) are pharmacists, they are expected to have their professional ethical values accessible to them on the field. But there is no reference to this and there is no evidence that the organizational context of N2 visibly supports its professionals remaining tied to the standards of professional ethics they learnt in earlier life and education. This is explained given that N2 main organisational characteristic was found to be opportunistic independent success and alliances on the basis of opportunistic self-interest. Hence employees choosing to engage their professional ethical values in making moral decisions could be affected by personal choice and more importantly by the effect of the unregulated bureaucracy on their professional identity in which case employees are more inclined to do the easier things on the field that gives them the recognition of being loyal employees to the bureaucracy’s objectives.

Hence, a pharmacist in these bureaucracies is not the pharmacist defined by the PCN but one that is defined by the objectives of the bureaucracy. Consequently, in order to be liked and in order to ‘survive’, enjoy the benefits the system has to offer or to be seen as a ‘good pharmacist’, employees are faced with the dilemma of either adapting to the demands of their employer, particularly enforced by the salient characteristics of the bureaucracies, which would imply a reconstruction of their professional identities to fit in or a choice by participants to remain as ‘traditional pharmacists’. The latter may not fit into the system, or be subtly sanctioned by the non-offering of easy career and personal development paths. Since, employees may be morally incompetent by virtue of their CMD reasoning level, resultant conformist behaviours are prevalent in the system. A pharmacist therefore no longer sounds like one trained to save lives but like a sales person trained in a sales firm, out to make as much money as possible. The effect of the bureaucracies’ demands of the bureaucracies is responsible for this reconstruction of professional identity such that employees who have interacted with the system are prone to working only with those

values that make them survive within the system. In fact, many speak as if they are working at the highest levels of ethics because they are working in obedience to set standards of the bureaucracies. Such is the subtle but potent way bureaucracies reconstruct professional identities to the extent that a pharmacist would boldly declare himself/herself as a sales executive, not as a pharmacist and still feel he/she is working within the ethics of the profession when in fact his/her responses reveal they have clearly been submerged under the demands of how bureaucracies want them to operate.

Also, bureaucracies through recruitment, socialisation and copious training programs are able to impact the ideologies of the bureaucracy into employees, who are expressly told how to behave in the system such that their professional identities are thereby reconstructed. Through recruitment, it was discovered across the cases that in most cases, bureaucracies also employ non-pharmacists to do the job of trained pharmacists. With these persons not having any professional training and identity with which they are affiliated, they are easily converted by the bureaucracies through trainings into the sales persons they are designed to function as. Besides, the notion of working in pharmaceutical organisations is lost in the nature of job roles and demands of the sales and marketing orientation of most bureaucracies akin to any other sales company. In other words, the ways the firms are structured and roles named seem to relinquish the pharmaceutical firms to merely sales and marketing organisations saddled with the responsibility of hawking drugs and making as much money as they can. The essential focus of saving lives is entirely lost in this kind of organisational milieu.

Consequently, this is the ideal that bureaucracies promote that employees could be professional as a manager or a professional manager. However a critical observation here is that management is not a profession. Profession is an independent body (outside of any organisational interests) which advises people who undertake a particular strand of work and which provides some core ethical criteria and norms about the essential purpose of this profession for society independently of the context/employer where the professional exercises this (Hall, 1968, Freidson, 1973, Forrester, 1988). A profession is beyond and above an institution within which professionals work, while professional bodies are the guardians of very long lasting ethical traditions about practicing a particular profession (McCloskey and McCain,

1987). For instance different professional bodies regulate the activities of journalists. Such professional bodies advocate that good journalism involves abiding with standards considered to meet professional integrity – not broadcasting violence and atrocities regardless of its effect on viewership of the channel. This is in contrast with media that may only be interested in increasing viewership and ratings or supporting individuals or groups to influence public opinion and so on. Likewise in the pharmaceutical industry, professional bodies guide the ethos of being a pharmacist such that pharmacists for instance are forbidden to treat their clients as mere market segments (Koehn, 1994). Instead, there should be a sense of being a part of a profession, it is almost like a ritual being a part of the professional body but management is more nebulous.

This is part of the critique of bureaucracies that they create a sense of requiring managers to justify their authority over the professions. Managers need to appear they act in the service of the interests of shareholders and that they demonstrate organisational loyalty as agents (Genfu, 2004; Laffont and Martimont, 2009). This study shows that often this loyalty is understood in a way that is mainly self-serving and mirroring managerial cognitive and moral capacity. Managerial authority to substitute professional norms by their own ones serves them as a means for increasing managerial power.

On the other hand managerial authority to override or recreate the professional norms in a given organisational context may just mirror and express their own cognitive moral capacity, based on their integrity and their meaning making quality as noted (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang, 2011). Then because most of the management as found in this study and other studies reason at the conventional CMD level (Jackall, 1983), their way of showing they are good agents who ensure org interests is by setting their own “expert” standards of moral goodness and badness that overwrite and compete with professional ethical codes. This may be or become a way of exercising power and ownership over employees’ moral identities and employees’ integrities because they consider them as “their” resources, in the sense of belonging to the organisation via their permanent employment contract. This may wrongly be misunderstood as a duty to submit their personal moral identities, their integrities to the agents-managers who legitimately are entrusted to take care of the firm’s good. As such, there is the tension between managerial

authority and professional authority and this is where the real problems lie. If one speaks to a proper professional in a bureaucracy, they should have a sense of 'you do not owe me' because who really owes me if anybody does is the profession. This sense was felt only in the charismatic bureaucracy where employees were proud to say they place their professions over the firm anytime and the leaders encourage them to do so.

9.5 Theoretical Implications

The implications of the findings examined above will now be critically discussed in two different sections. First, as seen from the previous section, bureaucracies can manifest in different forms often having varying impact on employee morality. This study has been able to uncover four different hybrids of bureaucracy and their effect on employee morality. Prior studies on bureaucratic morality by Jackal (1988) and Hummel (2007) did not account for such subtle differences in their conceptualisation of bureaucracy; hence an implication of this finding on the literature of bureaucracy will first be presented. Secondly this study advances our understanding of how bureaucracies actually have negative effect on employee morality through the different mechanisms they create. These were not explained in the studies of Jackal and Hummel and will be discussed in greater detail in the second implications section that discusses the findings above in the light of the bureaucratic morality literature.

9.5.1 Implications for the literature on Bureaucracy

In general, this study presents more explicit evidence that bureaucracy always influences morality and that bureaucracy has a subtle but rather negative impact on morality as shown in tables 9.2 and 9.3— except for charismatic authority. This is in alignment with earlier studies by Jackal, (1988) and Hummel (1998) whose findings suggest predominantly negative effects of bureaucracy on morality. They do this by creating a façade of morality that takes away the essential component of ethics - independent critical moral inquiry. This study establishes that by creating facades, bureaucracies are able to systematically discourage independent critical moral inquiry, which results in employees becoming increasingly insensitive to moral issues until they become unable to make independent moral choices on their jobs.

According to Cho et al, (2015), the concept of an organisational façade is originally theorised to serve one purpose – to create an organisational legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. As such Abrahamson and Baumard, (2008: pg. 437) define an organisational façade as “a symbolic front erected by organisational participants designed to re-assure their organisational stakeholders of the legitimacy of the organisation and its management” which aligns with the Lindblom, (1993) conception of Legitimacy theory. As will be further discussed below, it will be posited that bureaucracies through their internal mechanisms such as rules and managerial control are able to create a moral façade that legitimises them with their Board of Directors and shareholders. By this employees are made to believe that compliance to rules for instance means they are competent on their jobs and that this covers all aspects of moral decision making as well. Through this, rules replace independent moral inquiry as found in the case of the traditional bureaucracy for instance. However employees don't simply relinquish their autonomy at once, they are systematically lured by the bureaucracy's façade that pushes them to do or act without thinking as a way of thinking they are okay in moral terms. This, over time results in employees becoming converts of the bureaucracy's ways of doing things, which is often devoid of genuine personal moral inquiry. This often results in a climate in which conformity is prevalent as will be explored in the second section.

More recent theorising of organisational façade by Abrahamson and Baumard, (2008) suggests that an organisation's façade is not unitary but could have several facets that serve different (and less ethically responsive) purposes. For example, Abrahamson and Baumard, (2008) cited examples of organisational facades two of which are relevant in this discussion of bureaucracy and its effect on morality as follows: rational façade and reputational façade.

According to Cho et al, (2015: pg. 343), rational façade is ‘the key to market legitimacy’. It presents ‘rational norms’ which Meyer and Rowan, (1977: pg. 343) argue are not simply general values but that ‘they exist in much more specific and powerful ways in the rules, understandings and meanings attached to institutionalised social structures’. This was found to be particularly true in the all the traditional and caste bureaucracies, in which rational norms as displayed through rules and managerial control played powerful roles in the meanings employees attached to their social structures. For instance in some contexts, rules were the

'holy grail' of effectiveness, efficiency and doing the right things, whilst in some other contexts, rules were simply control tools to protect interests by restricting certain classes of persons from privileged positions. In the former, employees substitute compliance for critical moral inquiry whilst in the latter, employees use their subjective personal moral reasoning in making their moral decisions. But in all instances, 'rational norms' had great effects in influencing the perception of employees which ultimately also affected their moral dispositions within the bureaucracies. Also having rules that claim to restrict employees' activities in certain ways in the wider corrupt context of the Nigerian pharmaceutical industry seems like the 'right' thing to have. In each of the case groups, there were mechanisms put in place to erect a moral front aimed at reassuring employees and other stakeholders of the legitimacy of the firm's approach to the Nigerian market. This implies that organisations attempt to present an outlook that they are committed to doing things 'properly' in a context where 'anything goes' and that they have sufficient mechanisms to regulate and control all firm activities. By this, stakeholders are made to believe in the firm's commitment to ethical processes in order to protect their reputation hence the rational façade.

A reputational façade aims at displaying rhetoric and symbols desired by critical stakeholders such as the press (Abrahamson and Baumard, 2008). These symbols often express "corporate values such as language, code of ethics or the attainment of an industry excellence award" (Cho et al: pg. 82) aimed at inflating corporation's goals or masking unacceptable performance. Similarly, the websites of each of the firms studied in this dissertation all had sections for code of ethics, corporate values and the likes of such symbols that are on public display. Also, through this façade most employees actually believed that their bureaucracy is ethical and would deny that they do anything wrong. These all contribute towards creating a reputational façade. However in reality, these may be nothing but masks for the several unregulated activities of the firms and its employees on the field. For instance in the case of the Firm X scandal in Kano, the first references the firm made in response to accusations that it had violated due process were to its existing code of ethics of how things are expected to be done even though there were clear evidences that these were not necessarily followed in the build up to the scandal (Murray, 2007).

Therefore, bureaucracies create a façade of obedience and alignment to different rules norms and standards that are nothing but the bureaucracies own generated standards and not moral laws. This is like the convention theory (Daudigeos and Valiorgue, 2010; Wilkinson, 2011) in which different groups create their own rules through group systems but these are not moral laws even if these make an attempt at being morally inclined. That is, the rules within bureaucracies are often very different from a clear evidence of universal standards of ethics. Thus, different ethical theories at some point refer to a minimum that bring a realisation that it is not about conventions that suit an organisation or a group but that there are universal standards of ethics such as justice, equality, fairness and so on. But as have been discovered, the hybrids of bureaucracy discussed above predominantly have rules that are not directly associated with such universal standards of ethics but rather protect some independent interests, most often economic gains. Such rules, with their focus on other objectives besides universal ethics are able to discourage independent critical inquiry. The essential component of ethics is not in people following the conventions but in following universal standards of ethics, for instance, Rawl's (1971) theory of justice or that individuals show evidence of post-conventional reasoning through independent critical moral inquiry. Furthermore, with the notion of moral inquiry, individuals are encouraged to abide by universal ethics that underlie humanistic traditions (justice, human dignity etc) and engage in moral reflection and debate. But when employees are 'limitless' or when a system of governance makes employees feel they are self-righteous and limitless, for instance in the Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy, they do as they wish and that is exactly the absence of ethics.

9.5.2 Implications for the literature on Bureaucratic Morality

It follows from the previous section that even though bureaucracies may change, they all have a common pattern of effects that often interferes "as noise" for morality. That is, in each of the bureaucracies are elements and mechanisms that help create a façade/ climate that they may seem moral or that seems to encourage morality whereas their effects on employee morality is often negative as previously established. For instance, in the case of the traditional bureaucracy, enforcement of rule compliance through managerial control creates the impression that the bureaucracy supports strong morality whereas its effect on employee morality is

discovered to actually impede ethics. In the caste bureaucracy, the adoption of strict rules under a utilitarian ethic façade and justified as being for the greater good using the previous history of fraud could create such 'noise' for morality. In the entrepreneurial bureaucracy the data of this study shows that there was a "wicked" phenomenon whereby success, drive and performance norms were conflated to be understood as relevant to ethical values, which may be misleading to orient employees and management towards losing their ethical compass as a good thing insofar as they keep being successful.

The only exception was found in the case of a morally inclined 'charismatic bureaucracy' (N1). Although this finding was neither planned or expected, and despite the literature that also cautions as to the many ethical perils of charisma (Howell and Avolio, 1992; Graham, 1991), this exhibits the importance of moral character based on positive values of benevolence, trust, respect exhibited by the senior managers and via the managerial role models able to support a genuinely shared moral climate regarding the relations of managers and employees. This climate systematically values that facades are minimal and a genuine understanding of and appreciation of behaviour favouring benevolent collaboration is the norm. The effect of the charismatic persons in the senior management on the bureaucracy that serve as moral role models can be seen through the lens of social cognitive theory.

As explained by Wood and Bandura (1989: pg. 364), social cognitive theory explains that 'in any causal structure, behaviour, cognitive and other personal factors and environmental events operate as interacting determinants that influence each other bi-directionally. This was the case within the charismatic bureaucracy whereby the effect of the charisma of the leaders created a system of bidirectional impact through mutual trust and social accountability that impacted significantly on how employees perceive the bureaucracy.

In the leadership / ethics literatures there are works on the general impact of charismatic authority on employees, studies such as Morana, (1987); Shamir, House and Arthur, (1993); Conger and Kanungo, (1994); McNeese-Smith, (1995); McNeese-Smith, (1997); Chiok Foong Loke, (2001) have linked charismatic authority in organisations to job satisfaction, productivity, employee outcome, motivation, commitment and other similar employee related traits. Also, a study by Howell and

Avolio, (1992) highlighted some of the darker sides of charismatic authority such as 'charming' employees into submission towards immoral ends. However, the opposite of this was found in the *Charismatic Bureaucracy* in which the managers' behaviours encourage a greater sense of moral awareness whilst also allowing employees make their own choices thereby helping them retain their personal moral values. By this employees feel liberated to be themselves. Studies on employee moral development by Burns, (1978); House and Arthur, (1993); Dvir, Eden, Avolio and Shamir, (2002) based on Kohlberg's (1973) theory suggested that for managers to be charismatic, they have to be 'morally uplifting' (Bass, 1998). This was found to be true within the context of the charismatic bureaucracy in which employees considered their leaders to inspire them morally and by this, they embrace these values which translates into a communal understanding of common values that binds the organisation together. The internalisation of company values by employees of N1 is not a function of rule compliance but a function of the charisma of the leaders who are faces of the values the firm stands for and whom employees willingly respect and embrace their values. It is also noteworthy that the context of the charismatic bureaucracy recorded the highest number of post conventional thinkers in any of the case groups, another indicator confirming the positive effect of charismatic authority on the morality of employees.

Therefore all of the above imply that having an ethical protocol (Trevino, 1986; Ferrell and Skinner, 1988; Trevino, Butterfield and McCabe, 1998) codified is not enough but that morality has to be tacit. In the cases of the four hybrids of bureaucracies discovered in the cause of this study, two had clearly codified rules and these played out to have negative impact on employee morality. However with the two firms without clear rules, one had the effect of charismatic authority driving it whilst the other was driven by opportunistic entrepreneurship. The latter context also proved to have negative impact on employee morality however the only firm without rules but with some control underpinned by charismatic leadership seemed to work best for employee morality. As such, any codified attempt to define moral standards through websites and public relations, SOPS is often open to interpretation based on individuals' stage of moral reasoning and also based on the overall purpose of the bureaucracy, which in most cases is efficiency. This was clearly the case in three of the hybrids of bureaucracy found in this study. Therefore as espoused in the

charismatic bureaucracy, ethics is best diffused by personalised, tacit means via role modelling, direct association and visual observation. As such in the case of the charismatic bureaucracy, it is the charisma of all the leaders that changed the picture of the bureaucracy. Thus, for morality to be effectively diffused within any system a strong consistency and coherence between context and individuals (individuals living out what they claim to believe) have to be a complimentary package for morality to work. This once again emphasizes the individual-situation interaction model of Trevino, (1986) in which it was posited that both individuals and contexts make ethics.

9.6 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the main contribution of this study which is an empirical study of bureaucratic contexts on employee morality. From the four hybrids of bureaucracies found in the three case groups explored in this study, each had unique and varying in their impact on employee morality with three having a prevalently negative effect. Only the Charismatic Bureaucracy contributed positively to the moral development of employees within it. Across the case groups, it was also identified that there was a general inflated moral identity pattern caused by different factors within each context. Also, CMR was discussed to show more reliability in explaining employee moral behaviour given the fact that moral identity is prone to contextual sensitivities. Finally, discussions focused on how bureaucracies tend to support expertise over and above professionalism. Interestingly in all of these, the charismatic bureaucracy was found to disconfirm the findings of all propositions.

CHAPTER 10

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

10.0 Introduction

This final chapter begins by highlighting the main limitations of this study. Then key practical implications of the main findings in this study are presented building on the discussions from chapter nine. On each of these practical implications, directions for future research are also proposed. From all these I draw my conclusions.

