Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation

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Contreras-Marin, R., Georgantzis, N. and Gines, M. (2008) Collusion in a Bertrand duopoly model with decreasing returns and product differentiation. Estudios de Economia, 35 (1). pp. 19-31.

Abstract/Summary

We study cartel stability in a differentiated price-setting duopoly with returns to scale. We show that a cartel may be equally stable in the presence of lower differentiation, provided that the decreasing returns parameter is high. In addition we demonstrate that for a given factor of discount, there are technologies that can have decreasing returns to scale where the cartel always is stable independent of the differentiation degree.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/41450
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
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Date Deposited:	03 Dec 2015 10:18	Date item deposited into CentAUR
Last Modified:	10 Jul 2021 21:48	Date item last modified

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