Tomlin, P. (2015) Should retributivists prefer pre-punishment? Social Theory and Practice, 41 (2). pp. 275-285. ISSN 0037-802X doi: 10.5840/soctheorpract201541215
Abstract/Summary
Some philosophers believe that we can, in theory, justifiably pre-punish people – that is, punish them for a crime before they have committed that crime. In particular, it has been claimed that retributivists ought (in principle) to accept pre-punishment. The question of whether pre-punishment can be justified has sparked an interesting and growing philosophical debate. In this paper I look at a slightly different question: whether retributivists who accept that pre-punishment can be justified should prefer (ordinary) post-punishment or pre-punishment, or see them (in principle) as on a par. The answer is complex: asking this question brings to light unrecognised distinctions within both retributivism and pre-punishment, giving us four different answers to the question, depending on what kind of retributivism and what kind of pre-punishment are combined. Surprisingly, given that it is usually presented as a second best, to be pursued only when post-punishment is unavailable, some combinations will find pre-punishment preferable.
Altmetric Badge
| Item Type | Article |
| URI | https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/38660 |
| Identification Number/DOI | 10.5840/soctheorpract201541215 |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Divisions | Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations |
| Publisher | Florida State University Department of Philosophy |
| Download/View statistics | View download statistics for this item |
Downloads
Downloads per month over past year
University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record
Download
Download