10.1 Limitations

In accurately capturing the two major theoretical measures employed in this study: moral identity (Aquino and Reed, 2002) and cognitive moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1961), a few limitations may be reported. First, in determining the moral identity strength of employees, the Aquino and Reed, (2002) moral identity measure was employed. The measure is widely documented to have consistently high validity; reliability and significant variations in large samples (Aquino and Reed, 2002, Aquino, McFerran and Laven, 2011). However the smaller sample size in this study could have affected the moral identity scores obtained, hence a limitation. Secondly, in measuring the cognitive moral development (Kohlberg 1973) of employees, the Defining Issues Test (DIT) created by (Rest, 1989) is the main measurement tool that achieves scientific reliability and validity in the literature. The nature of this study being a more qualitative exploration of effects of various bureaucratic contexts on employee morality was not based on this measure but rather a more subtle qualitative interview guide which has subsequently undergone qualitative analysis (of the manifested patterns of thought of the interviewees) to be matched against Kohlberg's theoretical categories in his CMD theory (1961). This is clearly a limitation, which also entails some increased researcher subjectivity bias, which is however part of the general critiques for qualitative studies with interpretative research epistemology. However given the volume of the DIT questionnaire and the difficulty of getting participants to take part in this study, the DIT could not be used, nor was it compatible with a qualitative study as noted. My chosen method of capturing the cognitive moral reasoning patterns of the interviewees could however be subject to researcher bias, which is thus another related limitation of this study.

Also, given the nature of ethics and the role contexts play in affecting moral thought and action, a cross-sectional study may not fully capture the full extent of the dynamics between organisational context variables (in this case, bureaucracy and related dimensions) and morality, i.e. the phenomenon investigated in this dissertation is very subtle, emerging and requires systematic observation across time. It is expected that longitudinal studies will more accurately reveal the full import of the role of contexts in shaping employee morality and this is something that the researcher may do in future studies.

10.2 Practical Implications and Future research

In this section, I present significant practical implications arising from the findings of this study. For each point raised, I also discuss directions for future research.

Implications for Nationalised Bureaucratic Institutions in the organisational context of healthcare

This study focused on bureaucracy in the private sector with multinationals in the corrupt context of Nigeria. The effects of the different bureaucracies within this context have been severally discussed earlier and it can be imagined that similar issues are true for national health care organisations like the National Health Service (NHS). The NHS is a large organisation with a complex structure and even within the structures, it contains both large and smaller units and all function differently. This research can also be applied in this instance to discuss the different arms of the NHS, the types of bureaucratic hybrids in each of these arms and their implication on the moral dispositions they might encourage. Also in the light of sweeping reforms taking place in the organisation of the public health service in England and Sweden for instance, (Fotaki and Boyd, 2005), it would be interesting to study across the different countries to further explore if for example the bureaucracies in their national health care systems are characterised by such or other hybrids of bureaucracy and their subsequent effects on morality and individual moral agency. The nationalised bureaucratic healthcare context across EU and European countries may be a very interesting further context for continuing this empirical research. It is expected that this will help give interpretations to some of the moral and organisational behaviour challenges being experienced in those contexts for instance concerns of patient choice, governance hybrids and partnerships (Fotaki, 2011).

Overall, this is expected to contribute to the growing research on how to make the NHS and other nationalised healthcare institutions in developed and developing countries work more effectively and more ethically.

Headquarters and Subsidiaries Relationships

The findings in this study also have implications for international business. In two of the three case groups studied in this research, the findings in this study bring to light the role the relationships between subsidiaries and their headquarters can play in shaping the type of bureaucracies operating within them as well as the type of morality they espouse. As such, the different subsidiaries of a firm could have entirely different bureaucracies in different contexts in which they operate, whilst the Headquarters presents a global façade of morality, while affiliate organisations in foreign contexts may be less encouraged to actively pursue organisational ethics beyond a surface level adherence to the operating procedures and codes of ethics of the Headquarters, as was found to be the case of A1 and A2 in this study. In such instances, subsidiaries are not necessarily fully regulated by the headquarters but such are left to function in contexts as desired. On the contrary, it could be the Headquarters that pressures subsidiaries into certain practices thereby stifling efforts being made at the subsidiary level to get things right. Generally however, it would be interesting to study the subsidiaries of the same firm in different contexts, particularly the developing nations vis-à-vis the developed nations to see the types of bureaucracy hybrids operating at these levels and the role of the headquarters in these different subsidiaries.

Beyond Bureaucracy

This study has highlighted the predominantly negative impact of bureaucracy on employee morality. This implies that bureaucracy is not an organisational form that necessarily encourages morality. From this study therefore, the bureaucracy literature benefits from the deeper understanding of how Weber's ideal type is idealistic and that there are several manifestations of bureaucracy based on different factors such as national context, culture and firm's objectives. However, within the literature of organisational studies and design, newer forms of organisations deemed to be 'post-bureaucratic' such as in the case of the *Charismatic Bureaucracy* and *Entrepreneurial Bureaucracy* have since emerged (Heckscher, Donnellon, 1994;

Kernaghan, 2000; Morris and Farrell, 2007) claiming to be radically different alternatives to the traditional bureaucracy. But, in discussing these newer forms of organisations, no matter the names given to them, there are always some elements of bureaucracy. As Heckscher, (1994:14) posited, in saying that post bureaucratic organisations 'centre on teamwork, or lateral coordination, it turns out that some highly traditional bureaucratic organisations have a great deal of teamwork too'. Hence variations between these alleged new forms of organisations and traditional bureaucracies are hard to judge. Hence, wherever elements of bureaucracy such as rules (SOPs) or some form of managerial control are present, regardless of the type of organisation it is, flat or networked, these particular variables or dimensions will have both the positive effects (as found in the Charismatic Bureaucracy) and negative effects (present in the other three hybrids) found in this dissertation. Therefore, when newer forms of organisations are said to have been discovered yet have traces of rule compliance in some way or managerial control either via personalised means or other means, the negative effects of these on employee morality as found in this dissertation will have to be faced. In reality then, this calls to question the uniqueness of these newer forms of organisation if indeed they have some of the Weberian dimensions within them. Can they therefore be referred to as hybrids instead of radically new, different organisations? This question calls for future research studying these alleged newer forms of organisations to investigate their acclaimed uniqueness and to test whether some of the effects on employee morality found in this study are present in them as well.

Hybrid bureaucracy and context

In this study, four different hybrids of bureaucracy were found in the context of one industry. Each of these bureaucracies had different manifestations of rules and managerial control and also had different effects on the morality of individuals. All of these imply that there is no pure bureaucracy per se and that bureaucracy is idealistic. There is no one singular type of bureaucracy neither is there one singular way in which each of its dimensions manifest in any given context or setting. Bureaucracy is so nuanced that even within one industry, there are different shades. Hence, there could be as many different types of bureaucracies as there are organisations, with fundamental differences and superficial similarities. Therefore, it will be interesting to research across industries to find out whether the four hybrid

types found in this study are present in other industries or whether different industries tend to have their own types of bureaucracies peculiar to them.

There is also a need for studies that might show contextual differences and resultant effects on different bureaucratic dimensions. Future research in bureaucracy can also look at other industry sectors and also consider other Weberian dimensions to be investigated in addition to the ones explored in this study. Longitudinal studies in each of the contexts can also be carried out to further appreciate the impact of the bureaucracy on employee morality. The current research design gives a snapshot of what is happening within each bureaucracy however, the continuous effect of the context on employee morality needs to be monitored over longer periods of time to test the stability of these effects. Also longitudinal studies are needed for instance to study the charismatic bureaucracy to see whether the charisma is sustained over a long period of time and whether its effects remain consistent over the duration of the longitudinal study.

Promoting Ethical Organisations

Although this research has been a qualitative study, in spite of its limitations earlier discussed, it has provided strong evidence that confirms Jackall, (1988) on how much conventional moral level of reasoning has been expanding in large organisations so as to become the norm of doing business, while in the morality and ethics literature conventional moral behaviour is understood as a rather inferior and immature way of individual being and active. This potentially means that organisational contexts of work may be gradually over time corrosive for both personal character and weakening of the possibility for a virtuous economy for the common good (Akrivou & Sison; 2016 forthcoming).

The fact this research has been able to show that the persistence of conventional level morality in every day work contexts of large firms may be also an outcome due to the dynamics of bureaucratic organising in competitive global capitalist settings whereby the attraction, selection and the promotion of lower and mid level conventional moral reasoners / actors in key managerial and other positions of authority is a conscious act insofar as it supports a concern for short term efficiency that requires tolerance and promotion of conventional and transactional ways of professional relations within and outside firms. It is clear

anyway that bureaucratic rationality and conventional (lower-middle) level moral reasoning capacity are sine-qua non aspects of organisations.

Therefore policy makers or anyone interested in promoting ethical organisations have to think of the implications of context on behaviour based on the findings of this dissertation. If the designs of organisations are not changed such that they promote other ethical forms of behaviour such as allowing for independent critical moral inquiry or such that they allow for universal ethics of justice and fairness (Kohlberg stage 6) to thrive, organisations may continually undermine employee morality. A good model as found in this study is in the case of the charismatic bureaucracy where a tacit exchange of morals from managers to subordinates through visible character and conduct resulted in the encouraging high number of post conventional level thinkers. All these support the notion in descriptive ethics literature (Trevino, 1986; Weaver, 2006) that ethics is an interaction between context and behaviour hence, close attention must be paid to contexts and its impact on employees. Besides bureaucracy, the roles of other contextual elements or other organisational forms in affecting the morality of their employees may be considered in future studies. Also further studies could address how to break the habit of encouraging conventional level thinking within bureaucracies. Therefore subsequent studies could review how bureaucracies can best encourage morality in their employees whilst also helping the bureaucracy become a thriving ground for propagating individual critical moral inquiry.

Tacit ethics

As found in this study there is likely to be a higher level of moral reasoning in organisations where managerial control is more personal assuming that the management is more genuinely driven by ethical character and motivation and where SOPs are more tacit. The tacit nature is transmitted via the interactions between the managers and their subordinates. This was found in the Nigerian firms as an emergent finding but extremely interesting as contexts with more collectivistic culture have a more personalised culture rather than the individualistic culture, as in the west. If managers are explicitly trying to create organisational change, then one of the implications for organisational change is that moving towards a quasi collectivist culture would be more difficult even in a North American or Western

contexts, which are more individualist cultures. There could be more resistance because people want to see SOPs written down, risk registers etc in guiding their actions instead of trusting mutually shared norms as modelled by their leaders. More research is needed to test whether tacitly transferred ethics in different contexts have positive effects on the morality of employees. Through tacit conversations, there is a replication of norms, the mechanism that if I had longitudinal data; I could show why bureaucracy has longevity and is resistant to change. This would be interesting for future research to see how this continues over time. Also given all the negative contributions of the bureaucracy to morality and also given how resistant and long-lived bureaucracies tend to get, more work is required to empirically see how organisations are able to introduce positive change to break the bureaucracy and create a healthy environment for ethics.

Rules: Managerial and Employee Meaning Making

In this study, the roles rules or SOPs play in the bureaucracy show that they can be used to drive compliance towards certain ends but that they can also be used to cover up managerial immorality. Therefore, the SOPs themselves may not necessarily be the problem but the way managers use and interpret them, which as shown and noted also depends on the moral reasoning and character capacities of these but also on the normative elements of the bureaucracies that define a narrow role for management, mainly concerned with efficiency and the guarding of the upper echelon's interests and goals. This may mean that more qualitative research is required to understand the way managers and individuals within the organisation understand, interpret or are allowed to interpret the moral context, rules, relationships and their own role and authority freedoms and limitations (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang, 2011).

In this same literature (Akrivou & Bradbury-Huang, 2011) it has been observed that while the role of leadership is the main catalyst of the type of context/morality norms that exists in each setting, it is also organisational relations between management and any non-management role holders that co-create the organisational behaviour dynamics. This study has shown that all these human dynamics are seriously limited in terms of their ethical flourishing possibilities within bureaucratic contexts. The American firms for instance do not give a leeway to interpretation so the importance

of research and practice is to help raise more management meaning making capacity because some of the adverse effects of rules found in this study could be competence issues. Having the SOPs does not do the job; the responsibility is on individuals and managers to create the moral climate where the SOPs become something more (encouraging individual moral capacity) and not something less (limiting and stifling). The SOPs create an illusion that managers and employees must rely on the rules as they are but what I found in this case is that management as well as employee meaning making (Akrivou and Bradbury-Huang, 2011) is crucial since managers are the ones who have the power to sanction and reward, to elevate these SOPs into being useful for building moral capacities of their employees. Thus the responsibility of interpretation and implement is on individuals.

Implications for management education and training

This study has further confirmed the critical need to teach ethics in business schools in a way that prepares aspiring business managers for the realities they will face in the work place. This study has highlighted three of these realities including the likelihood of an inflated moral identity, conformity to norms and an excessive focus of results at the expense of professionalism. Therefore, the need arises in management education to emphasise the delicate role contexts can play in shaping and affecting the morality of those working in them. This study suggests the need for current and aspiring managers to be equipped with tools to engage in deliberate, critical, personal, independent moral inquiry, which could be a way to checkmate the negative effects contexts may have on their individual morality and choices. This also calls for emphasis to be made on the need for aspiring and current managers to assume a greater sense of responsibility in their moral choices, which can be enhanced by an objective self-reflection at work. At this level, organisations can also be encouraged to create enabling environments for their employees to engage in such acts of critical moral inquiry whilst training can be directed as deliberating on how the excesses of contexts can be curtailed to create more morally healthy environment for employees.

10.3 Conclusion

This dissertation has been able to address a critical gap in our understanding of how contexts, in this case bureaucracies create mechanisms that are generally inhibitive

to employee morality. In so doing, it has been able to contribute to the literature of organisational design, moral identity, ethical decision-making and bureaucracy. Building on the initial suggestions of Trevino, (1986) and Weaver, (2006) that future research in descriptive ethics needs to consider the role of contexts in shaping employee morality and decision making capacity, this dissertation set out to investigate bureaucratic contexts. Earlier studies on bureaucratic contexts and their impact on employee morality (Jackall, 1988; Hummel, 2007) discovered that bureaucracies typically encouraged conventional level reasoning among employees. This implied that employees were unable to rise above the norms and status quo of bureaucracies in making ethical decisions at the post conventional level for instance. How bureaucracies achieve this however was not described. Also, the conceptualisation of bureaucracies was based on the assumption that there was only Weber's ideal type, as it existed in traditional organisations. However, within the context of this study, four different hybrids of bureaucracy were found to have varying effects on employee morality, even though they were predominantly negative effects. This implies that studies on contexts need to carefully understand the nature of the contexts being investigated and their peculiarities as this will have huge ramifications on the effects discovered within them.

In this study, clear mechanisms such as rule compliance, superficial belongingness, and success-oriented opportunism were found to be examples of ways different hybrids of bureaucracy stifled individual critical moral inquiry whilst also inflating a sense of strong moral identity. However charisma was found to play a positive role in tacitly building the moral awareness and capacity of employees. By these, it can be concluded that explicitly written rules as discovered in this study tend to have more negative effects on employee morality but that a more potent way of shaping the employee morality in a positive way is through tacit transfer and hence socialisation through the visible character and conduct of the managers.

In conclusion, the literature on organisational design benefits from how to build ethical organisations that enhance the moral capacities of persons (employees and management) through recognition of the importance of a relational perspective alongside the structural and rule perspectives in positively shaping employee morality. The descriptive ethical literature benefits from yet another confirmation of the clear complimentary role in which both contexts and individuals play in shaping

ethical decision-making and also confirm this interplay as the direction for all future studies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdullahi, (2002). *Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc*, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17436 Argyris *1 (S.D.N.Y. September 17, 2002)
- Abrahamson, E., & Baumard, P. (2008). What lies behind organizational façades and how organizational façades lie: An untold story of organizational decision making. *The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making*. Oxford: OUP.
- Ackroyd, S., Batt, R., Thompson, P. and Tolbert, P. (2005) 'Texts and Times: Mapping the Changing Study of Work and Organizations', in Ackroyd, S., Batt, R., Thompson, P. and Tolbert, P. (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Work and Organization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Adair-Toteff, C., (2005). Max Weber's charisma. *Journal of Classical Sociology*, 5(2), pp.189-204.
- Adewale, A.A., (2011). *Cognitive moral development in Africa: Case study of Nigerian managers*. MSc Henley Business School.
- Adler, P. S. & Borys, B. (1996). Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive. *Administrative science quarterly*, pp. 61-89.
- Adler, P. S. & Cole, R. (1995). *Designed for learning: a tale of two auto plants*.
- Adler, P. S. (1999). Building better bureaucracies. *The Academy of Management Executive*, 13(4), pp. 36-47.
- Akomah, B. B., & Nani, G. (2016). Public Procurement Corruption: Types, Approaches, and Collusion or Rigging. *African Journal of Applied Research (AJAR)*, 3(3).
- Akrivou, K. (2013). *Self-Ideal Congruence And Self Complexity: The Constructs, Their Positive Role for Adult Ego Development And Their Relationship* being a discussion paper series at the John Dunning Centre for International Business, Henley Business School
- Akrivou, K., & Bradbury-Huang, H. (2011). Executive catalysts: Predicting sustainable organizational performance amid complex demands. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 22(5), pp.995-1009.
- Akrivou, K., & Bradbury-Huang, H. (2015). Educating integrated catalysts: Transforming business schools toward ethics and sustainability. *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, 14(2), pp. 222-240.
- Akrivou, K. and Orón, J. V. (2016) Two kinds of human integrity: towards the ethics of inter-processual self (IPS). In: Akrivou, K. and Sison, A. J. G. (eds.) *Challenges of capitalism for virtue and the common good: inter-disciplinary perspectives*. Edward Elgar. ISBN 9781784717902 (In Press)

- Akrivou, K. and Sison, A. J. G. (2016) Challenges of capitalism for virtue ethics and the common good: interdisciplinary perspectives. Edward Elgar, London. ISBN 9781784717902 (In Press)
- Akunyili, D. (2005, March). Counterfeit and substandard drugs, Nigeria's experience: implications, challenges, actions And recommendations. In *Talk for NAFDAC at a Meeting for Key Interest Groups on Health*.
- Akunyili, D. (2006). The fight against counterfeit drugs in Nigeria. *Transparency International—global corruption report*, 96-100.
- Al-Habil, W. (2011). Governance and government in public administration. *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research*, 3, 123-128.
- Albrow, M. (1970). *Bureaucracy*, Macmillan London.
- Allen, R. C. (2006). The British Industrial Revolution in global perspective: How commerce created the Industrial Revolution and modern economic growth. *Unpublished, Nuffield College, Oxford*.
- Almasri, L. (2011). An investigation of the Weberian notion of bureaucracy in the context of service higher education institutions.
- Alvesson, M. & Thompson, P. (2005). *Post-bureaucracy?*
- Anand, V., Ashforth, B. E., & Joshi, M. (2004). Business as usual: The acceptance and perpetuation of corruption in organizations. *Academy of Management Executive*, 18(2), pp.39–53.
- Anderson, C. & Brown, C. E. (2010). The functions and dysfunctions of hierarchy. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, 30, pp. 55-89.
- Antaki, C., Billig, M., & Edwards, D. (2002), Discourse analysis means doing analysis: A critique of six analytic shortcomings. *Discourse Analysis Online (online journal at: <http://extra.shu.ac.uk/daol/index.html>)*
- Aquino, K., & Reed, A. I. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 83(6), pp.1423–1440.
- Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed II, A., Lim, V. K., & Felps, W. (2009). Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: the interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology; Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97(1), 123.
- Aquino, K., Freeman, D., Reed, A., Lim, V., & Felps, W. (2008). When morality matters: Moral identity and the self-regulation of behavior. *Paper under review*.
- Aquino, K., McFerran, B., & Laven, M. (2011). Moral identity and the experience of moral elevation in response to acts of uncommon goodness. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 100(4), 703.
- Arches, J. (1991). Social structure, burnout, and job satisfaction. *Social work*, 36, 202-206.

