Tax principles, product differentiation and the nature of competition

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Hashimzade, N., Khodavaisi, H. and Myles, G. D. (2005) Tax principles, product differentiation and the nature of competition. International Tax and Public Finance, 12 (6). pp. 695-712. ISSN 1573-6970 doi: 10.1007/s10797-005-0411-1

Abstract/Summary

We analyze the choice between the origin and destination principles of taxation when there is product differentiation and Bertrand competition. If taxes are redistributed to consumers and demand is linear the origin principle dominates the destination principle whatever the degree of product differentiation and extent of economic integration. With nonlinear demand the origin principle dominates if there is sufficient economic integration. When the social value assigned to tax revenue is higher than the private value, the destination principle dominates for intermediate values of product differentiation and economic integration. The same results are also shown to hold with Cournot competition.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/30524
Identification Number/DOI 10.1007/s10797-005-0411-1
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher Springer
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