Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality

Bach, C. W. and Perea, A. (2020) Generalized Nash equilibrium without common belief in rationality. Economics Letters, 186. 108526. ISSN 1873-7374 doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526

Abstract/Summary

We provide an existence result for the solution concept of generalized Nash equilibrium, which can be viewed as the direct incomplete information analogue of Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, a tuple consisting of a probability measure for every player on his choices and utility functions is a generalized Nash equilibrium, whenever some mutual optimality property is satisfied. This incomplete information solution concept is then epistemically characterized in a way that common belief in rationality is neither used nor implied. For the special case of complete information, an epistemic characterization of Nash equilibrium ensues as a corollary.

Item Type	Article
URI	https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/118762
Identification Number/DOI	10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108526
Refereed	Yes
Divisions	No Reading authors. Back catalogue items Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher	Elsevier
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