- Argyris, C. (1973). Some limits of rational man organizational theory. *Public Administration Review*, 253-267.
- Aron, R. (1970). *Main Currents in Sociological Thought: Vol. 2: Durkheim, Pareto, Weber*. Anchor Books.
- Aronson, J. (1994). A pragmatic view of thematic analysis. *The Qualitative Report*, 2(1), 2(1).
- Asch, S. E. (1951). Effects of group pressure upon the modification and distortion of judgments. *Groups, leadership, and men*. Pp. 222-236.
- Ashforth, B. E., & Mael, F. (1989). Social identity theory and the organization. *Academy of management review*, 14(1), pp. 20-39.
- Attride-Stirling, J. (2001). Thematic networks: an analytic tool for qualitative research. *Qualitative research*, 1(3), 385-405.
- Au, A. K., & Wong, D. S. (2000). The impact of guanxi on the ethical decision-making process of auditors—an exploratory study on Chinese CPAs in Hong Kong. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 28(1), 87-93.
- Bakan, J. (2004). *The corporation: the pathological pursuit of power and profit*. New York: Free P.
- Bales, R. F., Strodtbeck, F. L., Mills, T. M. & Roseborough, M. E. (1951). Channels of communication in small groups. *American Sociological Review*, 461-468.
- Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. *Psychological review*, 84(2), pp.191.
- Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 3, 193–209.
- Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. *Annual review of psychology*, 52(1), 1-26.
- Bar, M., & Leukhina, O. (2007). Accounting for Changes in Labor Force Participation of Married Women: The Case of the US since 1959, Discussion paper. *University of Maryland*.
- Barker, J.R., (1993). Tightening the iron cage: Concertive control in self-managing teams. *Administrative science quarterly*, pp.408-437.
- Barnett, J.H. and M.J. Carson (1989). Managers, values, and executive decisions: An exploration of the role of gender, career stage, organizational level, function, and the importance of ethics, relationships and results in managerial decision-making, *Journal of Business Ethics* 8, pp. 747-771.
- Barnett, T. (1992). A preliminary investigation of the relationship between selected organizational characteristics and external whistleblowing by employees. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11(12), 949-959.

- Barzelay, M., Armajani, B. J., & Altshuler, A. (1992). *Breaking through bureaucracy: A new vision for managing in government*. Univ of California Press.
- Bass, B. M. (1985). *Leadership and performance beyond expectations*. Free Press; Collier Macmillan.
- Bass, B. M. (1998). The ethics of transformational leadership. *Ethics, the heart of leadership*, pp.169-192.
- Bass, B. M. (2008). The Bass handbook of leadership. *Theory, research and managerial applications*, 4.
- Bass, K., Barnett, T., & Brown, G. (1999). Individual difference variables, ethical judgments, and ethical behavioral intentions. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 9(02), 183-205.
- Bauman, T. (2001). Shifting sands: Towards an anthropological praxis. *Oceania*, 202-225.
- Bauman, Z. (1983). Industrialism, consumerism and power. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 1, 32-43.
- Bauman, Z. (1993). *Postmodern ethics*. Blackwell Oxford.
- Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. *The qualitative report*, 13(4), pp. 544-559.
- Bell, E., & Bryman, A. (2007). The ethics of management research: an exploratory content analysis. *British Journal of Management*, 18(1), 63-77.
- Beneish, M. D., Chatov, R., (1993). Corporate Codes of Conduct: Economic Determinants and Legal Implications for Independent Auditors. *Journal of Accounting and Public Policy*. 12 (e.g. 2), pp.3-35
- Bergman, R. (2004). Identity as motivation: Toward a theory of the moral self. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez, (Eds.), *Moral development, self and identity*: 21-46. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Blasi, A. (1980). Bridging moral cognition and action: A critical review of the literature. *Psychological Bulletin*, 88: 1-45.
- Blasi, A. (1983). Moral cognition and moral action: A theoretical perspective. *Developmental review*, 3(2), 178-210.
- Blasi, A. (1984). Moral identity: Its role in moral functioning. In W. Kurtines & J. Gewirtz (Eds.), *Morality, moral behavior and moral development* (pp. 128–139). New York: Wiley.
- Blasi, A. (1993). The development of identity: Some implications for moral functioning. In G. G. Naom & T. E. Wren (Eds.), *The moral self* (pp. 99–122). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

- Blasi, A. (1999). Emotions and moral motivation. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 29(1), 1-19.
- Blasi, A. (2004). Moral functioning: Moral understanding and personality. In D. K. Lapsley & D. Narvaez (Eds.), *Moral development, self, and identity* (pp. 335–348). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Blasi, A. (2005). 6 What should count as moral behavior? The nature of “early morality” in children's development. *Advances in Psychology*, 137, 119-140.
- Blau, P. M. (1955). *The dynamics of bureaucracy: A study of interpersonal relations in two government agencies*, Chicago, U. P.
- Blau, P. M. (1964). *Exchange and power in social life*, Transaction Publishers.
- Bolton, L. E., & Reed, A. (2004). Sticky priors: The perseverance of identity effects on judgment. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 41(4), pp. 397-410.
- Boone, C., Van Olfen, W., Van Witteloostuijn, A., & De Brabander, B. (2004). The genesis of top management team diversity: Selective turnover among top management teams in Dutch newspaper publishing, 1970–94. *Academy of Management Journal*, 47(5), pp. 633-656.
- Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). *Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development*. Sage.
- Brady, F. N., & Wheeler, G. E. (1996). An empirical study of ethical predispositions. *Journal of business ethics*, 15(9), pp. 927-940.
- Braun, V, and Clarke V., (2006). Using Thematic Analysis In Psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology* 3 (2) pg 77-101.
- Brenner, S. N. & Molander, E. A. (1977). *Is the ethics of business changing?*, Harvard Business Review.
- Brichacek, A. (2001). What price corruption?. *Pharmaceutical Executive* 21. (11), pp.94
- British Broadcasting Corporation (2016). *France Drug-trial: Brain-dead man dies in Hospital*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35337671> accessed 29/04/2016
- Bruce, W. (1994). Ethical People Are Productive People. *Public Productivity & Management Review*, 17(3).
- Bryman, A. (2001). The nature of qualitative research. *Social research methods*: pp. 365-399.
- Bryman, A. (2003). Triangulation. *Encyclopedia of social science research methods*, 8.
- Burkhardt, M. E. (1994). Social interaction effects following a technological change: A longitudinal investigation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 37(4), 869-898.

- Burnard, P., Gill, P., Stewart, K., Treasure, E., & Chadwick, B. (2008). Analysing and presenting qualitative data. *British dental journal*, 204(8), 429-432.
- Burns, J. M. (1978). *Leadership*. NY.
- Burns, T. E. & Stalker, G. M. (1961). The management of innovation. *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship*.
- Bussey, K., & Maughan, B. (1982). Gender differences in moral reasoning. *Journal of personality and Social Psychology*, 42(4), pp. 701.
- Byrne, R. M. (2002). Mental models. *Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences: An Interdisciplinary, Searchable, and Linkable Resource*.
- Campbell, J. M. (2013). *Review of Instituting Nature: Authority, Expertise, and Power in Mexican Forests* by Andrew S. Mathews.
- Carsrud, A. and Brännback, M., (2011). Entrepreneurial motivations: what do we still need to know?. *Journal of Small Business Management*, 49(1), pp.9-26.
- Carter, L. F. (1994). Charisma and control in Rajneeshpuram: The role of shared values in the creation of a community.
- Chadwick, W.O., (2016). Protestantism. *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*. Retrieved 08 May, 2016, from <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Protestantism>
- Chandler Jr, A. D. (1990). The visible hand: the managerial revolution in American business (Cambridge, Mass., 1977). *ChandlerThe visible hand: the managerial revolution in American business 1977*.
- Chaubey, M.D., (2006). *HealthSouth Corporation: Fraud, Greed and Corporate Governance*. Case for International Conference on management Cases, India.
- Chiok Foong Loke, J., (2001). Leadership behaviours: effects on job satisfaction, productivity and organizational commitment. *Journal of nursing management*, 9(4), pp.191-204.
- Cho, C.H., Laine, M., Roberts, R.W. and Rodrigue, M., (2015). Organized hypocrisy, organizational façades, and sustainability reporting. *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 40, pp.78-94.
- Chonko, L. B., & Hunt, S. D. (1985). Ethics and marketing management: An empirical examination. *Journal of Business Research*, 13(4), pp. 339-359.
- CIA. (2013). Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved 22 March 2015, from <https://www.cia.gov/redirects/ciaredirect.html>
- Clawson, D. (1980). *Bureaucracy and the labor process: The transformation of US industry, 1860-1920*, Monthly Review Press New York.
- Clegg, J., & Slife, B. D. (2009). Research ethics in the postmodern context. *The handbook of social research ethics*, 23-38.

- Clegg, S. & Baumeler, C. (2010). Essai: From iron cages to liquid modernity in organization analysis. *Organization Studies*, 31, 1713-1733.
- Clegg, S. & Dunkerley, D. (1980). *Organization, Class and Control*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Clegg Organization, class and control 1980.
- Clegg, S. R., Harris, M., & Höpfl, H. (Eds.). (2011). *Managing modernity: beyond bureaucracy?*. Oxford University Press.
- Coffee, J. C. (1981). "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment. *Michigan Law Review*, 79(3), pp. 386-459.
- Cohen, M. (2006). The privatization of health care cleaning services in southwestern British Columbia, Canada: Union responses to unprecedented government actions. *Antipode*, 38(3), 626-644.
- Colby, A. & Kohlberg, L. (1987). The measurement of moral judgment: Theoretical foundations and research validation (Vol. 1). *New York: Cambridge*.
- Conger, J. A., & Kanungo, R. N. (1994). Charismatic leadership in organizations: Perceived behavioral attributes and their measurement. *Journal of organizational behavior*, 15(5), pp.439-452.
- Cook, J. M. (1983). *The Persian Empire*. Schocken.
- Coser, L & Rosenberg, B. (1976). *Sociological Theory*. 4th ed.
- Coser, L. A. (1977). Georg Simmel's neglected contributions to the sociology of women. *Signs*, 2(4), pp.869-876.
- Cottone, R. R., & Claus, R. E. (2000). Ethical decision-making models: A review of the literature. *Journal of Counseling & Development*, 78(3), pp.275-283.
- Courpasson, D., (2000). Managerial strategies of domination. Power in soft bureaucracies. *Organization studies*, 21(1), pp.141-161.
- Crafts, N. F., & Mills, T. C. (1994). Trends in real wages in Britain, 1750-1913. *Explorations in Economic History*, 31(2), 176-194.
- Crane, A. & Matten D., (2006). *Business Ethics* 3rd ed. Oxford Press: London.
- Cressy, D. (1992). The Fifth of November Remembered. *Myths of the English*, pp. 68-90.
- Crozier, M., (1964). *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Daft, R. L. (1982). Bureaucratic versus non-bureaucratic structure and the process of innovation and change. *Research in the Sociology of Organizations*, 1, 129-166.
- Damon, W. (1984). Self-understanding and moral development from childhood to adolescence. *Morality, moral behavior, and moral development*, pp.109-127.

- Dane, E., & Pratt, M. G. (2007). Exploring the role of intuition in managerial decision making. *Academy of Management Review*, 32(1), 33–54.
- Daudigeos, T., & Valiorgue, B. (2010). Convention Theory. *Is there a french school of organizational institutionalism*.
- Denzin, N.K. (1970). *The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods*. Chicago: Aldine.
- Denzin, N.K. (1978). *The Research Act*, 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Derlien, H.U. (1999). Unorthodox employment in the German public service. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 65, 13-23.
- DiMaggio, P. J. & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American sociological review*, 147-160.
- Dimock, M. E., & Hyde, H. K. (1940). *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations* (No. 11-15). US Government Printing Office.
- Dobson, A. (2003). *Citizenship and the Environment*. OUP Oxford.
- Donaldson, T., & Dunfee, T. W. (1994). Toward a unified conception of business ethics: Integrative social contracts theory. *Academy of management review*, 19(2), pp.252-284.
- Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. *Academy of management Review*, 20(1), pp.65-91.
- Dopson, S. & Stewart, R. (1990). What is happening to middle management? *British Journal of Management*, 1, 3-16.
- Doris, J. M. (1998). Persons, situations, and virtue ethics. *Nous*, 32(4), pp. 504-530.
- Downs, A., & Rand Corporation. (1967). *Inside bureaucracy* (p. 264). Boston: Little, Brown.
- Downs, J. F. (1969). Fables, Fancies and Failures in Cross-Cultural Training. *Trends*, 2, n3.
- Dreher, G. F., Ash, R. A., & Bretz, R. D. (1988). Benefit coverage and employee cost: Critical factors in explaining compensation satisfaction. *Personnel Psychology*, 41(2), 237-254.
- Drucker, P. F. (1988). *The coming of the new organization*.
- Du Gay, P. (2000). *In praise of bureaucracy: Weber-organization-ethics*, Sage.
- Dunsire, A. (1988). Bureaucratic Morality in the United Kingdom. *International Political Science Review*, 9(3), 179-191.
- Duska, R., & Whelan, M. (1975). Moral development. *A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg* (NY 1975).

- Dvir, T., Eden, D., Avolio, B. J., & Shamir, B. (2002). Impact of transformational leadership on follower development and performance: A field experiment. *Academy of management journal*, 45(4), pp. 735-744.
- Dwivedi, O. P., & Jain, R. B. (1988). Bureaucratic morality in India. *International Political Science Review*, 9(3), 205-214.
- Eichelberger RT. (1989). *Disciplined Inquiry: Understanding and Doing Educational Research*. New York: Longman.
- Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. *Academy of management review*, 14(4), 532-550.
- Elm, D R., & Nichols, M.L. (1993): An investigation of the moral reasoning of managers. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 12: pp. 817-833.
- Elwell, F. (1996). The Sociology of Max Weber
<http://academic.udayton.edu/RichardGhere/POL%20307/weber.htm>
- Eme, O.I & Emeh, I.E.J. (2012). Bureaucracy and Rural Development; the Role of Public Administration in National Development: The Nigerian Perspective. *Global journal of Management and Business Research*, 12 (4), 18-40.
- Epstein, D., & O'Halloran, S. (1999). Asymmetric information, delegation, and the structure of policy-making. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 11(1), 37-56.
- Erhun, W. O., Babalola, O. O., & Erhun, M. O. (2001). Drug regulation and control in Nigeria: The challenge of counterfeit drugs. *Journal of Health & Population in Developing Countries*, 4(2), 23-34.
- Erikson, E. H. (1964). *Insight and responsibility*. New York: Norton.
- Evans, P. and Rauch, J.E., (1999). Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of "Weberian" state structures on economic growth. *American sociological review*, pp.748-765.
- Evans, P. B., & Wurster, T. S. (1997). The new economics of information. *Harvard business review*, 5, 71-82.
- Fagermoen, M.S., (1997). Professional identity: values embedded in meaningful nursing practice. *Journal of advanced nursing*, 25(3), pp.434-441.
- Farazmand, A. (2001). Globalization, the State and public administration: a theoretical analysis with policy implications for developmental States. *Public Organization Review*, 1(4), 437-463.
- Farazmand, A. (2004). *Sound governance: Policy and administrative innovations*. Greenwood Publishing Group.
- Farazmand, A. (2007). Global administrative reforms and transformation of governance and public administration. *PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY-NEW YORK-*, 129, 351.

