Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision

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Bardsley, N. and Sausbrueber, R. (2005) Conformism and reciprocity in public good provision. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26 (5). pp. 664-681. ISSN 0167-4870 doi: 10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001

Abstract/Summary

People contribute more to experimental public goods the more others contribute, a tendency called “crowding-in.” We propose a novel experimental design to distinguish two possible causes of crowding-in: reciprocity, the usual explanation, and conformity, a neglected alternative. Subjects are given the opportunity to react to contributions of a payoff-irrelevant group, in addition to their own group. We find evidence of conformity, accounting for roughly 1/3 of crowding-in.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/33360
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.joep.2005.02.001
Refereed Yes
Divisions No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Department of Agri-Food Economics & Marketing
Publisher Elsevier
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