Smug alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game

Clot, S. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4964-825X, Grolleau, G. and Ibanez, L. (2014) Smug alert! Exploring self-licensing behaviour in a cheating game. Economics Letters, 123 (2). pp. 191-194. ISSN 0165-1765 doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.039

Abstract/Summary

We test experimentally a prediction of the ‘moral credit model’, in which committing a virtuous act creates moral credits that can license immoral behavior in a succeeding decision. We use a basic cheating experiment that was either preceded by a virtuous deed or not in a developing country context. We found that people who previously achieved a good deed cheat more. Gender and origin are also significant explicative variables for cheating.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/47426
Item Type	Article
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher	Elsevier
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