- Farazmand, A. (2009). Bureaucracy, administration, and politics: An introduction. *Bureaucracy and administration*, 1-18.
- Felson, R. B. (1985). Reflected appraisal and the development of self. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, pp.71-78.
- Fereday, J., & Muir-Cochrane, E. (2006). Demonstrating rigor using thematic analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme development. *International journal of qualitative methods*, 5(1), pp 80-92.
- Ferrell, O. C. & Fraedrich, J. (2014). *Business ethics: Ethical decision making & cases*, Cengage Learning.
- Ferrell, O. C. & Skinner, S. J. (1988). Ethical behavior and bureaucratic structure in marketing research organizations. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 103-109.
- Ferrell, O. C., Fraedrich, J., & Ferrell, L. (2012). *Business ethics: Ethical decision making and cases*. CengageBrain. com.
- Ferrell, O. C., Weaver, K. M., Taylor, J. W. & Jones, R. M. (1978). Ethical beliefs of marketing managers. *The Journal of Marketing*, 69-73.
- Fisher, R. J. (1993). Social desirability bias and the validity of indirect questioning. *Journal of consumer research*, pp. 303-315.
- Fleming, J. E. (2006). *Securing Constitutional democracy: The case of autonomy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Fleming, M. (2005). Adolescent Autonomy: Desire, Achievement and Disobeying Parents between Early and Late Adolescence. *Australian Journal of Educational & Developmental Psychology*, 5, pp.1-16.
- Fogel, R. W. (2004). *The escape from hunger and premature death, 1700-2100: Europe, America, and the Third World* (Vol. 38). Cambridge University Press.
- Ford, R.C., & Richardson, W.D. (1994). Ethical decision making: A review of the empirical literature. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 13: 205-221.
- Forrester, D. A. (1988). Sex role identity and perceptions of nurse role discrepancy. *Western journal of nursing research*, 10(5), pp. 600-612.
- Fotaki, M. (2011). Towards developing new partnerships in public services: users as consumers, citizens and/or co- producers in health and social care in England and Sweden. *Public Administration*, 89(3), pp. 933-955.
- Fotaki, M., & Boyd, A. (2005). From plan to market: a comparison of health and old age care policies in the UK and Sweden. *Public Money & Management*, 25(4), 237-243.
- Foucault, M., (1975). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. Vintage.
- Fowler, F. (1993). *Survey Research Methods*, Second Edition. SAGE Publications, Newbury Park.

- Fraedrich, J., Thorne, D. M., & Ferrell, O. C. (1994). Assessing the application of cognitive moral development theory to business ethics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 13(10), 829-838.
- French Jr, J. R. & Raven, B. (1959). The bases of social power.
- Frey, B. F. (2000). The impact of moral intensity on decision making in a business context. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 26(3), 181-195.
- Frey, L., Botan, C. H., & Kreps, G. (2000). *Investigating communication*. NY: Allyn & Bacon.
- Fritzsche, D. J. & Becker, H. (1983). Ethical behaviour of marketing managers. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 2, 291-299.
- Fry, M. J. (1980). Saving, investment, growth and the cost of financial repression. *World Development*, 8, 317-327.
- Gajduschek, G. (2003). Bureaucracy: Is it efficient? Is it not? Is that the question? Uncertainty reduction: An ignored element of bureaucratic rationality. *Administration & Society*, 34, pp.700-723.
- Galbraith, J. R. (1973). *Designing complex organizations*, Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc.
- Garuba, H. A., Kohler, J. C., & Huisman, A. M. (2009). Transparency in Nigeria's public pharmaceutical sector: perceptions from policy makers. *Globalization and health*, 5(1), 1.
- Gates, G., Ewing, J., Russell, K., Watkins, D. (2016). *Explaining Volkswagen's Emissions Scandal*. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html?_r=0 Accessed on 29/04/2016
- Genfu, F. (2004). Double Principal-agent Theory: Another Analysis Framework of Listed Companies' Governance [J]. *Economic Research Journal*, 12, 16-25.
- Gilligan, C. (1982). *In a different voice*. Harvard University Press.
- Gioia, D. A. (1992). Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11(5-6), pp.379-389.
- Glenn Jr, J. R., & Van Loo, M. F. (1993). Business students' and practitioners' ethical decisions over time. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 12(11), 835-847.
- Goldacre, B. (2013). *Bad Pharma: How Drug Companies Mislead Doctors and Harm Patients*. United States: Faber and Faber.
- Goodpaster, K. E. (1978). On being morally considerable. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 308-325.
- Goodpaster, K. E. (1991). Business ethics and stakeholder analysis. *Business ethics quarterly*, 1(01), 53-73.

- Gouldner, A. W. (1954). Patterns of industrial bureaucracy.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1955). Metaphysical pathos and the theory of bureaucracy. *American Political Science Review*, 49, 496-507.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1959). *Organizational analysis*.
- Graham, J. W. (1991). Servant-leadership in organizations: Inspirational and moral. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 2(2), pp.105-119.
- Grant, A. M., & Patil, S. V. (2012). Challenging the norm of self-interest: Minority influence and transitions to helping norms in work units. *Academy of Management Review*, 37(4), 547-568.
- Green, S., & Weber, J. (1997). Influencing ethical development: Exposing students to the AICPA code of conduct. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 16(8), pp.777-790.
- Greenberg, J. (2002). Who stole the money, and when? Individual and situational determinants of employee theft. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 89(1), pp.985-1003.
- Gronow, J. (1988). The element of irrationality: Max Weber's diagnosis of modern culture. *Acta sociologica*, 31(4), 319-331.
- Grove, J (2014). Black Scholars still experience Racism. The Times Higher Education. Retrieved at <https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/black-scholars-still-experience-racism-on-campus/2012154.article>. Accessed on 25/04/2016
- Gruenfeld, D. H. & Tiedens, L. Z. (2010). Organizational preferences and their consequences. *Handbook of social psychology*.
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). *Fourth generation evaluation*. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA (1989)
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. *Handbook of qualitative research*, 2(163-194), p.105.
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (2005). *Paradigmatic controversies, contradictions, and emerging confluences*. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *The Sage handbook of qualitative research* (3rd ed., pp. 191-215). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Guzak, J. R. (2015). Affect in Ethical Decision Making: Mood Matters. *Ethics & Behavior*, 25(5), 386-399.
- Habermas, J. (1971). *Toward a rational society: Student protest, science, and politics*, Beacon Press.
- Hage, J. (1965). An axiomatic theory of organizations. *Administrative science quarterly*, 289-320.
- Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. *Psychological Review*, 108, 814–834.

- Hales, C. (2002). 'Bureaucracy- lite' and Continuities in Managerial Work. *British Journal of management*, 13, 51-66.
- Hall, R. H. (1963). The concept of bureaucracy: An empirical assessment. *American Journal of Sociology*, 32-40.
- Hammersley, M. and Atkinson, P. (1995). "Recording and organizing data". In *Ethnography* (, 2nd ed., Edited by: Hammersly, M. and Atkinson, P. 175–204. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Hannah, S. T., Avolio, B. J., & May, D. R. (2011). Moral maturation and moral conation: A capacity approach to explaining moral thought and action. *Academy of Management Review*, 36(4), pp.663-685.
- Hardy, S. A., & Carlo, G. (2005). Identity as a source of moral motivation. *Human development*, 48(4), 232-256.
- Hare, R. (1991). The philosophical basis of psychiatric ethics. In S. Block & P. Chodoff (Eds.), *Psychiatric ethics* (2nd ed., pp. 33-46). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Harman, G. (2003). No character or personality. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 87-94.
- Harris, J. R. (1990). Ethical values of individuals at different levels in the organizational hierarchy of a single firm. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 9, 741-750.
- Hart, D., Atkins, R., & Ford, D. (1998). Urban America as a context for the development of moral identity in adolescence. *Journal of Social Issues*, 54, 513–530.
- Hartwell, R. M. (1971). *The industrial revolution and economic growth* (pp. 178-179). London: Methuen.
- Healy, P.M. & Krishna, G., (2003). The fall of Enron. *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17(2), 3-26.
- Heckscher, C. and Donnellon, A. eds., 1994. *The post-bureaucratic organization: New perspectives on organizational change*. SAGE Publications, Incorporated.
- Henry, G. T. (1990). Practical sampling: Applied social research methods series. Vol. 21 [0—16. SAGE Publication, Inc.
- Higgins, A., Power, C. & Kohlberg, L., (1984). The Relationship of Moral Atmosphere to Judgments of Responsibility, in W. M. Kurtines and J. L. Gewirtz (eds.). *Morality, Moral Behavior, and Moral Development* (Wiley, NY), pp. 74-106.
- Higgins, E. T. (1996). Knowledge activation: Accessibility, applicability, and salience.
- Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), (2015). Overview of Staff in British Universities. Retrieved from: <https://www.hesa.ac.uk/stats-staff> Accessed 13/02/2016
- Hill, C.W. and Jones, T.M., (1992). Stakeholder- agency theory. *Journal of management studies*, 29(2), pp.131-154.

- Hoffman, K. E. (2000). Administering identities: state decentralization and local identification in Morocco. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 5(3), 85-100.
- Hofstede, G. (2015). *Nigeria*. Retrieved from <http://geert-hofstede.com/nigeria.html> accessed 15/03/2016
- Holloway, I., & Todres, L. (2003). The status of method: flexibility, consistency and coherence. *Qualitative research*, 3(3), 345-357.
- Holstein, C. B. (1976). Irreversible, stepwise sequence in the development of moral judgment: A longitudinal study of males and females. *Child Development*, pp.51-61.
- Howard, G. S., & Dailey, P. R. (1979). Response-shift bias: A source of contamination of self-report measures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 64(2), 144.
- Howell, J. M., & Avolio, B. J. (1992). The ethics of charismatic leadership: submission or liberation?. *The Executive*, 6(2), pp. 43-54.
- Huber, J. D., & Shipan, C. R. (2002). *Deliberate discretion?: The institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hummel, R. P. (2007). *The bureaucratic experience: The post-modern challenge*, ME Sharpe.
- Hummel, R.,(1998). Bureaucracy, *The International Encyclopedia of Public Policy and Administration*: 307, 1998
- Hunt, S. D., Chonko, L. B. & Wilcox, J. B. (1984). Ethical problems of marketing researchers. *Journal of Marketing Research*, 309-324.
- Hunter, I. (1994). *Rethinking the school: Subjectivity, bureaucracy, criticism*, Allen & Unwin Sydney.
- IMS Health, (2012) Pharmerging Markets. Retrieved from https://www.imshealth.com/files/web/Global/Services/Services%20TL/IMS_Pharmerging_WP.pdf Accessed: 12/01/2016
- Jackall, R. (1983). *Moral mazes: Bureaucracy and managerial work*, Harvard Business Review Case Services.
- Jackall, R. (1988). Moral mazes: The world of corporate managers. *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society*, 1, 598-614.
- Jaeger, A. M. (1983). The transfer of organizational culture overseas: An approach to control in the multinational corporation. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 91-114.
- Jaffee, D. (2001). *Organization theory: tension and change*, McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages.
- Janis, I. L. (1971). Groupthink. *Psychology today*, 5(6), 43-46.

- Janis, I. L. (1982). *Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes* (Vol. 349). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). *Decision making: A psychological analysis of conflict, choice, and commitment*. Free Press.
- Jennings, P. L., Mitchell, M. S., & Hannah, S. T. (2015). The moral self: A review and integration of the literature. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 36(S1), S104-S168.
- Jones, L. R., & Thompson, F. (2007). *From bureaucracy to hyperarchy in netcentric and quick learning organizations: exploring future public management practice*. IAP.
- Jones, T. M., & Gautschi III, F. H. (1988). Will the ethics of business change? A survey of future executives. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 7(4), 231-248.
- Jones, T.M., (1991). Ethical decision making by individuals in organisations: an issues- contingent model, *Academy of Management Review* 16(2), pp.366-395.
- Kalberg, S. (1980). Max Weber's types of rationality: Cornerstones for the analysis of rationalization processes in history. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1145-1179.
- Kallinikos, J. (2004). The social foundations of the bureaucratic order. *Organization*, 11, 13-36.
- Kawashima, N. (1999). The introduction of strategic management to local authority museums in Britain: a missing link between policy and organisation theory. *Policy & Politics*, 27(3), 359-373.
- Kaye, B. N. (1992). Codes of ethics in Australian business corporations. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11(11), pp.857-862.
- Kernaghan, K. (2000). The post-bureaucratic organization and public service values. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 66(1), 91-104.
- Khatri, N. & Ng, H.A. (2000). The role of intuition in strategic decision-making. *Human Relations*, 53: 57-86.
- Kidron, Y., & Fleischman, S. (2006). Promoting Adolescents' Prosocial Behavior. *Educational Leadership*, 63(7), pp.90-91.
- King, D., & Lawley, S. (2016). *Organizational behaviour*. Oxford University Press.
- Kimble, G. (2014). Children learning about biodiversity at an environment centre, a museum and at live animal shows. *Studies in Educational Evaluation*, 41, 48-57.
- Knights, D. and Willmott, H., 2007. *Introducing organizational behaviour and management*. Cengage Learning EMEA.
- Knill, C. (1999). Explaining cross-national variance in administrative reform: Autonomous versus instrumental bureaucracies. *Journal of Public Policy*, 19(02), pp.113-139.

- Koehn, D., (1994). *The ground of professional ethics*. Routledge.
- Kohlberg, L. (1971). Stages of moral development. *Moral education*, 23-92.
- Kohlberg, L. (1975). The cognitive-developmental approach to moral education. *Phi Delta Kappan*, 670-677.
- Kohlberg, L. (1981). The philosophy of moral development: Moral stages and the idea of justice (essays on moral development, volume 1). *San Francisco: Harper & Row*.
- Kohlberg, L. (1984). Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive developmental approach. In L. Kohlberg (Ed.), *Essays on moral development: Vol. 2. The psychology of moral development: The nature and validity of moral stages* (pp. 170–205). San Francisco: Harper & Row.
- Kohlberg, L., (1969). Stage and Sequence: The Cognitive- Developmental Approach to Socialization, in D. Goslin (ed.). *Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research* (Rand McNally, Chicago).
- Kohlberg, L., (1973). The claim to moral adequacy of a highest stage of moral development. *The Journal of Philosophy* 70(18): 630-646.
- Kohlberg, L., & Hersh, R. H. (1977). Moral development: A review of the theory. *Theory into practice*, 16(2), pp.53-59.
- Kohlberg, L., & Kramer, R. (1969). Continuities and discontinuities in childhood and adult moral development. *Human development*, 12(2), 93-120.
- Laffont, J. J., & Martimort, D. (2009). *The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model*. Princeton university press.
- Lanyon, R. I., & Goodstein, L. D. (1997). *Personality assessment*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Lapsley, D. K., & Lasky, B. (2001). Prototypic moral character. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 1(4), 345-363.
- Lapsley, D. K., & Narvaez, D. (2004). A Social-Cognitive Approach to the Moral Personality.
- Latham, B. (2007). Sampling: What is it. *Quantitative Research Methods-Texas Tech University*.
- Lather, P. (1992). Critical frames in educational research: Feminist and post-structural perspectives. *Theory into practice*, 31(2), pp. 87-99.
- Latsis, J.S. (2013). *History of Bureaucracy*. Lecture delivered at the Henley Business School, University of Reading.
- Lawrence, P. R. & Lorsch, J. W. (1967). Differentiation and integration in complex organizations. *Administrative science quarterly*, pp.1-47.

- Leahy, J. (2016). What is the Petrobras scandal that is engulfing Brazil? Retrieved from <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/6e8b0e28-f728-11e5-803c-d27c7117d132.html#axzz47AcE9krw> Accessed 29/04/2016
- Lee, S.J. and Shah-Hosseini, S., 2013. *How Does an International Company Ensure That its Culture Remains Intact While Also be Flexible Enough to Cater to Local Behaviors?*.
- Lefort, C. (1974). What is bureaucracy? *Telos*, 1974, 31-65.
- LeVine, R. A. (2007). Ethnographic studies of childhood: A historical overview. *American anthropologist*, 109(2), 247-260.
- Lewis, D. E. (2003). *Presidents and the politics of agency design: Political insulation in the United States bureaucracy, 1946-1997*. Palo Alto.
- Lincoln, D. J., Pressley, M. M. & Little, T. (1982). Ethical beliefs and personal values of top level executives. *Journal of Business Research*, 10, 475-487.
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (2000). The only generalization is: There is no generalization. *Case study method*, pp. 27-44.
- Lindblom, C.K (1993). *The implications of organised legitimacy for corporate social performance and disclosure*. Presented at the critical perspectives on accounting conference, Ney York
- Lippitz, W. (2007). Foreignness and otherness in pedagogical contexts. *Phenomenology & Practice*, 1(1).
- Loe, T. W., Ferrell, L., & Mansfield, P. (2000). A review of empirical studies assessing ethical decision making in business. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 25(3), 185-204.
- Lohr, S.L. (1999). *Sampling: Design and Analysis*. Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury Press.
- Lucas, R. E. (2002). The industrial revolution: Past and future. *Lectures on economic growth*, 109-188.
- Maccoby, E.E., and Maccoby, N. (1954). The interview: A tool of social science. In: G. Lindzey (ed.). *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Volume I Theory and Method, Cambridge, Mass: Addison-Wesley, pp. 449-487.
- MacIntyre, A. (1981). A crisis in moral philosophy: why is the search for the foundations of ethics so frustrating?. In *The Roots of Ethics* (pp. 3-20). Springer US.
- Maclagan, P. (2007). Hierarchical control or individuals' moral autonomy? Addressing a fundamental tension in the management of business ethics. *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 16, 48-61.
- MacNealy, M. (1999). *Strategies for Empirical Research in Writing*. New York: Longman.

