The Google dilemma: as hyper-profits generation continues apace, the EU Commission’s enforcement approach fails to deter Google from engaging in exclusionary multi-market anti-competitive activities

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Dermot, C. and Wang, J. orcid id iconORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9180-7525 (2024) The Google dilemma: as hyper-profits generation continues apace, the EU Commission’s enforcement approach fails to deter Google from engaging in exclusionary multi-market anti-competitive activities. European Competition Journal. ISSN 1757-8396 doi: 10.1080/17441056.2024.2440223

Abstract/Summary

Recently designated as an EU Digital Markets Act “gatekeeper”, this article examines Google’s history of engaging in exclusionary anti-competitive practices in Europe, leveraging its dominance from one online market to another, adversely affecting consumers and competition along the way, and raises the question whether current fining levels are a sufficient deterrent to large online platforms who generate hundreds of billions of dollars every year.

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Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/119556
Identification Number/DOI 10.1080/17441056.2024.2440223
Refereed Yes
Divisions Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Law
Publisher Taylor & Francis
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