Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Andow, J. (2016) Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions. Philosophical Psychology, 29 (6). pp. 904-911. ISSN 1465-394X doi: 10.1080/09515089.2016.1168794

Abstract/Summary

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have a unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/51203
Identification Number/DOI	10.1080/09515089.2016.1168794
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
Publisher	Taylor & Francis
Download/View statistics	View download statistics for this item