- Maesschalck, J., & Vanoverbeke, D. (2005). Describing and explaining the administrative ethical climate of a country: the case of the Japanese bureaucracy.
- Magee, J. C. & Galinsky, A. D. (2008). 8 Social Hierarchy: The Self- Reinforcing Nature of Power and Status. *The Academy of Management Annals*, 2, 351-398.
- Mapunda, G. (2013). African Philosophy of Management in the Context of African Traditional Cultures and Organisational Culture. *Philosophy of Management*, 12(2), 9-22.
- Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 63–78.
- Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. *American psychologist*, 41(9), 954.
- Markus, H., & Wurf, E. (1987). The dynamic self-concept: A social psychological perspective. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 38, 299- 337.
- Martin, K. D., & Cullen, J. B. (2006). Continuities and extensions of ethical climate theory: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 69(2), 175-194.
- Matherne III, C. F., & Litchfield, S. R. (2012). Investigating the relationship between affective commitment and unethical pro-organizational behaviors: The role of moral identity. *Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics*, 9(5), 35.
- McCloskey, J. C., & McCain, B. E. (1987). Satisfaction, commitment and professionalism of newly employed nurses. *Image: The Journal of Nursing Scholarship*, 19(1), pp.20-24.
- McDonald, G. M. & Zepp, R. A. (1989). Business ethics: practical proposals. *Journal of Management Development*, 8, 55-66.
- McNeese-Smith, D. (1995). Job Satisfaction, Productivity, and Organizational Commitment: The Result of Leadership. *Journal of Nursing Administration*, 25(9), pp.17-26.
- McNeese-Smith, D. K. (1997). The influence of manager behavior on nurses' job satisfaction, productivity, and commitment. *Journal of Nursing Administration*, 27(9), pp.47-55.
- Meehan, T., Vermeer, C., & Windsor, C. (2000). Patients' perceptions of seclusion: a qualitative investigation. *Journal of advanced nursing*, 31(2), 370-377.
- Merkle, J. A. (1980). *Management and ideology: The legacy of the international scientific management movement*. Univ of California Press.
- Mertens D. (2009). *Transformative Research and Evaluation*. Guildford Press, New York, London
- Mertens, D.A. (2005) *Research and Evaluation in Education and Psychology*, 2nd ed. London, Sage.
- Merton, R. K. (1949). *On sociological theories of the middle range [1949]*, na.

- Merton, R. K. (1957). Priorities in scientific discovery: a chapter in the sociology of science. *American sociological review*, 635-659.
- Merton, R. K. (1968). *Social theory and social structure*, Simon and Schuster.
- Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B., (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. *American journal of sociology*, pp.340-363.
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). *Qualitative analysis*.
- Milgram, S. (1963). Behavioral study of obedience. *The Journal of abnormal and social psychology*, 67(4), 371.
- Milgram, S. (1964). Group pressure and action against a person. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 69(2), 137.
- Milgram, S. (1974). The experience of living in cities. *Crowding and behavior*, 167, 41.
- Miller, K. (2014). *Organizational communication: Approaches and processes*. Cengage Learning.
- Mintzberg, H. (1979). The structuring of organizations: A synthesis of the research. *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in Entrepreneurship*.
- Moore, C., & Gino, F. (2013). Ethically adrift: How others pull our moral compass from true North, and how we can fix it. *Research in Organizational Behavior*, pp.33, 53-77.
- Morana, C. (1987). Employee satisfaction: a key to patient satisfaction. *Perioperative nursing quarterly*, 3(1), pp. 33-37.
- Morgan, D. L. (2007). Paradigms lost and pragmatism regained methodological implications of combining qualitative and quantitative methods. *Journal of mixed methods research*, 1(1), pp. 48-76.
- Morris, J., & Farrell, C. (2007). The 'post-bureaucratic' public sector organization. New organizational forms and HRM in ten UK public sector organizations. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 18(9), 1575-1588.
- Mulder, L. B., & Aquino, K. (2013). The role of moral identity in the aftermath of dishonesty. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 121(2), 219-230.
- Muncy, J. A., & Vitell, S. J. (1992). Consumer ethics: An investigation of the ethical beliefs of the final consumer. *Journal of Business Research*, 24(4), 297-311.
- Murphy, J. M., & Gilligan, C. (1980). Moral development in late adolescence and adulthood: A critique and reconstruction of Kohlberg's theory. *Human development*, 23(2), 77-104.
- Murphy, P. R., Smith, J. E. & Daley, J. M. (1992). Executive attitudes, organizational size and ethical issues: Perspectives on a service industry. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11, 11-19.

- Murray, S (2007). Anger at deadly Nigerian drug trial being a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6768799.stm> Accessed on 15/05/2015
- Narvaez, D., & Lapsley, D. K. (2005). The psychological foundations of everyday morality and moral expertise. *Character psychology and character education*, 140-165.
- Narvaez, D., Getz, I., Thoma, S. J., & Rest, J., (1999). *Individual moral judgment and cultural ideologies. Developmental Psychology*, 35, pp.478-488.
- Narvaez, D., Lapsley, D. K., Hagele, S., & Lasky, B. (2006). Moral chronicity and social information processing: Tests of a social cognitive approach to the moral personality. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 40(6), 966-985.
- National Agency for Food and Drugs Administration and Control (NAFDAC), (2015). Drug Regulation. Retrieved from <http://www.nafdac.gov.ng/index.php/regulation/drug-regulations>. Accessed on 12/06/2016
- Nigerian Stock Exchange, (2015). *NSE Factsheet*. Retrieved from <http://www.nse.com.ng/market-data/other-market-information/nse-fact-sheet> Accessed on 21/05/15
- O'Fallon, M. J. & Butterfield, K. D. (2005). A review of the empirical ethical decision-making literature: 1996–2003. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 59, pp.375-413.
- Oakes, L. S., Townley, B., & Cooper, D. J. (1998). Business planning as pedagogy: Language and control in a changing institutional field. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, pp.257-292.
- Olowu, D. (1988). Bureaucratic morality in Africa. *International Political Science Review*, 9, pp.215-229.
- Olsen, J. P. (2004). Maybe It Is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16, pp.1-24.
- Olsen, J. P. (2006). Maybe it is time to rediscover bureaucracy. *Journal of public administration research and theory*, 16, pp.1-24.
- Olsen, J. P. (2008). The ups and downs of bureaucratic organization. *Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.*, 11, pp.13-37.
- Organ, D. W. & Greene, C. N. (1981). The effects of formalization on professional involvement: A compensatory process approach. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, pp.237-252.
- Pahlberg, C., (1995). *Cultural differences and problems in HQ-subsiary relationships in MNCs*.
- Parboteeah, K. P. and Kapp, E. (2008). 'Ethical Climates and Safety-Enhancing Behaviors: An Empirical Test', *Journal of Business Ethics* 80, pp.515–529.

- Parboteeah, K. P., & Cullen, J. B. (2003). Social institutions and work centrality: Explorations beyond national culture. *Organization Science*, 14(2), pp.137-148.
- Parboteeah, K. P., Chen, H. C., Lin, Y. T., Chen, I. H., Lee, A. Y., & Chung, A. (2010). Establishing organizational ethical climates: How do managerial practices work?. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 97(4), pp.599-611.
- Parsons, T. (1940). An analytical approach to the theory of social stratification. *American Journal of Sociology*, pp.841-862.
- Pasha, S. (2006). Enron trial: Defense skewers Fastow on the stand, CNNMoney.com. Retrieved from <http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/08/news/newsmakers/enron/index.htm>. Accessed: 06/03/2016
- Patton, M. Q. (1990). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods*. SAGE Publications, inc.
- Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., Piliavin, J. A., & Schroeder, D. A. (2005). Prosocial behavior: Multilevel perspectives. *Annu. Rev. Psychol.*, 56, pp.365-392.
- Pfeffer, J. (1981). *Power in organizations*, Pitman Marshfield, MA.
- Piaget, J., (1932). *The moral judgement of the child*. Kegan paul, London.
- Pojman, L. P. (1995). *Ethical Theory Classical and Contemporary Readings*.
- Posner, B. Z. & Schmidt, W. H. (1984). Values and the American manager-an update. *California Management Review*, 26, 202-216.
- Postema, G. J. (1980). Moral responsibility in professional ethics. *NYUL Rev.*,55, 63.
- Powell, W. W., & DiMaggio, P. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. *American Sociological Review*, 48(2), 147-160.
- Prentice, R. A. (2007). Ethical decision making: More needed than good intentions. *Financial Analysts Journal*, 63(6), 17-30.
- Pugh, D. S. & Hickson, D. J. (1976). *Organizational structure in its context*, Saxon House Westmead, Farnborough.
- Pugh, D. S., Hickson, D. J., Hinings, C. R. & Turner, C. (1969). The context of organization structures. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 91-114.
- QSR International, (2015). *What is NVIVO?* Retrieved from <http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo>. Accessed on 23/05/15
- Rai, T. S., & Fiske, A. P. (2011). Moral psychology is relationship regulation: moral motives for unity, hierarchy, equality, and proportionality. *Psychological review*, 118(1), 57.
- Randall, D. M., & Gibson, A. M. (1990). Methodology in business ethics research: A review and critical assessment. *Journal of business ethics*, 9(6), 457-471.

- Rauch, J. and Evans, P., (1999). *Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in developing countries* (No. 99-06). Working Paper.
- Rauch, J. E. (1995). *Choosing a dictator: Bureaucracy and welfare in less developed polities* (No. w5196). National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Rauch, J. E., & Evans, P. B. (2000). Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. *Journal of public economics*, 75(1), pp. 49-71.
- Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. *Bamforth N, Malik M and O'Connell C*.
- Razzaque, M. A., & Hwee, T. P. (2002). Ethics and purchasing dilemma: A Singaporean view. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 35(4), pp.307-326.
- Reed Elsevier, (2008). *Indian Management: Managing across Cultures*. Retrieved from <http://www.relx.com/corporateresponsibility08/PDFFiles/re-cultural-navigator.pdf> Accessed: 23/2/16
- Reed, M. (1999). From the cage to the gaze? The dynamics of organisational control in late modernity.
- Reed, M. (2005). Beyond the iron cage? Bureaucracy and democracy in the knowledge economy and society. *The values of bureaucracy*, pp. 115-40.
- Rest, J., & Navarez, D. (1994). *Moral development in the professions: Psychology and applied ethics*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Rest, J., Navarez, D., Bebeau, M., Thoma, S., (1999). *Post conventional moral thinking: A new-Kohlbergian Approach*, centre for the Study of Ethical Development, University of Minnesota.
- Rest, J.R, (1986). *Moral Development: Advances in research and theory*. New York: Praeger.
- Reuters, (2015) IPCA Laboratories. Retrieved from <http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/overview?symbol=IPCA.NS> Accessed on 20/08/2015
- Reynolds, P. D., W. D. Bygrave, E. Autio, L. Cox, and M. Hay (2002). *Global Entrepreneurship Monitor: 2002, Executive Report*. Kansas City, MO: Kauffman Center for Entrepreneurial Leadership.
- Reynolds, S. J. (2006). A neurocognitive model of the ethical decision-making process: Implications for study and practice. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 91(4), 737-748.
- Reynolds, S. J., & Ceranic, T. L. (2007). The effects of moral judgment and moral identity on moral behavior: an empirical examination of the moral individual. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92(6), 1610.
- Riesebrodt, M. (1999). Charisma in Max Weber's sociology of religion. *Religion*, 29(1), pp.1-14.

- Robinson, J (2015). *The 20 Fastest-Growing Economies This Year*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-25/the-20-fastest-growing-economies-this-year>. [Last Accessed 25/03/2015].
- Roe, J. W. (1916). *English and American tool builders*. Yale University Press.
- Rohr, J. A. (1988). Bureaucratic morality in the United States. *International Political Science Review*, 9(3), 167-178.
- Ruddick, G. (2016). TESCO could be fined £500m over accounting scandal says analyst. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jan/25/tesco-could-face-500m-fine-accounting-scandal-analysts-say> Accessed 29/04/2016
- Rutter Lotti (2014). *MSD and others must be held accountable for pharmagate plot*. [ONLINE] Available at: <http://www.tac.org.za/news/msd-and-others-must-be-held-accountable-pharmagate-plot>. [Last Accessed 12/02/2015].
- Ryan, G. W., & Bernard, H. R. (2000). *Data management and analysis methods*.
- Salvador, R., & Folger, R. G. (2009). Business ethics and the brain. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 19(1), 1–31.
- Sandel, M. J. (2010). *Justice: What's the right thing to do?*. Macmillan.
- Schein, E. H. (2004). The learning culture and the learning leader. *Organizational culture and leadership*. 3rd edn. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, 393-418.
- Schwandt, T. A. (2000). *Three epistemological stances for qualitative inquiry*. In: N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. 2nd ed., Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 189–213
- Schwitzer, G. (2004). A statement of principles for health care journalists. *The American Journal of Bioethics*, 4(4), W9-W13.
- Searcey, D., Young, S., & Scannell, K. (2005). Ebbers is sentenced to 25 years for \$11 billion WorldCom fraud. *The Wall Street Journal*.
- Shamir, B., House, R. J., & Arthur, M. B. (1993). The motivational effects of charismatic leadership: A self-concept based theory. *Organization science*, 4(4), pp.577-594.
- Shao, R., Aquino, K., & Freeman, D. (2008). Beyond Moral Reasoning. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 18(4), 513-540.
- Shenhav, Y. (2008). Managerial rationality. In S. R. Clegg & J. R. Bailey (Eds.), *International encyclopedia of organization studies* (Vol. 4, pp. 871-872). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Sheperd, J., (2011). *14,000 British professors – but only 50 are black*. Retrieved from <http://www.theguardian.com/education/2011/may/27/only-50-black-british-professors> Accessed on: 18/02/2016.

- Sherrer, H. (2000). The inhumanity of government bureaucracies. *INDEPENDENT REVIEW-OAKLAND-*, 5(2), 249-264.
- Shuttleworth, M. (2009). Research Bias. Retrieved from <https://explorable.com/research-bias> Accessed on Apr 19, 2015
- Siddall, N. (1979). Coalmining towards the 21st century. *Electronics & Power*, 25(4), 251-255.
- Simmel, G. (1955). *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*. New York: The Free Press.
- Sparks, J. R., & Hunt, S. D. 1998. Marketing researcher ethical sensitivity: Conceptualization, measurement, and exploratory investigation. *Journal of Marketing*, 62: 92-109.
- Spector, P. E. (1994). Using self- report questionnaires in OB research: A comment on the use of a controversial method. *Journal of organizational behavior*, 15(5), 385-392.
- Spicer, C. (2013). *Organizational public relations: A political perspective*. Routledge.
- Stake, R. E. (1995). The invalidity of standardized testing for measuring mathematics achievement. In *Reform in school mathematics and authentic assessment* (Vol. 8, pp. 173-235). State University of New York Press Albany, NY, US.
- Stephens, C. U., and Lewin, A. Y. (1992). A cross-level model of the determinants of ethical choice in organizations. In D. Ludwig and K. Paul (eds.), *Contemporary issues in the business environment*. Lewiston/Queenston/Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press.
- Stephens, J. (2006). Panel Faults Pfizer in '96 Clinical Trial In Nigeria in Washington Post. Retrieved from <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/06/AR2006050601338.html> Accessed 17/05/2015
- Stillman, R.J. (2000). *Public Administration: Concepts and Cases*, Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company, 2000.
- Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998). *Basics of qualitative research: Procedures and techniques for developing grounded theory*.
- Stryker, S., & Serpe, R. T. (1982). Commitment, identity salience, and role behavior: Theory and research example. In *Personality, roles, and social behavior* (pp. 199-218). Springer New York.
- Tannenbaum, A. S. (1962). Control in organizations: Individual adjustment and organizational performance. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 236-257.
- Ten Bos, R. (1997). Essai: Business ethics and Bauman ethics. *Organization Studies*, 18, 997-1014.
- Tetlock, P. E. (1985). Accountability: A social check on the fundamental attribution error. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 227-236.

- Tetlock, P. E. (1991). An alternative metaphor in the study of judgment and choice: People as politicians. *Theory & Psychology*, 1(4), pp.451-475.
- The University of Auckland (2015). *About Thematic Analysis*. Retrieved from <http://www.psych.auckland.ac.nz/en/about/our-research/research-groups/thematic-analysis/about-thematic-analysis.html> Accessed 20/5/2015
- Thompson, D. F. (1985). The possibility of administrative ethics. *Public administration review*, 555-561.
- Thompson, J. (1967). Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. *Classics in Organization and Management Series*. Trans. Publishers.
- Thompson, P. & Alvesson, M. (2005). Bureaucracy at work: misunderstandings and mixed blessings. *The values of bureaucracy*, 89-114.
- Thompson, R. T. (1965). *New Zealand in Relief: The Story of CORSO's Twenty-one Years of Relief Service Overseas*, NZ Council of Organisations for Relief Services [ie Service] Overseas.
- Thompson, V. A. (1969). *Bureaucracy and innovation*, University of Alabama Press.
- Transparency International, (2014). *Global Corruption Perception Index*. Retrieved from <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results>. Accessed on 11/07/2015
- Trevino L., & Youngblood, S. (1990). Bad apples in bad barrels: A causal analysis of ethical decision-making behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 75, 378–385.
- Trevino, L. K. (1986). Ethical decision making in organizations: A person-situation interactionist model. *Academy of management Review*, 11, pp. 601-617.
- Trevino, L. K. (1992). Moral reasoning and business ethics: Implications for research, education, and management. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 11(5-6), 445-459.
- Treviño, L. K. & Brown, M. E. (2005). The role of leaders in influencing unethical behavior in the workplace. *Managing organizational deviance*, 69-87.
- Treviño, L. K. & Weaver, G. R. (2003). *Managing ethics in business organizations: Social scientific perspectives*, Stanford University Press.
- Trevino, L. K., & Weaver, G. R. (1994). Business ETHICS/BUSINESS ethics: One Field or Two?*. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 4(02), pp.113-128.
- Trevino, L. K., & Weaver, G. R. (1996). *Barriers to and facilitators of moral perception: The case of competitive intelligence practitioners*. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Cincinnati.
- Treviño, L. K., Brown, M., & Hartman, L. P. (2003). A qualitative investigation of perceived executive ethical leadership: Perceptions from inside and outside the executive suite. *Human Relations*, 55, 5–37.

