Deal size, acquisition premia and shareholder gains

Full text not archived in this repository.

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Alexandridis, G., Fuller, K., Terhaar, L. and Travlos, N. (2013) Deal size, acquisition premia and shareholder gains. Journal of Corporate Finance, 20. pp. 1-13. ISSN 0929-1199 doi: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.10.006

Abstract/Summary

This study examines the contradictory predictions regarding the association between the premium paid in acquisitions and deal size. We document a robust negative relation between offer premia and target size, indicating that acquirers tend to pay less for large firms, not more. We also find that the overpayment potential is lower in acquisitions of large targets. Yet, they still destroy more value for acquirers around deal announcements, implying that target size may proxy, among others, for the unobserved complexity inherent in large deals. We provide evidence in favor of this interpretation.

Altmetric Badge

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/29004
Identification Number/DOI 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.10.006
Refereed Yes
Divisions Henley Business School > Finance and Accounting
Publisher Elsevier
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Search Google Scholar