Can I be a luck egalitarian and a Rawlsian?

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Tomlin, P. (2012) Can I be a luck egalitarian and a Rawlsian? Ethical Perspectives, 19 (3). pp. 371-397. ISSN 1370-0049 doi: 10.2143/EP.19.3.2172296

Abstract/Summary

Luck egalitarianism and Rawlsianism have been presented as competing answers to the same question: the question of distributive justice. In this paper, I show how they are in fact not different theories of the same thing, but rather different theories of different things - different answers to different questions. I trace the history of luck egalitarian thinking and try to show why Rawlsianism and luck egalitarianism were taken to be the same kind of project. I then examine different ways that one could consistently endorse (some version of) luck egalitarianism and (some version of/elements of) Rawls' theory.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/26298
Identification Number/DOI 10.2143/EP.19.3.2172296
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
Publisher Peeters
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