Distributive politics and asymmetric participation

Kerler, P. and Araújo Silva, V. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5392-5646 (2025) Distributive politics and asymmetric participation. Journal of Theoretical Politics. ISSN 1460-3667 doi: 10.1177/09516298241312347

Abstract/Summary

How do distributive politics affect participation under incomplete information? We theorize a novel mechanism that we call asymmetric participation, which explains participation as a self-selection process induced by a broadly targeted welfare benefit. Incomplete information about the de facto allocation of benefits causes asymmetric participation. When citizens expect particularistic distribution and access to the benefit depends on voter registration, supporters of the incumbent, who supplies the benefit, self-select into the electorate. This creates an incumbency advantage. We illustrate this argument using the case of the Renda Básica de Cidadania (RBC) in Maricá, Brazil, the largest unconditional cash transfer program in Latin America. Based on qualitative evidence, we develop a formal model, which we test against novel survey data. We find that under the de facto procedure of implementation, supporters of the incumbent supplying the RBC, self-select into the electorate, and engage more in activities that signal party loyalty.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/120440
Identification Number/DOI	10.1177/09516298241312347
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Politics and International Relations
Publisher	Sage
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