Limit-agreeing to disagree

Full text not archived in this repository.

Please see our End User Agreement.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

Add to AnyAdd to TwitterAdd to FacebookAdd to LinkedinAdd to PinterestAdd to Email

Bach, C. W. and Cabessa, J. (2017) Limit-agreeing to disagree. Journal of Logic and Computation, 27 (4). pp. 1169-1187. ISSN 1465-363X doi: 10.1093/logcom/exv082

Abstract/Summary

We reconsider Aumann' s seminal impossibility theorem that agents cannot agree to disagree in a topologically extended epistemic model. In such a framework, a possibility result on agreeing to disagree actually ensues. More precisely, agents with a common prior belief satisfying limit knowledge instead of common knowledge of their posterior beliefs may have distinct posterior beliefs. Since limit knowledge is defined as the limit of iterated mutual knowledge, agents can thus be said to limit-agree to disagree. Besides, an example is provided in which limit knowledge coincides with Rubinstein's (1989) notion of almost common knowledge, and the agents have almost common knowledge of posteriors yet distinct posterior beliefs. More generally, an epistemic-topological foundation for almost common knowledge is thus provided.

Altmetric Badge

Item Type Article
URI https://reading-clone.eprints-hosting.org/id/eprint/118751
Identification Number/DOI 10.1093/logcom/exv082
Refereed Yes
Divisions No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
Publisher Oxford University Press
Download/View statistics View download statistics for this item

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Search Google Scholar