- Treviño, L. K., Butterfield, K. D., & McCabe, D. L. (1998). The ethical context in organizations: Influences on employee attitudes and behaviours. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 8(03), pp. 447-476.
- Trevino, L. K., Weaver, G. R., & Reynolds, S. J. (2006). *Behavioural Ethics in Organizations: A Review*. *Journal of Management* Vol. 32, pp. 951–990.
- Tsahuridu, E. E. (2006). Anomie and ethics at work. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 69, 163-174.
- Tsalikis, J. & Fritzsche, D. J. (1989). Business ethics: a literature review with a focus on marketing ethics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 8, 695-743.
- Tuckett, A. G. (2005). Applying thematic analysis theory to practice: a researcher's experience. *Contemporary Nurse*, 19(1-2), pp. 75-87.
- Turiel, E. (1969). Developmental processes in the child's moral thinking. *Trends and issues in developmental psychology*, 92-133.
- Turner, S. P. (2000). *The Cambridge Companion to Weber*, Cambridge University Press.
- Udy Jr, S. H. (1959). "Bureaucracy" and "Rationality" in Weber's Organization Theory: An Empirical Study. *American Sociological Review*, 791-795.
- United Nations Comtrade, (2012). *Nigeria*. Retrieved from <http://comtrade.un.org/pb/countrypagesnew.aspx?y=2012> Accessed on 15/06/2015
- United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) (2013). *Pharmaceutical Sector profile on Nigeria*. Retrieved from https://www.unido.org/fileadmin/user_media/Services/PSD/BEP/Nigeria_PharmaceuticalSectorProfile_032011_Ebook.pdf Pp.1-87
- University of Surrey, (2015). *Introduction to Research*. Retrieved from http://libweb.surrey.ac.uk/library/skills/Introduction%20to%20Research%20and%20Managing%20Information%20Leicester/page_55.htm Accessed on 16/06/2015
- Valentine, S., & Barnett, T. (2002). Ethics codes and sales professionals' perceptions of their organizations' ethical values. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 40(3), 191-200.
- Van Vugt, M. (2006). Evolutionary origins of leadership and followership. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 10, 354-371.
- Venning, M. A. (2010). *X Marks the Spot: Women Writers Map the Empire for British Children, 1790–1895*, 31.
- Verbeke, W., Ouwerkerk, C. & Peelen, E. (1996). Exploring the contextual and individual factors on ethical decision making of salespeople. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 15, 1175-1187.

- Victor, B., & Cullen, J. B. (1988). The organizational bases of ethical work climates. *Administrative science quarterly*, 101-125.
- Victoria, M. and Dipak, B., 2014. Evolving relationship between the parent and subsidiaries in multinational companies. *Advances in Management*, 7(2), p.1.
- Vitell, S. J., & Patwardhan, A. (2008). The role of moral intensity and moral philosophy in ethical decision making: a cross- cultural comparison of China and the European Union. *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 17(2), 196-209.
- Volti, R. (2008). A car for the great Asian multitude. *Technology and Culture*, 49(4), 995-1001.
- Waldo, D. (1992). *The enterprise of public administration*. Novato: Chandler and Sharp.
- Walker, L. J. (2004). Progress and prospects in the psychology of moral development. *Merrill-Palmer Quarterly*, 50(4), 546-557.
- Walley, E. E., & Taylor, D. W. (2002). Opportunists, Champions, Mavericks...?. *Greener Management International*, 2002(38), pp.31-43.
- Walton, R. E. (1985). Toward a strategy of eliciting employee commitment based on policies of mutuality. *HRM trends and challenges*, 35-65.
- Watson, T. J. (2008). Managing identity: Identity work, personal predicaments and structural circumstances. *Organization*, 15(1), 121-143.
- Weaver, G. R., (2006). Virtue in organizations: Moral identity as a foundation for moral agency. *Organization Studies*, 27(3): 341-368.
- Weaver, G. R., & Agle, B. R. (2002). Religiosity and ethical behavior in organizations: A symbolic interactionist perspective. *Academy of management review*, 27(1), pp.77-97.
- Weaver, K. M., & Ferrell, O. C. (1977). The impact of corporate policy on reported ethical beliefs and behavior of marketing practitioners. *American Marketing Association Proceedings*, No. 41, 477-481.
- Weber, J. (1990). Managers' moral reasoning: Assessing their responses to three moral dilemmas. *Human relations*, 43, 687-702.
- Weber, J., & Gillespie, J. (1998). Differences in Ethical Beliefs, Intentions, and Behaviors The Role of Beliefs and Intentions in Ethics Research Revisited. *Business & Society*, 37(4), pp.447-467.
- Weber, J., & Wasieleski, D. (2001). Investigating Influences on Managers' Moral Reasoning The Impact of Context and Personal and Organizational Factors. *Business & Society*, 40(1), pp.79-110.
- Weber, M. (1946). The Protestant sects and the spirit of capitalism. *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*, 302-22.
- Weber, M. (1948). Class, status and party. In H. Gerth & C.W. Mills (Eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* (pp. 180–195). New York: Routledge.

- Weber, M. (1958). The three types of legitimate rule. *Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions*, 4(1), 1-11.
- Weber, M. (1968). *On charisma and institution building*. University of Chicago Press.
- Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*, Univ of California Press.
- Weber, M. (1993). *The sociology of religion*, Beacon Press.
- Weber, M. (2009). *From Max Weber: essays in sociology*. Routledge.
- Weber, M., Gerth, H. H. & Mills, C. W. (1946). *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology: Essays in Sociology*, Oxford university press.
- Weinstein, J. (1968). *The corporate ideal in the liberal state: 1900-1918*. Boston: Beacon.
- Whittington, R., Pettigrew, A., Peck, S., Fenton, E., & Conyon, M. (1999). Change and complementarities in the new competitive landscape: a European panel study, 1992–1996. *Organization Science*, 10(5), 583-600.
- Wilkinson, J. (2011). Convention theory. In D. Southerton (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of consumer culture* (Vol. 3, pp. 359-362). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd. doi: 10.4135/9781412994248.n134
- Willig, C. (2003). Discourse analysis. *Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research methods*, pp. 159-183.
- Willig, C. (Ed.). (1999). *Applied discourse analysis: Social and psychological interventions*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- Willmott, H. (1987). Studying managerial work: A critique and a proposal. *Journal of management studies*, 24(3), 249-270.
- Winterich, K. P., Aquino, K., Mittal, V., & Swartz, R. (2013). When moral identity symbolization motivates prosocial behavior: The role of recognition and moral identity internalization. *Journal of applied psychology*, 98(5), 759.
- Woiceshyn, J. (2009). Lessons from “Good Minds”: How CEOs use intuition, analysis and guiding principles to make strategic decisions. *Long Range Planning*, 42(3), 277–319.
- Woiceshyn, J. (2011). A model for ethical decision making in business: Reasoning, Intuition, and rational moral principles. *Journal of business ethics* (104), pp.311-323.
- Wolcott, R.C. and Lippitz, M.J., (2007). The four models of corporate entrepreneurship. *MIT Sloan Management Review*, 49(1), p.75.
- Wolfinger, N. H. (2002). On writing fieldnotes: collection strategies and background expectancies. *Qualitative research*, 2(1), pp. 85-93.

- Womack, J. P., Jones, D. T. & Roos, D. (1990). The machine that changed the world. *New York: Rawson Associates.*
- Wood, B. D., & Bohte, J. (2004). Political transaction costs and the politics of administrative design. *Journal of Politics*, 66(1), 176-202.
- Wood, R. and Bandura, A., (1989). Social cognitive theory of organizational management. *Academy of management Review*, 14(3), pp.361-384.
- Woodward, C. V. (1981). *Origins of the New South, 1877--1913: A History of the South* (Vol. 9). LSU Press.
- Worchesny, J. (2011). A model for ethical decision making in business: Reasoning, Intuition, and rational moral principles. *Journal of business ethics* (104), pp.311-323.
- World Bank, (2014). *Doing Business Annual Report 2014*. Retrieved at <http://www.doingbusiness.org/~media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB14-Full-Report.pdf>. Accessed on 12/04/15
- World Bank, (2015). *Doing Business Annual Report 2015*. Retrieved at <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports> . Accessed on 12/04/15
- World Health Organisation, (2007). World Health Report, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/whr/2007/whr07_en.pdf. Accessed on 4/09/2015
- Wright Mills, C. (1956). The power elite. *The power elite*.
- Yin, R. K. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods. *Sage Publications, Inc*, 5, p.11.
- Zhou, X. (1993). The Dynamics of Organizational Rules. *American Journal of Sociology*, 98, 1134-1166.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 KOHLBERG'S CMD STAGES & CMR PROFILES

KOHLBERG'S CMD STAGES

Pre-conventional Level

The pre-conventional level comprises stages 1 and 2. At this level, individuals are concerned with concrete consequences (Trevino, 1986) often following from rules perceived as external and imposed. Thus, right and wrong are judged based on punishment and rewards involved as well as exchange of favour (Weber, 2009). Stage one indicates individuals are guided by obedience to rules usually administered by an authority, in order to avoid punishments. The question often asked at this stage for example is, 'Will I get into trouble for doing or not doing this?' At stage two, some form of exchange takes place hence the instrumental element of it. Nothing goes for free and adherence is based on fairness (Fraedrich, Thorne and Ferrell, 1994) or that reciprocity is a matter of 'you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours,' not of loyalty, gratitude or justice (Duska and Whelan, 1975). Individuals operating at the second stage tend to ask the question, "what's in it for me?" with the ability to see beyond self a little bit more and focus on a fair exchange with another party. Thus, the social perspective at this level is characterised by egoism, in which actors are unable and unwilling to consider factors outside of self (Weber, 2009). Maesschalck and Vanoverbeke, (2005) added that the egoism criterion is focused on maximising 'self-interest', which is defined in a narrow, instrumental and economic sense of immediate interest. Both stage 1 and 2 seem to be in the flip side of the same coin in that punishment is avoided for rewards to be gained.

Conventional Level

Level two (the conventional level), comprises stages 3 and 4. At this level, the individual is expected to have internalised the norms of the society they belong to, for example in the family or at the work place and therefore, conformity to these norms is the golden rule for judging what is right (Kohlberg, 1967). As Kohlberg and Hersh, (1977) opined, 'The attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it' (p.55). In other words, fulfilment of responsibilities, behaving properly within set regulations, and living up to roles are all towards societal acceptance (Trevino, 1992).

There is an importance placed on interpersonal conformity and maintaining relationships (Colby and Kohlberg, 1987). At stage 3, good behaviours are seen as those that please others or are approved by them. The question often asked is, “what will people think of me?” and it is towards group approval. Kohlberg and Hersh, (1977) called this stage the ‘good boy – nice girl’ orientation stage. Motives and intentions come to play here with the key aim of gaining societal trust or interpersonal trust. Approval is earned by being ‘nice’. At the fourth stage, orientation is towards ‘law and order’ (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977). Duties are important especially as laid down in social, legal and religious systems. Doing right consists of maintaining the social order for its own sake and respecting authority, designed to benefit all.

Kohlberg, (1971) placed most American adults at this conventional level, specifically at the third stage. More recent studies on managers by Weber, (1990), Elms and Nichols, (1993) and Weber and Wasieleski, (2001) have also concluded that most research identifies managers as reasoning at this level in business organisations. In organisations, Colby and Kohlberg, (1987) described individuals operating at stage 3 as more focused on adhering to the procedures and rules of a narrowly defined group. Individuals would consider rewards, punishments and consequences of their actions on their groups, which could for instance be a managers’ work group or departmental team in making any decisions. At stage 4, Colby and Kohlberg, (1987) explained that individuals focus on broader societal norms during decision making as well as the consequences to the members of the society affected by the decisions. This stage is all about conformity to a surface level ‘groupishness’ and preservation of the status quo, and the inability and lack of interest to engage in personally responsible action.

Post-Conventional Level

The level three (post-conventional) is the highest level of moral development. At this level, comprising stages 5 and 6, individuals go beyond being identified by others or following the provisions of the law for the sake of order via a universal rule of ethics of justice, which is a function of the law (Kohlberg, 1971). They look beyond society and begin to operate at a universal level (Rest, 1986) and while they look to the law for its universality of application they also begin to question the ethical force of prescribed laws which are also culturally and contextually defined (Weber & Gillespe,

1998). As Weber and Gillespie, (1998) explained, 'the post conventional moral agent defines moral values and principles apart from the authority of groups, such as the organization or society'. Therefore, 'laws are not always the most ethical directive of behaviour and, in fact, this individual would set aside a law in favour of a consistent adherence to an ethical standard' (Weber and Gillespie, 1998). At stage five for example, there is an awareness of relativism in personal values and even though the law is still the defining societal contract, this stage of thought considers altering the law for socially useful purposes for example, when it is in the interest of humanity (Trevino, 1992). According to Kohlberg and Hersh, (1977), at this stage, 'right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have been critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society' (p.55). It also comes with an awareness of and sensitivity towards the problem of moral relativism in the society. Hence, post conventional stage morality is motivated by the desire to reach a consensus and as such comes with changing law in terms of rational considerations for social utility as different from the stiff 'law and order' orientation at stage four (Kohlberg, 1971).

At the sixth stage, the individual is guided more independently and is self-imposed not via external constraints and norms but freely committing oneself to self-chosen principles of ethical rights and justice. It is what Kohlberg and Hersh, (1977) called the universal ethical principle orientation, a stage at which 'right is defined by the decision of the conscience according to self-chosen principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality and consistency' (p.55). Such principles are often abstract universal ethical norms and not concrete rigid moral laws like the Ten Commandments for example (Kohlberg, 1967). At their very core these abstract ethical principles are universal principles of justice, quality of human rights and of respect for the dignity and respect for fellow humans as individual persons (Kohlberg and Hersh, 1977). An example of such abstract ethical principle is Kant's categorical imperative which proposed that actors should act in ways that their actions could become universal laws. Therefore, if an actor isn't willing for the ethical rule they are following to be applied equally to everyone, including themselves, then the rule is not a valid moral rule (Crane and Matten, 2006). Also in this category is Rawl's (1971) principle of justice in which he proposes humans take actions from behind 'a veil of ignorance' that blinds people to facts about themselves and thereby helps not to

tailor choices for self-advantage. Sandel’s (2010) opinion on justice is yet another perspective individuals operating at the post conventional CMD level can adopt. Sandel’s (2010) principle of justice inclines more toward Aristotelian ethics’ inspired ‘communitarianist’ ethics perspective and it is also relative to post conventional view on freely chosen morality. Accordingly, emphasis is placed on the interconnectedness of individuals and their community, for instance, family unit.

However, Weber, (1990) as well as other studies (Trevino, 1992; Nichols, 1993; Greenberg, 2002) have found that very few managers operate at this post conventional level of moral reasoning and this has been validated more widely. For instance, Jackall, (1988) in a study of 100 managers found that all managers in studied organisations operated mainly in the early level conventional moral development stages. But, individuals found operating at this post conventional level often flow freely between stage 5, where emphasis is on rights and stage 6, where focus is on consistently applying universal ethical principles. Kohlberg argued that less than 20% of the American adults reach this level of principled thinking (Rest, 1986; Trevino, 1992). Empirically, Kohlberg’s theory assumes that any individual found operating at this level within any organisation would transcend rules and conformity where necessary to operate at a higher level of moral reasoning to do the right things based on the principles that they choose to operate by. Therefore within a bureaucratic environment, such individuals weigh the rules of their immediate environments in the light of universal ethical principles and would stick to the latter whenever a conflict was observed. Thinking at this stage is expected to result in a string of unchanging, consistent moral behaviours based on outcomes of self-chosen principles, such Kantian ethics, Rawl’s or Sandel’s views of justice, for example.

