Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

Attanasi, G., Garcia Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Montesano, A. (2015) Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games. Games, 6 (3). pp. 273-298. ISSN 2073-4336 doi: 10.3390/g6030273

Abstract/Summary

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/41934
Identification Number/DOI	10.3390/g6030273
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
Publisher	MDPI
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