APPENDIX 1.1: CMR Profile of Participants in the American Case group

Participant	CMR level	Quote
A1g	Conventional level, Stage 3	<i>“...Like these are online trainings, they give us Case studies of situations and ask what we will do, we will give them the answer and they tell us either yes or no this is what you should do in such situations and then if you have such situations you report them so basically it is like trials, they tell you what to do more situations more often than not they are telling you this is how you shall handle this, they also tell you that</i>

		<p><i>this is a consequence of this is how much they have had to pay for defaulters...”</i></p> <p><i>“...There is usually one training every month. (What are the kinds of things that they tell you?) Like these are online trainings, they give us Case studies of situations and ask what what we will do, we will give them the answer and they tell us either yes or no this is what you should do in such situations and then if you have such situations you report them so basically it is like trials, they tell you what to do more in situations more often than not they are telling you this is how you shall handle this, they also tell you that this is a consequence of this is how much they have had to pay for defaulters. So you are aware of this severe implications and the severity of such situations.”</i></p>
A1f	Conventional level, Stage 4	<p><i>“... For example, let me come down to my level, you go to hospital, and you tell a doctor that you shall sponsor him for a particular program and that he would write your drugs more, what should he or she do? The answer of course is NO. You would tell him, of course it isn't the proper thing to do, sponsoring the doctor would imply that you are influencing him and inducing him to prescribe your drugs which is not what we do, we are a company that stands for quality as in what you offer should sell for you and not trying to induce anybody.”</i></p>
A1a	Conventional level, Stage 4	<p><i>“...Now, if you are talking to a government official, there are set guidelines. For a smart employees what you would do would be to come back to the office before meeting the person and have a scenario painting and say okay this is the best case, this is the worst case then you go, if you need any approval, you go with the worst case approved..”</i></p>
A1b	Conventional Level, Stage 3	<p><i>“That is not something I want to do even if the organisation allows me to do so. So whatever kind of business advantage we are trying to get or gain is secondary to your personal values. I would rather lose the business advantage than go against what the company set for me...”</i></p> <p><i>“And then also of course, the overall objectives is to ensure that everyone delivers on their numbers. It is a sales organisation whatever you are doing; your total overall picture is to impact</i></p>

		<p><i>results. That also you want to ensure so these are very straight forward expectations. Nothing ambiguous or complex about that."</i></p>
A1c	Post Conventional Stage 5	<p><i>"the company keeps finding ways of saying okay bringing in training as much as possible, how best can we work in a complaint environment, looking at our nature. Nigeria, Africa where we operate is a column B country according to the global standard of corruption, so in country where corruption index is high, compliance is even taken seriously there. Something that can be overlooked in some countries will not be allowed in a place like the country where we are so these are some of the things that so A1 operating in a country with high corruption index makes it more complex to operate."</i></p> <p><i>"For us (from self to we), integrity is very important [you hold that too as an individual?] I do top erm that's why for me I can work in A1. The company itself, the policy somehow dovetails into what I personally hold as what ought to be done. Where I may get a bit concerned is when I feel, oh this is too much, you can do this. It is not... Sometimes some issues are not because it is a compliance issues but because we cannot show proof, you need to show proof that this organisation that you said you gave money, you didn't give money to an individual which definitely you did not do but sometimes the person wants more evidence which you don't have to show that you didn't...that it's based on trust now."</i></p>
A1d	Conventional Stage 4	<p><i>"And everything is based strictly on compliance are you don't do things because you want to do it. You might be doing it and somehow to the applause of every other human it is okay and will evaluate it by looking at the laid down rules in terms of compliance were the rules followed? So you you might more than be penalised..."</i></p> <p><i>"Yes. Like I said before everything is based on approval. Because if approval is not given you wait and it helps things more better because once you do things without approval and issues emerge from such, the penalties are usually very high looking at a multinational company."</i></p>
A1e	Conventional Stage 3	<p><i>"The way we are being guided, so since you have a pre knowledge of what you expect to do, so would begin to know this is beyond me."</i></p>

		<i>"...Although our organisation (laughs) we are prone to change because every now and then we come up with new organisational structure that we need to align ourselves to..."</i>
A2a	Conventional level, Stage 3	<i>"All in all basically I have a target and a budget I have to meet at the end of the year which is like the first KPI for me so I try as much as possible to organise myself and ensure that with all these activities I mentioned would help and assist to me in meeting my target"</i> <i>"I think most part of my life has been sales and sales so I have come to enjoy sales and marketing which I think I will like to grow along that line so it's something that keeps driving me I actually want to see myself on top of the sales chart 1 day been like maybe the country manager or the managing director and all that so it's something that is driving me"</i>
A2b	Post-Conventional, Stage 6	<i>"My value system – God first and is centre for everything, there your relationship with people, being trustworthy like being reliable, owing up to what you can do and what you can't do you say it there. Everyone is a human being. As in you say your mind but assessing personality style and working with the person."</i> <i>"Well, it was just discernment and intuition, what was just coming up and I use it to act and I was calm and I was just confident. I didn't want to play like he was doing me a favour, I still will always talk about this patient the drug and all of that."</i>
A2c	Conventional level, Stage 4	<i>"We have people were really wanna take ownership of the business. We're very centered about the result and the same time where really really concerned about how we get the results. We about winning but wining the right way..."</i> <i>"We make sure that is an alignment between what you stand for and what the company believes in. If there is something about alignment, You are most likely going to be a perfect candidate, It starts that way..."</i>
A2d	Conventional Level, Stage 4	<i>We are a very compliant company... like just on Sunday, my boss sent us a corporate ethics and anti- bribery stuff again just to remind us of it. So the ever ready made rules internationally, their back rules, ethics and all of that so they pass it down."</i>

	<p><i>“...like I said, before you do something like that, always confirm with your boss, even though... Like I had a situation on Friday, I was talking with my boss. There was an consultant haematologist; he is the chairman of the Nigerian HIV AIDS task force, quite big. We sell ARVs and we are trying to get into the market. We have some generic competition so I was talking to my boss about it and he was telling me that we should come and make a presentation somewhere and talk to him. I asked my boss, what's in it for this man? before we go any farther, let's know where we say no and where we say.. and I said of course, because we are very ethical company what we can do is we can give him support educationally if he wants to go for a course or a training,</i></p>
--	---

Source: Fieldwork

APPENDIX 1.2: CMR Profile of Participants in the Indian Case group

Participant	CMR level	Quote
I1a	Conventional level, Stage 3	<i>"Most times he (the director) tells you what to do, I work based on instructions that's why I don't have the final say so whatever he says even if anyone comes around and needs something I only pass it on to my boss so whatever he says is final. So everything that comes up I have to follow up on the matter and give feedback...there is no freedom"</i>
I1c	Conventional level, Stage 4	<p><i>'...the way the system is run...the way it is structured there is nothing you can do in the system that they don't know about, the way it is being done is like they monitor everything that goes on here, they monitor from the sales right to the distribution so there is no how you can come in and say you want to play pranks because that is why they place themselves everywhere, like in finance they are charge of the finance, then in charge of the stock, they are in charge of most of the things...'</i></p> <p><i>"Well, like I said the environment wasn't that conducive, I just have to adapt, adapt in the sense that whatsoever comes my way, as long as I'm in the system I just have to play along with it. I'm not happy but is nothing I can do about it and in Nigeria now the job opportunities are so slim so anyone that you have with you just have to get hold of it except you get a better one are you leave that's just what I'm doing."</i></p>
I1d	Conventional level, Stage 3	<i>"...What you do is... you don't break the rules but you bend it, that's one of the things you do as a sales man you have to work smart. You don't only work hard but you work smart. You must work smart, there are times when a hospital needs order, and the order is just 50,000, you can ask at the pharmacy to write another 50,000 because you need it to meet up your target and you need the products so you can ask the pharmacist to add your own to it which are some of the unethical things that the office has forced you to do which ideally shouldn't be."</i>
I1e	Post-	<i>"I am one person will believes that it is very easy"</i>

	Conventional level, Stage 6	<i>to maintain character than to retrieve it when it is lost, and this job is changing it is getting to me, and beginning to do certain things I'll think I'll never do so it's part of the reason I want to leave, is beginning to do certain things that I've always been against my own value system because to be honest if you're here long enough you would lose will you are a you become something else even if you did used to be the sort of person would believe in tips and bribes for doctors, that is one change the job is brilliant to me making me think at least I've had enough here."</i>
I2b	Conventional level, Stage 4	<i>"...the company at times they haven't paid you for like two months and it's the third month I have not been paid, sometimes you just wonder how you're going to eat. Goods pass through us to the final consumer, and the also go through us to them, so, what it does to me sometimes not all the time, if I am remitting money I'll have to use my head, like I don't have money and company also wants work done, there is no way that is easy. I don't have money to go for work today because I don't have fuel in my car, sometimes I just take money from the money I am meant to remit, I don't score my manager for that so I just take it and with few things..."</i>
I2c	Conventional level, Stage 3	<i>"... That is one thing also about Philips it is more or less like a family although I started with them as a meaning organisation when it wasn't as large as this so as a thing evolved we know. I said I grew with them so everybody still relates, if there's anything it is not personal maybe it's on-the-job maybe you're not doing what you're supposed to do."</i> <i>"We have standard of practice that we are giving to use. if you climb the ladder you have the SOP well, it is something that is given but is not as if we... we know that this is how we do things like if you want to do a meeting like a meeting with the doctors were called clinical meetings, this is how you go about it for it to be okay that's standard... But it is not something that is... we know it."</i>
I2d	Conventional level, Stage 4	<i>"...Every organisation has ways in which they achieve results. We all have core values what we believe in or principles, but all in the name of you want to achieve your targets you compromise some things. One of the things I can actually say is, going through the back door to get some</i>

	<p><i>things done but naturally it is against my faith but because of my job what will I do?"</i></p> <p><i>"...Some of my colleagues sell other company products... you can't question this person because it is the person you have not been paying his expenses for months and you expecting them to cooperate he can't do magic... I will not, I will not. I will only query in areas where I feel that you know they are unfair enough to the company if the company is 80% to 90% fair to you, because these are issues that we also tender to management, please look into this and if management is not actually doing anything about it I don't know how you expect... if you cannot get hundred per cent from all these guys, if with this poor response of the company they still give you 60% 70% or 80% of your target I think they are on track. So I put all these into consideration, so for reasons like that I don't report such things..."</i></p>
--	---

Source: Fieldwork

APPENDIX 1.3: CMR Profile of Participants in the Nigerian Case group

Participant	CMR level	Quote
N1a	Conventional level, Stage 4	<i>"Haven worked in other organisations, here is quite different, they are unique in the way to do things, they make you to believe in yourself there are so many of is that you know cannot defend what do no but here I can tell you if you work here, if you know you will be able to defend it any time so here is a place that enables you to... they are very open, you feel challenged, you challenge yourself doing things. If you leave N1 you want half year working in any other organisation because they will groom you to. The culture here is such that you are close to the management, and directors you talk to them, you eat together so that fear is not there but at the same time be expected to do your job. Here they don't play with quality"</i>
N1b	Post Conventional level, Stage 6	<i>"I think basically, the values I hold in high esteem is a pure reflection of my religion and my religion tells me that my own motto, the motto I have, let me start from there – do good to everyone and always be a better person in every situation"</i> <i>"I come from a family that holds up to very high morals so on my job, I would not lower the standards of what should be obtainable at my desk so I ensure that everything that emanates from my desk is authentic, valid and I come back it up with documents and I think that speaks for every department in this organisation."</i>
N1c	Post Conventional Level 5	<i>for me, my values also relate somehow with where I'm working. like I said, I want to stand out, I want to be known, I also strive for excellence. many thing I lay my hands to do I don't mind if it takes me time, I wanted that when am giving it out, what is being signed is something of quality, it is something to reckon with. I do my job excellently well with little or minimal fault you understand so that it can pass across and so I can say yes this is good work, I look out for details because also I am an organised person when it comes to doing something in an organised way, I want to make sure that it is well done...</i>

		<p><i>in anything my name is been mentioned, I want to make sure that my name is being measured for good not for something that's not good so I will not in any way mingle or interact with anything that I know will soil my name. also believe in the same that whatever you do today is subject to judgement in the future so we always see if lie today, you will need to all more lies to cover for the life that you have said, I try as much as possible to be plain in what I'm doing. when I say yes to something, that yes is yes, if I go out maybe I'm not here now, you are with somebody else and you put up the speakerphone, yes I said to you whilst we were together is still the same when I am not around for you to say this is the person that signed this, you will look at it as they are you sure so I look out and strive to have a very good integrity in the institution I find myself.</i></p>
N1d	Conventional Level, Stage 4	<p><i>“They say we’re product of the environment, what we see and what we hear but I came from a background where discipline is instilled. I must confess that, my father is a retired military officer who never joked with discipline, I told him daddy thank you in 2008 for those disciplines because it is now back and actually see the essence of those discipline”</i></p> <p><i>“The MD said some words that he never knew we're going to play big on me, I picked them and actually applied them and I found out that their principles that you find in men were actually aspiring to be great and whilst in that I mentioned some of those words and he was like wow and me I was only doing my presentation to the whole management team of Fidson, I ended up being applauded like we have you been all this while and someone said I did fantastic and I thought I was only doing my stuff because they said they have always seen me as someone who is not serious or someone who is not up to to the game you know that's trying to erase shallow picking in what you do”</i></p>
N1e	Conventional Level, Stage 4	<p><i>When I am asked to lie that my boss in not around because he wants to avoid a particular person, it kills you. because you begin to have a disconnect with your personal values and What you are made to do your job and if you're a very emotional person by person that takes things seriously it can actually begin to affect you. fortunately for me a gain I don't have to do that.</i></p>

N1f	Post Conventional, Stage 5	<p><i>Integrity something personal, you understand, I might have integrity... my level of integrity might be different it is relative so me as an auditor my own level of integrity might enter the higher than somebody in another department because is not really involved in the review aspect of things because I has an auditor have to review whatever any department or unit has done, I have two review and all of that so my own level of integrity I think should be a little higher than others, because they have to ensure that things are being done the right way. I think basically that is how I perceive it.</i></p> <p><i>they have values, but people's individual values might not agree with the company's core values. the company might it okay this is what you should do but at the individual level people may not actually comply with those things and you having a higher standard reasoning maybe because of the experience in that area, professional competence and all of that you find that it is difficult for you to make them understand why things should be done the way things should be done. that's my job.</i></p>
N1g	Post-Conventional, Stage 5	Mention rotary club etc
N1h	Conventional Level, Stage 4	<p><i>“There is this free mindedness here... Firm N1 is an environment whereby you're not so scared of anybody even the bosses. I would also use an example of my director who grew me up to have confidence in myself no matter how critical or terrible you are you can stand up and just express this this and this. If you ask any about question my job, I will stand up and tell you this is how it is. I am not easily intimidated, one of my bosses the divisional director groomed me so here everybody's free, we are free with one another you know sometimes in some companies you could go up and say I want to see the MD and they say see the secretary... it is not like that here you walk up to him and say this is what I have, it is a friendly atmosphere, this freedom that is the best in my opinion, the freedom is there, expressing yourself in a well mannered way, not in an abusive way, you are free to express yourself...”</i></p>
N1i	Conventional	

	Level, Stage 4	
N2a	Post conventional, Stage 5	<p><i>It is not that I don't like money but I can't soil my hands because I want to get money. For me it is not worth it, I have a whole career ahead of me and I am building my own brand in the industry so because of...</i></p> <p><i>"...They won't tell you that you can't do things but if you did it to make money, nobody is going to harass you... You can do anything you feel like doing to a large extent... as long as you can justify it and of course you can always have a reason for it. It's unlike the multinationals where you have code of ethics, you can't do this, they do the anti-corruption law every time... But whilst you are here there is really no code of ethics as long as you can justify it.</i></p>
N2b	Pre- Conventional Level 2	<p><i>"I enjoy selling and the figures are coming in. I calculate what I will make from transactions and I have had to give the money because there was a condition for that if you can do this we get this. So I don't have to start calling the office again. You know at times you need to get back to the office mostly because of the price issue but this particular incident there was already a provision because I've complained that we need to take out something because of the challenge we have and they actually keyed in..."</i></p>
N2c	Pre- Conventional Level 2	<p><i>"We build relationships, we also work on their emotions, and we discover opportunities. You might walk into a customer shop, there are opportunities there which nobody has filled up, not only giving the person the product but there are needs in his business that have not been identified or taken care of you know so discovering does opportunities and in helping the person to meet those needs will also increase his loyalty to your brand. In marketing they call it a war at the front you must do whatever, you use all the strategy that you can ever think of in order to make sure you win"</i></p> <p><i>"My own values, I know that I am a team player and I am also self-motivated even things are not looking well i tend to encourage myself to be on top of my game and to do same for our colleagues also the values of the company, we tried to drive also the core values by maintaining good person relationship with your customers,</i></p>

		<i>making sure that everything that is given to you doesn't diminish rather you grow them, values are there a lot of pains about it which I to bring in the best that we have from our hearts to put in our best to make sure that things are working as it is supposed to."</i>
N2d	Conventional (Stage 4)	<i>"In terms of all that I think at times most of those things are just face values. They are things you just put in place any time you have meetings so one can ask you to recite the core values and all that but the truth is I feel to a very large extent these things are not being practised by me, by whoever, by the managing director, heads of departments and virtually everybody. so, I think people are not... it is more of Just lip service, people don't understand what it is what we see integrity. So easy for us to say integrity, we begin to look at our customers they are not paying but we also giving what we promised, at times what we promised is not just in terms of product. If you tell me we have integrity then if I tell you okay I am going to pay you your incentive on 27 May, you should pay it but it doesn't happen so that means even as a company we have team work is one of our core values but they were almost beating themselves, in fact the level of internal conflicts to me is so high, I am try to do this at times you can seek advice from someone and that is what the person we use against you up there so, everybody is just...(interruption) so in terms of the core values I'm not sure we are doing enough, and that's just a truth"</i>
N2e	Conventional Level Stage 4	<i>"Basically I just think that bureaucracy kills everything here. The steps you have to go through to get anything done it slows everything down just makes it very very boring, it makes a drag so I think it is the bureaucracy that is the problem here. The presence is just to much."</i> <i>"like I said, initially it was if you meet 80% of your target, they would give you a certain percentage but that has never happened and at this point they still argument as to who should do the payment. Basically what they are looking for his meeting your targets."</i>
N2g	Conventional Level Stage 4	<i>"Candour, results which is key, for me...at times no result is a result, you work at something you expect to get figures and the figures are not coming I feel that is a result, it is then left for you to look at that result that you have and ask</i>

	<p><i>yourself why are we getting this result, is there anything in the process that we can work at....”</i></p> <p><i>“My own personal values are say things that it is... it is easy for people to build up expectations and find that it is not possible- it's all much more than that. Say it as it is let's know how it is and how we can tinker about it. don't try to impress yes of course if you work hard it will shall but then if you're playing to the gallery would doubt the works to back it up, you're just wasting people's time and it can be annoying.”</i></p>
--	---

APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE

DECISION MAKING IN DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS

Dear Respondent,

Thank you for taking time to complete this questionnaire. This study explores how different organisational environments enable decision-making. Below are some questions in this regard, kindly answer as truthfully as you can. Where necessary, kindly provide further explanations, as you deem necessary. This will help researchers understand your responses.

CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY: This is an academic work supervised by Drs K. Akrivou and E Fenton, in the University Of Reading, UK. Anonymity and confidentiality have been part of this study's ethical approval clauses in the UK. We treat all responses as **STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL**. Note that you won't be asked for your name. Any personally sensitive details you wish to share will be treated as anonymous information, with a random number assigned to this data. All data will be aggregated to study general patterns. No individual data will be appearing in the end of this study.

Adeyinka Adewale
Researcher

Job Designation:

SECTION 1: ORGANISATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

1. Are there written rules guiding how you respond to issues/ standardised processes on how to do things on your job? **Yes** [] **No** [] *if yes, kindly use the scale below to report how clear and complex the rules are, if no, kindly proceed to question 2*

On this scale, 1 indicates rules are of low clarity/complexity and 7 indicates rules are of high clarity/complexity

CLARITY OF RULES	Scale						
	Low						High
The rules are clear	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
COMPLEXITY OF RULES							
The rules are complex	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

2. Are you allowed freedom of judgement on issues you face while performing your work responsibilities? **Yes** [] **No** []

Kindly explain what is expected of you and to what extent your freedom is encouraged or curtailed. Please give examples of each case (you may please continue overleaf)

1. I have freedom to

2. I have freedom to.....

3. I have freedom to

4. I don't have freedom to

5. I don't have freedom to.....

6. I don't have freedom to

For each item identified below, circle the number to the right that best fits your judgement of its quality where **1 equals Strongly Disagree and 7 equals strongly Agree**
Use the rating scale to select the quality number.

Environmental Features	Scale						
	Neither Agree/Disagree						
1. I am usually expected to do my work strictly following written rules or explicit procedures	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am usually expected to always check with my manager before I take initiative in my work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If a written rule does not cover some situation, I make up our own rules for doing things as I go along	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Management control help me do my job more effectively	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
In my dealings with this company, even quite small matters have to be referred to someone higher up for a final answer	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I can take very little action on my own until it is approved by my superior(s)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
If my boss wants something dropped, I have to drop it	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
There are strong penalties for violating company's procedures of doing things	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rules and procedures make sense	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Rules and procedures make work effective	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
On the whole, this company is more concerned with results than how we get the job done	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Generally this company monitors all the time how I spend my work and effort	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I feel like I am closely monitored to ensure that I comply with company rules	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My manager inspects my work relations closely	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
My job allows me to do only the same things day to day	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I see myself as a specialist at my job	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am not emotionally attached to my work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am not emotionally connected to other people in this organisation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I know the names of many other co-workers around here	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I relate well with many other employees in this organisation to them	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I trust the decisions of my managers	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SECTION 2: ABOUT ME

Imagine you are the person described in the statements 1 -9 below how, kindly rate on the given scale the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement

1 indicates Strongly Disagree and 7 equals strongly Agree

Behavioural Preferences	Scale						
	Neither Agree/Disagree						
2. I love giving a lot to people and charitable causes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I show compassion all the time	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I believe in treating all equally in all my dealings	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
People love hanging around me because I care for them	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I dislike showing concern about the wellbeing of others	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am always of help to those who need my help around me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I believe in hard work	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I tell people things as I feel, even if it will make them feel bad	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I could give my last naira note to another as long as it makes them feel better	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Haven considered statements 1-9 above, kindly rate how you feel about them							
I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I strongly desire to have these characteristics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Having these characteristics is not really important to me	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I often wear clothes that reflect my moral values	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The type of things I do in my spare time clearly identify me as having these characteristics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The kind of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others I have these characteristics	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SECTION 3: DEMOGRAPHICS

Highest level of education achieved:
Age: 18- 25 [<input type="checkbox"/>] 26- 30 [<input type="checkbox"/>] 31 – 35 [<input type="checkbox"/>] 36 – 40 [<input type="checkbox"/>] 41 – 45 [<input type="checkbox"/>] 46 – 50 [<input type="checkbox"/>] 51 – 55 [<input type="checkbox"/>] 56 and above [<input type="checkbox"/>]
Gender: Male [<input type="checkbox"/>] Female [<input type="checkbox"/>]
State of Origin:
Years of Working in this Organisation:
Your rank in this organisation Employee: [<input type="checkbox"/>] Administrator [<input type="checkbox"/>] Supervisor [<input type="checkbox"/>] manager [<input type="checkbox"/>] Senior Management [<input type="checkbox"/>]

Overall working experience (in years):
Any experience of work or study abroad? Yes [] No []
Marital Status:
Spoken Languages

THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS SURVEY

APPENDIX 3: RESEARCH PROCEDURE

Research Procedure

This section details a step-by-step guide to how data was collected and the research conducted. It also highlights some crucial challenges faced by the researcher in the cause of the project and how these were circumvented.

School's ethic committee approval

The initial stages of this study required that appropriate clearance is received from the school's ethics research committee. This is to verify that the research to be conducted will be within the permissive legal jurisdiction of research by the university's standards. Checks were made to ensure participants are not vulnerable persons and that no live human specimens would be taken in the cause of the research. Also that any collected data would be by the consent of the parties after full disclosures have been made to them and that at the end of the research, such evidences will be destroyed. This study met with these and other criteria and was therefore approved.

Selecting Potential Firms

Next, a detailed list of all potential pharmaceutical firms in Lagos, Nigeria was collated using a recent United Nations (UNIDO, 2013) report on the industry. This list was used as a guide in uncovering key players in the industry, a detailed description of the firm's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT Analysis). From this, about 26 firms comprising 20 multinationals and 6 high profile indigenous firms were shortlisted for the research. Of these, the researcher planned to get access to about 6 firms, two each from three different case groups as planned from the research design. The risk of anonymising participating organisations was a critical issue at this stage of the research and as explained in the prior research design section, the researcher ensured that there was an ample number of firm population within each case group from which only two were studied. This ensured data would remain untraceable to any firm in particular thereby achieving the crucial ethic of anonymity. The next challenge was access into these firms.

Gaining access into the organisations

Gaining access to the firms was an on-going process throughout the research. From the initial contacts made to potential participating firms and the scheduled period of the fieldwork was 10 months. Inside these 10 months, only one firm had confirmed access. Access to others was obtained during the fieldwork. The process to gaining access began with the use of company email links provided in the aforementioned UN report. Emails were sent to about 26 potential firms about 10 months prior to the intended period of data collection. Of these, only one firm replied asking for more details on the research and contact of the researcher's supervisors to perform appropriate checks. Afterwards, the management of the firm granted an approval for the research to proceed and promised full cooperation. This was the only firm that granted express approval in writing and also greatly cooperated with the researcher during the research. On another occasion with another firm, permission was denied after series of exchanges between the researcher and a designated HR staff of the organisation. The challenge of access to potential firms and low responses was therefore a major setback in the initial stages of the research. As at the time of heading into the field, only one firm had signalled support and no other save for an internal contact in one of the Indian firms. Upon getting to Nigeria, physical meetings with some of the established contacts had a major impact on access as the researcher was allowed into some firms with the help of these contacts. The researcher also then leveraged the professional networks of these leads to gain access into other firms with huge success. Thus, in five of six firms that took part in this study, no formal approval letter was obtained from the senior management as this had proven to be counterproductive when initially explored as the formal procedure to follow. However, all respondents that took part in this study did so voluntarily and were quite happy to lend their opinion to the research.

Finding potential respondents

The process of finding potential respondents for this study could only begin as soon as the respondent travelled to Lagos, the context of this research. Physically meeting with potential participants was more fruitful within the context than the use of virtual communication since access to some of the firms was through the help of internal leads. Upon gaining access into the firms, the network of internal leads was often the first target for interviews, after which the leads themselves would follow. The

snowball technique of finding participants for the interview proved very effective with each new participant often leading to one or two newer participants for the study. In other instances, the researcher simply approached some of the staff to whom the researcher had been previously informally introduced to, to give an introduction to the research and to request their participation. This yielded some result and a couple of new participants were recruited through this means. The former strategy however was the most potent for the study given that most of the organisations used are closed and often difficult for formal access.

Arranging appointments for interview

After making contact with potential participants, appointments were often fixed over the telephone and the researcher was flexible to the itinerary of the participant. It was for this reason interviews had to be conducted in different places. As a lot of participants were pharmaceutical sales representatives, the nature of their job required constant travel to different parts of Lagos. As such interview times and locations varied quite significantly and would average about two to three daily in most cases. Executing these two or three daily interviews would require hours of driving through notorious traffic and at times travelling very early in the mornings or late in the evenings. For ease in some instances, interviews were pre-arranged to take place in the participant's various places of appointments outside their offices to save time and energy. In such cases, daily interview numbers would usually be on the average of three to four. Also, making room and adjustment for disappointments was an essential skill the researcher had to learn as there were seven different occasions interviews had to be rescheduled after the researcher had travelled to the agreed meeting point only for the participant to disappoint owing to unforeseen circumstances. This was prevalent early in the research and was subsequently controlled by sending reminder text messages to potential participants a day before the appointment and also telephoning them two hours before the agreed time to ensure the appointment was still holding. This method worked in almost all cases, and in cases where participants did not meet initial appointments, rescheduling for the same day was often negotiated but with the researcher having to wait around the agreed location for usually a maximum of 3-4 hours.

Introducing the research to potential participants

Upon meeting up with the potential participant, the researcher introduced the research to the participant as clearly as possible so they could understand the aim of the research. Usually to avoid bias and guide answers the aim of the research project was modified slightly. To balance the need for research ethics but also ensure the avoidance of participant bias once the research content is fully communicated required, participants to read that this research's aim is to understand organizational decision-making effectiveness in different firms in Lagos. Often when this was done, the participant felt less vulnerable and connected with the researcher for both the interviews and survey questionnaire. Also at this stage the ethics of the research and the consent form were read out to them for their signature and approval. A crucial part of the ethics included the protection of the identities of all firms and respondents that took part in the study. As such, a guarantee of anonymity accompanied the consent forms, which often made the interviewee feel a lot safer in asserting their views when questioned with boldness and openness. Since all identities were anonymised, the researcher instead generated and apportioned codes to all interviews and survey data to aid the ease of subsequent use of all gathered data. This standard was also applied to the only firm that granted express approval. The last part of introducing the research to participants included requesting their permission for interviews to be audio recorded, which was granted in all cases except on two occasions in which the researcher was allowed to take notes instead. After explaining these, participants were often asked if they were willing to go ahead with the interviews and questionnaires and in all cases, the response was affirmative. However, there were two cases in which after these explanations were made, the potential participants turned down their involvement in the research on the grounds that there were too busy to make time for the study since average time required was about two hours per participant.

The interviews

The interviews provided the most fascinating experiences during this whole research process. First was the fact that the researcher was meeting participants in almost all cases for the first time and from the first point of contact, a strong positive impression had to be made to win over the participants. This also made a steep learning curve for the researcher. Interview questions were semi-structured, they guided the

researcher's questions initially and as interesting issues emerged from the interviewee's responses, those were further probed. In situations where the interview setting was open and a bit tense, such as on two occasions in the Indian firms, the researcher had to devise sensitive ways of making the interviewee comfortable in order to draw information out of them. This included humour most of the times, nods of affirmation, intermittent sounds of agreement, and eye contact. In all cases, interviewees responded very positively to these such that even when the researcher was promised just 30 minutes of interview, the interviews often lasted for 90 minutes or more at times. In all cases, the researcher always ended the interview on a very bright note especially in cases where very personal examples and incidents had been shared in the course of the interview. Also, as the number of completed interviews increased, the researcher identified potent questions that often drew interviewees to open up on salient issues, which provided much needed insights for the study. These were retained and were strategically introduced at the peak of the interviews, once the interviewee got comfortable with the researcher (Hermanowicz, 2002). Likewise, questions that were not clearly understood or unproductive were carefully taken out of the fold. As these refined sets of questions were deployed in subsequent interviews, quality discussions ensued. All interviews were captured using the iPhone recording application. It was chosen for its handiness and ease of use without making participants feel uncomfortable by any 'professional' looking device akin to making the researcher look like a real journalist. With each interview taking up to one hour and more in most cases, the recording device was always ready and effective in doing the good job.

The questionnaire

All participants in this study were also required to fill out the questionnaire (see Appendix 2) prepared to collect additional information on pertinent features of this study. This was aimed at providing a source for data triangulation at the analysis stage. This survey instrument was three pages long and had three sections; one for the bureaucratic features of the organisation, the second for the moral identity of participants and the last section collected demographic information of participants. In most cases, questionnaires were filled only after the interview had taken place. Only on a few occasions were questionnaires filled in before the interviews were held. Also, due to time constraints, in many cases, the questionnaire had to be left behind

and picked up at a latter date since the interviews had taken a lot of participant's time during working hours. There were slight challenges recovering some of these questionnaires but with persistence, they were all recovered.

Organisation of collected data

Codes were allocated to both audio data and survey questionnaires for ease of matching them together at the analysis stage. Appropriate back-ups were also made for all collected data in case of accidental data losses or failure of the electronic device.

The following table shows the duration of each stage of this research process:

Table 4.5 – Research process timeline

Activity	Time line
Ethics committee approval	2 weeks
Selecting potential firms	10 months
Gaining Access	12 months
Finding potential participants	8 weeks
Data collection (interviews and survey questionnaires)	10 weeks

APPENDIX 4: PROFESSIONAL ETHICS

The Public Pledge as the ground for professional authority

With the notion of expertise being the sole constituent of professionalism significantly faulted by Koehn, she goes further to argue that for professionals to have moral authority, they must be trustworthy. Trust in this case is the trustor's expectation that the trusted will act to benefit the trustor. She puts forward seven conditions that must be met for professionals to be deemed trustworthy. In this case, the professional is the trusted and the client is the trustor. It follows that:

1. The professional must act only in ways that aim at the client's good to be worthy of the client's trust.
2. The professional must exhibit willingness to act. This is also necessary for trust in the professional –client relationship
3. The willingness to help must be sustained and last for as long as the client needs for help to be rendered to them.
4. Professionals must also be competent to be trustworthy
5. Since it takes two to make help possible, the professional must be able to demand from the client the degree of accountability and discipline necessary for treatment to proceed or a legal case to be developed
6. The professional must have the autonomy or freedom to serve the client's good with discretion in such ways to ensure the best possible service is rendered to the clientele.
7. The professional must have a high sense of responsibility. Since no one can watch over professionals all of the time so the professional must be bound to monitor her own behaviour. (Koehn, 1994:54)

These are not exhaustive but grounding professional authority becomes a matter of showing either that the professional practice is already structured to meet the requirements above or that it can be altered to do so. Professionals are trust worthy as long as their actions conform to what it is to be a professional. The criteria of who qualifies to be a professional vary widely. Five frequently cited traits include:

1. Professionals are licensed by the state to perform a certain act

2. They belong to an organisation of similarly franchised agents who promulgate standards and or ideal behaviour and who discipline one another for breach of these standards
3. They possess esoteric knowledge or skills not shared by other members of the community
4. Exercise autonomy over their work, work which is not well understood by the community
5. Publicly pledge themselves to render assistance to those in need and as a consequence have special responsibilities or duties not incumbent upon others who have not made this pledge

According to Koehn, the first four points are neither necessary nor sufficient but the fifth one is controversial yet defensible. A license does not confer professionalism just as much as having a driver's license does not make one a professional driver. Nor is membership of an organised body a necessary condition for professionalism. Indeed doctors and lawyers belong to such bodies to regulate conduct and practices yet many others do not belong to any professional bodies perhaps because they do not entirely agree with the principles of such bodies. For instance in the case of doctors renouncing their professional membership of the American Medical Association for initiating policies that restrict health care access. Likewise, possessing esoteric skill does not create a moral obligation to help with those sets of skills as have already been argued in the case of experts.

The persons who are universally recognised as professionals are those who do serve clients. Professionals must command the trust of clients who seek a public good. The concept of trust in this relationship is defined as the trustor's expectation that the trustee will exhibit towards him. This is trust and not the perceived power of the professional to manipulate things or people, which bestows moral legitimacy. Therefore Koehn (1994) defines a professional as 'an agent who freely makes a public promise to serve persons (e.g. the sick) who are distinguished by a specific desire for a particular good (e.g. health) and who have come into the presence of the professional with or on the expectation that the professional will promote that particular good' (page 59).

Therefore, agents become professional by virtue of what they publicly profess or proclaim before persons lacking particular goods. Historically, the term profession implies the importance of the public statement of the professional to practice within the community. The word profess is from the Greek word *prophaino* meaning 'to publicly declare' and Latin word *professio*, a term applied to public statement made by persons who sought to occupy a position of trust. In all of these the profession or statement binds the speaker, but not the listener to act to help those needing a particular form of assistance. This is different from a contract, which is binding on two parties, which also must be accepted by both to be binding. In this case, once the utterance has been made, it becomes binding.

Thus, professions use pledge to bind would be helpers to assist parties. These pledges are relatively unconditional and they bind the utterers to serve those who qualify as clients irrespective of clients' ability to pay, their personal traits or the personal liking the professional may feel towards them. As such in the case of a lawyer, when a lawyer pledges to uphold the law as he becomes a practising member of the profession, he swears an oath to help and render his services to those who need it in the context of the law. Hence, the client cannot be reduced to the person upon whom a lawyer decides to bestow service. Rather the client is the person seeking legal justice who has come to the lawyer because of the lawyer's public promise to promote legal justice, which is the good the client desires. This is the nature of professionalism as Koehn argues. It is based on an unwavering commitment based on public pledge to render a service to anyone in need of such service and it is on these grounds that professionals have moral legitimacy and can be trusted.